THE  AMERICAN  NATION 
A  HISTORY 

FROM  ORIGINAL  SOURCES  BY  ASSOCIATED  SCHOLARS 

EDITED  BY 

ALBERT  BUSHNELL  HART,  LL.D 

PROFESSOR   OF  HISTORY  IN   HARVARD   UNIVERSITY 

ADVISED  BY 
VARIOUS  HISTORICAL  SOCIETIES 

IN  27  VOLUMES 
VOL.  18 


THE    AMERICAN    NATION 
A    HISTORY 


LIST  OF  AUTHORS  AND  TITLES 

GROUP  I. 
FOUNDATIONS  OF  THE  NATION 

Vol.  i  European  Background  of  American 
History,  by  Edward  Potts  Chey- 
ney,  A.M.,  Prof.  Hist.  Univ.  of  Pa. 

"  2  Basis  of  American  History,  by 
Livingston  Farrand,  M.D.,  Prof. 
Anthropology  Columbia  Univ. 

"  3  Spainin  America,  by  Edward  Gay- 
lord  Bourne,  Ph.D.,  Prof.  Hist. 
Yale  Univ. 

"  4  England  in  America,  by  Lyon  Gar- 
diner Tyler,  LL.D.,  President 
William  and  Mary  College. 

"  5  Colonial  Self -Government,  by 
Charles  McLean  Andrews,  Ph.D., 
Prof.  Hist.  Bryn  Mawr  College. 

GROUP  II. 
TRANSFORMATION  INTO  A  NATION 

Vol.  6  Provincial  America,  by  Evarts 
Boutell  Greene,  Ph.D.,  Prof.  Hist. 
Illinois  State  Univ. 

"  7  France  in  America,  by  Reuben 
Gold  Thwaites,  LL.D.,  Sec.  Wis- 
consin State  Hist.  Soc. 


Vol.  8  Preliminaries  of  the  Revolution, 
by  George  Elliott  Howard,  Ph.D., 
Prof.  Hist.  Univ.  of  Nebraska. 
"  9  The  American  Revolution,  by 
Claude  Halstead  Van  Tyne.Ph.D., 
Asst.  Prof.  Hist.  Univ.  of  Michi- 
gan. 

1  i  o  The  Confederation  and  the  Consti- 
tution, by  Andrew  Cunningham 
McLaughlin,  A.M.,  Director  Bu- 
reau Hist.  Research  Carnegie  In- 
stitution. 

GROUP  III. 
DEVELOPMENT  OP  THE   NATION 

Vol.  1 1  The  Federalist  System,  by  John 
Spencer  Bassett,  Ph.D.,  Prof. 
Hist.  Trinity  Coll.  (N.  C.). 

'  12  The  Jeffersonian  System,  by  Ed- 
ward Channing,  Ph.D.,  Prof.  Hist. 
Harvard  Univ. 

"  13  Rise  of  American  Nationality,  by 
Kendric  Charles  Babcock,  Ph.D., 
Pres.  Univ.  of  Arizona. 

"  14  Rise  of  the  New  West,  by  Freder- 
ick Jackson  Turner,  Ph.D.,  Prof. 
Am.  Hist.  Univ.  of  Wisconsin. 

'  15  Jacksonian  Democracy,  by  Will- 
iam MacDonald,  LL.D.,  Prof. 
Hist.  Brown  Univ. 

GROUP  IV. 
TRIAL  OP  NATIONALITY 

Vol.  1 6  Slavery  and  Abolition,  by  Albert 
Bushnell  Hart,  LL.D.,  Prof.  Hist. 
Harvard  Univ. 


Vol.  17  Westward  Extension,  by  George 
Pierce  Garrison,  Ph.D.,  Prof. 
Hist.  Univ.  of  Texas. 

"  1 8  Parties  and  Slavery,  by  Theodore 
Clarke  Smith,  Ph.D.,  Prof.  Am. 
Hist.  Williams  College. 

"  19  Causes  of  the  Civil  War,  by  Ad- 
miral French  Ensor  Chadwick, 
U.S.N. 

'  20  The  Appeal  to  Arms,  by  James 
Kendall  Hosmer,  LL.D.,  recent 
Librarian  Minneapolis  Pub.  Lib. 

"  21  Outcome  of  the  Civil  War,  by 
James  Kendall  Hosmer, LL.D.,  re- 
cent Lib.  Minneapolis  Pub.  Lib. 

GROUP  V. 

NATIONAL  EXPANSION 
Vol.  22  Reconstruction,  Political  and  Eco- 
nomic, by  William  Archibald  Dun- 
ning, Ph.D.,  Prof.  Hist,  and  Politi- 
cal Philosophy  Columbia  Univ. 

1  23  National  Development,  by  Edwin 
Erie  Sparks,  A.M.,  Dean  of  Aca- 
demic College,  Univ.  of  Chicago. 

'  24  National  Problems,  by  Davis  R. 
Dewey,  Ph.D.,  Professor  of  Eco- 
nomics, Mass.  Inst.  of  Technology. 
"  25  America  the  World  Power,  by 
John  H.  Latane,  Ph.D.,  Prof. 
Hist.  Washington  and  Lee  Univ. 

'  26  Ideals  of  American  Government, 
by  Albert  Bushnell  Hart,  LL.D., 
Prof.  Hist.  Harvard  Univ. 

'  27  Index  to  the  Series,  by  David 
May  dole  Matteson,  A.M.,  Harvard 
College  Library. 


COMMITTEES  APPOINTED  TO  ADVISE  AND 
CONSULT  WITH  THE  EDITOR 


THE  MASSACHUSETTS  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY 

Charles  Francis  Adams,  LL.D.,  President 
Samuel  A.  Green,  M.D.,  Vice- President 
James  Ford  Rhodes,  LL.D.,  zd  Vice- President 
Edward  Channing,  Ph.D.,  Prof.  History  Harvard 

Univ. 
Worthington  C.  Ford,  Chief  of  Division  of  MSS. 

Library  of  Congress 

THE  WISCONSIN  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY 

Reuben  G.  Thwaites,  LL.D.,  Secretary  and  Super- 
intendent 

Frederick  J.  Turner,  Ph.D.,  Prof,  of  American  His- 
tory Wisconsin  University 

James  D.  Butler,  LL.D.,  formerly  Prof.  Wisconsin 
University 

William  W.  Wight,  President 

Henry  E.  Legler,  Curator 

THE  VIRGINIA  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY 

William  Gordon  McCabe,  Litt.D.,  President 

Lyon  G.  Tyler,  LL.D.,  Pres.  of  William  and  Mary 

College 

Judge  David  C.  Richardson 
J.  A.  C.  Chandler,  Professor  Richmond  College 
Edward  Wilson  James 

THE  TEXAS  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY 

Judge  John  Henninger  Reagan,  President 
George  P.  Garrison,  Ph.D.,  Prof,  of  History  Uni- 
versity of  Texas 
Judge  C.  W.  Raines 
Judge  Zachary  T.  Fullmore 


STEPHEN    A.  DOUGLAS 

From  a  Contemporary  Photograph 


THE  AMERICAN  NATION  :  A  HISTORY 

VOLUME  18 

PARTIES  AND  SLAVERY 

1850-1859 


BY 

THEODORE   CLARKE   SMITH,  PH.D. 

PROFESSOR  OF  AMERICAN   HISTORY   IN  WILLIAMS   COLLEGE 


WITH  MAPS 


NEW   YORK  AND  LONDON 

HARPER   &   BROTHERS    PUBLISHERS 

1906 


Copyright,  1906,  by  HARPER  &  BROTHERS. 

All  rightt  reserved. 
Published  November,  1906. 


CONTENTS 

CHAP.  PAGE 

EDITOR'S  INTRODUCTION xi 

AUTHOR'S  PREFACE xv 

i.       THE  SITUATION  AND  THE  PROBLEM  (1850-1860)  3 

ii.      THE  COMPROMISE  A  FINALITY  (1850-1851)  .     .  14 

in.     POLITICS  WITHOUT  AN  ISSUE  (1851-1853)    .     .  28 

iv.     THE  OLD  LEADERS  AND  THE  NEW  (1850-1860)  40 

v.      THE  ERA  OF  RAILROAD  BUILDING  (1850-1857)  59 
vi.     DIPLOMACY  AND  TROPICAL  EXPANSION   (1850- 

i85S) 75 

vn.    THE  KANSAS-NEBRASKA  BILL  (1853-1854)  .     .  94 

vin.  PARTY  CHAOS  IN  THE  NORTH  (1854)  ....  109 

ix.     POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY  IN  KANSAS  (1854-1856)  121 
x.      THE  FAILURE  OF  THE  KNOW-NOTHING  PARTY 

(1854-1856) 136 

xi.     THE    KANSAS    QUESTION    BEFORE     CONGRESS 

(1856) 149 

xii.   THE  PRESIDENTIAL  ELECTION  (1856)  ....  161 

xin.  THE  PANIC  OF  1857   (1856-1858) 174 

xiv.  THE  SUPREME  COURT  AND  THE  SLAVERY  QUES- 
TION (1850-1860) 190 

xv.    THE  FINAL  STAGE  OF  THE  KANSAS  STRUGGLE 

(1857-1858) 209 

xvi,  THE  TRIUMPH  OF  DOUGLAS  (1858)      ....  223 


x  CONTENTS 

CHAP.  PAGE 

xvii.  THE  IRREPRESSIBLE  CONFLICT  (1858-1859)   .  236 
xvin.  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS  DURING  THE  KANSAS  CON- 
TEST (1855-1860) 249 

xix.    SOCIAL  FERMENT  IN  THE  NORTH  (1850-1860)  263 

xx.      SECTIONALISM  IN  THE  SOUTH  (1850-1860)  .     .  286 

xxi.    CRITICAL  ESSAY  ON  AUTHORITIES 305 

INDEX 325 


MAPS 

THE  UNITED  STATES  (SEPTEMBER,  1850)  (in 

colors) facing  6 

RAILROAD  LINES  IN  ACTUAL  OPERATION 
OCTOBER,  1850  (BASED  ON  TIME-TABLES), 
(in  colors) "  62 

TEST  VOTE  ON  KANSAS-NEBRASKA  BILL  IN 

THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  (1854)  "  106 

CIVIL  WAR  IN  KANSAS  (1854-1858)  ....       "        126 

PARTY  SITUATIONS  SHOWN  BY  ELECTIONS  OF 

1855 "  132 

PRESIDENTIAL  ELECTION  OF  1856  (in  colors)  "  158 
CENTRAL  AMERICA  AND  ISTHMIAN  ROUTES 

(1848-1860) "  246 


EDITOR'S    INTRODUCTION 

THE  period  from  1851  to  1859  is  one  of  transi- 
tion, in  which  the  political  organizations  which 
had  been  dominant  during  the  previous  thirty  years 
were  broken  up,  and  gave  place  to  new  crystalliza- 
tions of  voters ;  and  in  which  also  the  former  political 
ideas  and  issues  were  absorbed  in  the  paramount 
rivalry  of  slavery  and  anti-slavery.  To  bring  out 
the  contrast  between  the  old  parties  and  their  aims 
and  the  new  and  imperious  issues  is  the  object  of 
Professor  Smith's  volume. 

It  was  a  period  of  remarkable  characters  as  well 
as  of  stirring  events;  Clay  and  Webster  are  just 
descending  on  the  horizon ;  Seward,  Chase,  Douglas, 
Jefferson  Davis,  Sumner,  Wade,  come  to  the  front 
as  the  protagonists  in  Congress  and  outside.  The 
abolition  movement,  described  in  Slavery  and  Aboli- 
tion (vol.  XVI.  of  the  series),  gives  place  to  a  broader 
and  ever-widening  anti-slavery  movement,  stirred 
by  the  fugitive  -  slave  cases  and  by  Uncle  Tom's 
Cabin,  but  kept  persistent  by  the  attempts  at  the 
extension  of  slavery  into  the  territories.  The  south- 
ern attitude  towards  slavery  changes  from  the  defen- 
sive to  the  aggressive  assertion  that  slavery  was 


xii  EDITOR'S    INTRODUCTION 

meritorious.  The  conditions  described  by  Garrison 
in  Westward  Extension  (vol.  XVII.  of  this  series), 
are  also  changed :  the  annexation  of  Texas  and  fut- 
ure of  New  Mexico  are  no  longer  disputed ;  and  the 
controversy  shifts  to  Kansas,  and  thus  involves  the 
long-standing  Compromise  of  1820. 

The  book  begins  after  the  passage  of  the  Com- 
promise of  1850,  which  is  described  in  the  previous 
volume,  and  chapters  i.  to  iii.  are  given  to  the 
finality  period  and  to  the  attempt  to  keep  slavery 
out  of  politics.  In  chapter  iv.,  Professor  Smith 
traces  the  appearance  of  the  new  generation  of 
public  men,  who  are  to  remain  in  power  until  after 
the  Civil  War.  Then  come  two  chapters,  v.  and  vi., 
the  first  on  the  internal  development  of  the  country 
by  railroad  building,  the  other  on  the  renewed  at- 
tempts at  external  expansion  by  the  annexation  of 
Cuba.  Chapters  vii.  to  xii.  describe  the  Kansas- 
Nebraska  episode,  its  effect  in  breaking  up  the  old 
parties,  the  attempt  to  make  a  new  issue  through 
the  Native  American  movement,  and  the  final  re- 
sult in  establishing  a  national  anti-slavery  party, 
which  comes  near  electing  its  candidate  in  1856. 
Chapter  xiii.  is  on  the  panic  of  1837  and  its  economic 
results.  Then  follows,  in  chapters  xiv.  and  xv.,  an 
account  of  the  Dred  Scott  decision  and  of  the  re- 
newal of  the  Kansas  struggle  in  the  debate  over 
the  Lecompton  bill,  the  two  chapters  illustrating 
the  last  attempts  to  adjust  the  slavery  controversy 
by  the  federal  judiciary  or  Congress  Chapters  xvi. 


EDITOR'S    INTRODUCTION  xiii 

and  xvii.  describe  the  breach  between  the  northern 
and  southern  democrats.  Then,  after  one  chapter 
(xviii.)  on  Buchanan's  diplomacy,  including  schemes 
of  annexation  of  future  slave-holding  territory,  the 
text  closes  with  two  chapters  on  the  state  of  mind 
in  the  north  and  in  the  south,  especially  with  refer- 
ence to  the  Union. 

The  special  importance  of  the  volume  in  the 
American  Nation  series  is  that  it  shows  the  efforts  to 
prevent  the  crisis  which  finally  resulted  in  Civil 
War,  by  coming  to  an  understanding  as  to  the 
future  of  slavery;  and  that  it  reveals  the  impossi- 
bility of  reconciling  the  rival  habits  of  thought  on 
that  dividing  question. 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE 

IN  the  present  volume  I  have  endeavored  to  show 
how,  in  the  years  between  1850  and  1860,  the 
sectional  divergence  between  free  and  slave  states 
came  to  permeate  law  and  politics,  literature  and 
social  intercourse.  This  result  was  brought  about 
in  spite  of  the  reluctance  of  the  majority  of  the 
northern  and  southern  people  to  admit  any  such 
antagonism,  and  over  the  persistent  opposition  of 
public  leaders  who  exhausted  every  device  to  keep 
political  feeling  amicable  and  unsectional.  If  I  have 
emphasized  any  one  feature  it  is  the  course  of  party 
development,  for  it  was  in  the  field  of  party  man- 
agement and  in  party  struggles  that  the  battles  of 
sectionalism  were  fought  at  this  time,  largely  deter- 
mining the  course  of  executive  action  and  of  legisla- 
tion. The  final  party  catastrophe  which  was  the 
immediate  cause  of  secession  is  left  for  a  later 
volume  in  this  series,  but  the  year  with  which  this 
volume  closes,  1859,  marks  the  virtual  break-down 
of  the  effort  at  non-sectional  politics.  In  the  prep- 
aration of  this  work  I  have  based  my  conclusion 
upon  independent  study  of  the  documentary  sources 
and  other  contemporary  material,  but  in  special 


xvi  AUTHOR'S   PREFACE 

fields  I  have  not  hesitated  to  rely  upon  the  labors 
of  other  investigators,  and  throughout  I  have  con- 
sulted the  larger  historical  works  which  cover  this 
period.  I  wish  to  record  my  special  indebtedness 
to  the  History  of  the  United  States  by  James  Ford 
Rhodes,  upon  whose  scholarly  thoroughness  I  have 
continually  relied  for  assistance  and  guidance. 

THEODORE  CLARKE  SMITH. 


PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY 


PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY 


CHAPTER   I 

THE   SITUATION   AND  THE   PROBLEM 
(1850-1860) 

THE  year  1850  marks  the  end  of  the  first  stage 
of  the  slavery  controversy  in  the  United  States. 
In  1843  a  movement  began  for  expansion  towards 
the  southwest  which  brought  about  the  annexation 
of  Texas  in  1845,  the  war  with  Mexico  from  1846 
to  1848,  and  the  purchase  of  the  great  domain  of 
New  Mexico  and  California.  In  the  course  of  these 
events  it  was  discovered  that  the  majority  of  the 
people  in  the  states  where  slavery  did  not  exist 
were  unwilling  to  see  it  introduced  into  any  of 
the  newly  acquired  territory.  They  demanded,  ac- 
cordingly, from  Congress,  the  passage  of  laws  ex- 
pressly prohibiting  involuntary  servitude  in  the 
new  lands,  asserting  this  to  be  the  traditional  policy 
of  the  country,  as  illustrated  in  the  Northwest 
Ordinance  and  the  Missouri  Compromise.  This 
sentiment  of  the  free  states  regarding  slavery  was 


4  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1789 

to  a  large  degree  the  result  of  an  agitation  for  its 
abolition  which  had  been  active  for  a  score  of 
years  without  any  positive  results,  until  the  north- 
ern feeling  against  slavery  extension  revealed  that 
numbers  of  people  who  strongly  disavowed  any 
sympathy  with  abolitionists,  properly  so  -  called, 
had,  nevertheless,  been  brought  to  dislike  slavery 
as  an  indirect  consequence  of  the  abolitionists'  in- 
cessant denunciation  of  the  institution.1 

On  the  other  hand,  it  became  evident  that  the 
people  of  the  southern  states  regarded  the  existence 
of  slavery  in  the  new  territories  as  vital  to  their 
interests.  They  maintained  that,  from  the  start, 
it  had  been  the  policy  of  the  country  to  leave  south- 
ern territory  open  to  slavery,  the  proof  being  the 
absence  of  any  restrictions  upon  the  territories  south 
of  the  Ohio  at  the  time  of  the  Northwest  Ordinance, 
upon  Florida  or  upon  the  Louisiana  cession  south 
of  the  Missouri  Compromise  line.  In  opposition  to 
the  proposal  to  exclude  slavery  from  all  the  new 
regions,  they  demanded  either  the  admission  of 
slaves  everywhere,  or  at  least  the  division  of  New 
Mexico  and  California  by  a  continuation  of  the 
Missouri  Compromise  line,  prohibiting  slavery  to  the 
north  of  it  (as  in  the  Louisiana  territory)  but  per- 
mitting it  to  the  southward.2  They  considered  the 


1  Cf .    Garrison,    Westward  Extension    (Am.    Nation,   XVII.), 
chap,  xviii. 

2  Cf .  Turner,  New  West,  chap.  x. ;     Hart,  Slavery  and  Abolition, 
chap.  xxi.  (Am.  Nation,  XIV.,  XVI.) 


1850]  SITUATION   AND   PROBLEM  5 

northern  attitude  an  outgrowth  of  ignorance,  big- 
otry, and  unfairness,  due  to  the  abolitionist  propa- 
ganda, and,  regarding  themselves  as  the  aggrieved 
party — since  the  expansion  movement  was  from  the 
start  a  southern  one — freely  threatened  to  dissolve 
the  Union  in  case  their  equality  in  the  territories 
was  not  conceded. 

As  soon  as  the  consideration  of  territorial  organ- 
ization began  in  Congress,  it  was  found  that  the 
House,  in  which  the  superiority  of  the  north  in 
population  gave  an  antislavery  majority,  was  bal- 
anced by  the  Senate,  in  which  the  number  of  mem- 
bers from  free  and  slave  states  was  equal.  The 
"Wilmot  Proviso,"  as  the  clause  excluding  slavery 
from  the  territories  was  called  from  its  original 
mover,  repeatedly  passed  the  House,  from  1846  to 
1849,  only  to  fail  in  the  Senate;  on  the  other  hand, 
the  extension  of  the  Missouri  Compromise  line, 
which  the  Senate  stood  ready  to  adopt,  was  never 
favored  by  the  House.  Congress  could  not  agree 
upon  any  form  of  organization  for  the  territories, 
owing  to  this  sectional  issue,  and  popular  excite- 
ment increased  in  intensity  as  year  after  year 
elapsed  and  no  decision  was  reached.1 

During  this  controversy,  however,  there  existed  a 
powerful  influence  which  prevented  the  sectional 
antagonism  from  showing  itself  in  undisguised  form. 
Two  political  parties,  the  Democratic  and  Whig, 
stood  in  the  years  from  1840  to  1850  as  parts  of  the 

1  Garrison,  Westward  Extension  (Am.  Nation,  XVII.) ,  chap.  xvi. 


6  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1844 

accepted  institutions  of  the  country,  singularly  deep- 
rooted,  thoroughly  organized  in  every  part  of  the 
Union,  and  not  dependent  upon  casual  issues  for 
their  existence.  Led  by  keen  politicians,  their  chief 
function  was  to  carry  elections  and  fill  offices. 
Around  their  nominations,  platforms,  and  campaign 
methods  there  had  grown  up  a  body  of  tradition 
hardening  into  immovable  custom;  and  the  sense 
of  party  loyalty  among  the  voters  had  developed 
into  an  unquestioning  faith  and  acceptance  of  the 
duty  of  supporting  the  "regular  ticket"  and  the 
"usages  of  the  party.'* 

Principles  which  were  supposed  to  divide  Demo- 
crat from  Whig  were  not  always  easy  to  discover, 
since  the  real  basis  of  the  organizations  was  social 
and  partisan  and  not  related  to  legislation;  but,  in 
general,  the  Democratic  party  professed  an  adhe- 
rence to  states'  rights  and  a  tendency  to  restrict  the 
powers  of  the  central  government ;  while  the  Whigs 
inherited  to  some  degree  the  more  liberal  govern- 
mental views  of  the  Federalists,  whose  semi-aristo- 
cratic attitude  they  also  shared.  On  all  issues  of 
the  day  it  was  practicable  and  often  necessary  for 
the  parties  to  avoid  taking  definite  action,  since  it 
was  seldom  that  their  membership  was  sufficiently 
united  upon  any  federal  policy  to  make  it  safe 
to  enforce  party  discipline  in  a  merely  legislative 
question.  The  main  desideratum  was  always  party 
unity  in  elections;  and  while  the  widest  divergence 
in  voting  in  Congress  was  compatible  with  party 


PART 
IMMAN   C 


THE   UNITED   STATES 

SEPTEMBER,  1850 

SCALE  OF  MILES 


Slavery  prohibited  by  State  Law 
Slavery  prohibited  by  Federal  Law 
Slavery  maintained  by  State  Law 
Slavery  permitted  by  Federal  Action 


105  Longitude          100 


1850]  SITUATION   AND   PROBLEM  7 

membership,    no    deviation    at    election    time   was 
tolerated,  except  in  rare  cases. 

Towards  the  new  slavery  issue,  the  attitude  of 
the  two  parties  was  strictly  limited  by  the  opinions 
of  the  leaders  as  to  how  far  it  was  safe  for  campaign 
purposes  to  take  ground  for  or  against  any  measure. 
In  1844  the  Democratic  party  declared  for  the  an- 
nexation of  Texas,  but  the  Whig  platform  carefully 
avoided  the  subject,  for  fear  of  cooling  the  zeal  of 
proslavery  southerners  or  of  antislavery  northern 
members.  As  soon  as  the  sectional  divergence  be- 
came apparent  in  Congress,  the  local  party  organiza- 
tions fell  in  with  the  sentiment  of  their  sections, 
demanding  exclusion  or  admission  of  slavery  as  the 
case  required;  but  this  apparent  sectional  division 
disappeared  in  the  presidential  campaign  of  1848, 
when  each  party,  by  the  simple  expedient  of  refus- 
ing to  take  any  attitude  whatever  on  the  problem 
of  slavery  in  the  new  territories,  was  able  to  face 
both  ways  and  retain  its  constituency.1  Through- 
out the  period,  however,  there  was  visible  a  tendency 
on  the  part  of  the  party  leaders,  both  in  the  federal 
executive  and  in  Congress,  to  favor  conciliating  the 
south  as  far  as  was  feasible  without  danger  of  alien- 
ating the  north,  since  the  possibility  of  southern 
disunion  was  always  alarming.  This  attitude,  and 
the  absence  of  any  definite  party  principles  on  the 
issue  of  the  extension  of  slavery,  led  the  more  radical 

1  Cf.  Garrison,  Westward  Extension  (Am.  Nation,  XVII.) , 
chap.  xvii. 


VOL.  XVIII. —  2 


8  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1845 

antislavery  politicians  to  attempt  the  formation  of 
a  new  northern  party  at  Buffalo,  in  1848,  but  the 
Free  Soil  organization  succeeded  only  in  drawing 
enough  votes  in  the  state  of  New  York  from  Cass, 
the  Democratic  candidate,  to  secure  the  election  of 
his  rival,  General  Taylor.  The  election  decided 
nothing  and  the  situation  remained  critical. 

In  the  session  of  Congress  beginning  December, 
1849,  and  lasting  to  October,  1850,  the  moderate 
leaders  of  both  parties — Clay,  Webster,  Cass,  Doug- 
las, and  others — united  to  advocate,  and,  after  a  bit- 
ter struggle,  to  carry  through,  a  series  of  acts  intend- 
ed to  establish  a  permanent  adjustment  between  the 
sections.  This  arrangement  included  three  minor 
propositions  as  make-weights:  the  abolition  of  the 
slave-trade  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  to  satisfy 
antislavery  sentiment;  a  more  stringent  fugitive- 
slave  law,  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  slave-owners; 
and  the  payment  of  a  sum  of  ten  millions  in  return 
for  the  relinquishment  by  Texas  of  territorial  claims 
over  part  of  New  Mexico.  The  most  important  acts 
were  three:  one  admitted  California,  where  the  dis- 
covery of  gold  had  already  drawn  a  considerable 
population,  as  a  free  state  covering  the  entire  Pacific 
coast  -  line  between  Oregon  and  Mexico ;  the  other 
two  organized  Utah  and  New  Mexico  as  territories 
without  prohibiting  slavery,  under  the  so-called 
"principle  of  Congressional  non-interference."  The 
final  determination  as  to  slavery  was  left  to  the 
inhabitants  at  the  time  when  they  should  draught  a 


1850]  SITUATION   AND   PROBLEM  9 

constitution  and  apply  for  admission  as  a  state. 
During  the  long  congressional  struggle  over  this 
compromise,  the  south  resounded  with  threats  of 
secession,  and  a  convention  of  delegates  of  the  slave 
states  met  at  Nashville  to  take  preliminary  steps  for 
uniting  the  section  in  case  its  rights  were  not  recog- 
nized. The  state  of  Texas  threatened  to  assert  its 
claims  in  the  region  of  New  Mexico  by  force,  and 
President  Taylor  was  preparing  to  maintain  the  au- 
thority of  the  United  States,  at  the  risk  of  civil  war, 
when  a  sudden  illness  caused  his  death  and  the  acces- 
sion of  Fillmore,  a  less  pugnacious  man,  to  the  presi- 
dency. All  felt  that  the  country  had  been  saved 
from  a  dangerous  crisis  by  the  leadership  of  Clay 
and  his  colleagues.1 

With  the  passage  of  these  compromise  laws,  every 
part  of  the  public  territories  of  the  United  States 
received  some  sort  of  regulation  as  regarded  slavery. 
Except  the  Indian  reservation,  all  of  the  old  Louis- 
iana purchase  which  still  remained  in  the  territorial 
state  was  closed  to  slavery  by  the  Missouri  Com- 
promise, which  in  1845  had  been  extended  also 
over  a  small  part  of  Texas.  The  Oregon  territory 
was  closed  by  an  organizing  act  of  1848.  All  that 
was  left  open  to  slave-holders  was  the  large  but  arid 
domain  of  Utah  and  New  Mexico,  clearly  unsuited 
to  any  industry  hitherto  carried  on  in  the  United 
States  by  slave  labor.  It  seemed  as  though,  there 
was  no  further  opportunity  for  sectional  contro- 

1  Garrison,  Westward  Extension  (Am.  Nation,  XVII.) ,  chap.  xix. 


io  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

versy  over  the  slavery  issue,  provided  that  the  exist- 
ing conditions  remained  unaltered. 

From  1850  to  1860  the  problem  for  the  political 
leaders  of  the  United  States  was  that  of  guiding 
public  affairs  in  such  a  way  that  neither  section  of 
the  country  should  again  feel  that  its  interests  were 
endangered.  It  was  obvious  that  the  chief  danger  to 
this  programme  was  to  be  feared  from  the  southern 
extremists ;  for,  whatever  might  be  the  legal  or  po- 
litical rights  of  the  south,  the  slave-holding  com- 
munities, as  Calhoun  had  been  pointing  out  for  a 
generation,  were  on  the  defensive  and  were  in  the 
minority.  There  was  no  northern  institution  which 
was  really  endangered  by  the  south,  no  northern  in- 
terest menaced  by  southern  reprobation.  Slavery, 
on  the  contrary,  was  the  object  of  attack  by  north- 
ern public  opinion ;  and  if  the  north  should,  as  a  unit, 
decide  to  exclude  slavery  from  the  federal  domain 
or  to  use  the  powers  of  the  federal  government  to 
discourage  the  institution,  its  superiority  of  num- 
bers would  enable  it  to  carry  out  the  purpose.  With 
this  situation  clearly  before  them,  southern  extre- 
mists formed  a  far  larger  proportion  of  the  local  pop- 
ulation than  did  abolitionists  in  the  north,  and  were 
held  in  far  higher  respect  at  home  and  greater  awe 
in  the  councils  at  Washington.  They  proclaimed 
a  visible  danger.  Accordingly,  all  the  conservative 
leaders  of  both  sections  regarded  the  south  as  the 
political  element  of  the  country  to  be  placated,  and 
exercised  their  influence  in  executive,  legislative,  and 


i86o]  SITUATION   AND   PROBLEM  n 

judicial  office  upon  that  assumption.  With  the 
older  generation,  as  sectional  dangers  thickened,  this 
feeling  grew  to  be  the  sole  effective  political  aim, 
until  the  last  years  of  such  a  man  as  Webster  were 
devoted  to  the  one  object  of  inducing  his  section  to 
cease  criticising  the  south,  for  fear  of  endangering 
the  safety  of  the  federal  Union ;  and  the  entire 
energy  of  such  a  president  as  Pierce  or  Buchan- 
an was  expended  in  trying  to  satisfy  southern 
desires. 

The  powerful  assistance  of  the  existing  parties  in 
carrying  out  this  plan  was  clearly  recognized,  and 
from  1850  to  1860  the  possibility  of  keeping  the 
south  contented  was  seen  to  rest  largely  upon  the 
preservation  of  these  organizations  in  their  nation- 
al, non-sectional  condition.  So  long  as  Whig  and 
Democratic  parties  drew  support  from  all  parts  of 
the  country  it  was  not  possible  for  a  sectional  presi- 
dent or  a  sectional  Congress  to  be  elected.  But  it 
was  seen  that  the  free  states,  if  a  sectional  northern 
party  were  formed,  could  through  their  superior 
population  elect  an  antislavery  president  and  Con- 
gress, a  result  which  would  inevitably  precipitate 
disunion;  so  that  the  one  great  political  danger 
dreaded  by  conservatives  and  by  the  older  party 
leaders  was  the  disturbance  of  the  existing  party 
loyalty  and  the  rise  of  either  a  northern  or  a  south- 
ern sectional  party.  The  practical  problem  in  1850 
was,  then,  to  preserve  the  old  Whig  and  Democratic 
traditions,  and  to  resume,  if  possible,  the  compara- 


12  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

tively  innocuous  party  contests  of  the  years  before 
1848. 

The  only  source  of  possible  friction  lay  in  the 
chance  that  the  southern  people  might  again  at- 
tempt tropical  annexations,  an  event  which,  in  1850, 
seemed  by  no  means  unlikely.  Should  the  acquisi- 
tion of  Cuba,  the  goal  of  southern  desires,  be  seri- 
ously sought,  the  question  of  the  addition  of  slave 
territory  would  lift  its  head,  and  might  again  arouse 
the  north  to  sectional  action;  hence  any  attempt 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to  enter  this  field 
must  be  made  with  caution.  Other  points  where 
the  federal  government  must  continue  to  touch 
slavery  might  prove  annoying,  but  could  hardly  be 
dangerous.  The  new  fugitive-slave  law  involved  no 
striking  novelty,  and  the  diplomacy  of  slavery,  re- 
lating to  the  slave-trade  and  shipwrecked  or  mu- 
tinous negroes,  was  not  sufficiently  important  to 
arouse  sectional  antagonism. 

Now  that  the  slavery  question  had  received  some 
sort  of  adjustment,  it  remained  to  be  seen  whether 
the  country  would  acquiesce  'and  let  the  old  parties 
resume  their  customary  electoral  contests,  and  con- 
cern themselves  with  those  problems  of  internal  gov- 
ernment with  which  their  earlier  days  had  been 
taken  up — such  as  the  currency,  the  tariff,  the  pub- 
lic lands.  The  administration  in  power  was  that  of 
Millard  Fillmore,  a  conservative  Whig,  thoroughly 
committed  to  the  compromise  measures  which,  as 
president,  he  had  signed.  His  cabinet,  newly  formed 


1850]  SITUATION   AND   PROBLEM  13 

in  the  summer  of  1850,  was  equally  determined  to 
adhere  to  sectional  harmony,  from  Webster,  the 
secretary  of  state,  and  Corwin,  secretary  of  the 
treasury,  to  Crittenden,  of  Kentucky,  the  attorney- 
general.  The  era  of  compromise  opened  with  its 
friends  in  power  in  all  parts  of  the  federal  govern- 
ment. 


CHAPTER   II 

THE   COMPROMISE   A  FINALITY 
(1850-1851) 

THE  three  years  following  the  passage  of  Henry 
Clay's  compromise  measures  were  marked  by 
the  apparent  triumph,  in  public  opinion  and  in  fed- 
eral and  state  politics,  of  the  belief  that  the  slavery 
issue  between  north  and  south  could  be  permanently 
set  aside.  This  triumph  was  foreshadowed,  during 
the  spring  and  summer  of  1850,  by  a  rising  demand 
for  sectional  peace,  which  aided  Clay  and  his  follow- 
ers to  carry  out  their  programme.  By  the  time  that 
Congress  adjourned,  in  October,  1850,  the  victory 
seemed  almost  won.  All  that  remained  was  to  se- 
cure definite  ratification  by  press,  pulpit,  party  reso- 
lutions, and  the  election  of  " compromise"  candi- 
dates. To  secure  this  the  antislavery  sentiment  of 
the  north,  embodied  in  the  Free  Soil  movement,  and 
the  still  more  threatening  secessionist  agitation  in 
the  south,  must  be  stamped  out,  and  the  old-time 
political  system  re-established. 

In  the  northern  states  the  problem  of  the  defenders 
of  the  new  compromise  was  to  induce  men  of  anti- 
slavery  tendencies  to  forego  all  further  agitation 


1850]  FINALITY  15 

concerning  slavery,  on  the  ground  that  the  decision 
just  reached  was  equitable;  and  that,  unless  the 
north  accepted  it  as  final,  the  southern  states  might 
be  driven  to  secede.  To  prove  that  the  failure  to 
exclude  slavery  from  Utah  and  New  Mexico  was 
unimportant  was  comparatively  easy ;  but  to  render 
the  fugitive-slave  law  acceptable  seemed  at  first  a 
difficult  task.  For  the  speedy  capture  of  fugitives 
special  federal  commissioners  were  provided,  and 
the  United  States  marshals  and  their  deputies  were 
enjoined  to  aid;  the  procedure  was  simply  proving 
the  identity  of  the  asserted  slave  to  the  satisfaction 
of  the  commissioner  by  ex  parte  evidence,  excluding 
any  testimony  of  the  negro  whose  freedom  was  at 
stake;  the  decision  of  the  commissioner  was  final; 
and  all  good  citizens  were  liable  to  be  called  upon 
to  aid  in  enforcing  the  law  under  heavy  penalties 
for  refusal  or  for  aiding  the  fugitive.  The  commis- 
sioner's fee  was  to  be  ten  dollars  when  he  returned 
a  fugitive  to  slavery,  five  when  he  discharged  him. 
No  part  of  the  law  indicated  any  precautions  against 
the  enslavement  of  actually  free  negroes ;  it  assumed 
that  members  of  that  race  were  normally  slaves  and 
that  their  liberty  was  a  concern  of  the  laws  of  the 
slave  states  alone,  subject  only  to  the  check  of  the 
commissioner 's  judgment .  * 

Upon  this  act  was  poured  out  the  anger  of  all 
unreconciled  antislavery  people  in  the  autumn  of 
1850.  Public  meetings  by  the  hundred  were  held  in 

1  U.  S.  Statutes  at  Large,  IX.,  462. 


16  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

all  parts  of  the  free  states  to  denounce  it  as  uncon- 
stitutional, immoral,  unchristian,  and  abhorrent  to 
every  instinct  of  justice  and  religion,  and  to  demand 
its  repeal.  Many  announced  their  purpose  to  dis- 
obey the  act,  often  in  exasperating  language.  "  We 
hereby  declare  our  purpose,"  said  an  Indiana  meet- 
ing, "to  make  it  powerless  in  the  country  by  our 
absolute  refusal  to  obey  its  inhuman  and  diabolical 
provisions."  *  "The  enactment  of  it  is  utterly  null 
and  void,"  declared  a  Syracuse  mass-meeting,  "and 
should  so  ...  be  treated  by  the  people."  2 

Against  this  agitation  such  defenders  of  the  com- 
promise as  Cass,  Dickinson,  and  Douglas,  of  the  Dem- 
ocrats, and  Choate  and  Webster  among  the  Whigs, 
began  a  powerful  counter-movement  for  peace  and 
submission  to  law.  On  their  side  rallied  respectable 
society,  the  clergy,  business  men,  and  all  who  were 
tired  of  wrangles ;  and  they  all  proclaimed  earnestly 
and  repeatedly  that  the  time  had  come  for  an  abso- 
lute cessation  of  antislavery  controversy.  "Union 
meetings"  in  New  York,  Boston,  and  other  cities  ap- 
proved the  compromise  measures  and  demanded  the 
execution  of  the  fugitive-slave  law  in  order  to  save 
the  country.  The  great  meeting  in  New  York  on 
October  30  voted  "the  thanks  of  this  communi- 
ty and  of  the  whole  nation  ...  to  those  eminent 
statesmen  and  patriots,  Clay,  Cass,  Webster,  Fill- 
more,  Dickinson,  Foote,  Houston  and  others,"  re- 

1  Indiana  True  Democrat,  November  8,  1850. 

2  National  Anti-Slavery  Standard,  October  17,  1850. 


1850]  FINALITY  17 

solved  to  sustain  the  fugitive-slave  act  by  all  lawful 
means,  declared  all  further  slavery  agitation  to  be 
dangerous  to  the  Union,  and  pledged  those  present 
not  to  vote  for  any  one  who  favored  it.1 

No  one  was  more  active  nor  more  influential  than 
Webster,  who  devoted  all  the  powers  of  his  eloquence 
in  letters  and  speeches  to  reiterating  the  substance 
of  his  Seventh-of-March  speech,  denouncing  the  aboli- 
tionists, censuring  all  who  did  not  admit  the  binding 
force  of  the  fugitive-slave  law,  and  declaring,  again 
and  again,  "  No  man  is  at  liberty  to  set  up,  or  affect 
to  set  up  his  own  conscience  above  the  law."  2  In 
Chicago  the  city  council,  supported  by  popular  opin- 
ion, passed  a  resolution  requesting  all  citizens  to 
abstain  from  executing  the  obnoxious  act ;  but  Doug- 
las achieved  the  feat  of  bringing  a  hostile  public 
meeting  by  sheer  force  of  oratory  to  adopt  resolu- 
tions for  submission  to  the  law.3 

The  effect  of  this  general  campaign  for  finality  was 
shown  in  the  elections  of  1850 ;  the  crisis  seemed  over, 
and  voters  were  returning  to  the  party  situation 
which  existed  before  1848.  The  Whig  party,  whose 
platforms  were  usually  rather  more  antislavery  than 
those  of  the  Democrats,  lost  ground  in  congressional 
and  state  elections,  the  Barnburners  of  1848  now  re- 
turned to  their  old  ranks,  and  the  Free  Soil  party 
crumbled  into  insignificance.  In  two  states,  how- 

1  N.  Y.  Tribune,  October  31,  1850. 

2  Webster,  Works  (ed.  of  1851),  578. 
8  Sheahan,  Douglas,  159. 


i8  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

ever,  the  Free-Soilers  were  able  to  score  one  last 
triumph  owing  to  the  accident  that  their  representa- 
tives in  the  legislatures  held  the  balance  between 
the  two  old  parties  and  thus  were  able  to  dictate  the 
election  of  antislavery  senators.  In  Ohio  they  as- 
sisted in  sending  to  the  Senate  Benjamin  F.  Wade, 
a  Whig  of  strong  antislavery  principles  and  pugna- 
cious northern  sectionalism.  In  Massachusetts,  by 
a  formal  coalition,  the  two  minority  groups,  Free- 
Soilers  and  Democrats,  managed  to  control  the  legis- 
lature and  share  the  offices  by  electing  George  S. 
Boutwell,  a  Democrat,  as  governor,  and  Charles 
Sumner,  a  Free-Soiler,  as  senator.  This  coalition, 
which  was  denounced  by  the  dispossessed  "  Cotton 
Whigs  "  as  utterly  immoral  and  unprincipled,  seemed 
by  its  success  to  obscure  the  real  decline  of  anti- 
slavery  feeling;  but  outside  of  Massachusetts  the 
failure  of  the  Free  Soil  party  was  manifest.1 

Meanwhile  a  very  different  contest  was  going  on 
at  the  south.  There  the  problem  for  such  leaders 
as  Clay,  Crittenden,  Stephens,  Cobb,  and  Foote,  who 
accepted  the  compromise,  was  far  more  difficult  than 
that  of  their  northern  colleagues.  It  was  necessary 
to  persuade  the  southern  people  that  their  section 
had  not  lost  by  the  admission  of  California,  and  that 
the  north  was  going  to  carry  out  the  fugitive-slave 
law,  so  that  no  cause  existed  any  longer  for  secession. 
In  the  northernmost  slave  states  the  influence  of 

1  Wilson,  Slave  Power,  II.,  chap,  xxvii.;  Pierce,  Sumner,  III., 
221-244;  Curtis,  Curtis,  I.,  138-185. 


i8so]  FINALITY  19 

Clay  was  strong,  but  in  the  "  cotton  states  "  an  active 
minority  of  leaders  repudiated  the  compromise  and 
refused  to  acquiesce  without  an  effort  to  bring  about 
secession.  The  result  was  a  campaign  carried  on 
with  all  the  personal  absorption,  high  feeling,  and 
vigorous  oratory  which  characterized  the  contests 
of  southern  leaders  with  one  another.  Among  the 
secessionists  Governor  Quitman,  of  Mississippi,  was 
prominent,  urging  that  the  time  for  action  had  come. 
"There  is  nothing,"  he  said  in  his  message  to  the 
legislature  in  November,  "to  encourage  the  hope 
that  there  will  be  any  respite  from  aggression.  Never 
has  hostility  to  slavery  been  more  distinctly  marked 
or  more  openly  asserted.  .  .  .  The  North  has  just 
triumphed  in  every  claim  she  has  asserted.  I  do  not 
hesitate  to  express  my  decided  opinion  that  the  only 
effectual  remedy  to  evils  which  must  continue  to 
grow  from  year  to  year  is  the  prompt  and  peacea- 
ble secession  of  the  aggrieved  states."1  Governor 
Means,  of  South  Carolina,  and  Governor  Bell,  of  Tex- 
as, were  equally  ready  to  bring  about  a  crisis  over  the 
Texas  boundary  question ;  and  all  that  held  Means 
back  from  prompt  action  was  his  conviction  that 
some  other  state  than  South  Carolina  ought  to  take 
the  lead.2  In  Alabama,  William  L.  Yancey,  the  elo- 
quent and  radical  "fire-eater,"  organized  Southern 
Rights  associations  whose  purpose  was  frankly  to 

1  Claiborne,  Quitman,  II.,  47,  50. 

2  Means  to  Quitman,  May  12,  1851,  Claiborne,  Quitman,  II., 
133- 


20  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

agitate  for  disunion,  and  these  were  imitated  in  other 
states  until  a  new  secessionist  organization  had  come 
into  existence.  The  Alabama  Southern  Rights  con- 
vention, on  February  i,  1851,  denounced  a  "tame 
submission  to  hostile  and  unconstitutional  legisla- 
tion," resolved  to  form  a  new  southern  party,  called 
for  the  election  of  delegates  to  a  southern  congress, 
and  announced  that,  if  any  other  state  or  states 
seceded,  Alabama  should  follow.1 

On  the  other  side,  however,  stood  the  bulk  of  the 
conservative  Whigs  and  Democrats ;  and,  in  addition, 
many  leaders  who  had  been  aggressive  for  slavery 
extension  during  the  struggle  just  ended,  but  were 
now  willing  to  accept  the  compromise  as  a  tempo- 
rary settlement.  Such  men  as  Foote,  of  Mississippi, 
Howell  Cobb,  Alexander  Stephens,  and  the  fiery 
Toombs,  of  Georgia,  were  no  less  champions  of  south- 
ern rights  than  Quitman  and  Yancey,  and  they  now 
threw  their  personal  weight  into  the  scales  against 
secession.  The  first  victory  of  the  southern  Union- 
ists was  won  in  the  adjourned  session  of  the  Nash- 
ville Convention  of  June,  1850,  which  came  together 
again  in  November,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  Judge 
Sharkey,  the  Unionist  president,  refused  to  issue  the 
call.  So  reduced  was  the  membership  that  the 
convention  did  not  feel  strong  enough  to  do  more 
than  denounce  the  compromise  measures,  reassert 
the  right  of  secession,  and  recommend  the  south  to 
cut  off  commercial  relations  with  the  north  until 

1  Hodgson,  Cradle  of  Confederacy,  290;   Du  Bose,  Yancey,  252. 


1851]  FINALITY  21 

its  rights  were  recognized.1  Then  the  governors  of 
Arkansas,  Virginia,  Alabama,  and  Florida,  while  con- 
demning the  compromise,  admitted  that  there  was  no 
necessity  for  secession  until  some  further  action  on 
the  part  of  the  north  should  aggravate  the  situation ; 2 
and  the  Texas  legislature,  instead  of  insisting  on  its 
boundary  claim,  accepted  the  federal  offer  of  ten 
millions  as  a  money  compensation,  thus  removing  a 
possible  source  of  conflict. 

Finally  came  the  election  of  a  state  convention  in 
Georgia  to  decide  the  question  of  union  or  secession. 
The  strong  trio  of  Cobb,  Stephens,  and  Toombs  can- 
vassed the  state,  and  after  a  campaign  of  considerable 
excitement  the  Unionists  won  a  complete  victory 
in  November.  When  the  convention  met  the  next 
month,  it  drew  up  what  became  widely  known  as  the 
"Georgia  platform,"  embodying  the  ultimatum  of 
the  southern  proslavery  Unionists.3  It  declared  in 
substance  that  the  state,  while  not  entirely  approv- 
ing of  the  compromise,  would  regard  it  as  a  perma- 
nent adjustment,  but  in  future  "would  resist  even 
to  the  disruption  of  the  union"  any  act  prohibiting 
slavery  in  the  territories,  or  a  refusal  to  admit  a 
slave  state,  or  any  modification  of  the  fugitive-slave 
law.4  By  the  opening  of  the  year  it  looked  as  though 

1  Hodgson,  Cradle  of  Confederacy ,  279;  N.  Y.  Tribune,  Novem- 
ber 27,  1850;    Cluskey,  Political  Text  Book,  597. 

2  Harper's  Magazine,  January,  1851,  p.  267. 

3  Stovall,  Toombs,  83.  0 

*  Phillips,  Georgia  and  State  Rights,  165;  Hodgson,  Cradle  of 
Confederacy,  279-314. 


22  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

the  advocates  of  peace  and  union  were  likely  to  win 
in  their  contest.  The  next  twelve  months  were  to 
settle  the  matter  definitely. 

When  Congress  met  in  December,  1850,  it  was 
evident  that  a  calm  had  come  over  that  once  turbu- 
lent and  angry  body.  All  the  forces  of  compromise 
united  to  declare  the  finality  of  the  slavery  adjust- 
ment, Fillmore  intimating  in  his  annual  message 
that  he  would  use  his  veto  to  protect  it,  and  Clay 
uniting  with  forty  other  members  in  a  manifesto 
pledging  themselves  to  support  no  man  for  office 
who  was  not  opposed  to  all  further  agitation.1  At- 
tempts by  Hale  and  Giddings,  two  inveterate  anti- 
slavery  champions,  to  revive  discussion  of  slavery 
questions  provoked  no  response ;  and  when  southern 
leaders  such  as  Mason,  of  Virginia,  pointed  to  the 
agitation  against  the  fugitive-slave  law  as  a  proof 
that  the  compromise  was  not  working  well,  they 
were  met  by  eager  assertions  on  the  part  of  Clay  and 
others  that  agitation  was  dying  out.  "  I  believe  the 
law  will  be  executed,"  asserted  Cass,  "wherever  the 
flag  of  the  Union  waves.  ...  A  wonderful  change 
in  public  sentiment  has  taken  place.  It  is  going  on 
and  will  go  onward  until  the  great  object  is  accom- 
plished. We  see  it  at  the  North,  we  see  it  at  the 
West,  and  all  around  us,  and  we  cannot  mistake 

it."  >  < 

It  was  a  source  of  grief  to  Clay  and  his  sympa- 
thizers that  a  succession  of  annoying  episodes  proved 
1  Cong.  Globe,  31  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  304.  2Ibid.,  296. 


1851]  FINALITY  23 

that  the  fugitive  law  was  bitterly  unpopular  at  the 
north.     Its  passage,  accompanied  by  rumors  that 
the  government  intended  to  apply  it  vigorously, 
caused  a  panic  among  the  colored  population  of 
northern  cities.     Fugitives  who  had  been  living  in 
imagined  security  fled  to  Canada,  and  their  course 
seemed  justified  by  the  first  cases  under  the  law, 
which  appeared  to  show  a  greater  anxiety  to  return 
alleged  slaves  than  to  secure  certainty  as  to  their 
identity.1     Finally,   in  February,    1851,   a  fugitive 
named  Shadrach  was  violently  rescued  in  Boston 
by  a  crowd  of  negroes  after  examination  before  a 
commissioner.2     This  act,  not  significant  in  itself, 
distressed  the  advocates  of  sectional  harmony  as 
seeming  to  contradict  their  confident  assertions  of 
the  purpose  of  the  north  to  execute  the  act;  and 
Fillmore  at  once  issued  a  proclamation  announcing 
his  purpose  to  employ  the  whole  force  of  the  gov- 
ernment to  support  the  law.     In  a  special  message 
he  also  asked  Congress  for  additional  powers,3  with 
the  result  of  a  lively  controversy  between  extreme 
southerners  who  were  anxious  to  prove  the  law  a 
failure  and  conservatives  like  Clay,  who  insisted  that 
the  behavior  of  Massachusetts  was  exceptional ;  but 
no  action  was  taken,  and  the  session  ended  without 
further  sectional  recrimination. 


1  Wilson,  Slave  Power,  II.,  chap.  xxvi. 

2  Garrison,  Garrison,  III.,  325;   Weiss,  Parker,  II.,   103-106; 
Frothingham,  Parker,  412. 

8  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V.,  101,  109. 
VOL.  xvin. — 3 


24  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1851 

The  campaign  for  finality  was  now 'fought  to  a  suc- 
cessful conclusion.  In  the  north,  Webster  and  others 
continued  with  unabated  activity  preaching  the  sanc- 
tity of  the  Union,  the  finality  of  the  compromise, 
the  futility  and  folly  of  agitation,  and  the  supremacy 
of  the  law.1  It  was  true  that  a  number  of  other 
cases  of  forcible  resistance  to  the  fugitive-slave  law 
occurred  in  1851,  notably  the  rescue  of  "Jerry"  in 
Syracuse  by  a  crowd  of  abolitionists  and  others,2 
and  the  killing  of  a  master,  Gorsuch,  by  a  band  of 
negroes,  among  whom  was  the  fugitive  whom  he  was 
attempting  to  recapture.  In  their  anxiety  to  pun- 
ish this  crime  with  adequate  severity,  the  federal 
authorities  made  an  effort  to  convict  a  Quaker, 
Castner  Hanway,  of  treason,  on  the  ground  that,  as 
a  by-stander,  he  had  refused  to  assist  Gorsuch ;  but 
this  attempt  to  bring  resistance  to  the  fugitive-slave 
act  under  the  head  of  "levying  war  against  the 
United  States  "  proved  futile.3  As  the  year  wore  on, 
it  became  evident  that  the  compromise  had  done  its 
work. 

In  spite  of  the  efforts  of  radicals,  the  excitement 
over  the  fugitive-slave  act  diminished,  and  the  peo- 
ple of  the  free  states  settled  down  to  an  attitude 
of  sincere  but  reluctant  acquiescence.  "  It  is  a  dis- 

1  Curtis,  Webster,  II.,  499-523;  Webster,  Works  (ed.  of  1851), 
VI.,  582  et  seq. 

2  Frothingham,  Smith,  117;   May,  Antislavery  Conflict,  373. 

3  Wilson,  Slave  Power,  II.,  328;    Still,  Underground  Railroad, 
349;    History  of  Trial  of  Castner  Hanway,   1852;    McDougall, 
Fugitive  Slaves,  §  60. 


1851]  FINALITY  25 

graceful  and  dirty  business,"  said  the  Ohio  State 
Journal,  "but  it  is  sanctioned  by  the  constitution," 
and  "whatever  things  it  pledges  them  [the  northern 
people]  to  do,  these  things  they  intend  to  do,  whether 
agreeable  or  disagreeable."  *  A  sign  of  this  acquies- 
cence was  the  successful  return  from  Boston  of  a 
fugitive  named  Sims,  in  April,  1851,  in  spite  of  the 
opposition  of  sympathetic  abolitionists.2 

In  the  elections  of  1851,  both  Whig  and  Demo- 
cratic platforms  dropped  the  last  shreds  of  anti- 
slavery  language.  The  decline  in  the  Whig  vote 
continued,  and  the  Free  Soil  party  now  numbered 
little  more  than  the  old  Liberty  party.  So  hopeless 
appeared  its  outlook  that  one  of  its  leaders  in  the 
Senate,  Chase,  of  Ohio,  formally  joined  the  Demo- 
crats in  the  state  election.3  Another  result  of  the 
compromise  struggle  was  seen  this  year  in  Missouri. 
Senator  Benton,  having  refused  to  obey  proslavery 
instructions  of  the  state  legislature,  and  having  voted 
for  the  admission  of  California,  his  defiant  attitude 
led  to  a  split  in  the  Democratic  party  in  the  sena- 
torial election.  Though  Benton  retained  a  majority 
of  Democrats,  his  opponents  joined  the  Whigs  to 
elect  H.  S.  Geyer,  an  adherent  of  the  compromise. 
Benton  refused  to  accept  this  defeat  as  final,  and 
fought  hard  for  six  years,  sitting  for  one  term  in  the 

1  Ohio  State  Journal,  April  21,  1851. 

2  Adams,  Dana,  I.,  185;    Frothingham,  Parker,  415;    Details 
of  the  rescues  of  fugitives,  in  Hart,  Am.  Hist  told  by  Contempo- 
raries, IV.,  §§  29-33. 

3  Smith,  Liberty  and  Free  Soil  Parties,  239-241. 


26  PARTIES  AND  SLAVERY  [1851 

House  of  Representatives,  and  dividing  his  party  in 
election  after  election,  without  success.1  After  his 
death,  in  1858,  the  Bentonian  Democrats  in  many 
cases  became  Republicans. 

The  struggle  between  the  Unionists  and  Secession- 
ists was  now  fought  to  a  conclusion  in  the  cotton 
states,  where  the  efforts  of  the  Southern  Rights 
associations  caused  a  temporary  reconstruction  of 
party  lines.  Most  of  the  Whigs  united  with  the  con- 
servative Democrats  in  a  Union  party,  while  the 
Southern  Rights  party,  comprising  the  rest  of  the 
Democrats,  and  led  by  the  unreconciled  Quitman  and 
Yancey,  took  the  field  in  a  last  effort  at  secession. 
The  result  was  a  sweeping  and  conclusive  victory  for 
the  Unionists  in  every  state  where  the  issue  was 
joined,  a  victory  due  in  large  part  to  the  personal 
power  of  the  Unionist  leaders  in  a  region  where  per- 
sonality counted  much.  In  Georgia,  Cobb,  the 
Union  candidate  for  governor,  won  easily  over  the 
State  Rights  nominee ; 2  in  Alabama  both  candidates 
approved  the  compromise ;  in  Mississippi  the  Union- 
ists won  a  complete  victory  in  the  election  of  dele- 
gates for  a  state  convention.  This  seemed  such  a 
personal  condemnation  that  Quitman,  the  Southern 
Rights  candidate  for  governor,  withdrew  and  Jeffer- 
son Davis  took  his  place,  finishing  out  the  campaign 
with  vigor  against  Foote,  who  barely  succeeded  in 

1  Meigs,  Benton,  414;    Durrie  and  Davis,  Missouri,  chap,  xv.- 
xvii.;    Switzler,  in  Barns,  Missouri,  chap,  xxiii. 

2  Phillips,  Georgia  and  State  Rights,  166. 


1851]  FINALITY  27 

defeating  him.1  Finally,  in  South  Carolina,  where 
the  issue  was  made  between  those  demanding  imme- 
diate secession  and  those  advocating  co-operation 
with  other  states,  the  co-operationists  won  by  a  good 
majority  in  October.2  By  the  autumn  of  1851,  ac- 
cordingly, the  last  elements  of  irreconcilable  opposi- 
tion to  the  finality  of  the  compromise  were  beaten 
down  in  north  and  south.  The  only  relics  of  the  ex- 
treme wings  were  a  few  Free  Soil  senators  and  repre- 
sentatives— Hale,  Chase,  Sumner,  Giddings — and  a 
few  Southern  Rights  exponents.  The  people  of  the 
country  clearly  accepted  the  compromise  as  a  set- 
tlement, for  the  time  being  at  all  events,  and  the  sla- 
very question  seemed  laid  to  rest  as  a  national  issue. 
The  reasons  for  this  state  of  rest  are  the  same  as 
those  for  the  passage  of  the  compromise:  the  mass 
of  the  northern  people  were  not  enough  concerned 
about  slavery  to  risk  driving  the  south  into  dis- 
union, and  were  willing  to  endure  even  the  fugi- 
tive-slave law  for  the  sake  of  regaining  political  and 
commercial  peace.  The  southern  people,  deeply  as 
they  felt  the  loss  to  their  section  of  a  share  of  Cali- 
fornia, and  little  as  they  trusted  the  good-will  of 
the  north,  were  willing  to  let  matters  rest,  provided 
nothing  further  should  arise  to  disturb  the  equilib- 
rium. So  peace  reigned  once  more  at  Washington, 
and  among  the  states. 

1  Davis,  Confederate  Government,  I.,  18-22;  R.  Davis,  Recollec- 
tions, 315-323;  Garner,  in  Miss.  Hist.  Soc.,  Publications,  IV.,  91. 

2  Hodgson,  Cradle  of  Confederacy,  285-299. 


CHAPTER   III 

POLITICS  WITHOUT  AN  ISSUE 
(1851-1853) 

THE  triumph  of  the  compromise  of  1850  as  a 
final  settlement  once  assured,  the  political  life 
of  the  country,  freed  from  the  annoyance  of  wrangles 
over  slavery,  turned  back  into  the  old  channels ;  and 
the  years  immediately  following  1851  were  a  second 
"era  of  good  feeling."  People  could  now  devote 
themselves  to  their  own  affairs,  glad  to  be  rid  forever 
of  the  wearisome  phrases  " extension  of  slavery," 
"  Wilmot  proviso,"  "states  rights"  and  "secession." 
It  was  perfectly  true,  as  Free-Soilers  at  the  north  and 
"fire-eaters"  at  the  south  pointed  out,  that  the  dif- 
ferences between  the  free  and  slave  states  remained 
unaltered,  and  that  there  was  no  guarantee  against 
interruption  by  the  first  question  which  might  come 
up  requiring  federal  action  towards  slavery.  But 
such  prophets  of  evil  were  unpopular  and  were  re- 
garded as  disturbers  of  a  hard -won  peace.  The 
whole  country,  in  short,  tried  by  an  effort  of  will  to 
sink  the  sectional  differences  into  oblivion. 

The  two  great  parties  were  again  organized  for 
contest  just  as  before  1848,  and  called  for  public  sup- 


1851]  POLITICS  29 

port;  but  it  now  appeared  that,  with  the  slavery 
question  out  of  the  way,  there  remained  no  other 
important  national  issue.  The  old  questions  of  na- 
tional bank  and  tariff  were  obsolete,  for  a  new  indus- 
trial life  had  come  into  being  and  new  problems  were 
confronting  capitalists  and  farmers.  Hence  local 
affairs  absorbed  the  interest  of  voters  and  legislat- 
ures. State  banking  laws  were  forced  through, 
vetoed,  or  submitted  to  popular  referendum;  rail- 
ways were  aided  or  regulated;  new  public  schools 
and  universities  were  established ;  and  the  newspa- 
pers, once  filled  with  angry  editorials  and  sectional 
arguments  upon  slavery,  now  gave  space  to  the 
paving  and  lighting  of  streets,  the  delimitation  of 
legislative  districts,  taxation  for  charitable  institu- 
tions, and  like  homely  issues.  Only  steadfast  abo- 
litionist and  intense  proslavery  papers  continued  to 
refer  to  the  subject  which  the  country  was  trying 
hard  to  ignore. 

In  default  of  a  national  issue,  public  interest 
turned  to  various  reforming  movements.1  The  tem- 
perance agitation  had  been  going  on  for  twenty 
years,  in  the  form  of  a  moral  and  religious  propa- 
ganda against  drunkenness,  headed  by  vehement 
orators,  of  whom  the  eloquent  and  emotional  John 
B.  Gough  was  the  foremost  example.  By  1850  pub- 
lic sentiment  against  the  liquor  traffic  had  grown  so 
strong  that  attempts  were  made  to  prohibit  the  sale 

1  For  earlier  stages,  see  Hart,  Slavery  and  Abolition  (Am.  Na- 
tion, XVI.),  chap.  i. 


3o  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1848 

altogether.  The  state  of  Maine  led  the  way  in  acts 
of  1846  and  1848,  culminating  in  the  drastic  statute 
of  1851,  known  henceforth  as  "the  Maine  law.'*  It 
absolutely  prohibited  the  manufacture  or  sale  of 
alcoholic  liquors  except  under  state  authorization 
for  medicinal  use,  and  backed  up  its  mandates  by 
fines,  imprisonment,  and  powers  of  search.  The  agi- 
tation for  the  Maine  law  quickly  spread  to  other 
states,  and  soon  resulted  in  bitter  political  struggles 
in  legislatures  and  elections.  Governors  were  obliged 
to  veto  or  sign  bills,  parties  were  called  upon  to  recog- 
nize the  issue  in  their  platforms,  until  it  seemed  as 
though,  in  the  absence  of  any  other  pressing  question, 
the  whole  country  was  destined  to  be  absorbed  in  the 
prohibition  contest.  In  many  states  the  Free  Dem- 
ocratic party  adopted  this  policy  and  made  notable 
gains  in  its  vote,  and  in  others  impatient  temperance 
reformers  began  to  set  up  independent  candidates.1 
Observers  detected  in  this  sudden  fervor  the  signs 
of  a  new  excitability  in  American  political  life,  which, 
deprived  of  its  former  food  by  the  cessation  of  the 
slavery  struggle,  sought  for  some  substitute.  Such 
an  outlet  was  furnished  by  the  visit  of  Kossuth  and 
other  Hungarian  refugees  to  the  United  States  in 
1852.  The  people  of  the  country  were  keenly  in- 
terested in  the  upheavals  of  1848  in  Europe,  sym- 
pathized strongly  with  the  revolutionists,  and  were 
especially  stirred  by  the  brave  struggle  of  Hun- 

1  Whig  Almanac   and    Tribune  Almanac,  1851-1856;   Cyclop, 
of  Temperance  and  Prohibition,  275-360. 


1851]  POLITICS  3I 

gary  against  Austria  and  Russia.  When  Hungary 
was  crushed  in  1849  and  Kossuth  took  refuge  in 
Turkey,  an  agitation  began  which  finally  led  Con- 
gress to  offer  an  asylum  to  the  exiles.  Accordingly, 
in  December,  Kossuth  arrived  at  New  York  as  a 
national  guest  and  began  a  tour  of  the  country  in 
search  of  pecuniary  and  other  aid.  Under  any  cir- 
cumstances the  tragic  fate  of  Hungary  and  the  at- 
tractive personality  and  wonderful  eloquence  of  Kos- 
suth would  have  commanded  interest;  but  coming 
at  this  time  of  absolute  political  calm,  his  visit 
produced  a  volcanic  eruption  of  excitement  which 
equalled  the  earlier  crazes  over  "  Citizen  G£net"  and 
Lafayette.  He  was  met  at  New  York  by  roaring 
crowds,  salutes  of  cannon,  banquets,  and  welcoming 
deputations  from  every  conceivable  body  of  men 
from  Socialists  to  Presbyterian  ministers.  At  Phila- 
delphia, Baltimore,  and  other  cities  the  same  excite- 
ment was  manifested.  Local  politicians,  conscious 
of  the  pressing  necessity  of  keeping  with  the  popular 
current,  made  speeches  of  unmeasured  eulogy  and 
sympathy.1  Had  the  language  of  many  fervent  con- 
gressmen been  taken  literally,  Kossuth  would  have 
been  justified  in  expecting  the  United  States  to  enter 
upon  a  course  of  active  intervention  in  behalf  of 
Hungary  and  other  oppressed  nations  of  Europe.2 

1  Von  Hoist,  United  States,  IV.,  64-96;  Rhodes,  United  States, 
I.,  231-243. 

2  Cong.  Globe,  32    Cong.,  i    Sess.,  December    i,  8-12,  16,  27, 
January  2,  5,  8,  20  et  seq. 


32  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1851 

Webster,  however,  as  secretary  of  state,  carefully 
refrained  from  committing  the  United  States  to  any 
formal  action,1  and  although  there  was  a  public  re- 
ception to  the  Hungarian  patriot  by  each  House  of 
Congress,  Kossuth,  whose  head  was  not  turned  by 
his  situation,  saw  clearly  that  he  could  hope  for  noth- 
ing more  than  sympathy.  Some  of  the  more  conser- 
vative members  of  Congress,  alarmed  by  the  inflam- 
matory eloquence  of  such  men  as  Cass,  Foote,  Doug- 
las, and  Walker,  of  Wisconsin,  took  occasion  to  preach 
restraint  and  caution,  but  it  was  really  not  necessary. 
The  whole  affair  was  only  saved  from  being  a  farce 
by  the  vein  of  genuine  republicanism  and  defiance 
of  Europe  which  underlay  all  the  extravagances  of 
enthusiasm  and  applause.  When  Kossuth  left  the 
country,  in  the  summer  of  1852,  the  excitement  was 
over ;  and  all  the  eloquent  exile  had  to  show  for  his 
visit  was  a  small  amount  of  money.  The  episode 
was  at  an  end. 

Meantime,  national  politics  sank  into  a  vacuity 
which  reflected  the  prosperity  of  the  times.  The 
Congress  of  1851-1852  sat  for  nine  months,  but  ac- 
complished little  beyond  granting  public  lands  and 
passing  a  river  and  harbor  bill.  The  large  Demo- 
cratic majority  in  each  house  found  no  party  measure 
to  consider,  and  the  time  of  the  members  was  devoted 
for  weeks  together  to  political  manoeuvring  with  re- 
gard to  the  presidential  election  of  1852.  The  party 
situation  was  peculiar,  for  with  no  definite  issue  in 
1  Curtis,  Webster,  II.,  571. 


1852]  POLITICS  33 

existence  success  seemed  to  depend  upon  the  strength 
of  party  loyalty,  the  choice  of  a  popular  candidate, 
and  the  careful  avoidance  of  any  position  which 
might  seem  to  endanger  the  quiet  between  the  sec- 
tions. From  Free-Soilers  and  secessionists  there  was 
nothing  to  fear,  and  the  prime  necessity  in  the  eyes 
of  leaders  was  to  establish  their  devotion  and  that 
of  their  respective  parties  to  the  compromise.  Much 
time  was  devoted  in  party  caucuses  and  in  each 
House  to  the  consideration  of  resolutions  affirming 
"finality,"  but  beyond  the  passage  of  such  a  resolu- 
tion on  April  5,  by  the  House  of  Representatives,  no 
definite  results  were  attained,  nor  could  either  side 
claim  any  advantage  over  the  other.1 

Still,  by  the  spring  of  1852,  it  became  clear  that 
of  the  two  parties  the  Democratic  was  in  far  better 
shape.  Its  discipline  was  restored  with  the  return 
•  of  the  Barnburners,  its  northern  and  southern  lead- 
ers were  in  accord,  and  its  recent  successes  in  con- 
gressional and  state  elections  gave  it  courage.  For 
the  Whigs,  on  the  other  hand,  the  situation  looked 
ominous.  They  had  lost  steadily  for  two  years  in 
congressional  and  state  elections;  the  respectable 
Fillmore  administration  did  nothing  to  win  prestige ; 
and  the  chasm  between  southern  and  northern 
Whigs,  however  carefully  ignored  by  the  leaders, 
must  be  revealed  the  moment  the  question  of  a 
presidential  candidate  or  platform  was  raised.  Upon 

1  Cong.  Globe,  32  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  6-9;  Von  Hoist,  United  States, 
IV.,  105-117,  976-983. 

VOL.  XVIII. — 3 


34  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1852 

what  common  ground  could  men  like  Toombs  and 
Seward  meet?  Would  the  southern  wing  be  satis- 
fied with  anything  short  of  an  explicit  adoption  by 
the  party  of  the  southern  position  as  laid  down  in 
the  " Georgia  Platform,"  and  the  nomination  of  a 
man  thoroughly  committed  to  the  execution  of  the 
fugitive -slave  law?  Could  the  Seward  Whigs  ac- 
cept such  a  programme,  or  hold  their  constituents 
if  they  did  so? 

The  party  nominations  and  platforms  in  1852  were 
of  a  purely  partisan  and  wholly  uninteresting  char- 
acter. The  Democratic  convention,  held  June  i, 
at  Baltimore,  added  to  its  earlier  platforms  a  new 
resolution  pledging  the  party  to  a  faithful  execution 
of  the  compromise  measures,  "  the  act  for  reclaiming 
fugitive  slaves  included,"  and  promising  to  resist  all 
attempts  at  renewing  the  agitation  of  the  slavery 
question.1  Then  for  three  days  it  struggled  over  the 
problem  of  a  candidate,  unable  to  secure  a  majority 
vote  for  Cass,  Marcy,  Buchanan,  or  Douglas,  until  on 
the  forty-ninth  ballot  the  convention  suddenly  found 
a  solution  of  the  difficulty  in  a  carefully  prepared 
"  stampede  "  towards  Franklin  Pierce,  of  New  Hamp- 
shire. Pierce  was  not  a  man  of  national  prominence, 
but  he  had  held  a  respectable  place  in  public  life,  was 
personally  attractive,  kindly  in  manner  and  feelings, 
with  no  record  to  attack  and  no  enemies  to  fear.2 
Immeasurably  inferior  to  either  of  the  four  men  he 

1  Stanwood,  Hist,  of  the  Presidency,  249. 

2  Hawthorne,  Pierce,  109  et  seq. 


1852]  POLITICS  35 

supplanted,  he  was  a  safe  selection  under  the  exist- 
ing conditions.  The  candidate  for  vice-president 
was  William  R.  King,  senator  from  Alabama. 

Two  weeks  later  the  Whig  convention  met  at  the 
same  place  and  hastily  adopted,  without  debate  and 
over  loud  protests  from  many  northern  members,  a 
platform  which  had  been  framed  by  the  Georgia 
Whigs  and  was  intended  to  satisfy  all  elements. 
The  first  two  resolutions  committed  the  party  to  the 
doctrine  of  states  rights,  and  the  eighth  resolution 
declared  the  compromise  acts,  "the  Fugitive  Slave 
Law  included,"  to  be  a  settlement  of  the  slavery  ques- 
tion, and  pledged  the  party  to  maintain  them  until 
time  should  demonstrate  the  necessity  of  further 
legislation,  and  to  discountenance  all  efforts  to  renew 
the  slavery  agitation.1  The  concession  to  the  north- 
ern Whigs  lay  in  the  careful  avoidance  of  the  term 
"final."  In  selecting  a  candidate  the  convention 
found  its  members  divided  between  three  aspirants, 
each  with  a  devoted  band  of  followers.  General 
Winfield  Scott  was  supported  by  northern  Whigs, 
who  hoped  to  repeat  the  success  of  Taylor  in  1848, 
while  on  the  other  side  the  compromising  or  "  final- 
ity" vote  was  divided  between  Webster,  with  the 
New  England  contingent  behind  him,  and  Fillmore, 
who  received  southern  votes.  The  stubbornness  of 
the  followers  of  the  last  two  candidates  made  them 
unable  to  combine  against  Scott,2  and  protracted  the 

1  Stanwood,  Hist,  of  the  Presidency,  251. 

2  Curtis,  Webster,  II.,  620-627. 


36  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1852 

contest  for  fifty -three  ballots,  but  the  gradual 
change  of  a  few  delegates  finally  gave  Scott  a 
majority. 

The  immediate  impression  of  these  nominations 
upon  the  country  was  significant.  Pierce  received 
hearty  support  from  all  elements  of  the  Democratic 
party,  southern  as  well  as  northern,  Unionist  as  well 
as  secessionist,  " Barnburner"  as  well  as  " Hunker," 
while  Scott  repelled  the  southern  Whigs.  The  south- 
ern Union  party  of  1851  was  now  entirely  broken 
up,  its  Democratic  contingent  supporting  Pierce; 
while  its  Whigs  either  yielded  a  reluctant  support  to 
Scott  or  openly  bolted.  July  3  a  number  of  leading 
southern  Whigs,  headed  by  Stephens  and  Toombs, 
published  a  manifesto  announcing  their  purpose  to 
oppose  Scott  as  not  sufficiently  in  favor  of  the  com- 
promises.1 Others  in  Georgia  formed  a  Webster  elec- 
toral ticket.  In  short,  the  campaign  had  hardly 
opened  when  it  was  seen  that  the  Whig  party,  in 
spite  of  the  adoption  of  a  compromise  platform,  had 
driven  away  by  its  nomination  those  elements  which 
had  given  it  victory  in  i848.2  Hoping  to  revive  their 
party,  the  Free-Soilers  rallied  in  August  at  Pittsburg 
and  nominated  John  P.  Hale  for  president  on  a  plat- 
form which  reiterated  the  protest  of  1848  against  the 
existence  of  slavery  in  the  territories,  denied  the 
finality  of  the  compromise,  denounced  the  fugitive- 
slave  law  as  repugnant  to  the  Constitution,  to  Chris- 

1  Cluskey,  Political  Text  Book,  682. 

*  Hodgson,  Cradle  of  Confederacy,  323-330. 


1852]  POLITICS  37 

tianity,  and  the  sentiments  of  the  civilized  world,  and 
demanded  its  repeal.1 

Since  there  was  no  real  issue  except  the  personality 
of  the  candidates,  the  campaign  of  1852  was  trivial 
and  unenthusiastic.  Scott 's  attempts  to  win  over  the 
German  and  Irish  vote,  during  a  thinly  disguised 
stumping  tour  in  the  west,  provoked  ridicule,  and 
the  contest  soon  degenerated  into  petty  abuse  and 
personalities.  Pierce  was  painted  as  a  coward  in  the 
Mexican  War  and  a  drunkard  in  private  life,  and 
Scott  was  held  up  as  a  miracle  of  vanity  and  inepti- 
tude.2 The  most  vigorous  efforts  of  the  Whigs  to 
stir  up  enthusiasm  for  "the  hero  of  Lundy's  Lane, 
Contreras  and  Churubusco"  fell  flat,  and  the  result 
of  the  election  was  foreseen  weeks  before  the  vote 
took  place.  Pierce's  victory  was  overwhelming. 
He  carried  every  state  except  Massachusetts,  Ver- 
mont, Kentucky,  and  Tennessee,  and  received  254 
electoral  votes  to  Scott's  42.  In  the  south,  the  Whig 
vote  shrank  to  small  figures.  In  the  north,  the  Free 
Democratic  party,  as  the  revived  Free  Soil  organiza- 
tion now  styled  itself,  polled  only  155,825  votes,  and 
had  no  direct  influence  upon  the  result. 

The  Whig  leaders  and  newspapers  seemed  stupe- 
fied by  the  completeness  of  their  defeat.  It  was  true 
that  the  election  decided  nothing  more  than  a  change 
of  office-holders:  no  new  policy  was  presaged;  no 
alteration  of  sectional  balance  was  indicated;  but 

1  Stan  wood,  Hist,  of  the  Presidency,  253. 

2  Rhodes,  United  States,  I.,  269-277. 


38  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1852 

the  failure  of  the  party  to  retain  its  southern  support 
was  ominous,  and,  in  spite  of  the  large  popular  vote 
drawn  by  Scott  in  the  north,  the  future  seemed  dark. 
For  over  a  year  all  energy  departed  from  Whig  party 
activity,  and  in  1853  it  suffered  renewed  severe  de- 
feats in  state  elections. 

Fillmore's  last  months  in  office  went  by  in  peace,  the 
short  session  of  Congress  (1852-1853)  contributing 
nothing  of  importance  to  public  interest  other  than 
sundry  debates  upon  foreign  affairs,  the  only  quarter 
where  any  new  developments  were  looked  upon  as 
likely  to  occur.  Pierce  was  inaugurated  March  4, 
1853,  in  the  full  sunshine  of  popularity,  and  delivered 
an  optimistic  address  to  the  greatest  concourse  ever 
assembled  in  Washington  on  such  an  occasion.  All 
elements,  Whig  as  well  as  Democratic,  were  disposed 
to  look  favorably  upon  the  handsome,  affable  presi- 
dent whose  aims  seemed  so  high  and  whose  prospects 
appeared  so  secure.  His  cabinet  was  conciliatory  in 
its  make-up.  Marcy,  the  secretary  of  state,  had 
been  a  leader  of  the  New  York  "  Hunkers,"  but  Mc- 
Clelland, of  Michigan,  had  been  an  antislavery  man; 
Guthrie,  secretary  of  the  treasury,  and  Dobbin,  of 
the  navy  department,  were  conservative  southern 
Democrats,  but  Davis,  of  Mississippi,  the  secretary 
of  war,  had  been  a  Southern  Rights  leader  in  1851 ; 
Caleb  Gushing,  of  Massachusetts,  the  attorney-gen- 
eral, able,  shrewd,  and  considered  shifty,  had  only 
recently  come  out  of  the  Whig  party.  All  elements 
were  represented. 


1853]  POLITICS  39 

So  ended  a  period  of  political  stagnation,  interest- 
ing only  as  showing  how  the  American  public,  by 
sheer  effort  of  will,  could  force  itself  into  old  lines 
of  political  habit  and  ignore  a  vital  question.  The 
success  of  the  effort  in  arresting  sectional  contro- 
versy was  undeniable,  but,  as  far  as  the  Whigs  were 
concerned,  the  refusal  of  the  southern  members  to 
support  the  party  nominee  in  1852  showed  that  not 
even  the  utmost  efforts  of  compromising  and  Union- 
saving  leaders  could  efface  sectional  distrust.  The 
appearance  of  any  new  issue  might  instantly  destroy 
the  artificial  calm. 

VOL.  XVIII. — 4 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  OLD  LEADERS  AND  THE  NEW 
(1850-1860) 

IN  the  contest  of  nationalism  against  sectionalism, 
which  was  seen  to  be  inevitable  after  1844,  the 
triumph  of  the  Unionists  in  1850  and  the  years  fol- 
lowing was  due  largely  to  the  fact  that  the  weight  of 
leadership  and  party  tradition  was  with  the  com- 
promisers. To  keep  the  slavery  question  suppressed 
and  to  prevent  the  sections  from  again  coming  into 
conflict  in  Congress,  the  same  strong  leadership  must 
continue;  but  unfortunately  for  the  finality  of  the 
compromise,  the  leaders  who  had  won  that  victory 
soon  passed  off  the  stage  and  left  no  successors  of 
equal  influence.  The  result  was  the  ultimate  vic- 
tory of  sectionalism  in  north  and  south,  and  the 
coming  to  the  front  of  those  radically  different  ideals 
and  political  habits  which  guided  north  and  south 
into  and  through  the  Civil  War. 

The  distinguishing  feature  of  the  older  group  was 
the  strong  Unionism  of  its  leaders,  whether  Whig  or 
Democratic.  The  peace,  perpetuity,  and  strength  of 
the  Union  stood  in  their  eyes  above  all  other  politi- 
cal ideals;  and  when  the  slavery  question  arose  and 


1852]  LEADERS  41 

extremists  in  north  and  south  insisted  on  forcing 
the  sectional  issue,  they  were  alarmed  and  horrified. 
Their  principles  in  politics  were  imbibed  when  most 
of  them  entered  public  life,  in  the  nationalistic  era 
of  iSio-1830,1  and  they  felt  called  on  neither  to 
approve  nor  to  condemn  slavery,  nor,  in  fact,  to 
concern  themselves  with  it.  In  their  eyes  the  moral 
earnestness  of  the  abolitionist  was  as  incomprehen- 
sible as  the  sincere  sectionalism  of  the  secessionist 
was  abhorrent;  and  they  were  amazed  and  grieved 
by  the  fierce  disapprobation  of  compromise  by  both 
kinds  of  extremists.  Considering  slavery  outside 
the  range  of  legitimate  political  discussion,  they 
tried  to  exclude  it  first  by  their  disapproval  and  then 
by  compromise. 

As  long  as  such  men  as  Clay  and  Webster  led  the 
forces  of  nationalism  with  all  the  power  of  their  per- 
sonalities and  the  splendor  of  their  eloquence,  the 
spirit  of  Union  triumphed ;  but  Clay's  work  was  done 
when  the  cornpromise  of  1850  was  carried  through; 
he  took  little  part  in  events  thereafter,  beyond 
speaking  in  the  Senate  in  behalf  of  "finality."  His 
death,  in  June,  1852,  was  regarded  as  a  national  loss, 
and  Whig  and  Democrat  alike  paid  him  glowing 
tributes  and  united  in  recognizing  the  passing  of  a 
great  American  leader  whose  sun  had  set  in  peaceful 
skies,  for  he  had  outlived  personal  ambition. 

Not  so  with  Webster :  to  the  last  he  hoped  for  the 
Whig  nomination  for  the  presidency,  and  when  Scott 
1  Cf.  Turner,  New  West  (Am.  Nation,  XIV.),  chap,  xviii. 


42  PARTIES  AND  SLAVERY  [1848 

was  selected  over  him  his  bitterness  and  grief  were 
intense.  He  even  advised  his  intimate  friends  to 
vote  for  Pierce,  and  died  in  October,  1852,  a  sad- 
dened man.  In  New  England  his  death  was  mourned 
as  the  loss  of  the  foremost  citizen,  and  even  his  bitter- 
est critics,  the  Free-Soilers,  admitted  his  intellectual 
greatness ;  but  outside  of  his  own  constituency  only 
the  conservative  Whigs  felt  his  loss.  Something  in 
Webster's  personality  prevented  him,  in  death  as 
in  life,  from  rivalling  the  popularity  and  national 
standing  of  his  rival,  Clay. 

Most  of  the  other  strong  Unionist  leaders  retired 
from  political  life  about  the  same  time.  Among  the 
northern  Jacksonian  Democrats,  Van  Buren  made 
his  last  appearance  in  politics  in  1848;  in  1851 
Woodbury  died,  and  Dickinson  lost  his  seat  in  the 
Senate;  and  of  the  Webster  Whigs,  Winthrop,  of 
Massachusetts,  and  Ewing,  of  Ohio,  retired  in  1851, 
and  Corwin  in  1853.  At  the  south,  Benton,  the 
senatorial  Hercules  of  the  Jacksonian  Unionists,  lost 
his  seat  in  1851,  and  consumed  his  remaining  days 
in  a  gallant  but  futile  struggle  to  regain  power  in 
his  state ;  and  Foote,  who  had  led  the  Unionist  forces 
in  Mississippi,  did  not  re-enter  national  politics  af- 
ter 1851.  Among  the  southern  Whigs,  Berrien,  of 
Georgia,  retired  from  the  Senate  in  1851,  and  Man- 
gum,  of  North  Carolina,  in  1853.  Most  of  these  men 
were  of  the  older  school,  except  perhaps  Foote,  and 
their  public  conduct  was  guided  by  a  tradition  of 
formal  statesmanship  inherited  from  the  first  dec- 


1852]  LEADERS  43 

ades  of  the  century.  Their  simultaneous  departure 
from  the  field  of  national  politics  left  the  leadership 
of  Union  feeling  to  men  who  were  at  once  less  able 
to  control  sentiment  and  less  skilful  in  congressional 
and  executive  direction. 

The  surviving  Unionists,  during  the  years  1853- 
1860,  were  stronger  in  the  Democratic  party  than  in 
the  Whig,  especially  since  they  counted  among  their 
number  the  one  man  who  had  the  ability  to  succeed 
Clay  as  a  congressional  and  popular  orator.  Stephen 
A.  Douglas  entered  public  life  in  the  preceding  dec- 
ade, and  by  experience  in  House  and  Senate  had 
become,  by  1850,  the  keenest  parliamentarian  of  his 
party  and  the  foremost  man  in  the  west.  He  was  a 
strong  defender  of  the  compromises,  totally  indif- 
ferent to  slavery  as  an  institution,  and  devoted  to 
Unionism  in  the  same  way  that  Webster  and  Clay 
had  been.  His  ability  as  a  public  speaker,  which 
gave  him  party  leadership  in  the  Senate,  made  him 
the  idol  of  the  Illinois  Democrats  and  won  him  the 
admiration  of  his  party  in  most  states;  while  his 
force  and  energy  so  dominated  his  short  frame  that 
he  was  known  as  "the  Little  Giant."  Douglas  was 
better  suited  than  any  other  man  in  the  United 
States  to  maintain  Unionism  against  antislavery 
sentiment  in  the  north,  but,  unfortunately  for  his 
success,  he  was  hampered  by  his  very  facility  in 
debate  and  in  party  leadership,  for  he  lacked  caution 
and  insight  into  the  conditions  of  popular  feeling. 
Unable  to  comprehend  the  force  of  moral  indigna- 


44  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1851 

tion  against  slavery,  he  was  led  through  overcon- 
fidence  in  his  own  powers  into  grave  mistakes  of 
policy  which  eventually  ruined  his  cause.1 

Other  Democratic  Unionists  were  Cass,  Buchanan, 
and  Marcy,  rivals  with  Douglas  in  the  national  con- 
vention of  1852.  Of  these  Marcy  was  the  strongest 
in  character,  an  experienced  Jacksonian  politician 
of  New  York,  a  member  of  the  "Albany  Regency," 
and  the  originator  of  the  famed  phrase  "  to  the  vic- 
tors belong  the  spoils  of  the  enemy."  Marcy  was, 
however,  much  more  than  a  spoilsman:  he  was  a 
hard-headed,  aggressive  Democratic  partisan,  with 
none  of  the  popular  power  of  his  younger  rival, 
Douglas,  but  with  much  more  caution  and  political 
shrewdness.  His  later  career  as  secretary  of  state 
under  Pierce  was  his  last  appearance  in  politics,  and 
his  death  in  1857  removed  one  of  the  steadying  in- 
fluences in  his  party.  Cass  and  Buchanan  remained 
in  public  life  to  the  end  of  the  period,  and,  with 
Douglas,  stood  forward  as  representatives  of  the 
compromise  Democracy.  Of  the  two,  Cass  had  the 
greater  native  ability,  and  from  his  long  career  in 
Michigan  and  his  vigorous  personality  had  a  fairly 
strong  hold  over  the  party  in  the  northwest.  Like 
Douglas,  he  does  not  seem  to  have  had  any  compre- 
hension of  the  depth  of  the  moral  opposition  to 
slavery  in  the  north,  and  his  eagerness  to  settle 
sectional  questions  by  compromise  or  by  finding 
some  way  to  appease  southern  threats  won  him, 
1  See  Brown,  Douglas. 


1852]  LEADERS  45 

among  abolitionists  and  Free-Soilers,  the  name  of 
"  Arch-dough-face."  Buchanan,  with  less  courage 
and  personal  strength  than  Marcy,  held  somewhat 
the  same  position  in  Pennsylvania,  where  his  con- 
servative, steadily  partisan  record  made  him  the 
special  representative  of  the  highly  conservative 
Democratic  party  of  that  state.  At  no  time  in  his 
career  did  a  spark  of  originality  disturb  his  utter- 
ances ;  but  he  had  a  political  shrewdness  which  stood 
him  in  good  stead.  These  men,  strongly  intrenched 
in  the  party  machinery  of  their  section,  were  pre- 
pared to  make  an  obstinate  fight  for  the  principles 
of  Unionism  through  compromise. 

Among  the  Whigs  the  Unionist  leadership  was 
far  weaker.  Edward  Everett,  of  Massachusetts,  elo- 
quent, honorable,  a  lover  of  concord  and  harmony, 
was  sent  to  the  Senate  to  succeed  Webster,  but  he 
lacked  the  fighting  quality  of  men  like  Douglas,  and 
could  not  retain  leadership.  Fillmore,  after  his  re- 
tirement from  the  presidency,  remained  a  figurehead 
for  conservative  Whigs,  but  he  had  no  power  over 
people;  nor  did  Fish,  the  New  York  Whig  senator 
who  replaced  Dickinson  in  1851,  prove  to  be  a  strong 
leader ;  while  Choate,  of  Massachusetts,  distinguished 
for  eloquence  and  brilliancy,  lacked  the  willingness 
to  throw  himself  heart  and  soul  into  a  contest  for 
party  supremacy.  Nowhere  among  the  Whigs  did 
there  appear  a  figure  of  national  prominence  able 
to  carry  on  the  work  of  Clay  and  Webster 

At  the  south,  the  sincere  Unionists  were  tempora- 


46  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

rily  reinforced,  in  1850,  by  a  large  number  of  Whigs 
and  Democrats,  who  later  showed  that  at  heart  they 
were  more  sectional  than  national.  If  these  be  left 
aside,  the  number  of  consistent  Union  leaders  who 
remained  in  public  life  after  the  death  or  retirement 
of  Clay,  Benton,  Berrien,  and  the  rest,  was  compara- 
tively small.  Houston,  of  Texas,  an  original  Jack- 
sonian,  was  a  picturesque  figure  in  the  Senate  and  a 
personality  of  influence  in  his  own  state,  where  to 
the  end  he  upheld  the  cause  of  Unionism  against 
secession.  Bell,  of  Tennessee,  a  man  without  great 
gifts  as  either  speaker  or  thinker,  but  popular  in  his 
own  section  and  a  leader  of  steady  Unionism,  was 
joined  in  the  Senate  by  Crittenden,  of  Kentucky,  a 
man  of  Clay's  type  with  all  of  Clay's  fervent  Union- 
ism and  much  of  Clay's  personal  hold  over  the  peo- 
ple. Up  to  the  verge  of  the  Civil  War  these  three 
men,  with  Clayton,  of  Delaware,  a  strenuous  debater 
although  a  rather  unsuccessful  diplomat,  struggled 
to  maintain  the  traditions  of  Clay,  carrying  on  a 
contest  in  their  section  parallel  to  that  waged  by 
the  northern  Unionists. 

Now  that  the  passions  aroused  by  the  civil  conflict 
have  retired  into  the  past,  it  is  possible  to  credit 
these  Unionists,  northern  and  southern,  with  more 
genuine  honesty  and  patriotism  than  it  was  custom- 
ary to  ascribe  to  them  in  earlier  years.  The  northern 
Doughface,  willing  to  make  concessions  to  the  south 
for  the  sake  of  peace,  the  southern  Unionist,  ready 
to  forego  an  opportunity  to  advance  the  interests  of 


i86o]  LEADERS  47 

slavery  if  by  so  doing  he  could  preserve  the  Union, 
were  not  cowards  nor  traitors  to  their  sections ;  they 
were  stimulated  by  an  ideal  no  less  than  were  their 
opponents ;  and  their  failure  discredits  not  so  much 
their  patriotism  or  moral  earnestness  as  their  powers 
to  meet  the  difficult  task  imposed  upon  them.  Cer- 
tainly a  large  majority  of  the  American  people  looked 
to  these  men  as  true  patriots,  inspired  by  the  senti- 
ments expressed  in  Longfellow's  apostrophe  to  the 
Union  in  his  "Building  of  the  Ship,"  published  in 
1850;  and  even  as  late  as  1860  a  great  majority  of 
the  wealthier  classes  at  north  and  south  still  held  to 
their  point  of  view. 

Opposed  to  these  Unionists  there  stood  in  the 
north  a  growing  number  of  antislavery  political 
leaders  who  regarded  politics  from  a  wholly  different 
point  of  view.  In  their  eyes  the  controversy  over 
slavery  was  not  a  distressing  interruption  to  normal 
politics,  but  was  an  inevitable  consequence  of  their 
highest  convictions.  The  Union,  they  too  professed 
to  uphold,  and  they  uniformly  denounced  secession, 
but  they  were  ready  to  risk  harmony  and  peace 
within  the  Union  for  the  sake  of  righting  what  they 
considered  a  wrong.  Admitting  their  impotence  to 
interfere  with  slavery  in  the  states,  and  for  the  most 
part  disclaiming  the  desire  to  do  so,  they  insist- 
ed that  slavery  must  not  be  extended  into  additional 
territory,  nor  fostered  by  the  federal  government. 
Such  Unionism  was  very  different  from  that  of  Clay 
or  Foote :  it  meant  that  a  peculiar  interest  of  one  sec- 


48  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1848 

tion  was  not  to  receive  national  support  or  counte- 
nance ;  and  it  did  not  prevent  a  feeling  towards  the 
south  ranging  from  hostile  criticism  to  savage  dis- 
like. 

The  earliest  representatives  of  this  northern  sec- 
tionalism had  been  John  Quincy  Adams  and  Joshua 
R.  Giddings  in  the  House,1  joined  later  by  Hale,  of 
New  Hampshire,  in  the  Senate.  Adams  died  in  1848, 
but  Giddings  and  Hale  continued  in  Congress  during 
most  of  this  decade,  where  as  open  agitators  they 
made  incessant  attacks  on  slavery.  Of  the  two,  Gid«- 
dings  was  bitter  and  aggressive,  Hale  keen  and 
humorous ;  but  each  had  an  unerring  scent  for  those 
interests  of  slavery  which  on  their  face  did  not  refer 
to  the  "institution."  The  Free  Soil  agitation  and 
the  controversy  over  the  compromise  of  1850  brought 
into  office  a  number  of  men  who  were  destined  to  be 
the  country's  leaders  in  the  period  of  civil  war  and 
reconstruction.  Two  of  these  were  Free-Soilers — 
Chase,  of  Ohio,  and  Sumner,  of  Massachusetts — men 
who  fought  together  the  battle  of  antislavery,  and, 
while  very  different  in  personal  qualities,  were  united 
by  a  lasting  friendship  and  confidence.  Chase  was 
in  some  respects  the  abler  of  the  two,  gifted  with 
strong  practical  sense  in  legislative  matters,  good 
powers  of  debate,  and  some  of  the  useful  qualities  of 
the  managing  politician.  He  was  a  large  man  in 
every  way  but  one;  he  was  deficient  in  a  sense  of 

party  loyalty,  and,  by  his  willingness  to  advance  his 

i 
1  Cf .  Hart,  Slavery  and  Abolition  (Am.  Nation,  XVI.) ,  chap,  xviii. 


1849]  LEADERS  49 

own  interests  without  concerning  himself  much  about 
his  political  friends,  had  won  a  reputation  for  self- 
seeking  which  stood  in  his  way  in  later  life.  In  the 
Senate,  however,  his  bearing  was  admirable.1  The 
northern  compromisers  and  southern  sectionalists 
had  no  more  dangerous  opponent.  Sumner,  his  col- 
league, was  a  narrower  man,  less  of  a  politician  and 
less  of  a  legislator,  his  main  interests  lying  in  the 
slavery  contest.  He  brought  with  him  to  the  Senate 
a  florid  eloquence,  a  biting  tongue  in  debate,  and  an 
unflinching  courage  in  enunciating  the  doctrines  of 
the  antislavery  philosophy  in  the  teeth  of  the  south- 
erners, which  was  later  to  cost  him  dearly.2 

Wholly  different  from  these  men  were  two  anti- 
slavery  Whigs  who  now  came  forward.  Wade,  of 
Ohio,  was  a  fighting  northern  partisan,  a  rough, 
fearless,  practical  westerner,  with  none  of  Summer's 
eastern  scholarship  and  little  of  Chase's  solid  legal 
training  and  ability,  but  well  suited  to  aid  these 
men  in  undermining  the  hold  of  compromisers  upon 
the  north.  Seward,  of  New  York,  elected  in  1849, 
was  still  different,  for  he  was  as  much  politician 
as  antislavery  statesman.  Trained  under  Thurlow 
Weed,  the  master  of  the  Whig  machine  in  New  York, 
he  knew  all  the  details  of  party  management  and  was 
ever  guided  in  his  senatorial  career  by  considerations 
of  party  and  personal  policy.  He  did  not  love  a 
fight,  as  did  Hale,  Chase,  and  Sumner;  and  his 

1  Hart,  Chase,  chaps,  iv.,  v. 

2  Pierce,  Sumner,  I.,  chaps,  xxxv.-xlii. 


50  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1851 

speeches  in  the  Senate  were  rather  party  and  personal 
manifestoes  than  a  share  in  a  give-and-take  debate ; 
but  his  reputation  as  party  leader  often  gave  them 
an  importance  which  the  more  strictly  forensic  efforts 
of  the  others  failed  to  secure.1 

At  a  later  time  these  leaders  were  joined  by  a  host 
of  other  antislavery  representatives,  in  House  and 
Senate,  especially  Trumbull,  of  Illinois,  a  hard-hit- 
ting debater,  and  Wilson,  of  Massachusetts,  an  anti- 
slavery  politician  with  a  power  of  party  management 
equal  to  Seward's.  No  one  of  these  men,  however, 
was  individually  the  equal  of  Douglas,  and  it  was  not 
until  Abraham  Lincoln  issued  from  private  life  in 
1858  that  his  hold  upon  the  west  was  shaken. 

Over  against  the  northern  radicals  stood  a  group 
of  southern  proslavery  statesmen,  destined  to  lead 
their  states  into  secession  and  civil  war.  These  men, 
whether  nominally  Whigs  or  Democrats,  differed 
from  their  great  forerunner,  Calhoun,  in  openly  and 
frankly  holding  that  the  sectional  interests  of  their 
states  were  superior  to  any  incompatible  claims  of 
the  Union,  and  in  making  that  the  main-spring  of 
their  action.  They  regarded  the  north  with  uncon- 
cealed suspicion  and  hostility,  and  were  equally 
ready  to  secede  or  to  stay,  according  to  the  benefits 
which  their  section  derived  from  the  situation.  In- 
asmuch as  their  attitude  was  the  most  direct  threat 
to  the  perpetuity  of  the  Union,  they  were  regarded 
by  the.  northern  Unionists  as  the  chief  power  to  be 

1  Cf.  Bancroft,  Seward,  I.,  chaps,  xii.-xxi. 


1858]  LEADERS  51 

conciliated,  and  thence  came  their  strong  influence 
over  such  Whigs  as  Webster,  Everett,  and  Choate, 
and  such  Democrats  as  Cass  and  Buchanan.  No 
group  of  men  in  the  country  was  so  powerful :  they 
dictated  platforms,  inspired  executive  policy  in  do- 
mestic and  foreign  affairs,  and  exercised  in  Congress 
an  almost  unbroken  parliamentary  supremacy.  Ut- 
terly fearless  in  debate,  they  assumed  and  main- 
tained a  masterful  control  over  less  belligerent  north- 
erners, overawing  them  by  their  greater  fluency  of 
speech,  their  readiness  to  resort  to  personalities,  and 
their  hot  tempers,  which  the  social  influence  of  the 
slave-holding  south  had  not  taught  them  to  bridle.1 
Among  the  more  significant  of  these  leaders  were 
several  former  Unionists.  Senator  Toombs,  of  Geor- 
gia, whose  reputation  in  the  north  was  that  of  one  of 
the  hottest  of  the  "fire-eaters,"  was  really  less  ex- 
treme than  many  other  southerners.  Elected  as  a 
Whig  to  succeed  Berrien  in  the  Senate  in  1851,  he 
showed  himself  a  man  of  great  eloquence  and  strong 
personal  assertiveness.  In  debate  he  held  the  fore- 
most place  until  Jefferson  Davis,  of  Mississippi,  re- 
turned to  his  chair  in  1857,  when  he  became  the 
southern  spokesman.  Davis  was  a  more  logical 
speaker  than  Toombs,  less  diffuse,  and  keener. 
When  matched,  as  he  was  later,  against  the  adroit 
and  slippery  Douglas,  Davis,  by  his  directness  and 
singleness  of  aim,  showed  himself  his  equal.  These 
two  men,  insisting  on  the  rectitude  of  slavery  and 
1  Brown,  Lower  South,  61,  80. 


52  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1851 

the  rights  of  the  states,  proved  too  strong  for  the 
southern  Unionists. 

Yet  neither  Toombs  nor  Davis  at  that  time  was  a 
secessionist;  each  avowed  his  preference  for  a  con- 
tinuance of  the  Union,  but  each  showed  clearly  that 
when  the  choice  had  to  be  made  between  secession 
and  a  Union  in  which  slavery  was  restricted,  they 
would  prefer  disunion.  Some  other  southerners 
were  ready  for  secession  at  any  time,  notably  William 
L.  Yancey,  of  Alabama,  a  man  of  great  popular  elo- 
quence, a  born  agitator  and  stump-speaker,  whose 
desire  for  a  separation  from  the  north  was  so  strong 
that  he  refused  to  serve  in  any  federal  office.  Quit- 
man,  of  Mississippi,  a  strong  advocate  of  Cuban  an- 
nexation, was  also  ready  for  secession  as  soon  as 
possible,  and  many  South-Carolinians,  notably  Barn- 
well  Rhett,  who  remained  out  of  politics  during  most 
of  this  decade.  Both  Senate  and  House  in  these 
years  contained  a  group  of  southerners  of  the  Davis 
and  Yancey  type,  all  marked  by  the  same  readiness 
in  debate,  sensitiveness  to  the  rights  of  their  section, 
and  self-confident  spirit  in  all  affairs.  They  had  a 
dash,  a  vigor,  a  parliamentary  "gallantry,"  to  use 
the  favorite  southern  adjective,  entirely  lacking 
among  northern  representatives.  Such  men  as  the 
fiery  Stephens,  of  Georgia,  Howell  Cobb  and  Tver- 
son  of  the  same  state,  Clement  C.  Clay,  the  leading 
Alabama  "fire-eater,"  and  A.  G.  Brown,  of  Missis- 
sippi, had  an  advantage  in  debate  not  disturbed, 
until  just  before  the  Civil  War  the  break-down  of 


1858]  LEADERS  53 

Unionist  sentiment  at  the  north  allowed  a  number 
of  radical  opponents  of  slavery  to  enter  Congress  and 
meet  the  fire-eaters  with  equal  spirit,  if  not  with 
equal  eloquence. 

The  older  generation  of  statesmen  took  with  them 
into  the  grave  or  into  retirement  not  merely  their 
lively  Unionist  spirit,  but  also  their  old-fashioned 
opposition  to  a  partisan  civil  service.  As  a  rule, 
men  like  Clay,  Webster,  Adams,  and,  above  all  others, 
Calhoun,  had  no  love  for  office-broking,  and  looked 
with  contempt  upon  such  political  manipulation  as 
was  perfected  by  Van  Buren,  Weed,  and  other  ma- 
chine managers.  But  the  rising  generation  of  party 
leaders  in  the  north  entertained  no  such  feelings. 
Davis,  Toombs,  Seward,  Chase,  Lincoln,  and  Doug- 
las alike  considered  the  filling  of  offices  with  personal 
and  party  friends  as  the  natural  course  of  events.1 
The  last  relic  of  reluctance  to  avow  the  principles  of 
rotation  in  office  was  exhibited  when  the  Whigs, 
under  Taylor  and  Fillmore,  still  affected  to  consider 
the  turning  out  of  Democrats  to  make  place  for 
office-seekers  a  "reform."  The  claim  was  de- 
nounced as  hypocrisy  by  the  defeated  party.  "Ap- 
pointments and  removals,"  said  Bright,  of  Indiana, 
in  the  Senate,  "were  made  throughout  the  Union 
and  in  every  state  on  the  sole  ground  that  the  in- 
cumbent was  a  Democrat  and  the  applicant  a  Whig. 
If  the  removals  had  been  made  on  this  ground  I  do 

1  Salmon,  Appointing  Power,  76-85;  Fish,  Civil  Service  and 
Patronage,  161-164. 


54  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1850 

ribt  believe  there  is  a  decapitated  officer  .  .  .  that 
would  have  uttered  a  voice  of  complaint.  .  .  .  But 
when  ...  the  monstrous  defence  is  set  up  that  our 
friends  were  dishonest,  unfaithful  and  incompetent, 
a  reply  is  demanded.  .  .  .  Recollect,  Mr.  President,  I 
am  not  complaining  of  the  removal  of  my  political 
friends,  when  that  removal  is  made  under  the  regu- 
lar rules  and  articles  of  political  warfare."  1 

When  Pierce  came  in,  the  pressure  for  office  was 
overwhelming;  and  the  kind-hearted  president,  be- 
wildered by  the  unbounded  demands  of  office-seekers, 
and  unable  to  say  "  no  "  to  any  one,  was  driven  to 
distraction  before  the  expiration  of  a  year  of  his  term. 
His  fruitless  efforts  to  please  everybody  succeeded 
merely  in  causing  heart-burnings,  and  in  leading  to  a 
complete  rupture  of  the  New  York  Democrats  into 
two  factions,  the  Hard -shells  and  the  Soft-shells,  who 
formed  distinct  organizations  and  remained  bitterly 
at  war  for  three  years.2 

Four  years  later,  at  the  accession  of  Buchanan,  the 
theory  of  rotation  in  office  reached  its  full  develop- 
ment, for  although  one  Democratic  president  suc- 
ceeded another,  the  pressure  for  removals  was  nearly 
as  strong  as  though  there  had  been  a  party  change. 
Accordingly,  almost  without  arousing  comment,  Bu- 
chanan turned  large  numbers  of  Pierce's  appointees 
out  of  office  in  order  to  make  places  for  new  Demo- 

1  Cong.  Globe,  31  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  155,  156. 

2  Fish,  Civil  Service  and  Patronage,  165;  Rhodes,  United  States, 
I..  385-389.  399.  419-421. 


1857]  LEADERS  55 

cratic  incumbents.1  Marcy  merely  provoked  a  smile 
when  he  remarked,  "They  have  it  that  I  am  the 
author  of  the  doctrine  that  'to  the  victors  belong 
the  spoils,'  but  I  should  never  recommend  the  policy 
of  pillaging  my  own  camp."  The  last  vestiges  of 
opposition  to  the  reign  of  spoils  in  federal  offices 
seemed  to  have  disappeared.  At  the  south,  how- 
ever, the  system  was  less  fully  developed.  The  per- 
sonal and  local  character  of  politics  prevented  the 
rise  of  a  class  of  office-seekers  dependent  upon  pat- 
ronage for  a  livelihood,  and  kept  the  federal  service 
in  these  states  comparatively  free  from  plunder.2 

Another  feature  of  the  new  politics  of  the  decade 
was  the  appearance  of  corruption.  The  industrial 
development  of  the  north  at  this  time,  the  growth  of 
large  cities,  and  the  influx  of  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  ignorant  foreigners,  largely  Irish  and  German, 
produced  the  first  unmistakable  signs  of  a  new  era 
in  machine  politics.  For  the  first  time  one  encoun- 
ters in  the  newspapers  of  these  years  rumors  of  the 
lavish  use  of  money  in  elections  and  of  bribery  in 
legislatures.  Actual  corruption  was  proved  in  con- 
nection with  land  grants  by  a  Wisconsin  legislature 
in  1856,  and  with  the  tariff  of  1857.  "  Bribery  is  com- 
paratively of  recent  introduction  in  our  country," 
wrote  one  observer.  "  Its  effects  are  only  very  par- 

1  Fish,  Civil  Service  and  Patronage,  166;  Salmon,  Appoint- 
ing Power,  84;  Taney  to  Pierce,  August  29,  1857,  in  Am.  Hist. 
Rev.,  X.,  359. 

^Charleston  Mercury,  April  4,  1857;  Fish,  Civil  Service  and 
Patronage,  157. 

VOL.  XVIII. — 5 


56  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1849 

tially  developed,  but  the  rapid  progress  it  has  made 
within  a  few  years  is  a  fact  too  prominent  to  be  over- 
looked and  a  warning  too  serious  and  too  significant 
to  be  disregarded.  ...  In  some  states  wealthy  and 
powerful  corporations  have  usurped  absolute  power, 
controlling  both  the  legislative  and  judicial  action — 
its  officers  openly  boasting  that  they  carry  the  state 
in  their  pockets  and  that  their  corporation  is  rich 
enough  to  buy  any  legislation  they  want."  1  There 
is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  one  party  was  materially 
better  than  the  other :  a  Democratic  legislature  and 
Republican  governor  in  Wisconsin  took  "  gratuities  " 
from  a  railway  with  equal  facility,2  and  though  the 
municipal  corruption  of  New  York  City  occurred 
under  Democratic  rule,  the  largest  defaulter  in  a 
state  office  at  this  time  was  a  Republican  treasurer 
of  Ohio  during  Chase's  governorship. 

Two  scandals  connected  with  cabinet  officers  took 
place  under  Whig  administrations:  the  Galphin 
claim,  in  which  George  W.  Crawford,  secretary  of 
war  under  Taylor,  secured  one-half  the  payment  of 
the  arrears  of  interest  on  a  Revolutionary  claim, 
amounting  to  ninety-four  thousand  dollars ;  and  the 
Gardiner  claim,  where  Corwin,  as  secretary  of  the 
treasury,  received  large  sums  from  a  claim  later 
proved  fraudulent.3  In  Buchanan's  term,  also,  the 
Covode  investigation,  of  a  bitterly  partisan  char- 

1  Hazard,  Economics  and  Politics,  118, 120. 

2  Tuttle,  Wisconsin,  346,  356. 

3  Rhodes,  United  States,  I.,  203,  298. 


1853]  LEADERS  57 

acter,  found  evidence  of  corruption  in  purchasing 
votes  in  Congress  for  an  administration  measure  by 
contracts,  offices,  and  money  bribes.  These  charges 
Buchanan  denied  sweepingly  but  ineffectually.1  It 
was  definitely  proved  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil 
War  that  Floyd,  Buchanan's  secretary  of  war,  was 
a  defaulter  under  circumstances  which  showed  a 
singularly  dull  sense  of  official  propriety. 

In  New  York  City  the  employment  of  municipal 
offices  to  fill  the  pockets  of  party  leaders  was  now 
in  full  operation.  During  years  of  turbulent  poli- 
tics, in  which  the  figure  of  Fernando  Wood,  the  first 
successful  city  boss,  occupied  the  central  place,  the 
voters  struggled  with  dishonest  primary  inspectors, 
corrupt  election  judges,  and  self -seeking  leaders  whose 
desire  for  reform  was  wholly  subordinate  to  their 
personal  interests.  In  1853  there  came  an  exposure 
of  corruption  of  the  kind  which  on  many  later  occa- 
sions has  produced  waves  of  "reform."  Bribery  in 
the  awarding  of  street  railway  franchises,  corrupt 
contracts,  the  sale  of  offices,  and  inefficiency  on  the 
part  of  the  police  were  revealed ;  but  the  strong  con- 
trol maintained  by  Wood  over  the  voters  was  suffi- 
cient to  bring  him  into  power  after  a  brief  interval 
of  "reform"  government  by  a  coalition  candidate.2 

In  the  decade  after  1850  the  elements  of  later 
political  life  were  plainly  visible.  The  old  methods 
of  Jacksonian  days  were  superseded  by  a  more  so- 

1  House  Exec.  Docs.,  36  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  648. 

2  Myers,  Tammany  Hall,  178-230. 


58  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

phisticated  machinery,  in  which  the  nominating  con- 
vention, party  committee,  and  newspaper  organ  were 
not  merely  means  for  carrying  elections,  but  were 
the  field  of  operations  of  a  perfectly  well-defined 
class  of  professional  politicians.  The  industrial  rev- 
olution taking  place  in  American  economic  life  was 
affecting  politics  and  making  of  them  a  business  in 
city  and  country.  The  advent  of  a  new  political 
generation  in  the  north  meant  the  control  of  political 
life  by  men  who  were  at  the  same  time  more  elevated 
than  their  predecessors  in  their  conception  of  per- 
sonal liberty,  and  less  elevated  towards  party  or- 
ganization and  corrupt  politics. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE   ERA  OF  RAILROAD   BUILDING 
(1850-1857) 

ONE  of  the  chief  reasons  for  the  hearty  accept- 
ance of  the  compromise  measures  as  a  final 
settlement  was  the  fact  that  they  were  adopted  in 
the  midst  of  an  era  of  great  economic  prosperity  and 
optimism.  To  the  men  of  the  decade  before  the 
Civil  War,  the  real  interests  of  the  country  were 
financial,  commercial,  and  industrial,  and  in  their 
eyes  the  slavery  controversy  was  an  annoying  inter- 
ruption. Foremost  among  the  causes  for  congratu- 
lation after  the  compromise  was  the  opportunity 
for  undivided  attention  to  the  absorbing  expansion 
of  the  country's  business. 

The  most  striking  economic  fact  of  these  years  is 
the  extension  of  the  railway  systems  of  the  United 
States  from  the  seaboard  into  the  great  plains,  and 
the  creation  of  a  new  economic  balance.  Under  the 
influence  of  this  new  opportunity  for  exchange  there 
came  a  great  growth  of  American  manufacturing, 
stimulated  in  addition  by  the  sudden  deluge  of  Cali- 
fornian  gold  and  the  temporary  disorganization  of 
European  economic  conditions  through  the  Crimean 


60  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1849 

War.  All  these  agencies  combined  to  bring  an  era 
of  confidence,  hope,  and  expansion  in  agriculture,  in- 
dustry, and  finance. 

The  construction  of  the  first  railways  began  slowly 
in  the  eastern  states,1  and  for  many  years  was  car- 
ried on  as  an  adjunct  to  river,  canal,  or  other  water 
carriage.  The  total  number  of  miles  built  from  1830 
to  1848  was  under  6000;  but  after  that  year  rail- 
roads suddenly  became  a  mania,  and  no  less  than 
16,500  miles  were  laid  down  between  1849  and  1857, 
the  larger  part  in  the  interior.  The  barrier  of  the 
Appalachian  Mountain  system  was  penetrated  by 
seven  trunk  lines,  and  these  by  their  connections  in 
the  central  states  were  able  to  reach  the  Ohio  River 
at  eight  places  and  the  Mississippi  at  ten.  The  first 
railroad  to  make  a  through  connection  to  the  lakes 
was  the  New  York  Central  system  in  1850;  next 
followed  the  Erie  road,  whose  completion  to  Dun- 
kirk in  1851  was  celebrated  by  a  journey  of  the  Fill- 
more  cabinet,  including  Webster,  from  one  end  to 
the  other.  Farther  south  the  Pennsylvania  road 
reached  Pittsburg  in  1852,  and  the  Baltimore  and 
Ohio  road  was  completed  to  Wheeling  in  1853,  the 
same  year  in  which  the  Grand  Trunk  line  was 
opened  between  Portland  and  Montreal.  In  con- 
trast to  these  important  connections  between  the 
northern  seaboard  and  the  interior,  the  southern 
communications  lagged  behind,  none  being  com- 

*Cf.    MacDonald,  Jacksonian   Democracy,   chap,   vii.;    Hart. 
Slavery  and  Abolition,  chap.  iii.  (Am.  Nation,  XV.,  XVI.). 


i857]  TRANSPORTATION  61 

pleted  before  1857.  In  this  period  the  northeastern 
states  built  nearly  4000  miles,  the  south  Atlantic 
states  only  2750;  the  northern  central  states  con- 
structed no  less  than  7530  miles,  the  southern  in- 
terior states  only  2I50.1  In  the  "Old  Northwest" 
this  expansion  was  fairly  extravagant,  railways  radi- 
ating from  city  to  city  until  the  region  speedily  be- 
came a  net-work.  The  road-beds,  it  is  true,  were 
often  of  such  a  character  as  to  appall  an  English 
engineer,  and  the  cars  and  engines  appeared  flimsy; 
but,  such  as  they  were,  they  represented  a  great 
sinking  of  capital  in  a  still  sparsely  settled  com- 
munity. 

This  extension  of  railways  was  not  merely  the 
venture  of  capitalists,  but  the  absorbing  interest  of 
the  people  of  the  country.  Where  the  laws  permit- 
ted them,  cities  and  counties  subscribed  liberally  for 
the  mortgage  bonds  which  were  the  usual  means  of 
securing  capital,  and  carried  on  fierce  rivalries  for 
the  possession  of  railway  communications.  Indi- 
viduals contributed  from  motives  of  local  patriotism 
as  well  as  from  a  desire  to  speculate,  and  popular 
meetings  to  agitate  for  branch  lines  and  short  con- 
nections gave  the  movement  a  semi-political  aspect. 
Intense  indignation  was  stirred  up  in  New  York, 
Buffalo,  Cleveland,  and  Cincinnati  when  the  people 
of  the  town  of  Erie,  in  order  to  preserve  business  for 
their  freight-handlers  and  hotels,  forcibly  prevented 
the  alteration  of  the  broad-gauge  railroad  tracks  in 

1  Eighth  Census  of  the  U.  S.,  Miscellaneous  Statistics,  323. 


62  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

its  territory  to  conform  to  the  width  of  connecting 
lines.  The  "Erie  war"  attracted  general  interest 
in  the  early  part  of  1854,  and  the  railroads  were  for 
a  time  held  at  bay;  but  the  contest  ended  in  the 
defeat  of  the  obstructionists.  All  felt  that  the  only 
salvation  of  a  community  from  economic  death  de- 
pended upon  good  steam  communications  with  the 
eastern  seaboard,  or  at  least  with  the  leading  lake  or 
river  cities.  In  this  way,  in  the  years  from  1850- 
1857,  ^ne  main  lines  of  the  present  railway  system 
of  the  United  States  east  of  Chicago  were  brought 
into  being.1 

Westerners  rose  to  rhapsody  in  contemplating  the 
situation.  "The  West  is  no  longer  the  West,  nor 
even  the  great  West,"  said  an  enthusiastic  Ohioan, 
"it  is  the  great  Centre.  .  .  .  The  change  is  coming 
upon  us  so  rapidly  that  only  the  young  can  fully 
appreciate  it.  Like  a  splendid  dream  will  it  appear 
to  people  of  mature  age.  Before  the  census  of  1860, 
the  whistle  of  the  locomotive  and  the  roar  of  the 
rolling  train  will  be  heard  at  nearly  every  house  and 
hamlet  of  the  wide  central  plain,  and  no  one  but  a 
hermit  will  be  willing  to  live  beyond  the  cheering 
sounds.  .  .  .  The  imagination  can  conceive  nothing 
more  imposing  than  this  march  of  humanity  west- 
ward, to  enter  into  possession  of  *  Time's  noblest 
Empire.'"2 

The  telegraph,  also,  first  used  extensively  in  this 

1  Rhodes,  United  States,  III.,  21. 

*De  Boiv's  Review,  XV,  50  (July,  1853). 


1860]  TRANSPORTATION  63 

decade,  spread  with  the  railways  and  branched  into 
every  important  community.  Mail  routes  took  im- 
mediate advantage  of  the  new  lines,  and  Congress 
was  led,  in  1851,  to  pass  a  cheap-postage  law.  By 
1855  the  chief  elements  of  the  modern  commercial 
world  —  namely,  rapid  transportation  and  prompt 
and  easy  communication  by  mail  and  telegraph — 
were  established. 

The  general  effect  of  this  rush  into  railroad  build- 
ing was  to  upset  the  previous  economic  balance  of 
the  country.  Prior  to  1850  the  only  routes  of  trans- 
portation from  the  interior,  except  the  turnpike 
roads  over  the  mountains,  were  the  Great  Lakes  and 
the  Erie  Canal  or  the  Mississippi  outlet  to  the  Gulf. 
The  traffic  of  the  country  ran,  as  a  rule,  upon  north 
and  south  lines,  the  northern  seaboard  states  trading 
with  the  southern  by  water,  and  the  northern  interior 
states  reaching  the  southern  central  states  and  the 
exterior  world  by  the  great  river  system  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi and  its  branches.  But  after  1850  the  open- 
ing of  the  trunk  lines  made  it  possible  for  the  farmer 
of  the  west  to  ship  his  wool,  cattle,  and  grain  directly 
to  the  east,  and  receive  in  exchange  the  products  of 
eastern  mills  and  the  wares  of  the  importer.  The 
whole  current  of  trade  in  the  free  states  swung 
in  a  new  direction  within  a  few  years.  Yet  the 
inland  and  sea -coast  navigation  of  these  years 
did  not  feel  the  competition  of  railways  suffi- 
ciently to  keep  it  from  continuing  with  great  vig- 
or, carried  on  by  a  host  of  light  -  draught,  high- 


64  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

sided  river  -  steamers  and  a  growing  fleet  of  sail 
and  steam  craft  upon  the  ocean  and  the  Great 
Lakes. 

The  rush  into  railway  building  was  accompanied 
by  a  rising  demand  for  government  assistance  from 
the  promoters  in  the  western  states,  backed  in  most 
cases  by  the  state  legislatures.  The  first  grant  of 
public  lands,  in  response  to  such  an  appeal,  was  the 
donation,  in  1850,  of  two  and  a  half  million  acres  in 
the  states  between  Lake  Michigan  and  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico  to  the  state  of  Illinois,  by  which  it  was  to  be 
transferred  to  the  Illinois  Central  Railroad.  This 
precedent  was  eagerly  pressed  by  other  western  and 
southern  states,  but  of  fifteen  similar  land-grant 
bills  to  pass  the  Senate  in  1851,  only  one  passed  the 
House.  In  1853,  however,  Illinois,  Mississippi, 
Alabama,  Missouri,  and  Arkansas  received  coveted 
grants  of  land  to  be  transferred  to  railways,  and  in 
1856  no  less  than  nineteen  million  acres  were  given 
for  railroads  in  Florida,  Alabama,  Louisiana,  Missis- 
sippi, Michigan,  Wisconsin,  Iowa,  and  Minnesota. 
The  years  following  were  busily  occupied  by  the 
states  mentioned  in  transmitting  these  gifts  to  rail- 
way corporations,  though  seldom  with  immediate 
satisfactory  results.1 

In  addition  to  this  federal  munificence,  several 
states,  especially  Tennessee,  Georgia,  and  Florida,  en- 
tered into  financial  support  of  railways  which  proved 

1  Sanborn,  Cong.  Grants  of  Land  to  Railways,  chaps,  ii.-iv., 
App.  A;  Hart,  Practical  Essays  in  Am.  Govt.,  257. 


1860]  TRANSPORTATION  65 

at  a  later  time  a  serious  embarrassment . *  The  largest 
scheme  was  that  of  a  railroad  to  the  Pacific,  to  be 
built  by  the  aid  of  federal  land-grants  of  alternate 
sections  along  the  line  of  the  projected  road.  In 
spite  of  constant  efforts  by  the  California  senators,  no 
bill  passed  up  to  the  Civil  War,  mainly  because  of  the 
bitter  quarrels  over  the  eastern  terminal ;  just  as  rival 
towns  struggled  for  railway  connections,  so  the  north 
and  south  pulled  against  each  other  in  urging  New 
Orleans,  St.  Louis,  or  Chicago. 

During  these  years  the  long-standing  pressure  for 
government  aid  to  internal  and  sea-coast  navigation 
was  not  forgotten.  President  Pierce's  Democratic 
scruples,  based  on  traditions  of  Madison,  Monroe,  and 
Jackson,  were  put  to  the  test  which  Polk  and  Tyler 
had  been  obliged  to  meet,  and,  like  them,  Pierce  did 
not  flinch.  In  1854  his  veto  blocked  an  internal 
improvement  bill,  but  in  1856,  when  he  returned  five 
bills  for  deepening  the  channels  of  interior  and  sea- 
coast  rivers,  a  Democratic  Senate  joined  an  opposi- 
tion House  in  passing  them  over  his  veto.2 

Side  by  side  with  these  schemes  for  aiding  rail- 
ways and  steamers  went  demands  upon  Congress  and 
the  state  legislatures  to  regulate  them.  There  was 
crying  need  for  protection  against  the  accidents 
which,  in  the  age  of  reckless  construction  and 
unskilled  operation,  happened  with  appalling  fre- 

1  Scott,  Repudiation  of  State  Debts,  51,  67,  98,  131;   De  Bow's 
Review,  XX.,  386  (March,  1856). 

2  Mason,  Veto  Power,  101-103. 


66  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

quency.  The  number  of  deaths  from  railway  col- 
lisions and  steamboat  explosions  and  wrecks  were 
such  as  in  a  time  of  less  buoyant  optimism  would 
have  filled  the  country  with  horror.  In  the  first 
seven  months  of  1853  the  New  York  Herald  counted 
65  railway  accidents;  the  total  for  1855  was  142. 
This  was  equalled  by  the  list  of  steamboat  acci- 
dents on  the  western  rivers,  which  in  1853  amounted 
to  1 38.*  The  states  struggled,  without  great  suc- 
cess, to  render  travel  less  murderous  by  placing 
pecuniary  responsibility  for  losses  upon  the  rail 
road  companies.  Congress,  with  more  decisive  re- 
sults, regulated  steamboat  traffic  by  an  act  passed  in 
1852  which  provided  for  the  inspection  and  licensing 
of  steam  vessels  engaged  in  interstate  commerce, 
with  a  view  to  enforce  safety  in  construction  and 
equipment.2 

Such  mighty  changes  had  marked  effects  in  trans- 
portation and  upon  the  agricultural  life  of  the  coun- 
try. The  grain  of  the  interior  found  an  increased 
market  in  the  east  and  in  Europe,  its  sale  abroad 
being  stimulated  by  the  reduction  of  the  English 
corn  tariffs  and  the  loss  of  the  Russian  grain  supply 
during  the  Crimean  War.  The  northwest,  hitherto 
content  to  feed  the  south,  now  found  itself  called 
upon  to  send  its  surplus  to  Europe,  and  the  grain 
crops  of  the  land  swelled  correspondingly  from  one 

1  De  Bow's  Review,  XVII.,  305  (September,  1854),  XX.,  393 
(March,  1851). 

2  Cong.  Globe,  32  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  1667-1672,  1737-1742. 


i86o]  TRANSPORTATION  67 

hundred  million  bushels  in  1850  to  one  hundred  and 
seventy-one  millions  in  1860,  of  which  more  than 
one-half  was  grown  in  the  "  Old  Northwest."  Ohio, 
Indiana,  Illinois,  and  Wisconsin  replaced  New  York, 
Pennsylvania,  and  Virginia  as  the  leading  grain 
states.  In  the  same  way  the  centre  of  the  grazing 
industry  passed  in  this  decade  from  the  northeast  to 
the  states  north  of  the  Ohio  River  and  to  Texas, 
which  furnished  the  bulk  of  the  wool  grown  in  the 
United  States.1 

In  the  south  the  railways  shared,  although  to  a 
less  degree,  in  causing  the  great  prosperity  of  the 
cotton-growers,  which  in  this  decade  of  general  ex- 
pansion seemed  to  surpass  that  of  any  other  class 
in  the  Union.  In  spite  of  the  rapid  extension  of  the 
cotton  culture  in  the  southwest,  and  the  increase  of 
crops  from  an  average  of  two  million  one  hundred 
thousand  bales  before  1850  to  more  than  three  mill- 
ion three  hundred  thousand,  the  world's  demand 
seemed  unlimited,  and  the  price  remained  at  a  profit- 
able level.2  If  the  prosperity  of  the  whole  region 
might  be  gauged  by  the  success  of  this  single  crop — 
and  southern  writers  and  speakers  invariably  as- 
sumed that  such  was  the  case — the  south  was  unde- 
niably on  the  top  wave.  Never  were  prices  for 
slaves  higher  nor  the  demand  for  their  labor  steadier. 
From  all  parts  of  the  "cotton  states  "  railroads  and 
river-steamers  brought  to  the  exporting  centres  the 

1  Eighth  Census  of  U.  S.,  Agriculture,  184-191. 
-  Hammond,  Cotton  Industry,  250,  App.  i. 


68  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

one  never-failing  and  profitable  product.  The  value 
of  exports  of  cotton  grew  from  an  average  amount 
of  sixty  million  dollars  to  a  hundred  millions  in  the 
years  1850-1857;  and  it  was  estimated  that  three- 
fourths  of  the  total  world's  supply  was  furnished  by 
the  Gulf  states .  ' '  Cotton  is  King, ' '  said  the  southern 
planter,  and  few  ventured  to  contradict  him.  "In 
the  three  million  bags  of  cotton  the  slave -labor 
annually  throws  upon  the  world  for  the  poor  and 
naked,"  wrote  one,  "we  are  doing  more  to  advance 
civilization  .  .  .  than  all  the  canting  philanthropists 
of  New  and  Old  England  will  do  in  centuries. 
Slavery  is  the  backbone  of  the  Northern  commercial 
as  it  is  of  the  British  manufacturing  system.  .  .  . 
Our  labor  has  enabled  us  to  make  New  England 
rich."  1 

The  agricultural  prosperity  of  the  west  and  south 
was  matched  by  a  new  industrial  prosperity  in  the 
northeast,  where  all  kinds  of  manufacturing  felt  a 
great  impetus.  The  completion  of  the  railroad  con- 
nections with  the  interior  offered  an  opportunity 
which  the  business  men  of  New  England,  New  York, 
and  Pennsylvania  were  not  slow  to  seize  upon.  A 
rapid  extension  of  manufactures  followed,  especial- 
ly in  the  staples,  such  as  cotton  goods,  shoes,  house- 
hold articles,  and  the  cheaper  sorts  of  woollens. 
The  production  of  pig-iron  increased  from  an  esti- 
mated output  of  564,755  tons  in  1850  to  883,137 
in  1856,  and  iron  manufacturing  followed,  although 
lDe  Bow's  Review,  XVII.,  284,  365. 


i857]  TRANSPORTATION  69 

more  slowly.  The  optimism  of  the  western  farmer 
was  fully  equalled  by  the  enthusiasm  of  the  eastern 
manufacturer.1 

In  the  face  of  the  attractive  field  for  investment 
offered  by  this  new  traffic  of  east  with  west,  the  long- 
established  importance  of  the  ship-building  industry 
was  now  first  threatened.  In  these  years,  between 
1850  and  1857,  American  shipping  reached  its  maxi- 
mum, a  flush  of  prosperity  crowning  a  long  period  of 
success,  before  the  inevitable  decline  resulting  from 
the  diversion  of  the  capital  once  invested  in  it  to  more 
lucrative  fields .  These  were  the  days  of  the  American 
clipper-ships,  marvels  of  speed  and  carrying-power 
under  sail,2  and  they  were  also  days  of  expansion  in 
coasting-trade,  new  steamship  lines  being  established 
from  one  end  of  the  Atlantic  seaboard  to  the  other, 
and  to  Central  and  South  America.  In  the  trans- 
atlantic trade,  the  Collins  line,  aided  by  a  govern- 
ment subsidy,  built  a  fleet  of  paddle-wheel  steamers 
which  vigorously  competed  with  the  British  Cunard 
mail  line.  Under  the  stimulus  of  the  great  export 
and  import  trade,  the  American  merchant  marine 
grew  prodigiously,  almost  doubling  its  tonnage  be- 
tween 1850  and  1855,  so  that  although  British  ves- 
sels were  given  reciprocal  trading  privileges,  fully 
three-quarters  of  the  country's  foreign  trade  was 
carried  on  in  American  bottoms.  The  change  from 
wood  to  iron  as  the  standard  for  marine  construction, 

1  Swank,  Iron  in  all  Ages,  376 ;  Stanwood,  Tariff  Controversies, 
II.,  87.  *  Harper's  Magazine,  LXV.,  123  (July,  1882). 


70  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1850 

although  officially  recognized  by  the  Lloyds  in  1854, 
did  not  affect  the  well-being  of  American  shipping 
during  these  years  of  prosperity.1 

During  this  period  the  steady  flow  of  gold  from 
California  powerfully  affected  the  commercial  imagi- 
nation, creating  the  general  sense  of  an  inexhaust- 
ible reservoir  of  wealth  and  stimulating  commerce 
and  financial  expansion.  Nevertheless,  although 
the  mints  from  1850  to  1857  added  an  annual  aver- 
age of  nearly  fifty  millions  in  gold  to  the  coinage, 
there  was  no  sharp  general  rise  in  prices  which  could 
be  laid  to  an  increase  in  the  currency.  The  range 
of  prices  in  1850-1857  appears  to  have  been  a  result 
of  sanguine  spirit  and  business  confidence  rather 
than  of  inflation.  The  explanation  is  partly  to  be 
found  in  the  fact  that  gold  became  a  regular  article 
of  export  during  these  years,  and  two-thirds  of  the 
total  product,  at  least,  left  the  country.2 

An  inevitable  concomitant  of  the  expansion  of 
industry  and  transportation  was  an  expansion  in 
banking,  in  order  to  furnish  the  credit  necessary  to 
put  the  new  enterprises  into  operation.  From  1850 
to  1857  the  number  of  banks,  all  under  state  charters, 
increased  from  824  to  1416,  and  the  banking  capital 
from  $217,000,000  to  $343,000,000,  while  circula- 
tion and  deposits  nearly  doubled.  To  meet  the  ob- 
ligations there  was  a  specie  reserve  of  less  than 
one-seventh,  clearly  indicating  a  speculative  spirit. 

1  Wells,  Our  Merchant  Marine,  8-17 ;  Bates,  American  Marine, 
138-145.  2  Dunbar,  Economic  Essays,  267. 


1857]  TRANSPORTATION  71 

The  optimism  and  confidence  of  the  country's  finan- 
ciers was  shown  still  more  by  the  increase  of  loans 
from  $364,000,000  to  $684,000,000,  the  repayment 
of  which  rested  upon  the  success  of  new  industrial 
ventures  and  the  earning  power  of  the  new  rail- 
roads.1 

The  condition  of  these  fourteen  hundred  banks 
was  far  from  uniform.  In  the  east,  where  the  insti- 
tution of  clearing-houses  was  now  established,  they 
were  careful,  and,  on  the  whole,  sound ;  but  in  some 
of  the  western  and  southern  states,  notably  Illinois, 
they  were  recklessly  extravagant  and  speculative. 
In  nine  states  the  revulsion  against  banks  which 
followed  the  crisis  of  1837  led  to  their  absolute  pro- 
hibition by  state  constitution  or  by  popular  refer- 
endum; and  in  most  states  attempts  were  made  in 
these  years  to  regulate  and  safeguard  the  practice 
of  banking.  No  legislation,  however,  was  adequate 
to  secure  to  bank-notes  anything  like  an  approxi- 
mately equal  value  in  different  states,  or  to  prevent 
rashness  in  the  management  of  bank  capital;  but 
for  the  time  being  universal  prosperity  obscured  all 
doubts.2 

The  course  of  foreign  trade  in  these  years  reflected 
the  expansion  of  credit  and  commercial  optimism. 
Exports,  mainly  of  agricultural  products,  rose  from 
$137,000,000  in  1850  to  $338,000,000  in  1857,  while 
imports  grew  at  the  same  time  from  $178,000,000  to 

1  Senate  Exec.  Docs.,  37  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  No.  2,  pp.  358-360. 

2  Sumner,  Banking  in  all  Nations,  I.,  416-456. 


72  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

$360,000,000,  thus  creating  an  annual  balance  against 
the  United  States  of  nearly  thirty  million  dollars.1 
This  apparent  deficit  was  largely  made  up  by  act- 
ual shipments  of  California  gold  and  by  European 
investments  in  American  railway  projects  to  an 
amount  variously  estimated  at  from  two  hundred  to 
five  hundred  million  dollars.2  The  fact  is  also  to  be 
remembered  that  the  carrying-trade,  still  mainly  in 
American  hands,  earned  high  freights.  Notwith- 
standing contemporary  alarm  over  an  abnormal  for- 
eign trade  and  reckless  importation  of  luxuries,  there 
is  nothing  to  show  that  the  commerce  was  beyond 
the  abilities  of  the  country.3 

Government  finances  during  these  years  offered 
no  points  of  interest  or  difficulty  beyond  paying  off 
the  debts  contracted  during  the  Mexican  War,  for 
the  annexations  of  California  and  Texas,  and  for 
the  Gadsden  purchase,  and  providing  for  coining  the 
sudden  flood  of  gold.  The  coinage  acts  of  1850  and 
1 8  53  practically  made  gold  the  standard,  with  sub- 
sidiary silver.  Reduction  of  the  debt  was  made 
possible  by  a  surplus  revenue  resulting  from  the 
heavy  importations,  and  under  the  provisions  of  an 
act  of  1853  Secretary  Guthrie,  during  Pierce's  ad- 
ministration, was  able  to  purchase  United  States  se- 
curities at  market  prices.  In  this  and  other  ways 
the  debt  was  reduced  from  $68,000,000  in  1850  to 

1  Senate  Exec.  Docs.,  37  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  No.  2,  p.  223. 

2  Rhodes,  United  States,  III.,  53. 

3  Dunbar,  Economic  Essays,  268. 


i8S7]  TRANSPORTATION  73 

less  than  $29,000,000  in  1857.*  Nevertheless,  gold 
continued  to  accumulate  in  the  sub-treasuries,  and 
although  Guthrie  was  a  firm  believer  in  the  sub- 
treasury  system,  and  had  done  much  to  improve  its 
operation,2  he  felt  this  hoarding  to  be  unhealthy, 
and  repeatedly  recommended  a  revision  of  the  cus- 
toms duties,  from  which  nearly  nine-tenths  of  the 
revenue  was  derived. 

To  diminish  the  unwelcome  surplus,  the  exist- 
ing tariff  of  1846  was  reduced  in  the  last  month  of 
Pierce 's  administration  by  a  bill  which  passed  almost 
without  debate  and  without  eliciting  popular  interest. 
Protectionism  as  a  political  force  seemed  dead.  The 
tariff  of  1846  probably  did  not  afford  certain  in- 
dustries, notably  the  woollen,  sufficient  protection 
to  enable  them  to  endure  competition  from  English 
mills ;  but  although  the  woollen  men,  when  the  tariff 
was  under  consideration,  exerted  themselves  to  se- 
cure relief  by  getting  wool  on  the  free  list,  they  failed. 
Only  the  lowest  grades  were  so  treated  and  the  situa- 
tion in  the  finer  woollens  remained  unaltered.  The 
House  and  Senate  showed  great  indecision,  adopting 
the  most  inconsistent  amendments,  but  finally  they 
joined  in  reducing  the  rates  on  the  schedules  of  the 
tariff  of  1846  by  one-fifth  to  one-half.  The  vote  for 
the  bill  bore  no  relation  to  party  or  sectional  feeling, 
and  seems  to  have  included  both  advocates  of  pro- 
tection and  of  free-trade.  Every  Massachusetts  and 

1  Dewey,  Financial  Hist,  of  the  U.  S.,  248-274, 

2  Kinley,  Independent  Treasury,  46-64^ 


74  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1857 

every  South  Carolina  member  voted  for  it.  The 
issue  which  had  been  so  prominent  a  generation  ear- 
lier seemed  to  have  dropped  out  of  sight.1 

So  the  country  came  to  the  end  of  Pierce 's  term 
in  the  flood-tide  of  prosperity,  hopefulness,  and  con- 
tentment. If  there  were  occasional  doubters  who 
queried  the  security  of  the  foundations  for  the  great 
expansion  of  credit,  and  doubted  the  immediate  re- 
turns from  all  the  new  railways  and  mills,  their 
voices  were  drowned  in  the  general  assertion  of  a 
magnificent  industrial,  agricultural,  and  financial 
future  spreading  before  the  "happiest  people  on 
God's  earth." 

1  Stanwood,  Tariff  Controversies,  II.,  83-109. 


CHAPTER   VI 

DIPLOMACY  AND  TROPICAL  EXPANSION 
(1850-1855) 

DURING  the  years  after  the  compromise,  the 
foreign  relations  of  the  United  States  were 
characterized  by  the  same  sense  of  national  impor- 
tance and  spirit  of  expansion  which  brought  about 
the  annexation  of  Texas,  the  Oregon  controversy, 
and  the  Mexican  War.1  A  feeling  of  "manifest  des- 
tiny" was  in  the  air;  people  looked  for  additions  of 
territory  to  the  southward,  and  approved  of  a  policy 
of  national  assertion  at  the  expense  of  neighboring 
states  and  of  European  powers.  It  was  an  era  of  a 
crude  belief  in  the  universal  superiority  of  " Ameri- 
can institutions,"  a  lofty  contempt  for  the  "effete 
monarchies"  of  Europe,  and  a  strong  sense  of  the 
righteousness  of  any  aggressive  action  which  the 
republic  might  undertake.  Although  the  secretaries 
of  state  during  this  period  were  northern  men  of  the 
older  race  of  statesmen,  Clayton,  Webster,  and  Ever- 
ett under  Fillmore,  Marcy  under  Pierce,  and  Cass 
under  Buchanan ;  and  were  inclined  by  their  political 

1  Cf.    Garrison,    Westward    Extension    (Am.    Nation,    XVII.), 
chaps,  i.,  vi.,  xi.,  xiv. 


76  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1849 

experience  and  their  mature  years  towards  a  cau- 
tious policy,  they  could  not  avoid  being  influenced 
by  the  prevailing  spirit  and  showing  it  in  language 
and  action. 

The  chief  obstacle  in  the  way  of  a  vigorous  foreign 
policy,  expressing  this  spirit  of  "manifest  destiny," 
was  the  strong  dislike  which  had  grown  up  in  the 
northern  states  towards  any  annexation  involving 
an  increase  of  slave  territory.  This  feeling  was 
shared  by  conservatives  and  anti-slavery  men  alike, 
and  its  existence,  although  veiled  in  the  era  of  politi- 
cal calm,  was  known  to  the  statesmen  in  charge  of 
foreign  affairs  and  had  a  strong  restraining  influence. 
Not  even  Marcy,  the  boldest  of  them  all,  was  inclined 
to  take  any  radical  action  without  unmistakable 
signs  of  northern  acquiescence.  Nevertheless,  so 
complete  was  the  sectional  quiet  during  Fillmore's 
term  and  the  first  part  of  Pierce's,  that  for  a  time 
an  aggressive  policy  seemed  likely  to  succeed. 

The  defiant  attitude  of  the  democratic  republic 
towards  "  European  despotism  "  was  illustrated  by  a 
series  of  contentions  with  Austria.  In  1849,  Clayton 
sent  an  emissary,  Dudley  A.  Mann,  with  instructions 
to  recognize  the  Hungarian  Republic  in  case  it  ap- 
peared to  be  firmly  established.  He  found  Hungary 
prostrate  and  so  took  no  action ;  but  the  purpose  of 
his  errand  became  known  to  the  Austrian  govern- 
ment,1 which  instructed  Huelsemann,  the  Austrian 
charg6-d'affaires,  to  protest  against  the  mission  as 

1  Curtis,  Webster,  II.  537. 


1850]         DIPLOMACY   AND   EXPANSION  77 

unfriendly.  It  fell  to  Webster  to  respond,  and  he 
yielded  so  far  to  the  complacency  of  the  time  as  to 
write,  December,  1850,  a  spirited  reply,  denying  that 
the  visit  was  an  unfriendly  act,  and  asserting  the 
right  of  the  American  people  to  sympathize  with  the 
efforts  of  any  nation  to  acquire  liberty.  He  con- 
cluded with  a  direct  comparison  between  Austria  and 
the  United  States:  "The  power  of  this  republic,"  he 
said,  "  at  the  present  moment  is  spread  over  a  region 
one  of  the  richest  and  most  fertile  on  the  globe,  and 
of  an  extent  in  comparison  with  which  the  possessions 
of  the  House  of  Hapsburg  are  but  a  patch  on  the 
earth's  surface.  .  .  .  Life,  liberty,  property,  and  per- 
sonal rights  are  amply  secured  to  all  citizens  and 
protected  by  just  and  stable  laws ;  and  credit,  public 
and  private,  is  as  well  established  as  in  any  gov- 
ernment of  continental  Europe.  .  .  .  Certainly  the 
United  States  may  be  pardoned,  even  by  those  who 
profess  adherence  to  the  principles  of  absolute  gov- 
ernments, if  they  entertain  an  ardent  affection  for 
those  popular  forms  of  political  organization  which 
have  so  rapidly  advanced  their  own  prosperity  and 
happiness,  and  enabled  them  in  so  short  a  period  to 
bring  their  country  and  the  hemisphere  to  which  it 
belongs  to  the  notice  and  respectful  regard — not  to 
say  the  admiration — of  the  civilized  world."  * 

Immediately  following  this  letter,  which  Webster 
wrote,  as  he  explained,  in  hopes  of  stimulating  pride 
in  the  Union,  the  Kossuth  craze  came  to  emphasize 
1  Senate  Exec.  Docs.,  31  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  No.  9,  p.  7. 


78  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1853 

the  popular  sympathy  with  republican  aspirations, 
and  the  general  detestation  of  Austria  and  Russia.1 
In  1853  a  similar  opportunity  was  presented  to 
Marcy,  when  Martin  Koszta,  a  Hungarian  refugee  to 
the  United  States,  who  had  declared  his  intention  of 
becoming  a  citizen,  returned  to  Europe  before  com- 
pleting his  naturalization  and  was  seized  by  an 
Austrian  cruiser  in  a  Turkish  port.  Captain  Ingra- 
ham,  of  the  United  States  man-of-war  St.  Louis,  took 
the  bold  step  of  forcing  the  Austrian  vessel  to  release 
Koszta,  and  Huelsemann  promptly  presented  a  de- 
mand for  reparation  and  the  disavowal  of  his  be- 
havior; but  Marcy,  in  a  long  despatch,  absolutely 
refused  any  conciliatory  action  and  justified  Ingra- 
ham's  course.2 

National  scorn  of  monarchical  customs  was  also 
amusingly  exhibited  by  a  circular,  issued  when 
Marcy  took  charge  of  the  state  department,  which  ad- 
vised American  representatives  at  foreign  courts  not 
to  wear  any  ceremonial  uniforms,  but  to  appear  "  like 
Franklin,  in  the  simple  costume  of  an  American  citi- 
zen." The  sensation  produced  at  several  European 
capitals  by  the  appearance  of  American  ministers  in 
ordinary  civilian  clothes  was  as  ludicrous  as  it  was 
genuine ;  and  in  Prussia,  Spain,  and  France  they  were 
practically  compelled  to  invent  a  court  dress.  Mason, 
at  Paris,  chose  a  fancy  costume  concocted  by  a  Dutch 
tailor  after  the  model  of  the  servants  of  the  Austrian 

1  See  above,  p.  30. 

2  Senate  Exec.  Docs.,  33  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  i,  pp.  25-49. 


1 8$4]        DIPLOMACY    AND    EXPANSION  79 

legation.  Buchanan,  at  London,  provoked  sneers  in 
Conservative  newspapers  and  had  some  difficulties 
with  the  master  of  ceremonies,  but  was  finally  al- 
lowed to  attend  in  the  "  ordinary  dress  of  an  Ameri- 
can citizen,"  to  which,  in  order  to  distinguish  himself 
from  the  court  servants,  he  thoughtfully  added  a 
small  sword.  By  this  episode,  as  by  the  Austrian 
correspondence,  notice  was  served  upon  Europe  of 
the  independent,  democratic  standards  of  the  Amer- 
ican republic.1 

In  diplomatic  dealings  involving  positive  action, 
the  United  States  showed  a  vigorous  attitude  in 
minor  matters  in  the  far  east.  Under  Webster  and 
Marcy  the  Japanese  government  was  obliged  to  re- 
ceive the  expedition  of  Commodore  Perry  in  1853, 
and  to  make  a  commercial  treaty  the  next  year, 
which  opened  Japanese  ports  to  American  trade  and 
began  the  process  of  introducing  western  civiliza- 
tion.2 Marcy  went  so  far  as  to  attempt  to  annex 
Hawaii,  a  step  from  which  Webster  had  recoiled, 
and  his  plan  was  only  wrecked  by  the  death  of  the 
Hawaiian  king  in  i854.3  Nearer  home,  a  boundary 
question,  arising  over  the  line  laid  down  in  the  treaty 
of  Guadalupe-Hidalgo  with  Mexico,  was  settled  in 
1853  by  purchasing,  through  James  Gadsden,  a  strip 
of  territory  to  the  south  of  the  Gila  River,  in  order 


1  Senate.  Exec.  Docs.,  36  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  31;  Curtis,  Bu- 
chanan, II.,  114. 

2  Nitobe,  The  U.  S.   and  Japan,  37-69. 

3  Callahan,  Am.  Relations  in  the  Pacific,  120-123. 


80  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1849 

that  a  future  Southern  Pacific  railroad  might  run 
wholly  over  United  States  soil.1 

In  like  manner  the  long-standing  quarrel  between 
Canadian  authorities  and  New  England  fishermen, 
over  the  privileges  granted  by  the  treaty  of  1818, 
was  settled  in  this  period.  The  Canadian  govern- 
ment was  eager  to  purchase  commercial  reciprocity, 
using  the  fisheries  as  a  make-weight ;  but  no  treaty 
could  be  obtained,  although  an  emissary  made  a  fruit- 
less visit  to  Washington  in  1851.  After  this  failure 
the  Canadians  resorted  to  the  use  of  British  men-of- 
war  to  seize  suspected  fishermen,  which  stirred  up 
great  indignation  in  New  England,  but  led  to  no 
action  until,  in  Marcy's  regime,  Lord  Elgin  visited 
Washington  and  succeeded  in  securing  the  ratifica- 
tion of  a  reciprocity  treaty  in  1854.  This  granted 
equal  fishing  rights  (inshore  and  river  fishing  except- 
ed)  in  return  for  commercial  concessions.2  The  kind 
of  diplomacy  used  by  Lord  Elgin  was  described  by 
Laurence  Oliphant  of  his  suite,  as  "chaffing  Yan- 
kees and  slapping  them  on  the  back. "  "  If  you  have 
got  to  deal  with  hogs,"  he  queried,  "what  are  you 
to  do?"3 

The  really  serious  problems  of  these  years,  how- 
ever, were  those  connected  with  southern  expansion. 
The  first  related  to  Cuba,  the  annexation  of  which 
was  ardently  desired  in  the  southern  states,  partly 

1  Senate  Exec.  Docs.,  32  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  97. 

2  Henderson,  Am.  Diplomatic  Questions,  504  et  seq. 

3  Oliphant,  Oliphant,  109,  120. 


1851]        DIPLOMACY    AND    EXPANSION  81 

as  an  expression  of  the  general  spirit  of  expansion, 
but  more  from  the  desire  for  slave  territory.  "  If 
we  hold  Cuba,"  wrote  one  enthusiast,  "we  will  hold 
the  destiny  of  the  richest  and  most  increased  com- 
merce that  has  ever  dazzled  the  cupidity  of  man. 
And  with  that  commerce  we  can  control  the  power 
of  the  world.  .  .  .  The  world  will  fall  back  upon 
African  labor,  governed  and  owned  in  some  shape 
or  form  by  the  white  man,  as  it  always  has  been. 
.  .  .  We,  too,  are  in  the  hands  of  a  superintending 
Providence  to  work  out  the  real  regeneration  of 
mankind."  * 

The  other  problem  related  to  the  control  of  the 
isthmus  of  Central  America,  which  suddenly  became 
important  after  1848  as  a  link  in  the  sea -passage 
to  California.  In  the  case  of  each  of  these  regions 
the  desires  of  the  southern  people  were  so  keen  that 
they  led  to  repeated  attempts  by  adventurers  to 
gain  military  control  in  the  hope  of  bringing  about 
an  eventual  annexation.  Whenever  the  govern- 
ment, impelled  by  popular  interest,  took  any  steps 
towards  carrying  out  the  expansionist  dreams,  it 
encountered  the  direct  opposition  of  Great  Britain 
in  each  field ;  and  the  diplomatic  dealings  which  re- 
sulted were  not  confined  to  Spain  or  the  petty  Cen- 
tral American  republics,  but  bore  the  character  of 
a  duel  with  a  determined  and  persistent  adversary 
and  rival. 

-1  De  Bow's  Review,  XVII.,  281  (September,  1854);   Callahan, 
Cuba  and  International  Relations,  198-228. 


82  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1848 

The  first  steps  towards  Cuban  annexation  in  this 
period  were  taken  under  Polk,  in  1848,  when  Saun- 
ders,  the  American  representative  at  Madrid,  was 
instructed  to  sound  the  Spanish  government.  The 
prompt  reply  he  received  from  the  minister  of  foreign 
affairs  was  typical  of  the  Spanish  attitude  on  the 
question  from  this  time  until  the  crisis  half  a  century 
later.  He  was  told  that  "  it  was  more  than  any  min- 
ister would  dare  to  entertain  such  a  proposition; 
.  .  .  such  was  the  feeling  of  the  country  that  sooner 
than  see  the  island  transferred  to  any  power  they 
would  prefer  seeing  it  sunk  in  the  ocean."  l  In  the 
face  of  such  a  determined  position  no  further  action 
was  taken  by  the  United  States,  but  the  idea  was 
spread  in  the  south  by  Spanish  refugees  that  Cuba 
itself  was  ready  to  revolt,  resulting  in  a  series  of 
filibustering  attempts,  engineered  by  Narcisso  Lopez, 
an  adventurer  from  South  America.  Although  the 
Spanish  minister  at  Washington,  the  persistent  Cal- 
deron  de  la  Barca,  was  kept  well  informed  of  the 
progress  of  every  plot  and  poured  a  stream  of  angry 
notes  upon  the  state  department,  nothing  could  pre- 
vent the  raiders  from  acting.  Clayton  and  Webster 
were  honestly  desirous  to  preserve  neutrality,  but  the 
sympathy  of  nine-tenths  of  the  southern  people  was 
so  strongly  with  Lopez  that  the  laws  could  not  be 
enforced.  Taylor  issued  a  proclamation  against  fili- 
bustering in  1849  and  managed  to  prevent  the  de- 
parture of  the  first  expedition,  but  the  second  one 
1  House  Exec.  Docs.,  32  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  121,  p.  58. 


i8si]       DIPLOMACY    AND    EXPANSION  83 

escaped,  only  to  fail  miserably,  Lopez  taking  refuge 
at  Key  West,  while  a  number  of  his  followers  were 
caught  and  tried  for  piracy.1 

Clayton  used  his  utmost  efforts  to  secure  the  re- 
lease of  these  men,  going  so  far  as  to  threaten  a 
"sanguinary  war"  in  case  the  prisoners  were  not 
sent  home  to  meet  the  merited  punishment  of  "  the 
indignant  frowns  of  their  fellow-citizens,"  2  but  it 
was  not  until  Webster  became  secretary  that  their 
release  was  accomplished  through  Barringer,  the 
minister  at  Madrid.  Meanwhile,  Lopez  was  trium- 
phantly acquitted  by  a  southern  jury  when  tried 
on  the  charge  of  violating  the  neutrality  laws, 
gathered  a  new  force,  undisturbed  by  Calderon's 
heated  protests,  and  made  a  second  descent  on  the 
island  in  August,  1851.  He  found  no  support,  was 
driven  to  the  hills,  captured,  and  promptly  garroted ; 
while  fifty  of  his  followers,  including  young  men 
from  prominent  southern  families,  were  shot  after 
a  summary  court-martial.  When  the  news  of  this 
severity  reached  New  Orleans,  the  centre  of  filibus- 
tering sympathy,  a  mob  wrecked  the  Spanish  con- 
sulate, defaced  a  portrait  of  the  queen,  and  looted 
Spanish  shops.3 

In  this  affair  the  United  States  was  so  clearly  in 
the  wrong  that  aggressive  action  was  out  of  the 

1  Senate  Exec.  Docs.,  31  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  No.  41,  p.  3. 
3  Clayton  to  Calderon,  July  9,  Clayton  to  Barringer,  July  i, 
Senate  Exec.  Docs.,  31  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  No.  41. 

3  House  Exec.  Docs.,  32  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  2,  p.  26. 


84  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1851 

question.  Webster  offered  reparation  for  the  insult, 
and  recommended  that  Congress  make  indemnity 
for  the  damage,  but  although  this  straightforward 
action  secured  the  release  of  the  surviving  prisoners, 
relations  with  Spain  continued  to  be  strained.1  The 
Cuban  administration  adopted  a  suspicious  and  ar- 
bitrary attitude  towards  Americans,  and  the  last 
months  of  Fillmore's  term  were  rilled  with  com- 
plaints from  traders  of  intolerable  exactions  and 
extortions  for  which  no  redress  could  be  obtained, 
since  the  Spanish  captain-general  had  no  diplomatic 
functions  and  declined  to  deal  with  American  consuls 
or  agents.2 

The  unconciliatory  attitude  of  the  Spanish  gov- 
ernment at  this  time  was  undoubtedly  due  to  a  sense 
of  British  support.  In  1851  the  British  and  French 
ministers  announced  at  Washington  that  their  men- 
of-war  had  orders  to  prevent  filibustering,  which 
brought  out  from  Crittenden,  acting  secretary  dur- 
ing an  illness  of  Webster,  a  strong  protest.  Later, 
in  April,  1852,  at  the  suggestion  of  the  Spanish  gov- 
ernment, England  proposed  a  tripartite  agreement, 
by  which  Great  Britain,  France,  and  the  United 
States  should  mutually  renounce  any  purpose  of 
annexing  Cuba;  but  Everett  firmly  declined  to  be 
drawn  into  any  such  arrangement,  on  the  ground  of 


1  House  Exec.  Docs.,  32  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  19,  pp.  2-7. 

*  Ibid.,  33  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  86;  Latan6,  Diplomacy  of  the 
U.  S.  in  Regard  to  Cuba,  232-239;  Callahan,  Cuba  and  Interna- 
tional Relations,  221-255. 


i8S3]        DIPLOMACY    AND    EXPANSION  85 

the  peculiar  interests  of  the  United  States  in  the 
island.1 

When  Pierce  assumed  office,  the  whole  country 
undoubtedly  looked  for  vigorous  actioh  in  foreign 
affairs,  especially  the  annexation  of  Cuba;  and 
Marcy,  his  secretary,  was  expected  to  take  the  mat- 
ter promptly  in  hand.  Marcy,  however,  although 
not  averse  to  annexation,  was  conservative,  cold- 
blooded, and  lawyer -like,  and  unwilling  to  take 
decisive  steps  without  a  perfectly  secure  footing. 
This  caution  fell  far  short  of  the  desires  of  the  south- 
ern Democrats  and,  for  the  moment,  of  the  northern 
party  leaders;  for  in  1853  the  exasperation  in  com- 
mercial centres  over  the  unfriendly  Spanish  policy  in 
Cuba  was  such  that  a  war  might  not  have  been 
unpopular.  The  new  minister  at  Madrid  was  Pierre 
Soul6,  of  Louisiana,  a  hot-headed  Frenchman,  an 
avowed  annexationist,  and  a  sympathizer  with 
filibusters,  a  man  contrasting  strongly  with  his 
Whig  predecessor,  the  firm  yet  cautious  Barringer. 
Marcy's  instructions  to  Soule  bade  him  be  slow  to 
raise  the  question  of  annexation,  in  view  of  the  ex- 
isting irritation  of  Spanish  feeling ;  but  directed  him 
to  press  for  reparation  for  outrages  in  Cuba  and  es- 
pecially to  demand  the  conferring  of  sufficient  diplo- 
matic power  upon  the  Cuban  captain-general  to  per- 
mit complaints  to  be  lodged  with  him  without  the 

1  Senate  Exec.  Docs.,  32  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  i,  pp.  74,  76;  2 
Sess.,  No.  63. 


86  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1854 

necessity  of  waiting  weeks  and  months  for  replies 
from  Madrid.1 

Soul6's  career  in  Spain  was  a  series  of  blunders. 
At  the  outset,  finding  no  business  of  a  pressing  char- 
acter, he  vented  his  temper  in  a  duel  with  the  French 
ambassador.2  Soon  news  came  from  Cuba  which 
seemed  to  the  excitable  minister  the  proper  pretext 
for  a  diplomatic  rupture.  The  cargo  of  the  steamer 
Black  Warrior,  which  for  months  had  been  making 
trips  to  Havana  without  molestation,  was  suddenly 
condemned  for  the  violation  of  an  obsolete  harbor 
regulation,  a  crowning  example  of  the  irritating 
policy  of  the  Cuban  authorities.  The  hot-heads  in 
the  United  States  clamored  for  war,  and  Congress 
resounded  with  angry  speeches;  but  Soule,  in  his 
rashness,  threw  away  whatever  tactical  advantages 
this  situation  had  given  him.  After  presenting  a 
claim  for  damages  on  April  8,  and  receiving  no  reply 
for  three  days,  he  sent  a  second  note  demanding 
reparation  within  forty-eight  hours,  under  threat  of 
asking  for  his  passports.  Such  hasty  action  trans- 
ferred the  grievance  to  the  other  side,  now  repre- 
sented by  the  former  minister  to  Washington, 
Calderon  de  la  Barca ;  and  since  Soule*  was  left  with- 
out support  from  Marcy  the  whole  affair  evaporated 
in  bluster.  In  spite  of  Soule's  angry  arguments  that 
Spain  needed  to  be  taught  a  lesson,  Marcy  would 
make  no  ultimatum ;  for  events  at  home  had  begun 

1  Marcy  to  Soul£,  July  23,  1853,  House  Exec.  Docs.,  33  Cong., 
2  Sess.,  No.  93,  p.  3.  2  Rhodes,  United  States,  II.,  11-15. 


1854]        DIPLOMACY    AND    EXPANSION  87 

to  appear  so  threatening  that  the  secretary  was  re- 
solved to  invite  no  foreign  complication.1  In  1855 
the  United  States  accepted  a  tardy  apology  and 
reparation  for  the  Black  Warrior  seizure,  and  the 
incident  was  closed. 

Meanwhile,  Soule  made  a  final  false  step,  which  led 
to  the  collapse  of  his  diplomatic  career.  Marcy  in- 
structed him  to  join  with  Mason,  minister  to  France, 
and  Buchanan,  minister  to  England,  in  conferring 
upon  a  policy  to  be  followed  by  the  United  States 
towards  Cuba,  and  the  three  ministers  met  according- 
ly, at  Ostend,  in  the  summer  of  1854.  The  result  was 
the  draught  of  a  manifesto  which1  was  sent  to  Marcy 
in  October,  to  the  effect  that  Spain  ought  to  sell  Cuba 
to  the  United  States;  that  Cuba  was  necessary  for 
the  safety  of  slavery  in  the  southern  states  of  the 
Union ;  and  that  if  Spain,  "  dead  to  the  voice  of  her 
own  interest  and  actuated  by  ...  a  false  sense  of 
honor,  should  refuse  to  sell  Cuba,"  then,  in  case  the 
internal  peace  of  the  Union  was  endangered,  "by 
every  law,  human  and  divine,  we  shall  be  justified 
in  wresting  it  from  Spain  if  we  possess  the  power."  2 
In  transmitting  this  surprising  document,  Soule 
added  that  now  was  the  time  to  declare  war  upon 
Spain,  since  England  and  France  were  involved  in 
the  Crimean  struggle  and  would  be  unable  to  inter- 
pose. 

Marcy,  however,  received  the  manifesto  with  ill- 

1  House  Exec.  Docs.,  33  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  No.  93,  pp.  30-120. 

2  Ibid.,  127-132. 

,VOL.   XVIII. — 7 


88  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1849 

concealed  surprise,  and  replied  in  a  note  which  ironi- 
cally assumed  that  "  It  was  not  intended  by  yourself 
or  your  colleagues  to  offer  to  Spain  the  alternative 
of  cession  or  seizure."  l  When  the  correspondence 
and  the  manifesto  were  published  in  March,  1855, 
the  unsparing  condemnation  expressed  in  the  north 
showed  that  the  time  had  gone  by  when  an  aggres- 
sive Cuban  policy  could  receive  support  or  acquies- 
cence from  a  united  public.  Soule  resigned  in  dis- 
gust and  the  Cuban  episode  came  to  an  end.2 

The  Central  American  question  brought  the  United 
States  into  conflict  with  an  equally  pertinacious  and 
more  formidable  antagonist.  Great  Britain  was  first 
in  the  field  with  the  colony  of  Belize  on  the  coast  of 
Honduras  and  a  traditional  but  ill-defined  protec- 
torate over  the  obscure  tribe  of  Mosquito  Indians  on 
the  eastern  shore  of  Nicaragua.  When  the  impor- 
tance of  the  isthmian  transit  became  visible,  espe- 
cially the  Nicaragua  route,  a  sudden  scramble  began 
for  its  control.  Chatfield,  the  British  representative, 
showed  a  tendency  to  stretch  the  elastic  Mosquito 
protectorate  over  the  San  Juan  River — the  eastern 
part  of  the  Nicaragua  passage — and  in  1849  caused 
the  occupation  of  Tigre  Island,  on  the  coast  of  Hon- 
duras, to  command  the  western  end.  Hise,  the 
American  minister  sent  by  Polk,  met  this  move  by 

1  House  Exec.  Docs.,  33  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  No.  93,  p.  135. 

2  Latan6,  Diplomacy  of  the  U.  S.  in  Regard  to  Cuba,  240-249; 
Callahan,  Cuba  and  International  Relations,  257-288;    Webster, 
"Mr.  Marcy,  the  Cuban  Question,"  in  Pol.  Sci.  Quart.,  VIII., 
1-32  (March,  1893). 


1855]        DIPLOMACY    AND    EXPANSION  89 

securing  a  treaty  from  Nicaragua  which  gave  the 
United  States  exclusive  privileges  over  the  canal 
route;  and  when  this  failed  of  ratification  by  the 
Senate,  Squier,  his  successor,  made  another  treaty, 
securing  somewhat  less  extensive  privileges,  and,  in 
addition,  induced  Honduras  to  cede  Tigre  Island, 
which  the  British  had  occupied,  to  the  United 
States.1 

Each  country  protested  vigorously  against  the 
actions  of  the  other's  agents,  but  after  a  year  of 
negotiations,  Clayton  agreed  with  Sir  Henry  Bulwer, 
in  1850,  upon  a  treaty  which  compromised  the  rival 
claims.  Each  country  promised  to  aid  in  the  con- 
struction of  an  interoceanic  canal  through  Nicaragua, 
to  guarantee  its  neutrality,  and  explicitly  to  re- 
nounce any  "  dominion  over  Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica, 
the  Mosquito  Coast  or  any  part  of  Central  America." 
The  principle  of  neutrality  was  to  be  extended  to  any 
other  canal  that  might  be  built,  and  other  powers 
were  invited  to  join  in  the  neutralization  of  the 
region.2  This  arrangement  was  regarded  at  the  time 
as  a  substantial  triumph  for  the  United  States,  and 
during  the  next  two  years  Webster  labored  vainly 
to  settle  the  dispute  between  Nicaragua  and  Costa 
Rica,  concerning  their  boundary  in  the  vicinity  of 
the  San  Juan  River,  where  an  American  "Accessory 

1  Senate  Exec.  Docs.,  31  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  No.  43;  Travis,  Clayton' 
Bulwer  Treaty,  31-71;    Henderson,  Am.  Diplomatic  Questions, 
106-123;    Keasbey,  Nicaragua  Canalr  chaps,  x.,  xi. 

2  MacDonald,  Select  Documents,  373. 


90  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1852 

Transit  Company"  was  now  operating  a  line  of 
steamers. 

As  time  went  on,  however,  the  conditions  on  the 
isthmus  did  not  seem  to  square  with  the  state  of 
things  assumed  in  the  treaty.  While  Great  Britain 
abandoned  Tigre  Island,  she  still  retained  the  Mosqui- 
to protectorate  as  well  as  Belize ;  and  in  the  summer 
of  1852  took  the  step  of  annexing  some  islands  off 
the  Honduras  coast  and  erecting  them  into  the  col- 
ony of  "  The  Bay  Islands."  At  the  same  time  Grey- 
town,  a  trading-post  in  Nicaragua  at  the  mouth  of 
the  San  Juan  River,  was  established  as  a  "free  city" 
through  the  active  support  of  the  British  represent- 
ative in  the  so-called  Mosquito  protectorate.  In 
1851  this  mushroom  sovereignty  endeavored  to  levy 
port  dues  upon  the  steamers  of  the  Transit  Company, 
and  when  one  of  these,  the  Prometheus,  refused  to 
pay,  it  was  fired  upon  by  a  British  man-of-war. 
These  actions  could  not  fail  to  create  an  impression 
in  the  United  States  that  England  was  deliberately 
violating  the  Clayton  -  Bulwer  treaty,  and  caused 
wide-spread  indignation.1 

Finally,  in  the  last  session  of  Congress  in  Fillmore's 
term,  it  was  brought  to  light  in  a  heated  debate  in 
the  Senate,  that  before  signing  the  treaty  in  1850, 
Sir  Henry  Bulwer  had  left  with  Clayton  a  memo- 
randum stating  that  the  British  government  did  not 
construe  its  renunciation  of  "dominion"  in  Central 
America  to  apply  to  Belize  "  or  any  of  its  dependen- 
1  Senate  Exec.  Docs.,  33  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  8. 


1853]        DIPLOMACY    AND    EXPANSION  91 

cies."  This  explained  the  recent  action  of  England 
and  made  it  clear  that  Clayton,  in  allowing  this 
memorandum  to  stand  as  an  unacknowledged  part 
of  the  treaty,  had  deprived  his  work  of  much  of 
its  value.  The  whole  subject  was  accordingly  re- 
opened.1 

When  Marcy  assumed  office  he  took  up  the  prob- 
lem in  a  resolute  fashion,  making  a  direct  attack  upon 
the  British  position  by  instructing  Buchanan  to  in- 
sist upon  a  renunciation  by  Great  Britain  of  the 
shadowy  Mosquito  protectorate.  Marcy 's  language 
was  that  of  an  aggrieved  party  and  was  so  vigorous 
that  Lord  Clarendon  termed  it  "hostile."  2  He  not 
only  stigmatized  the  retention  of  the  Bay  Islands 
and  the  Mosquito  claim  as  a  violation  of  the  treaty 
and  a  mere  "  convenience  to  sustain  British  preten- 
sions," but  denied  any  legal  basis  for  the  Belize 
Colony.3  To  this  Clarendon  replied  emphatically 
that  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  not  meant  to 
be  renunciatory  and  would  not  be  so  construed  by 
the  British  government.  Meanwhile,  to  aggravate 
the  situation,  an  explosion  took  place  at  the  self- 
styled  "free  city"  of  Grey  town.  The  Accessory 
Transit  Company  continued  to  be  embroiled  with 
the  "City"  government,  its  buildings  being  saved 

1  Cong.    Globe,  32    Cong.,   2    Sess.,  237;    Lawrence,   Disputed 
Questions,  89-103. 

2  Clarendon  to  Crampton,  July  22,  1853,  Brit,  and  For.  State 
Papers,  XLII.,  253. 

3  Marcy  to  Buchanan,  July   2,   1853,  Senate  Exec.  Docs.,  34 
Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  i,  p.  42. 


92  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1854 

from  destruction  only  by  the  interposition  of  the 
United  States  vessel  the  Cyane;  until  in  June,  1854, 
an  affray  occurred  in  which  one  of  the  officers  of  the 
company's  steamers  killed  an  individual,  and  a 
mob,  in  revenge,  attacked  the  United  States  consul. 
Thereupon  Lieutenant  Hollins,  of  the  Cyane,  de- 
manded reparation,  and,  in  default,  bombarded  and 
destroyed  the  town;  while  the  commander  of  a 
British  vessel .  present  at  the  time  protested  that 
only  inferior  strength  prevented  him  from  interpos- 
ing. Each  government  seemed  inclined  to  maintain 
its  position  stiffly,  and  the  action  of  the  United 
States  showed  a  willingness  to  resort  to  force.1 

At  this  juncture,  when  the  United  States  had 
embarked  in  a  serious  controversy  with  Great  Brit- 
ain, marked  by  every  sign  of  ill-temper,  and  while 
Great  Britain  was  embarrassed  by  the  outbreak  of 
the  Crimean  War,  Marcy  contented  himself  with  fur- 
nishing arguments  to  Buchanan  and  hinting  at  the 
abrogation  of  the  treaty,  but  took  no  definite  action. 
The  quarrel  which  had  begun  so  threateningly  dwin- 
dled to  a  mere  diplomatic  fencing  between  the  pa- 
tient and  courteous  Buchanan  and  the  British  foreign 
secretary,  in  such  spare  moments  as  the  latter  could 
afford  in  the  midst  of  his  serious  European  compli- 
cations.2 


Travis,  Clayton  -  Bulwer  Treaty,  153  et  seq.;  Senate  Exec. 
Docs.,  33  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  85. 

2  Marcy  to  Buchanan,  June  12,  1854,  Senate  Exec.  Docs.,  34 
Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  i,  p.  67. 


1854]        DIPLOMACY    AND    EXPANSION  93 

The  influence  which  put  a  veto  upon  an  aggres- 
sive policy  towards  Spain  and  restrained  Marcy  from 
pushing  the  Central  American  controversy  with 
vigor  was  a  sudden  violent  tempest  of  sectional 
feeling  and  an  overwhelming  defeat  of  the  Pierce 
administration  at  the  polls.  The  attention  of  the 
country  was  wholly  engrossed  with  a  renewal  of  the 
slavery  controversy,  and  Marcy  was  far  too  pru- 
dent to  commit  the  administration  to  any  grave 
foreign  policy  in  such  a  crisis.  The  time  for  south- 
ern expansion  as  a  means  for  increasing  slave  terri- 
tory had  gone  by.1 

1  This  subject  is  continued  in  chap,  xviii.,  below. 


CHAPTER   VII 

THE   KANSAS-NEBRASKA  BILL 

(1853-1854) 

THE  divergent  interests  of  the  sections  were  such 
that  the  calm  produced  by  the  general  acqui- 
escence in  the  compromise  of  1850  could  not  have 
endured  indefinitely;  sooner  or  later  the  slumber- 
ing antagonism  must  have  been  aroused.  Never- 
theless, the  measure  which  disturbed  the  national 
quiet  and  led  to  a  sudden  sharp  revival  of  the  sec- 
tional struggle,  seems  to  have  been  at  that  time  an 
undeniable  political  blunder.  At  the  opening  of  the 
session  of  Congress  in  December,  1853,  there  was  no 
federal  territory  where  the  status  of  slavery  was  not 
fixed  by  some  law  bearing  the  character  of  an  agree- 
ment between  the  sections ;  and  the  federal  govern- 
ment and  most  of  the  state  governments  were  in  the 
hands  of  a  party  committed  to  the  carrying-out  of 
the  compromise  measures.  In  his  first  annual  mes- 
sage, Pierce  congratulated  the  country  upon  its  calm, 
and  added:  "That  this  repose  is  to  suffer  no  shock 
during  my  official  term  if  I  have  power  to  avert  it, 
those  who  placed  me  here  may  be  assured."  l 

1  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V.,  222. 


1854]  KANSAS-NEBRASKA    BILL  95 

Among  minor  matters  requiring  consideration  at 
this  time  was  that  of  a  territorial  organization  for  the 
region  known  as  Nebraska,  comprising  that  part  of 
the  old  Louisiana  purchase  west  of  Iowa  and  Mis- 
souri. It  was  still  mainly  left  to  Indian  tribes,  and 
had  few  white  inhabitants,  but  there  was  a  growing 
desire  in  western  Missouri  for  a  chance  to  settle  in 
the  territory,  and  a  need  for  protecting  the  transcon- 
tinental wagon  route.  Hence,  Douglas,  of  Illinois, 
introduced  a  series  of  bills  for  that  purpose,  one  of 
which  passed  the  House  in  1853,  but  was  blocked  in 
the  Senate.  Nothing  in  the  bill  nor  in  the  language 
of  any  of  its  supporters  indicated  the  idea  that  the 
prohibition  of  slavery  in  Nebraska  by  the  Missouri 
Compromise  was  affected.1  There  was,  therefore, 
nothing  to  connect  the  proposed  measure  with  any 
danger  to  the  political  calm. 

January  4,  1854,  Douglas  reported  to  the  Senate 
from  the  committee  on  territories  a  new  Nebraska 
bill  which  added  to  the  formal  sections  a  proviso 
permitting  the  territory  to  enter  the  Union  when  it 
became  a  state,  "with  or  without  slavery."  The 
accompanying  report  said,  in  substance,  that  since 
many  southerners  thought  the  Missouri  Compromise 
unconstitutional,  and  since  the  principle  of  non- 
intervention had  been  established  by  the  compromise 
of  1850,  it  was  advisable  to  treat  all  territories  as 
New  Mexico  and  Utah  had  been  dealt  with.2  The 

1  Cong.  Globe,  32  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  1113  (March  3,  1853). 

2  Senate  Reports,  33  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  15. 


96  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1854 

bill  apparently  left  the  existing  prohibition  of  slavery 
undisturbed  and  yet  indirectly  authorized  the  in- 
habitants to  disregard  it. 

Douglas  appears  to  have  introduced  this  singular 
and  startling  proposition  entirely  on  his  own  mo- 
tion,1 and  its  purpose  seems  to  have  been  nothing 
more  nor  less  than  an  effort  on  the  part  of  a  presi- 
dential candidate  to  secure  favor  in  a  quarter  where 
he  lacked  popularity.  Douglas  was  too  thorough 
a  Democrat  in  person  and  in  feeling  to  be  regarded 
with  sympathy  by  the  aristocratic  south,  and  if  he 
was  to  be  successful  in  the  Democratic  national  con- 
vention of  1856,  he  saw  that  he  must  somehow  gain 
southern  approbation.  He  undoubtedly  thought 
that  by  applying  the  "principle  of  non-interven- 
tion," so  successful  in  allaying  discord  since  1850,  he 
could  win  the  applause  of  the  south  and  retain  the 
support  of  all  conservatives  at  the  north  who  were 
committed  to  upholding  as  a  finality  the  similar  ar- 
rangement in  the  cases  of  Utah  and  New  Mexico. 
That  his  bill  would  produce  a  revolution  in  politics 
and  do  more  than  any  one  thing  to  precipitate  civil 
war  never  entered  his  head.  His  action  was  based 
on  a  total  failure  to  comprehend  the  veiled  sectional- 
ism of  the  time  and  a  still  deeper  inability  to  grasp 
the  moral  bearing  of  the  anti-slavery  feeling  of  the 
north.  At  no  time  in  all  his  relations  with  the  sla- 
very controversy  did  Douglas  show  any  other  cri- 
terion than  that  of  immediate  political  success ;  and 
1  Cong.  Globe,  33  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  216, 


1854]  KANSAS-NEBRASKA   BILL  97 

hence  all  his  energy  and  ability  led  him  ultimately 
to  disaster. 

Instantly  the  question  rose  as  to  the  exact  mean- 
ing of  the  bill,  and  Douglas  was  promptly  obliged  to 
forsake  his  vagueness,  for  on  January  16  Dixon,  of 
Kentucky,  offered  an  amendment  expressly  repealing 
the  Missouri  Compromise ;  and  the  next  day  Sumner 
responded  by  offering  one  expressly  reaffirming  that 
clause.  It  now  became  necessary  for  Douglas  to 
commit  himself,  and  with  reluctance  he  decided  to 
risk  everything,  to  accept  the  principle  of  the  Dixon 
amendment,  and  to  take  the  consequences.1  The 
first  step  was  to  secure  the  approval  of  the  president, 
and  in  this  Jefferson  Davis,  secretary  of  war,  acted 
as  intermediary.  In  an  interview  on  January  22, 
Pierce  gave  his  assent,2  for  he  too  was  thinking  of 
1856  and  could  not  risk  offending  southern  sup- 
porters. Pierce 's  conduct  has  been  severely  criti- 
cised in  view  of  his  pledge  to  allow  no  disturbance 
of  the  existing  repose.  A  far-sighted  leader  would 
have  foreseen  the  dangers  involved  in  such  a  radical 
proposal  as  the  repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise ; 
but  Pierce  was  not  far-sighted  nor  was  he  in  any 
sense  a  leader.  He  was  simply  a  man  of  moderate 
abilities,  good  intentions,  and  personally  attractive 
qualities,  who  was  wholly  dominated  by  his  party 
and  its  acknowledged  leaders. 

1  Dixon,  Hist,  of  Missouri  Compromise,  442-450. 

2  Davis,   Confederate  Government,  I.,  28;  Webster,  "The  Re- 
sponsibility for  Secession,"  in  Pol.  Sci.  Quart.,  VIII.,  278. 


98  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1854 

The  bill  was  again  reported  by  Douglas  on  the 
24th,  with  new  provisions,  by  which  the  Missouri 
Compromise  was  openly  repealed,  on  the  ground 
that  it  was  "superseded  by  the  principles  of  the 
legislation  of  1850,"  and  the  territory  was  divided 
into  two  parts,  that  lying  west  of  Missouri  to  be 
called  Kansas,  the  rest  to  remain  as  Nebraska.  It 
was  clearly  intended  by  this  last  change  to  prepare 
Kansas  for  settlement  by  the  Missourians;  while 
Nebraska,  with  the  larger  limits,  was  left  to  the 
slower  process  of  northern  immigration.  At  the 
same  time  the  Washington  Union,  reputed  to  be 
Pierce's  organ,  printed  an  editorial  saying  that  the 
administration  approved  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill 
and  regarded  it  as  "a  test  of  Democratic  ortho- 
doxy." 1  The  proposition  was  now  fairly  before  the 
country. 

By  this  time  the  public  at  the  north  realized  that 
something  startling  was  under  way,  and  newspapers 
began  to  spread  the  alarm  that  Douglas  and  the 
administration  were  attempting  to  open  the  terri- 
tories to  slavery  and  disturb  the  existing  equilibrium. 
Whig  and  Democratic,  as  well  as  Free  Soil,  papers 
grew  extremely  bitter  in  their  comments  when  the 
bill  was  reported  in  its  second  form.  Then  appeared, 
January  24,  a  solemn  and  impassioned  protest,  writ- 
ten by  Chase  and  signed  by  the  group  of  third -party 
men  in  Congress,  entitled  the  " Appeal  of  the  Inde- 

1  January  24,  1854:   quoted  by  Rhodes,  United  States,  I.,  441; 
cf.  Webster,  in  Pol.  Sci.  Quart.,  VIII.,  227. 


1854]  KANSAS-NEBRASKA    BILL  99 

pendent  Democrats  in  Congress  to  the  people  of  the 
United  States."  They  called  upon  the  people  of  the 
north  to  oppose  the  passage  of  the  bill  by  every  pos- 
sible means  of  protest;  they  arraigned  it  in  strong 
language  as  "a  gross  violation  of  a  sacred  pledge;  as 
a  criminal  betrayal  of  precious  rights;  as  part  and 
parcel  of  an  atrocious  plot "  ;  they  called  the  repeal- 
ing clause,  with  its  reference  to  the  compromise  of 
1850,  "a  manifest  falsification  of  the  truth  of  His- 
tory"; they  accused  Douglas  of  criminal  ambition, 
and  in  conclusion  they  asked:  "Will  the  people  per- 
mit their  dearest  interests  to  be  thus  made  the  mere 
hazards  of  a  presidential  game  ? "  l  By  the  time  de- 
bate opened,  the  interest  of  the  whole  country  was 
concentrated  upon  the  measure,  and  sectional  pas- 
sions were  rising  with  alarming  rapidity. 

Then  followed  one  of  the  most  desperate  contests 
in  the  history  of  Congress.  In  the  Senate  the  debate 
lasted  from  January  30,  almost  without  interrup- 
tion, until  March  3.  It  was  seen  from  the  start  that, 
with  the  Democratic  administration  and  most  of  the 
southern  Whigs  to  aid  him,  Douglas  was  secure  of 
passing  his  bill  through  the  Senate ;  but  the  debating 
strength  of  the  minority  was  totally  unexpected,  and 
the  country  hung  upon  the  speeches  with  unrelaxing 
tension.  Douglas  began  with  a  savage  personal  at- 
tack upon  Chase  and  the  Independent  Democrats, 
whom  he  accused  of  having  "  applied  coarse  epithets 
by  name"  to  him  in  their  address,  and  of  stirring 

1  National  Era,  January  24,  1854;  cf.  Hart,  Chase,  138-143. 


ioo  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1854 

the  alarm  of  the  north  by  deception.  "This  tor- 
nado," he  cried,  "has  been  raised  by  Abolitionists 
and  Abolitionists  alone.  They  have  made  an  impres- 
sion upon  the  public  mind  .  .  .  by  a  falsification  of 
the  law  and  of  the  facts."  1 

On  the  other  side  the  assailants  of  the  bill  replied 
with  exasperating  emphasis,  especially  Chase,  who 
in  this  debate  reached  in  many  respects  the  highest 
point  of  his  senatorial  career.  He  spoke  not  merely 
for  the  small  third -party  group,  but  for  the  entire 
north,  and  in  strength  of  argument,  boldness,  and 
directness  of  attack  he  took  the  leadership.  He  tore 
the  sham  features  from  the  bill  with  merciless  hand. 
"The  truth  is,"  he  said,  "the  Compromise  acts  of 
1850  were  not  intended  to  introduce  any  principle  of 
territorial  organisation  to  any  other  territory  except 
that  covered  by  them.  .  .  .  Senators,  will  you  unite 
in  a  statement  which  you  know  to  be  contradicted 
by  the  history  of  the  country?  ...  If  you  wish  to 
break  up  the  time-honored  compact  embodied  in  the 
Missouri  Compromise,  ...  do  it  openly,  do  it  boldly. 
Repeal  the  Missouri  prohibition.  Do  not  declare  it 
'inoperative'  because  'superseded  by  the  principles 
of  the  legislation  of  1850.'  .  .  .  You  may  pass  it 
here,"  he  continued,  "it  may  become  law.  But  its 
effect  will  be  to  satisfy  all  thinking  men  that  no  com- 
promises with  slavery  will  endure,  except  so  long  as 
they  serve  the  interests  of  slavery.  .  .  .  This  discus- 
sion will  hasten  the  inevitable  reorganization  of  par- 
1  Cong.  Globe,  33  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  279. 


i8S4]  KANSAS-NEBRASKA   BILL  101 

ties  upon  the  new  issues.  ...  It  will  light  up  a  fire 
in  the  country  which  may,  perhaps,  consume  those 
who  kindle  it."  1 

Besides  Chase,  Sumner  spoke  for  the  Free  Dem- 
ocrats, Seward  for  the  anti-slavery  Whigs,  and  Ev- 
erett for  the  Webster  Whigs,  all  opposing  the  bill 
on  the  ground  of  its  violation  of  national  faith. 
Another  recruit  was  Chase's  colleague,  Wade,  who 
up  to  this  time  had  made  no  strong  impression  on  the 
Senate,  but  who  now  found  a  proper  field  for  his 
rough  and  aggressive  manner  in  assailing  the  south 
and  the  Democrats.  Without  Douglas's  wonderful 
adroitness  he  had  much  of  Douglas's  strength  in  in- 
vective, and  was  from  this  time  among  the  foremost 
northern  combatants. 

On  the  other  side  long  speeches  were  made  by  the 
leading  southern  senators;  but  the  real  defence  of 
the  bill  rested  with  Douglas,  who  showed  in  this  con- 
test an  ability  in  parliamentary  combat  unequalled 
by  any  of  his  opponents.  His  arguments,  whether 
good  or  bad,  were  presented  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
appear  plausible  and  reasonable.  He  dwelt  at  length 
upon  the  futility  of  mere  laws  to  exclude  or  establish 
slavery  in  any  territory,  asserting  that  the  Northwest 
Ordinance,  the  Missouri  Compromise,  and  the  Oregon 
act  had  been  mere  superfluities,  the  real  decision  in 
every  case  having  been  made  by  the  settlers  in  those 
regions.  Hence  he  insisted  upon  the  universal  ap- 
plicability of  the  "principle  of  non-intervention," 
1  Cong.  Globe,  33  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  App.,  139,  140. 


102  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1854 

claiming  the  authority  of  Clay  for  its  support.  Fur- 
ther, he  repeatedly  assailed  the  Missouri  Compromise 
as  in  no  sense  a  real  compact,  and  by  continually 
attacking  minor  defects  in  his  opponents'  reasoning 
made  it  appear  that  they  and  not  he  were  on  the 
defensive  before  the  country. 

In  the  final  session  Douglas  kept  up  a  running 
debate  single-handed  against  Seward,  Summer,  Ever- 
ett, and  Chase,  and  showed  himself  more  than  their 
equal,  closing  by  a  series  of  bitterly  personal  attacks 
upon  Chase  and  Sumner.  He  accused  them  of  enter- 
ing the  Senate  "by  corrupt  bargain,  or  a  dishonor- 
able coalition  in  which  their  character,  principles  and 
honor  were  set  up  at  public  auction  or  private  sale. 
.  .  .  Why,"  he  concluded,  "can  we  not  adopt  the 
principle  of  this  bill  as  a  rule  of  action  in  all  terri- 
torial organizations  ?  Why  can  we  not  deprive  these 
agitators  of  their  vocation?  ...  I  believe  that  the 
peace,  the  harmony  and  the  perpetuity  of  the  union 
require  us  to  go  back  to  the  doctrines  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, to  the  principles  of  the  Constitution,  to  the 
principles  of  the  Compromise  of  1850,  and  leave  the 
people,  under  the  Constitution,  to  do  as  they  may 
see  proper  in  respect  to  their  own  internal  affairs."  * 

However  much  Douglas  might  attempt  to  restate 
his  proposition  in  a  form  more  attractive  to  the 
north,  the  issue  was  the  naked  one  of  opening  to 
the  introduction  of  slaves  a  territory  from  which 
they  had  hitherto  been  excluded.  Chase  and  Sum- 
1  Cong.  Globe,  33  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  App.,  337,  338. 


i8S4]  KANSAS-NEBRASKA    BILL  103 

ner  continually  offered  amendments  designed  to  em- 
phasize this  fact,  but  their  propositions  were  voted 
down  without  ceremony  by  the  administration  ma- 
jority. The  only  amendments  of  importance  were 
two  providing  that  the  old  laws  of  Louisiana  recog- 
nizing slavery  should  not  be  revived;  and  limiting 
the  right  to  acquire  and  hold  land  to  American  citi- 
zens. Douglas  further  accepted  an  amendment  elim- 
inating the  equivocal  phrase  " superseded  by"  the 
compromise  of  1850,  and  substituting  the  words 
"inconsistent  with."  A  proviso  was  also  added, 
declaring  it  to  be  "the  true  intent  and  meaning  of 
this  act  not  to  legislate  slavery  into  any  territory  or 
state,  nor  to  exclude  it  therefrom ;  but  to  leave  the 
people  thereof  perfectly  free  to  form  and  regulate 
their  own  domestic  institutions  in  their  own  way." 
Benton  sneered  at  this  as  "a  little  stump  speech 
injected  in  the  belly  of  the  bill."  l  In  this  form  the 
measure  was  finally  passed,  March  3,  1854,  by  a  vote 
of  37  to  14.  The  majority  was  composed  of  28  Dem- 
ocrats, northern  and  southern,  and  9  southern  Whigs. 
The  minority  comprised  2  Free-Soilers,  6  northern 
Whigs,  i  southern  Whig — Bell,  of  Tennessee — 4 
northern  Democrats,  and  i  southern  Democrat— 
Houston,  of  Texas. 

The  struggle  was  now  transferred  to  the  House, 
but  when,  on  motion  of  Richardson,  of  Illinois,  Doug- 
las's lieutenant,  the  bill  was  taken  up  on  March  21, 
it  was  placed  on  the  calendar  of  the  committee  of  the 

1  Cong.  Globe,  33  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  App.,  559. 

VOL.  XVIII. — 8 


104  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1854 

whole  by  a  vote  of  no  to  95.  With  fifty  others 
ahead  of  it,  the  measure  seemed  placed  beyond  the 
reach  of  legislation ;  but  it  was  generally  recognized 
that  it  was  not  dead.  The  willingness  of  the  "  Hard ' ' 
faction  of  New  York  Democrats  to  harass  the  presi- 
dent caused  this  apparent  defeat,  and  not  a  genuine 
opposition  to  the  bill.  Still  for  weeks  it  was  in 
abeyance  and  the  country  remained  in  suspense. 

Meanwhile  the  members  of  Congress  and  the  ad- 
ministration were  treated  to  an  explosion  of  fury  in 
the  north  which  surpassed  anything  in  the  memory 
of  living  men.  At  a  breath  the  contented  calm  of 
1853  vanished  in  a  storm  of  anger  towards  Douglas, 
Pierce,  and  the  south.  From  outraged  conservatives 
who  saw  their  cherished  compromise  disturbed,  to 
radical  anti -slavery  men  who  fiercely  welcomed  the 
bill  as  an  unmasking  of  the  perfidy  of  the  "slave 
power,"  arose  a  tempest  of  protest.  Editorials  and 
public  letters  were  followed  by  meetings,  without 
distinction  of  party,  to  denounce  the  bill,  at  first 
singly  in  the  large  cities,  then  by  dozens,  scores,  hun- 
dreds in  nearly  every  county  and  town  of  the  free 
states.  Five  northern  legislatures  passed  resolutions 
of  protest.  Ministers  of  all  denominations  preached 
sermons  against  "the  Nebraska  iniquity,"  and  from 
them  and  from  thousands  of  others  petitions  and 
remonstrances  of  every  sort  began  to  pour  in  upon 
Congress.1 

On  the  other  side  the  bill  received  scant  applause. 

1  Rhodes,  United  States,  I.,  463-488, 


1854]  KANSAS-NEBRASKA   BILL  105 

Those  in  the  northern  states  who  did  not  object  to  it 
were  silent  in  the  tumult  of  denunciation,  and  only 
a  few  administration  newspapers  attempted  any  de- 
fence of  the  measure.  Three  Democratic  legislat- 
ures refused  to  take  any  action  in  the  matter,  and 
the  only  one  to  pass  approving  resolutions  was  that 
of  Illinois,  Douglas's  own  constituency.  In  the 
south  the  general  feeling  was  at  first  indifference, 
and  the  repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise  under 
Douglas's  leadership  was  regarded  as  a  northern 
affair;  but  when  the  rising  anti-slavery  excitement 
became  evident,  southern  newspapers  rallied  to  up- 
hold Pierce.  Still,  vigorous  popular  support  to 
counterbalance  the  northern  agitation  was  lacking. 

In  the  face  of  this  storm  the  administration 
showed  a  fighting  spirit.  However  much  Pierce  may 
have  regretted  the  demon  he  had  conjured  up,  Doug- 
las and  Davis  were  not  the  men  to  yield,  and  it  soon 
appeared  that  every  sort  of  official  pressure  was  to 
be  used  to  put  the  bill  through  the  House.  The 
cabinet,  excepting  Marcy  and  McClelland,  who  held 
aloof,  worked  heartily  to  whip  waverers  into  line  by 
the  use  of  patronage ;  and  the  Union,  the  administra- 
tion mouth-piece,  let  it  be  clearly  understood  that  no 
Democrat  who  forsook  his  party  at  this  crisis  could 
hope  for  further  favors.1 

On  May  8,  accordingly,  with  a  majority  stiffened 
up  by  these  means,  Richardson,  of  Illinois,  strongly 
aided  by  Stephens,  of  Georgia,  forced  the  fighting. 

1  March  7,  March  22,  1854. 


106  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1854 

The  original  Kansas-Nebraska  bill  was  too  deeply 
buried  for  resurrection,  but  by  laying  aside  eighteen 
other  bills  in  succession,  another  Nebraska  bill,  in- 
troduced into  the  House  earlier  in  the  session,  was 
finally  reached,  and  to  this  Richardson  moved  the 
Senate  bill  as  a  substitute.  This  manoeuvre  was 
successful  by  a  vote  of  about  109  to  88,  but  the  oppo- 
sition, keyed  up  to  unwonted  obstinacy  by  the  popu- 
lar excitement,  were  not  discouraged  from  a  desperate 
resistance.  On  May  n  Richardson  moved  to  close 
debate,  whereat  the  minority,  led  by  Campbell,  of 
Ohio,  Mace,  of  Indiana,  and  Washburne,  of  Illinois, 
began  a  contest  of  determined  filibustering.  For 
over  two  days,  in  continuous  session,  the  minority 
consumed  time  by  incessant  roll-calls,  motions  to  ad- 
journ, requests  to  be  excused  from  voting,  and  every 
other  device  within  the  rules  of  the  House,  while  feel- 
ing ran  continually  higher,  language  grew  harsher, 
and  popular  excitement  grew  more  intense.  The 
Senate  was  unable  to  keep  a  quorum,  for  its  mem- 
bers were  watching  from  the  galleries  while  Douglas 
steered  affairs  on  the  floor  of  the  House.  Finally, 
late  in  the  second  night,  when  all  were  angry  and 
many  were  inflamed  with  liquor,  a  personal  alterca- 
tion between  Campbell  and  Stephens  and  Seward,  of 
Georgia,  nearly  brought  on  a  free  fight.1  Only  the 
utmost  exertions  of  the  speaker,  Boyd,  of  Kentucky, 
succeeded  in  securing  an  adjournment. 

1  Cong.  Globe,  33  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  1183;   Pike,  First  Blows  of  the 
Civil  War,  224. 


i8$4]  KANSAS-NEBRASKA    BILL  107 

Then  followed  more  days  of  bitter  altercation, 
but,  on  a  second  trial,  Richardson  obtained  a  vote 
to  close  debate  on  May  20.  The  opposition  could 
not  have  had  any  real  hope  of  defeating  the  bill  by 
obstruction,  for  there  was  no  fixed  end  to  the  session 
nor  was  there  any  sign  of  weakening  among  the 
majority;  yet,  led  by  the  indefatigable  Campbell, 
they  still  fought  on  with  dilatory  motions  and 
amendments  until,  by  a  clever  trick,  Stephens  man- 
aged to  force  a  vote  on  the  night  of  May  22.  The 
bill  passed,  1 13  to  100.  The  majority  was  composed 
of  101  Democrats,  northern  and  southern,  and  12 
southern  Whigs;  the  minority  comprised  no  less 
than  42  northern  Democrats  and  2  southern  ones 
who  defied  the  administration,  together  with  45 
northern  and  7  southern  Whigs  and  4  Free  Demo- 
crats. Since  the  bill  as  passed  left  out  the  provision 
restricting  land-holding  to  citizens,  it  went  back  to 
the  Senate,  which  concurred,  after  a  brief  debate, 
on  May  25,  by  35  to  12.  May  30  Pierce  signed  it, 
and  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill  became  law. 

No  act  more  fateful  in  character  ever  passed  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States,  for  it  set  in  motion 
the  train  of  political  changes  which  led  straight  to 
the  Civil  War.  It  was  the  direct  cause  of  a  radical 
alteration  of  northern  political  feeling,  of  the  total 
failure  of  the  compromising  or  Union  policy  of  1850, 
and  of  the  destruction  of  both  the  national  parties. 
The  suddenness  of  its  introduction,  the  recklessness 
of  its  disturbance  of  the  territorial  situation,  were 


io8  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1854 

such  as  to  make  an  instant  powerful  impression ;  and 
the  members  of  Congress  who  passed  it  realized, 
when  the  session  finally  ended  in  August,  that  they 
had  begun  a  political  revolution  whose  end  no  man 
could  foresee. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

PARTY  CHAOS  IN  THE  NORTH 
(1854) 

UPON  parties,  the  sudden  anger  which  swept  the 
north  in  1854  produced  revolutionary  effects. 
At  the  opening  of  the  year  the  Democratic  party 
controlled  the  federal  government  and  most  of  the 
state  governments  north  and  south,  and  was  loyally 
supported  in  each  section.  The  opposing  Whig 
party,  though  discouraged  by  defeat  and  conscious 
of  sharp  differences  between  its  southern  and  north- 
ern wings,  was  still  formidable  in  numbers  and  not 
without  hope  of  recovering,  as  the  Democrats  had 
recovered  after  1840.  That  the  Free  Democratic 
party  should  ever  supplant  it  as  the  rival  of  the 
Democrats  was  beyond  the  bounds  of  probability, 
for  the  third  party  was  weakened  by  its  radicalism 
and  discredited  by  its  habit  of  coalitions  in  nearly 
every  state  for  the  sake  of  gaining  office. 

All  calculations  based  on  previous  experience  were 
upset,  however,  by  the  craze  of  anger  and  excite- 
ment over  the  repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise. 
The  Whig  party,  paralyzed  by  differences  between 
its  northern  and  southern  wings,  could  reap  no  ad- 


no  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1854 

vantage  from  the  blunder  of  the  Pierce  adminis- 
tration, for  most  of  its  northern  members,  turning 
in  despair  from  the  old  organization  as  something 
stale  and  inadequate,  welcomed  the  opportunity  to 
unite  with  anti-slavery  Democrats  and  Free-Soilers 
in  order  to  administer  a  stunning  rebuke  to  the 
party  in  power.  The  more  radical  anti-slavery  men 
favored  a  sectional  northern  party  formed  to  com- 
bat the  south  and  the  extension  of  slavery.  Others 
desired  not  so  much  a  new  anti-southern  as  a  new 
anti  -  Democratic  organization.  It  was  an  oppor- 
tunity where  a  great  leader,  a  man  of  the  Clay  or 
Webster  stamp,  was  needed  to  assume  control;  or 
in  default  of  such  a  personality,  a  group  of  men  able 
to  direct  public  action.  No  such  leaders  appeared, 
however,  and  the  new  forces  worked  themselves 
out  at  random  in  the  several  states,  with  the  result 
that  the  political  tornado  which  now  blew  the  Whig 
party  to  fragments  left  chaos  in  its  place. 

The  radicals  acted  first:  even  before  the  passage 
of  the  bill  an  outcry  went  up  for  a  new  party;  in 
April  the  first  steps  were  taken,  and  by  June  the 
newspapers  throughout  the  north  were  filled  with 
appeals  for  a  union  of  all  honest  men  to  rebuke  the 
broken  faith  and  violated  pledges  of  the  south.  The 
members  of  Congress  who  had  opposed  the  bill  joined 
in  issuing  an  address  calling  for  united  action  in  the 
next  congressional  election,  and  a  number  of  them 
fell  in  heartily  with  the  new  party  idea.1  There  was 

1  Wilson,  Slave  Power,  II.,  410. 


1 8 54]  PARTY    CHAOS  in 

nothing,  however,  resembling  any  central  control, 
and  the  leaders  in  the  state  elections  were  left  un- 
trammelled and  unaided. 

The  region  where  the  desire  for  a  new  anti-slavery 
organization  proved  strongest  was  the  "Old  North- 
west." There  Whiggery  was  less  popular,  for  the 
party  had  been  in  a  minority  for  years  and  the  name 
had  little  of  the  social  prestige  which  attached  to  it 
in  the  east  and  south.  Consequently  the  opponents 
of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill  were  able  in  these  states 
to  form  a  coalition  in  the  summer  of  1854.  In  Michi- 
gan a  state  mass  convention  at  Jackson  nominated, 
on  July  6,  a  mixed  ticket  of  Whigs,  Democrats,  and 
Free-Soilers,  and  adopted  a  new  name,  that  of  Re- 
publicans. Their  resolutions,  the  first  Republican 
party  platform,  placed  the  new  body  squarely  on 
anti-slavery  grounds  by  declaring  slavery  a  "moral, 
social  and  political  evil,"  denouncing  the  repeal  of 
the  Missouri  Compromise  as  "an  open  and  undis- 
guised breach  of  faith,"  demanding  the  repeal  of  the 
Kansas-Nebraska  act  and  the  fugitive -slave  law,  and 
pledging  the  party  to  act  under  the  name  Republican 
"  against  the  schemes  of  an  aristocracy  the  most  re- 
volting and  the  most  repressive  the  earth  has  ever 
witnessed."  1  In  Wisconsin,  Ohio,  and  Indiana  sim- 
ilar "  people's  "  conventions  met  July  13,  the  anniver- 
sary of  the  Northwest  Ordinance,  brought  about  a 
union  of  anti -slavery  elements,  and  organized  for  the 
fall  campaign.  Their  enthusiasm,  the  vigor  of  their 

1  Curtis,  Republican  Party,  I.,  188-190. 


ii2  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  1854 

resolutions,  and  the  promptness  with  which  the  Whig 
and  Free  Soil  parties  vanished  in  these  states  re- 
vealed the  deep  feeling  aroused  by  the  repeal  of  the 
Missouri  Compromise.  In  the  two  other  western 
states  the  same  result  was  attained  by  Whig  and 
Free  Soil  fusion.  In  Iowa,  the  Free  Democratic 
party  withdrew  its  own  ticket  and  indorsed  Grimes, 
the  Whig  candidate  for  governor,  who  ran  on  an 
anti-Nebraska  platform.1  In  Illinois,  an  attempt 
to  form  an  anti-Nebraska  party  proved  abortive, 
since  the  movement  fell  into  the  hands  of  radical 
Free-Soilers  with  whom  Illinois  Whigs  had  little  in 
common,  yet  the  elements  of  opposition  finally  man- 
aged to  unite  on  a  state  ticket.2 

In  congressional  nominations  the  same  process 
was  carried  through ;  in  nearly  every  district  in  the 
north  the  opponents  of  the  administration  uniting 
upon  a  distinctively  anti-Nebraska  candidate.  In 
this  way  there  appeared  the  beginnings  of  a  purely 
sectional  northern  party,  whose  controlling  senti- 
ment was  indignation  towards  the  south  and  a  de- 
termination to  oppose  the  extension  of  slavery  by 
restoring  the  Missouri  Compromise,  or  by  some  new 
means  of  effectual  restriction. 

This  movement,  however,  although  the  logical  out- 
come of  the  crisis,  failed  in  the  eastern  states  owing 
to  two  obstacles,  one  foreseen  and  one  utterly  unex- 

1  Salter,  Grimes,  33. 

2  Smith,    Liberty  and  Free  Soil  Parties,  295;    Harris,  Negro 
Servitude  in  Illinois,  189. 


1854]  PARTY    CHAOS  113 

pected.  As  was  apprehended  from  the  start,  the 
conservative  elements  of  the  Whig  party  in  the 
states  east  of  Ohio  refused  to  abandon  their  ranks. 
The  Whig  state  convention  of  Massachusetts,  while 
declaring  itself  "unalterably  opposed  to  the  exten- 
sion of  slavery  over  one  foot  of  territory  now  free," 
resolved  "that  the  Whig  party  of  Massachusetts, 
ever  true  to  liberty,  the  Constitution,  and  the  Union, 
needs  not  to  abandon  its  organization  or  change  its 
principles."1  With  many  anti- slavery  Whigs  the 
position  of  Senator  Seward  was  decisive.  He  was 
without  doubt  the  leader  of  anti-slavery  sentiment 
in  the  party  in  the  greatest  state  in  the  Union,  and 
his  political  weight  was  such  that,  had  he  chosen, 
he  could  have  decided  the  immediate  formation  of 
a  strong  northern  organization.  But  Seward  and 
Weed,  his  mentor,  were  thorough-going,  practical 
politicians,  and  hesitated  to  leave  the  safe  shelter  of 
the  regular  Whig  organization  for  the  doubtful  ad- 
vantages of  a  tumultuous  popular  movement.  In 
the  Nebraska  debate,  Seward  had  been  careful  to 
speak  always  as  the  Whig,  and  now  he  concerned 
himself  mainly  with  securing  his  re-election  as  sena- 
tor.2 In  two  eastern  states,  New  York  and  Vermont, 
the  anti-Nebraska  men  adopted  the  Whig  ticket; 
elsewhere  they  let  it  alone.  The  only  eastern  state 
where  the  Republican  party  as  such  was  successfully 

1  Boston  Advertiser,  August  17,  1854. 

2  Bancroft,  Seward,  I.,  367;    Scisco,  Political  Nativism,   114 
et  seq. 


H4  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

formed  was  Maine,  where  a  coalition  of  Free-Soilers 
and  Temperance  Democrats  adopted  the  name.1  In 
Massachusetts  a  convention  was  called  to  form  the 
party  but  it  proved  almost  a  fiasco. 

These  hesitating  movements  of  undecided  Whigs 
were  rendered  unimportant  by  a  totally  unexpected 
political  phenomenon  which  suddenly  burst  upon  the 
scene.  In  the  spring  of  1854  it  began  to  be  rumored 
that  a  new  secret  political  society  was  spreading 
everywhere,  and  by  summer  it  was  evident  that  this 
body,  whose  members  affected  ignorance  of  its  name, 
principles,  or  officers,  was  going  to  play  a  strong  part 
in  the  coming  elections.2  The  "Order  of  the  Star- 
Spangled  Banner"  had  been  in  existence  since  1850 
as  one  of  several  societies  opposed  to  the  influence 
of  foreigners  and  Catholics  in  politics.  The  presence 
of  immigrants  of  alien  speech  and  clannish  habits, 
visibly  controlled  by  their  priests,  was  resented  by 
American-born  working-men  as  early  as  1843,  when 
Native  American  parties  were  formed  in  municipal 
elections  in  some  of  the  large  cities.  This  movement 
died  down,  but  after  1850  the  rapid  influx  of  Irish 
and  Germans,  who  stayed  in  the  cities,  and  seemed 
to  be  debasing  local  politics  besides  competing  with 
native  working-men,  led  to  a  revival  of  alarm.3 
At  the  same  time  a  number  of  incidents  in  the 


1  Willey,  Anti-Slavery  Cause,  436-449. 

2  Scisco,  Political  Nativism,  chap.  ii. 

3  Haynes,  "Causes  of  Know-Nothing  Success,"  in  Am.  Hist. 
Rev.,  III.,  67. 


i8S4l  PARTY   CHAOS  115 

United  States,  joined  to  the  known  reactionary 
policy  of  Pope  Pius  IX.,  rendered  the  Roman  church 
offensive  to  radicals.  Archbishop  Hughes,  an  ag- 
gressive prelate,  attacked  the  New  York  public 
school  system,  objecting  especially  to  the  use  of  the 
Bible.  Then,  in  1853,  when  Bedini,  a  papal  nuncio, 
came  to  America  to  settle  a  question  of  the  owner- 
ship of  church  property  at  issue  between  the  bishop 
of  Buffalo  and  the  trustees  of  the  church,  his  decision 
in  favor  of  the  bishop  was  regarded  as  unfriendly  and 
his  mission  was  resented  as  an  attempt  at  dictation.1 
In  1853  and  1854  agitators  began  to  appear  who  de- 
nounced Jesuits,  the  pope,  the  Catholic  clergy,  and 
Catholicism  as  dangerous  to  the  state.  Prominent 
among  these  was  Alessandro  Gavazzi,  an  ex-priest 
who  had  been  active  in  the  revolution  of  1848  and 
now  made  tours  of  England  and  the  United  States, 
stirring  great  public  interest  by  his  savage  attacks 
upon  the  papacy  and  the  Catholic  church.  Soon 
riots  began  between  the  Catholic  Irish  and  the 
"  Know-Nothings,"  as  the  members  of  the  secret 
orders  were  commonly  called,  and  the  year  1854  was 
marked  by  tumults  of  alarming  proportions  in  New 
York  and  other  large  cities,  where  an  agitator  styling 
himself  "the  angel  Gabriel"  followed  in  Gavazzi 's 
track.2 

Of  course  this  movement  had  no  connection  with 
the  Kansas-Nebraska  excitement;    yet  it  was  un- 

1  Schmeckebier,  Know-Nothing  Party  in  Maryland,  46-60. 

2  Scisco,  Political  Nativism,  84-105. 


n6  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1854 

deniably  hostile  to  the  party  which  contained  within 
its  ranks  the  Germans  and  Irish.  Accordingly,  when 
the  wrath  over  the  repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise 
spread  like  wildfire  over  the  north,  thousands  of  men 
who  burned  to  rebuke  the  Pierce  administration,  but 
saw  no  hope  in  the  conservative  Whig  organiza- 
tion, found  this  new,  aggressively  American  order 
ready  to  receive  them.  Secrecy  and  the  charm  of 
novelty  had  for  the  moment  a  powerful  effect ;  and 
the  "Order  of  the  Star-Spangled  Banner"  suddenly 
grew  to  double,  triple,  and  finally  a  hundredfold. 
Other  similar  orders  flourished,  and  by  the  end  of 
the  summer  of  1854  the  anti-Nebraska  excitement 
was  paralleled  by  a  new  and  unexpected  anti-foreign 
agitation. 

The  order  was  well  suited  for  sudden  expansion, 
for  its  guidance  lay  in  the  hands  of  a  few  men,  the 
initiates  of  the  highest  of  the  three  " degrees"  con- 
ferred, who  alone  knew  the  order's  name  and  were 
eligible  for  its  dignities.  The  local  councils  were 
united  by  a  grand  council  for  each  state,  and,  after 
1854,  by  a  national  council,  whose  decisions  were 
binding  upon  the  whole  body.  Since  the  men  who 
directed  this  new  institution  were,  as  a  rule,  little 
known  in  public  life,  the  Whig  and  Democratic  lead- 
ers were  at  first  contemptuous  and  indifferent.  Later, 
as  the  craze  spread,  the  old-line  politicians  became 
alarmed  but  could  exert  no  influence.  Some,  seeing 
a  chance  for  personal  advantage,  joined  the  order, 
but  more  waited  to  see  what  the  outcome  would  be. 


1 8 54]  PARTY    CHAOS  117 

One  thing  became  steadily  clearer,  that  thousands 
of  anti-slavery  men  were  rushing  into  this  secret 
society  as  the  best  way  to  strike  at  the  administra- 
tion, regardless  of  the  utter  absence  of  relation  be- 
tween the  anti-Catholic  issue  and  the  Kansas-Ne- 
braska act.  By  the  autumn,  in  spite  of  the  profound 
mystery  attached  to  the  movements  of  the  Know- 
Nothings,  it  was  known  that  they  had  nominated 
tickets  in  Massachusetts,  New  York,  and  Pennsyl- 
vania, and  all  were  curious  to  see  how  the  experiment 
would  turn  out. 

Against  this  storm  of  angry  but  confused  attack, 
the  Democratic  party,  too  firmly  committed  to  avoid 
the  issue,  made  a  sullen  though  stubborn  fight.  In 
the  south  neither  the  anti-Nebraska  nor  the  "  Know- 
Nothing"  movements  had  any  effect  this  year;  but 
in  the  north  the  party  found  itself  at  a  great  disad- 
vantage with  no  effective  reply  to  its  opponents. 
Few  of  the  Democratic  newspapers  defended  the 
Kansas-Nebraska  act  in  more  than  a  perfunctory 
way,  yet  the  party  stood  unflinchingly  by  Douglas's 
"principle  of  non-intervention"  with  slavery  in  the 
territories,  and  raised  the  cry  of  intolerance  against 
the  new  Native  Americans.  The  campaign  went  on 
with  great  fury.  Congressional  and  state  candi- 
dates thundered  on  the  stump  against  the  adminis- 
tration, ringing  the  changes  on  the  "  Nebraska  swin- 
dle," "perfidy,"  "enormity,"  and  "outrage."  Doug- 
las was  the  target  for  unmeasured  abuse,  hailed  as 
Benedict  Arnold  and  Judas  Iscariot,  insulted  in  pub- 


n8  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1854 

lie  speeches  and  private  letters,  and  burned  in  effigy 
from  Maine  to  Illinois.1  When  he  appeared  before 
the  people  of  Chicago  to  defend  his  work,  he  was 
howled  down  and  threatened  with  stones  and  pistols 
until,  having  faced  his  opponents  with  unbending 
courage  for  hours,  he  yielded  to  his  friends  and  aban- 
doned the  effort.2  The  north  had  known  no  such 
campaign  since  the  days  of  "Tippecanoe  and  Tyler 
too." 

When  the  elections  came  off,  the  results  of  the 
year  of  excitement  became  visible.  In  the  north- 
west, where  the  opposition  was  united  in  an  anti- 
Nebraska  or  Republican  fusion,  it  carried  every  state 
except  Illinois ;  but  in  the  eastern  states  the  confu- 
sion of  parties  almost  defied  description.  Voters 
were  confronted  with  three  or  even  four  tickets: 
Republican,  ant i -Nebraska,  Peoples',  Fusion,  Know- 
Nothing,  Free  Soil,  Whig,  Democratic,  "Hard"  and 
"Soft"  Democrat,  anti-Maine  Law  or  "Rum"  Dem- 
ocrat, and  Temperance  candidates.  The  Republican 
or  Whig-Free-Soil-Temperance  fusion  carried  Maine, 
Vermont,  and,  by  a  narrow  margin,  New  York;  but 
these  successes  were  cast  into  the  shadow  by  the 
astoundingly  sudden  rise  of  the  Know-Not hings. 
This  hitherto  unknown  party,  with  no  public  cam- 
paign at  all,  cast  over  one-quarter  of  the  total  vote 
in  New  York,  more  than  two-fifths  in  Pennsylvania, 
and  nearly  two -thirds  in  Massachusetts,  electing 

1  Cutts,  Constitutional  and  Party  Questions,  96,  98-101. 

2  Sheahan ,  Douglas,  271. 


i855]  PARTY    CHAOS  119 

every  state  officer  and  nearly  every  member  of  the 
legislature.  In  other  states  great  numbers  of  the 
candidates  elected  as  Republicans  or  anti-Nebraska 
men  were  also  Know-Not hings,  and  the  effect  of  the 
rebuke  to  the  Pierce  administration  was  almost  lost 
sight  of  in  the  general  amazement  over  the  rise  of 
the  new  order.  Douglas  did  not  hesitate  to  claim 
that  the  whole  anti-Nebraska  campaign  had  mis- 
carried.1 

There  could  be  no  doubt,  however,  that  the  Demo- 
crats suffered  a  severe  defeat.  Nine  states  had  been 
taken  from  their  control,  and  among  the  congressmen 
elected  up  to  January,  1855,  there  was  an  actual  loss 
to  the  administration  of  sixty-two  seats.  Moreover, 
the  legislatures  of  a  number  of  northern  states  chose 
senators  in  the  winter  of  1855,  all  of  whom,  wheth- 
er Know -Nothing  or  not,  were  undoubtedly  anti- 
slavery  in  principles.  Prominent  among  those  re- 
elected  were  Seward  from  New  York  and  Hale 
from  New  Hampshire;  among  new  senators,  Colla- 
mer,  a  Seward  Whig  from  Vermont,  and  Lyman 
Trumbull,  an  anti-slavery  Democrat  from  Illinois. 
The  verdict  here  was  unmistakable 

At  the  end  of  1854  the  future  of  politics  seemed 
all  guesswork,  for  the  tempest  over  the  repeal  of  the 
Missouri  Compromise  was  dying  down  and  the  Know- 
Nothings  occupied  for  the  moment  the  place  of  chief 
public  interest.  The  last  session  of  the  thirty-third 
Congress  was  tame  and  uninteresting,  with  some  dis- 
1  Congressional  Globe,  33  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  App.  216. 

VOL.  XVIII. — 9 


120  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1855 

cussion  of  the  anti-foreign  craze  and  slight  reference 
to  the  slavery  question.  There  seemed  to  be  noth- 
ing pressing  for  an  Anti-Nebraska  party  to  do  but  to 
await  the  actual  working  of  affairs  in  the  territory; 
and,  meanwhile,  it  looked  as  though  the  result  of  the 
whole  episode  was  to  be  the  creation  of  a  national 
party  on  the  anti-Catholic  issue.  Nothing  in  Ameri- 
can political  history  is  more  remarkable  than  the 
way  in  which  the  voters  of  the  northern  states  re- 
sponded to  the  excitement  of  1854.  Except  in  the 
northwest,  their  action  was  so  far  from  being  what 
any  one  would  have  predicted  that  it  seemed  scarcely 
credible.  The  diversion  of  the  fierce  anti-southern 
anger  of  the  eastern  states  into  the  construction  of  a 
party  whose  professed  principles  were  absolutely  un- 
related to  the  measures  which  caused  the  upheaval 
seemed  utterly  inexplicable  on  rational  grounds. 
The  outcome  remained  to  be  seen. 


CHAPTER  IX 

POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY  IN  KANSAS 
(1854-1856) 

THE  immediate  result  of  the  Kansas  -  Nebraska 
act  was  to  revolutionize  parties  in  the  north; 
but  its  ultimate  outcome  was  to  lead  the  country  to 
the  verge  of  civil  war  by  creating  an  intense  rivalry 
in  the  territory  which  it  opened  to  settlement.  When 
the  bill  passed,  the  general  opinion  was  that  while 
Nebraska  would  develop  into  a  free  community, 
Kansas  was  practically  assured  as  a  slave  state ;  for 
its  geographical  position  marked  it  out  as  the  field 
for  immigration  from  Missouri,  the  lower  Mississippi 
Valley,  and  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  rather  than 
from  the  states  to  the  north  of  the  Ohio  River. 
Although  the  southern  leaders  did  not  initiate  the 
repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise,  they  gladly  wel- 
comed the  apparently  undoubted  opportunity  to 
gain  an  additional  slave  state  to  counterbalance 
California  in  the  Senate.  The  first  settlers  in  Kan- 
sas came  from  western  Missouri,  and  before  the  end 
of  1854  many  of  them  took  up  claims  along  the  Mis- 
souri and  Kansas  rivers,  founding  the  little  towns  of 
Kickapoo,  Leavenworth,  and  Atchison,  and  bringing 


122  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1854 

a  few  slaves  with  them.  "  Popular  sovereignty,"  as 
established  by  Douglas,  seemed  to  mean  exactly 
what  the  southern  leaders  desired. 

But  the  indignation  among  northern  men  over  the 
opening  of  Kansas  and  Nebraska  to  slave-holders 
now  led  to  an  entirely  unforeseen  attempt  to  turn 
the  principle  of  "popular  sovereignty"  against  the 
south  itself,  by  securing  a  majority  of  anti-slavery 
settlers  in  Kansas,  the  very  region  conceded  to  the 
slave-holders.  Even  before  the  passage  of  the  bill, 
steps  were  taken  which  led  to  the  formation  of  a 
New  England  Emigrant  Aid  Society,  organized  by 
Eli  Thayer,  of  Worcester,  and  largely  supported  by 
Amos  Lawrence  and  others  of  the  wealthiest  and 
most  prominent  men  of  Massachusetts.1  The  pur- 
pose of  this  corporation  was  to  assist  the  emigra- 
tion of  genuine  settlers — not  necessarily  abolitionists 
or  even  an ti- Nebraska  men — who  were  unwilling  to 
see  Kansas  made  into  a  slave  state;  the  society 
did  not  enlist  men  as  recruits,  but  was  ready  to 
assist  applicants  by  loaning  capital  for  mills  and 
hotels  and  by  furnishing  supplies  and  transporta- 
tion. In  the  summer  of  1854  the  first  band  of 
northern  settlers  reached  Kansas,  and  others  soon 
followed.  With  them,  although  not  under  the  au- 
spices of  the  society,  came  other  immigrants  from 
New  York  and  the  states  of  the  "Old  Northwest," 
looking  for  farms  in  the  fertile  valleys  of  the  Kansas 
and  its  tributaries.  Soon  a  new  community,  hold- 

1  Thayer,  Kansas  Crusade,  chap.  ii. 


i854]  POPULAR    SOVEREIGNTY  123 

ing  aloof  from  the  Missourian  settlements,  was  plant- 
ed near  the  town  of  Lawrence,  named  in  honor  of  the 
principal  patron  of  the  Emigrant  Aid  Society,  and 
the  country  became  aware  that  the  settlement  of 
the  territory  was  taking  on  an  unusual  and  ominous 
form.1 

This  "invasion"  of  Kansas  by  northern  immi- 
grants brought  sharply  to  the  front  one  of  the  many 
hazy  points  in  Douglas's  " popular  sovereignty." 
When,  under  the  law,  was  the  decision  to  be  made 
regarding  the  existence  of  slavery  ?  Must  it  be  post- 
poned till  a  state  constitution  was  framed,  or  could 
it  be  made  at  any  earlier  time?  The  full  southern 
theory,  announced  by  Calhoun  as  early  as  1847,  and 
held  by  most  southerners  in  1854,  was  that  there 
could  be  no  interference  with  slavery  by  either  Con- 
gress or  the  territorial  legislature,  no  community  ex- 
cept a  state  being  competent  to  make  a  decision. 
Douglas  would  not  commit  himself  on  this  point,  but 
a  very  general  impression  prevailed  in  the  north  that 
the  principle  of  popular  or  "squatter  sovereignty" 
would  permit  the  inhabitants  of  a  territory  to  decide 
the  point  for  themselves  as  soon  as  they  chose.  All 
saw,  northern  and  southern  men  alike,  that  in  de- 
fault of  any  positive  protection  of  slavery  by  law, 
actual  control  of  the  territorial  government  by  anti- 
slavery  men  would  effectually  prevent  Kansas  from 
ever  becoming  a  slave  state. 

1Cf.  contemporary  accounts  of  the  difficulties  in  Kansas,  in 
Hart,  Am.  Hist,  told  by  Contemporaries,  IV.,  §§  36-40. 


124  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1854 

This  danger  was  perceived  as  soon  as  the  organized 
eastern  emigration  began,  and  a  thrill  of  indignation 
ran  through  Missouri  and  the  entire  south.1  The 
actual  purpose  of  the  Emigrant  Aid  Society  was 
wholly  misunderstood,  and  the  extent  of  its  opera- 
tions exaggerated  beyond  all  measure.  It  was  be- 
lieved to  be  a  corporation  with  unbounded  resources, 
formed  for  the  purpose  of  holding  Kansas  by  force, 
sending  out  hordes  of  mercenaries,  mostly  abolition- 
ists, enemies  of  God  and  man,  provisioned,  and 
armed  to  the  teeth  to  seize  Kansas  from  legitimate 
southern  emigrants.  They  are  "a  band  of  Hessian 
mercenaries,"  said  a  committee  of  Missourians,  in  an 
address  to  the  people  of  the  United  States.  "To 
call  these  people  emigrants  is  a  sheer  perversion  of 
language.  They  were  not  sent  to  cultivate  the  soil. 
.  .  .  They  have  none  of  the  marks  of  tl.e  old  pio- 
neers. If  not  clothed  and  fed  by  the  same  power 
which  has  effected  their  transportation  they  would 
starve.  They  are  hirelings — an  army  of  hirelings. 
.  .  .  They  are  military  colonies  of  reckless  and  des- 
perate fanatics."  2 

The  sense  of  unfairness  and  unjust  aggression 
which  the  operations  of  the  Emigrant  Aid  Society, 
as  seen  through  these  distorted  rumors,  excited  in 
the  south,  was  as  keen  in  its  way  as  the  northern 
indignation  had  been  over  the  repeal  of  the  slavery 
restriction.  The  Missourians  and  southerners  in 

1  Carr,  Missouri,  241—256. 

*  Richmond  Enquirer,  October  5, 1855. 


1854]  POPULAR    SOVEREIGNTY  125 

general  felt  that  the  attempt  to  settle  Kansas  with 
northern  emigrants  was  a  direct  effort  to  take  from 
them  what  was  rightfully  theirs,  and  they  were  at 
once  driven  into  a  counter  -  effort  to  defeat  this 
aggression  by  controlling  the  territorial  government 
from  the  start  in  the  interests  of  slavery.1  The  con- 
test thus  begun  not  only  convulsed  Kansas,  but 
speedily  shook  the  country  from  end  to  end. 

The  first  open  conflict  between  the  opposing 
forces  came  in  the  autumn  of  1854.  The  territorial 
governor,  appointed  by  Pierce  to  carry  the  Kansas- 
Nebraska  act  into  effect,  was  Andrew  H.  Reeder,  a 
Pennsylvania  Democrat,  who  announced  his  entire 
willingness  to  see  Kansas  become  a  slave  state,  a 
man  of  an  excitable  temperament,  wholly  unprepared 
and  to  a  large  degree  unfitted  for  the  task  which  he 
found  thrust  upon  him.  No  sooner  had  he  arrived 
and  named  November  29  for  the  election  of  a  terri- 
torial delegate  than  the  storm  broke.  On  that  day 
over  sixteen  hundred  armed  men  from  the  western 
counties  of  Missouri,  who  had  been  organized  in 
"Blue  Lodges"  for  the  purpose  of  making  Kansas  a 
slave  state,  marched  into  the  territory  under  the 
leadership  of  United  States  Senator  Atchison,  and 
cast  votes  for  Whit  field,  a  former  Indian  agent  and 
a  southerner,  as  territorial  delegate.  Owing  possi- 
bly to  the  general  confusion  in  the  region,  as  well  as 
to  his  desire  to  avoid  trouble,  Reeder  raised  no  ob- 
jection to  this  illegality ;  nor  did  the  House  hesitate 
1  Hodgson,  Cradle  of  the  Confederacy,  344. 


126  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1854 

to  admit  Whitfield  to  a  seat  in  December,  1854,  and 
the  Missourian  invasion,  although  known  in  the  east, 
aroused  little  comment  in  the  whirl  of  the  Republican 
and  Know-Nothing  campaign. 

During  the  winter  of  1854-1855,  the  Missourians 
appealed  to  the  south  to  prevent  the  swamping  of 
the  slave-holders  in  Kansas  by  a  flood  of  New  Eng- 
land abolitionists.  More  money,  more  settlers  and 
arms  must  be  supplied  if  Kansas  was  to  be  kept  as 
a  slave  state.  "Two  thousand  slaves  actually  in 
Kansas,"  urged  B.  F.  Stringfellow,  a  Missouri  leader, 
"  will  make  a  slave  state  out  of  it.  Once  fairly  there 
nobody  will  disturb  them."  1  By  the  spring  of  1855 
the  excitement  in  Missouri  had  become  intense,  and 
when  Reeder  ordered  the  election  of  a  territorial  leg- 
islature for  March  30,  it  was  felt  that  the  decisive 
moment  was  at  hand.  Although  a  census  of  the 
territory,  taken  in  February,  1855,  showed  that  out 
of  a  total  of  8601  inhabitants  more  than  half  came 
from  the  south,  and  less  than  seven  hundred  came 
from  New  England,  the  Missourians  felt  it  would  not 
do  to  leave  anything  to  chance.  On  the  election  day, 
at  least  five  thousand  armed  anQ.  organized  men,  led 
by  Atchison,  Stringfellow,  and  others,  invaded  the  ter- 
ritory, took  possession  of  the  polls  in  nearly  every 
district,  overawed  or  drove  away  the  election  judges, 
and  cast  6307  ballots.2  The  northern  immigrants, 

1  Spring,  Kansas,  27. 

2  House  Reports,  34  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  200,  pp.  9-35;    Robin- 
son, Kansas,  27. 


N     E     B      B     A      S      K 


CIVIL,  WAR 
IN 

KANSAS 

(1854-1856) 


i8ss]  POPULAR    SOVEREIGNTY  127 

most  of  them  utterly  unused  to  violence,  and  all  un- 
prepared for  such  a  performance,  were  too  astound- 
ed and  alarmed  to  make  any  effective  protest ;  and 
when  Reeder  was  called  upon  to  declare  the  returns 
he  found  himself  surrounded  by  Missourians,  while 
he  had  scarcely  any  independent  supporters. 

Had  Reeder  possessed  the  courage  to  declare  the 
entire  election  fraudulent,  the  history  of  the  territory 
and  of  the  country  might  have  been  different ;  but 
he  did  no  more  than  to  throw  out  returns  from  seven 
contested  districts,  and  gave  certificates  of  election 
to  the  remaining  members,  who,  when  they  met  as  a 
legislature,  promptly  unseated  the  seven  Free-Soil- 
ers.  Kansas  was  thus  organized  with  a  legislature 
composed  wholly  of  pro-slavery  men,  and  the  south 
scored  the  first  success  in  the  contest.  The  victory 
was  won,  however,  by  fraud  and  violence,  and  the 
whole  theory  of  peaceful  " popular  sovereignty" 
vanished  into  thin  air. 

Very  significant  were  the  different  ways  in  which 
the  two  sections  regarded  this  election.  Upon  the 
people  of  the  north  it  produced  an  impression  of 
horror  and  disgust.  "The  impudence  of  this  at- 
tempt," said  Greeley,  "is  paralleled  only  by  its 
atrocity.  ...  If  a  man  can  be  found  in  the  Free 
State  to  counsel  the  surrender  of  Kansas  to  the  Slave 
power,  he  is  a  coward  and  slave  in  soul."  *  In  the 
south,  on  the  contrary,  it  was  universally  regarded 
as  an  act  of  justifiable  self-defence  against  the  un- 

1  N.  Y.  Tribune,  April  12,  1855. 


i28  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1855 

fair  encroachments  of  the  north;  one  invasion  had 
simply  been  answered  by  another  one  in  behalf  of 
the  right.  In  no  clearer  way  could  the  differing 
standards  of  the  north  and  the  south  be  contrasted. 

To  the  unfortunate  Reeder  now  fell  the  duty  of 
co-operating  as  governor  with  the  legislature  chosen 
by  the  "  Border  Ruffians,"  as  the  Missourians  began 
to  be  called.  First  he  showed  by  his  conduct  what 
a  revolution  had  been  worked  by  his  six  months' 
experience  in  his  views  regarding  slavery  and  slave- 
holders, for  in  returning  to  Washington  to  consult 
the  president,  he  made  a  speech  in  Pennsylvania 
which  told  the  story  of  the  election  in  detail.1  When 
he  reached  Washington  he  found  himself  the  object 
of  a  growing  southern  dislike  and  suspicion.  His 
failure  to  oppose  the  northern  invaders,  his  refusal 
to  co-operate  with  the  Missourians,  and  still  more  his 
letters  and  speeches,  earned  him  in  southern  eyes 
the  epithets  of  "incompetent,"  "corrupt,"  "traitor," 
and  "scoundrel." 

Reeder  found  Pierce  much  disturbed  by  the  grow- 
ing excitement  in  the  south  over  Kansas  affairs,  and 
unable  or  unwilling  to  give  him  any  support.  He 
showed  so  plainly  that  he  would  welcome  Reeder 's 
resignation  that  the  governor  offered  to  do  so,  pro- 
vided Pierce  would  give  him  a  written  statement 
approving  his  conduct;  but  this  Pierce  dared  not 
do.2  After  fruitless  interviews,  Reeder  returned  to 

1N.  Y.  Times,  May  i,  1855. 

2  House  Reports,  34  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  200,  p.  937. 


1 855]  POPULAR    SOVEREIGNTY  129 

Kansas,  with  the  eyes  of  the  whole  country  upon 
him,  but  sure  that  his  official  career  was  to  be  a 
short  one.  The  territorial  legislature  met  in  July, 
at  Pawnee,  a  town  without  inhabitants,  according  to 
contemporary  accounts,  where  Reeder  had  taken  up 
a  quantity  of  land.  The  governor's  message  was 
conciliatory,  but  the  legislature  disregarded  him 
utterly,  and,  in  spite  of  his  indignant  protest,  ad- 
journed to  another  settlement,  Shawnee*  Mission,  on 
the  Missouri  border,  where  it  proceeded  to  enact  a 
set  of  laws  which  won  immediate  notoriety.  Re- 
gardless of  the  Calhoun  theory  of  the  impotence  of 
a  mere  territorial  legislature  over  slavery,  it  passed 
statutes  to  establish  and  protect  the  institution  in 
the  territory,  adopting  for  the  purpose  the  text  of 
the  Missouri  slave  code. 

The  principal  statute,  entitled  "An  act  to  punish 
offences  against  slave  property,"  inflicted  the  death 
penalty  for  inciting  a  slave  insurrection;  death  or 
ten  years  at  hard  labor  for  aiding  a  slave  to  escape ; 
and  two  years  at  hard  labor  for  denying  "by  speak- 
ing or  writing,"  or  by  printing  or  introducing  any 
printed  matter,  "the  right  of  persons  to  hold  slaves 
in  this  territory."  The  last  section  also  was  note- 
worthy. "No  person,"  it  ran,  "who  is  conscien- 
tiously opposed  to  holding  slaves  or  who  does  not 
admit  the  right  to  hold  slaves  in  this  territory,  shall 
sit  as  jurors  on  the  trial  of  any  prosecution  for  any 
violation  of  any  of  the  sections  of  this  act."  *  The 

1  Tribune  Almanac,  1855,  p.  13. 


130  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1855 

news  of  this  legislation  intensified  the  rising  anger 
of  the  north.  "This  will  suffice,"  said  the  Tribune, 
"if  enforced,  to  hang  nearly  every  anti-slavery  man 
in  the  territory.  .  .  .  And  upheld  we  presume  it  will 
be."  1  Reeder  remained  in  office  but  a  short  time, 
being  removed  on  August  15,  nominally  because  of 
land  speculation  and  "lack  of  sympathy  with  the 
people,"  but  everybody  knew  that  it  was  owing  to 
his  refusal  to  adapt  himself  to  the  pro-slavery  Demo- 
crats.2 

By  this  time  the  country  was  aware  that  a  new 
and  serious  "Kansas  question"  was  shaping  itself. 
The  anti-slavery  indignation  of  the  north,  which  had 
dwindled  in  the  winter  of  1855,  now  rapidly  re- 
vived at  what  appeared  the  violent  and  ruthless 
determination  on  the  part  of  the  Missourians  to 
make  Kansas  slave  territory  with  or  without  law, 
justice,  or  a  majority  of  voters.  The  south,  equally 
aroused,  was  now  thoroughly  committed  to  the  effort 
to  defeat  the  lawless  invasions  of  the  northerners, 
and  raised  a  universal  voice  of  approval  over  the 
Missourian  exploits.  The  Georgia  Democratic  con- 
vention of  June  5,  1855,  resolved,  "That  we  sympa- 
thize with  the  friends  of  the  slavery  cause  in  Kansas 
in  their  manly  efforts  to  maintain  their  rights  and 
the  interests  of  the  southern  people,  and  that  we 
rejoice  at  their  recent  victories  over  the  paid  advent- 
urers and  Jesuitical  horde  of  northern  abolitionism 

1  N.  Y.  Tribune,  August  16,  1855. 

2  House  Reports,  34  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  200,  p.  944. 


1855]  POPULAR   SOVEREIGNTY  131 

.  .  .  that  the  deep  interest  taken  by  the  people  of 
Missouri  ...  is  both  natural  and  proper,  and  that 
it  is  their  right  and  duty  to  extend  to  their  southern 
brethren  in  the  territory  every  legitimate  and  honor- 
able sympathy  and  support."  1 

In  the  summer  of  1855  the  situation  in  Kansas 
was  further  complicated  by  the  sudden  action  of  the 
northern  settlers,  who  had  hitherto  played  a  passive 
part.  Led  by  Dr.  Charles  Robinson,  an  aggressive, 
cool-headed  politician,  an  agent  of  the  Emigrant  Aid 
Society,  who  had  been  in  California  in  i849,2  the 
northerners  determined  to  give  a  new  demonstration 
of  "popular  sovereignty"  by  repudiating  the  terri- 
torial legislature  as  illegal  and  seeking  admission  to 
the  Union  under  a  state  constitution.  At  the  same 
time  they  prepared  to  meet  force  with  force  in  case 
the  "Border  Ruffians"  again  invaded  the  territory. 
Rifles  and  ammunition  were  sent  for,  men  were 
drilled,  and  "Jim"  Lane,  a  reckless,  volatile  man 
from  Indiana,  with  little  soundness  of  judgment 
but  with  great  natural  oratorical  ability,  became 
the  military  chief.  During  September  and  October 
several  mass  conventions  organized  a  "Free  State 
party"  and  provided  for  a  constitutional  convention, 
which  met  duly  at  Topeka,  October  23,  comprising 
only  delegates  elected  by  the  Free  State  settlers,  and 
drew  up  the  "Topeka  Constitution"  prohibiting 
slavery.  It  is  worthy  of  note  that  the  convention 

1  Richmond  Enquirer,  June  n,  1855. 

2  Blackmar,  Robinson,  chaps,  ii.,  iii. 


132  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY 

also  submitted  to  popular  vote,  simultaneously  with 
the  constitution,  an  ordinance  prohibiting  the  en- 
trance of  negroes,  free  or  slave,  into  the  state,  a  fact 
indicating  how  far  from  abolitionist  the  northern 
settlers  were.1  During  this  time  occurred  the  regular 
election  of  a  territorial  delegate ;  but  the  Free  State 
men  conducted  a  separate  election  of  their  own, 
and  unanimously  sent  Reeder  to  contest  the  seat  to 
which  Whitfield  had  been  re-elected  by  all  the  pro- 
slavery  votes. 

This  policy  of  the  northern  settlers  stirred  the 
southern  element  to  lively  indignation  and  contempt. 
The  whole  south  regarded  the  Free  State  movement 
as  a  trick  by  which  the  "abolitionists,"  defeated  in 
the  election  of  the  territorial  legislature,  sought  none 
the  less  to  gain  control  of  the  region.  Missourians 
began  to  utter  threats  of  violence,  and  when  Shannon 
of  Ohio,  the  new  governor,  arrived  on  the  scene,  he 
found  the  situation  growing  daily  more  menacing. 
Shannon,  a  Douglas  Democrat,  favorably  disposed 
to  the  southern  claim  for  Kansas,  easily  accepted 
the  pro -slavery  view  that  the  Topeka  constitution 
was  a  revolutionary  proceeding,  and  in  his  inaugural 
address  clearly  showed  that  he  meant  to  oppose  the 
northerners.  He  even  presided  at  a  meeting  at  Leaven- 
worth  where  the  pro-slavery  sympathizers  organized 
themselves  into  a  "  Law-and-Order  party  "  to  oppose 
the  treasonable  plans  of  the  Free  State  people,  and  in 
a  speech  declared  "The  President  is  behind  you!"  2 

1  Holloway,  Kansas,  196.  2  Spring,  Kansas,  84. 


1855]  POPULAR    SOVEREIGNTY  133 

By  this  time  it  was  evident  that  "popular  sover- 
eignty" was  producing  serious  consequences.  There 
were  two  communities  in  the  same  territory,  living 
in  separate  towns  and  governed  by  separate  laws. 
The  slightest  event  might  cause  a  collision,  for  the 
Missourians  were  true  frontiersmen,  habituated  to 
the  ready  use  of  knife  or  gun  and  only  waiting  for  a 
pretext  to  "clean  out  the  abolition  crowd."  Cases 
of  brawls  and  shooting  became  frequent.  Finally, 
in  late  November,  just  before  the  time  set  by  the 
Free  State  men  for  a  vote  upon  their  constitution, 
an  episode  occurred  which  nearly  brought  on  civil 
war.  A  Free  State  man  who  had  been  arrested  by 
Sheriff  Jones,  a  red  -  hot  Missourian,  for  uttering 
threats  against  a  pro-slavery  murderer,  was  freed 
by  a  band  of  northerners  and  taken  to  Lawrence. 
Without  further  delay  the  infuriated  sheriff  sent 
word  to  Missouri,  and  later,  as  an  after-thought,  to 
Shannon ;  and  at  once  about  fifteen  hundred  excited 
"  Border  Ruffians"  swarmed  into  the  territory,  to  be 
joined  by  the  pro-slavery,  territorial,  "Law-and- 
Order"  militia.  The  town  of  Lawrence  was  found, 
however,  to  be  surrounded  by  earthworks,  behind 
which  lay  several  hundred  Free  State  men  armed  in 
part  with  the  dreaded  Sharps  rifles,  and  the  invad- 
ing force  hesitated  to  attack.  This  gave  time  for  the 
cooler  heads  on  each  side  to  work  for  peace;  and 
finally  Shannon,  upon  visiting  the  scene,  saw  that 
the  Free  State  town  had  done  nothing  in  the  eye  of 
the  law  to  call  for  any  such  attack,  and  drew  up  a 


134  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1855 

sort  of  treaty  of  peace.  The  Missourians  withdrew 
in  great  disgust  and  freely  announced  that  they  were 
simply  biding  their  time.1 

After  this  bloodless  affair,  somewhat  absurdly 
called  the  "Wakarusa  War/'  the  Free  State  party 
carried  through  the  rest  of  its  programme  undis- 
turbed, except  by  a  few  brawls  and  shooting  affrays. 
The  Topeka  constitution  was  ratified  on  December 
15,  and  the  ordinance  excluding  negroes  adopted,  and 
on  January  15,1856^  governor  and  a  legislature  were 
elected.  On  March  4  the  Topeka  legislature  met, 
and,  following  the  cautious  advice  of  Robinson,  the 
governor,  made  no  attempt  for  the  moment  to  as- 
sume jurisdiction  over  the  pro- slavery  settlements, 
but  adopted  a  memorial  to  Congress  asking  for  ad- 
mission to  the  Union,  and  adjourned  until  the  sum- 
mer to  await  events. 

Such  was  the  astounding  result  of  a  year  and  a 
half  of  " popular  sovereignty"  in  Kansas.  The  or- 
ganized immigration  from  New  England;  the  Mis- 
sourian  retort  of  fraud  and  intimidation ;  the  illegal 
voting,  and  the  extreme  pro-slavery  action  of  the 
Shawnee  Mission  legislature  were  utterly  beyond  the 
imagination  of  the  senators  and  representatives  who 
passed  the  bill  in  1854.  On  the  other  hand,  the  at- 
tempted imitation  of  California  by  the  Free  State 
men,  involving  a  defiance  of  the  territorial  authori- 
ties and  an  ignoring  of  nearly  one-half  of  the  actual 
inhabitants  of  the  territory,  was  a  total  surprise  to 

1  Robinson,  Kansas,  138;   Holloway,  Kansas,  249. 


1856]  POPULAR   SOVEREIGNTY  135 

the  eastern  anti-Nebraska  men.  The  settlers  in 
Kansas,  without  direction  from  any  quarter,  took 
affairs  into  their  own  hands,  and  created  a  political 
situation  as  exciting  as  the  original  Kansas  ques- 
tion, and  far  more  ominous.  The  time  had  come 
when  the  federal  government  could  not  avoid  taking 
a  hand.  The  rival  organizations,  the  contesting 
delegates,  and  the  imminent  danger  of  war  between 
the  factions  forced  Congress  and  the  president  to 
act.  When  the  thirty-fourth  Congress,  chosen  in 
the  months  of  political  upheaval,  met  in  December, 
1855,  the  attention  of  the  whole  country  was  fo- 
cussed  upon  the  struggle  for  control  of  the  territory, 
and  sectional  passions  were  deeply  involved. 


VOL.  XVIII. — 10 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  FAILURE   OF  THE  KNOW-NOTHING   PARTY 
(1854-1856) 

WHILE  the  course  of  events  in  Kansas  was  lead- 
ing, through  violence  and  illegality,  to  the  verge 
of  civil  war,  national  political  organization  was  also 
passing  through  a  crisis.  The  question  before  the 
country  after  the  election  of  1854  was  whether  an 
anti-slavery  party  should  win  the  support  of  north- 
ern voters,  or  whether  the  old  Whig  party,  compris- 
ing southern  as  well  as  northern  members,  should 
be  revived  under  some  new  form.  As  the  sudden 
anger  over  the  repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise 
died  away,  and  the  issue  of  the  control  of  the  ter- 
ritorial government  did  not  for  a  year  come  before 
Congress,  old  political  traditions  tended  to  draw  men 
into  organizations  which  claimed  to  be  national 
rather  than  sectional,  and  which  avoided  the  old 
danger  of  arousing  the  south  and  endangering  the 
stability  of  the  Union. 

These  feelings  worked  strongly  against  the  Repub- 
lican party  in  the  year  1855,  and  aided  a  vigorous 
effort,  which  now  began,  to  create  a  successor  to  the 
old  Whig  party  through  the  expansion  of  the  Know- 


1854]       FAILURE    OF    KNOW-NOTHINGS         137 

Nothings  into  a  national  organization.  The  nation- 
al council  of  November,  1854,  adopted  a  new  Union 
oath  which  placed  the  order  on  much  the  same  basis 
as  the  "  Union  -  saving "  compromisers  of  1850  and 
1851.  "You  will  discourage  and  denounce,"  it  ran, 
"  any  attempt  coming  from  any  quarter ...  to  destroy 
or  subvert  it  or  to  weaken  its  bonds,  .  .  .  and  you  will 
use  your  influence  to  procure  an  amicable  adjust- 
ment of  all  political  discontents  or  differences  which 
may  threaten  its  injury  or  overthrow.  You  do  fur- 
ther promise  and  swear  that  you  will  not  vote  for 
any  one  .  .  .  whom  you  know  or  believe  to  be  in 
favor  of  a  dissolution  of  the  Union  ...  or  who  is 
endeavoring  to  produce  that  result/*  * 

This  action  paved  the  way  for  others  besides  anti- 
slavery  and  anti-foreign  enthusiasts  to  enter  the 
organization;  and  in  the  winter  and  spring  of  1855 
councils  were  formed  all  over  the  United  States, 
honey  -  combing  the  local  Republican  or  anti- Ne- 
braska coalitions  of  the  west  with  a  Know-Nothing 
oath-bound  membership,  and  practically  absorbing 
the  entire  southern  Whig  body.2 

By  the  spring  of  1855  the  wildest  claims  were 
made  for  the  order ;  it  was  said  to  have  a  sworn  enrol- 
ment of  over  a  million  voters  and  to  be  able  to  con- 
trol every  city  and  nearly  every  state8  in  the  Union. 


1  Scisco,  Political  Nativism,  137;  Cluskey,  Political  Text  Book, 
66.  3  Hodgson,  Cradle  of  the  Confederacy  ,  354-357. 

3  Wilson,  Slave  Power,  II.,  422;  Whitney,  Defence  of  Am, 
Policy,  285. 


138  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1855 

The  spring  elections  turned  over  Rhode  Island,  New 
Hampshire,  and  Connecticut  into  the  hands  of  the 
Know-Not hings,  and  thus  gave  color  to  these  asser- 
tions; but  the  Virginia  campaign  in  May,  1855, 
showed  that  in  the  south  the  Know-Nothings  were 
merely  the  Whigs  under  a  new  name.  Henry  A. 
Wise,  the  Democratic  candidate  for  governor,  made 
a  powerful  canvass  of  the  state  and  was  successful, 
after  a  savage  contest,  by  ten  thousand  majority.1 
Thenceforward  the  extravagant  claims  for  the  Know- 
Nothings  were  discounted,  but  although  it  was  seen 
that  it  could  not  revolutionize  the  south,  its  control 
of  the  north  was  not  yet  disproved. 

By  this  time,  however,  two  obstacles  to  the  tri- 
umphant progress  of  the  Know-Nothing  party  were 
becoming  visible.  In  the  first  place,  the  attitude  of 
its  northern  and  southern  members  was  fundament- 
ally different  on  slavery  matters.  The  New  England 
Know  -  Nothings  were  anti  -  slavery  men,  who  had 
joined  the  society  in  order  to  strike  at  the  Pierce 
administration;  and  when  they  gained  control  of  a 
state  they  enacted  laws  to  obstruct  the  return  of 
fugitive  slaves,  passed  resolutions  denouncing  the 
repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise,  and  elected  anti- 
slavery  men  to  the  United  States  Senate.2  But  the 
southern  Know-Nothings,  although  old  Whigs,  and 
strongly  Unionist,  were  equally  pro-slavery,  and  the 

1  Hambleton,  Political  Campaign  in  Virginia,  233. 

2  Wilson,  Slave  Power,   II.,   424;    Haynes,  A   Know-Nothing 
Legislature  (Am.  Hist.  Assoc.,  Report,  1896),  p.  77. 


1855]       FAILURE    OF    KNOW-NOTHINGS         139 

chief  ground  of  attack  against  them  by  the  southern 
Democrats  was  not  so  much  their  secret  and  prescrip- 
tive platform  as  the  fact  of  their  being  in  the  same 
order  with  the  New  England  Americans.  "Know- 
Nothingism,"  said  a  Virginia  Democratic  address, 
"  has  its  origin  and  growth  in  those  quarters  of  the 
Union  where  Abolitionism  is  most  powerful.  .  .  . 
Every  election  in  which  Northern  Know-Nothing- 
ism  has  triumphed  has  inured  to  the  benefit  of  Abo- 
litionism. .  .  .  We  appeal  to  Southern  men,  without 
distinction  of  party,  to  ponder  the  consequences  be- 
fore they  cooperate  with  this  organization."1  The 
danger  of  sectional  difficulty  in  the  new  Union  party 
was  visible  almost  as  soon  as  it  was  created. 

The  other  weakness  of  the  new  party  lay  in  the 
fact  that  it  was  almost  without  strong  leaders.  Ex- 
cept in  the  northernmost  slave  states,  where  such 
men  as  Clayton,  of  Delaware,  and  Bell,  of  Tennessee, 
gave  it  some  support,  the  conservative  Whigs  who 
might  have  been  in  sympathy  with  its  non-sectional 
and  Unionist  aspirations  recoiled  in  disgust  from  its 
riotous  and  prescriptive  character  and  its  secret  ma- 
chinery. Such  men  as  Winthrop  and  Choate,  of 
Massachusetts,  representing  the  Webster  tradition, 
were  entirely  out  of  sympathy  with  it.  In  the  south, 
such  influential  men  as  Stephens  and  Toombs,  of 
Georgia,  and  Benjamin,  of  Louisiana,  went  squarely 
over  to  the  Democratic  party.  "  I  know  of  but  one 

1  Hambleton,  Political  Campaign  in  Virginia,  127;  Richmond 
Enquirer,  March  6,  1855. 


140  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1855 

class  of  people,"  said  Stephens,  "that  I  look  upon  as 
dangerous  to  the  country.  .  .  .  This  class  of  men  at 
the  North,  of  which  the  Massachusetts,  New  Hamp- 
shire and  Connecticut  legislatures  are  but  samples,  I 
consider  as  our  worst  enemies;  and  to  put  them 
down  I  will  join  as  political  allies,  now  and  forever, 
all  true  patriots  at  the  North  and  South,  whether 
native  or  adopted.  .  .  .  Their  very  organization  is 
not  only  anti-American,  anti-Republican,  but  at  war 
with  the  fundamental  law  of  the  Union  and  therefore 
revolutionary  in  its  character."  1 

The  abler  anti-slavery  leaders  at  the  north  in  like 
manner  held  aloof  from  the  movement.  Seward, 
Chase,  and  Sumner  refused  to  countenance  the  party, 
and  Greeley,  in  the  Tribune,  openly  scoffed  at  it, 
declaring,  in  a  phrase  which  became  permanently 
attached  to  it,  that  "it  would  seem  as  devoid  of  the 
elements  of  permanence  as  an  anti-Cholera  or  anti- 
Potato -rot  party  would  be."2  Almost  the  only 
strong  leader  in  the  north  was  Wilson,  of  Massachu- 
setts, a  sincere  anti  -  slavery  man  whose  political 
career  showed  boldness,  shrewdness,  and  a  light  re- 
gard of  party  ties.  Using  the  Know-Not hing  party 
simply  as  a  means  to  secure  the  redemption  of 
Massachusetts  from  the  "Cotton  Whigs,"  and  bring 
about  his  own  election  to  the  Senate,  he  was  entirely 
willing  to  destroy  it  in  the  interests  of  the  anti- 
slavery  cause.8  Left,  then,  to  the  management  of 

1  Cleveland,  Stephens,  468,  480. 

2  Tribune  Almanac,  1855,  p.  23.         3  Wilson,  Slave  Power,  II. ,423. 


i855]       FAILURE    OF    KNOW-NOTHINGS          141 

men  new  to  public  life  or  drawn  from  the  ranks  of 
minor  politicians,  the  party  showed  no  efficient 
leadership. 

When  the  national  council  of  the  order  met,  in 
June,  1855,  at  Philadelphia,  the  differences  between 
northern  and  southern  Know-Nothings  led  to  a  sharp 
contest  over  the  attitude  of  the  body  upon  slavery  in 
the  territories.  Anti-Catholic  and  anti-foreign  dec- 
larations were  unanimously  accepted;  but  it  took 
days  of  hot  debate  before  the  council,  by  a  vote  of 
80  to  59,  could  adopt  the  following  resolution :  "  Pre- 
termitting  any  opinion  upon  the  power  of  Congress 
to  establish  or  prohibit  slavery  in  the  territories,  it 
is  the  sense  of  this  National  Council  that  Congress 
ought  not  to  legislate  on  the  subject  of  slavery  with- 
in the  territories  of  the  United  States,  and  that  any 
interference  by  Congress  with  slavery  as  it  exists  in 
the  District  of  Columbia  would  be  ...  a  breach  of 
the  National  faith."  l  From  this  time  on  the  order 
stood  committed  to  the  familiar  policy  of  expressly 
conciliating  the  south. 

By  this  time  the  practical  identity  of  the  Know- 
Nothing,  or  American  party,  as  it  now  styled  itself, 
with  the  Whigs  was  manifest  in  membership  and 
character.  A  year  of  pretence  at  mystery  had  ex- 
hausted the  efficacy  of  that  device,  and  when  the 
proceedings  of  the  national  council  were  reported, 
unchecked,  to  newspapers  day  by  day,  it  was  evi- 
dent that  the  oaths,  grips,  passwords,  and  ritual  had 
1  Wilson,  Slave  Power,  II.,  423-433. 


142  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1855 

ceased  to  serve  their  purpose.1  From  this  time  the 
state  organizations  ordinarily  held  open  conventions 
and  went  before  the  voters  as  the  "American  party," 
although  in  popular  language  the  name  Know-Noth- 
ing lingered  on.  In  the  elections  of  1855  the  south- 
ern Know  -  Nothings  carried  Maryland,  Kentucky, 
and  Texas,  and  cast  a  respectable  minority  in  other 
states;  in  the  extreme  west,  also  as  a  pro-slavery* 
party,  they  carried  California;  but  in  the  north, 
although  they  carried  New  York — where  the  irrecon- 
cilable "Hard"  and  "Soft"  Democrats  still  ran 
separate  tickets — their  vote  fell  off  badly  in  Massa- 
chusetts and  Pennsylvania,  for  not  even  the  repudia- 
tion of  the  troublesome  twelfth  section  of  the  Phila- 
delphia platform  could  hold  anti -slavery  members.2 
The  Republicans  also  lost  ground,  being  unable  to 
gain  in  the  states  where  the  Know-Nothings  were 
strong.  Their  only  victory  was  in  Ohio,  which  elect- 
ed Chase  governor  over  both  a  Democratic  competi- 
tor and  a  candidate  supported  by  Whigs  and  Know- 
Nothings.  At  the  expense  of  these  two  parties  the 
Democrats  profited,  making  a  bold  campaign  in 
every  state,  denouncing  the  sectionalism  of  the  Re- 
publicans and  the  prescriptive  aims  of  the  Ameri- 
cans. They  carried  five  southern  states,  and  regained 
Pennsylvania,  Wisconsin,  and  Maine,  the  last  through 
Whig  assistance.  On  the  whole,  the  year  ended  with 
the  political  future  still  doubtful.  It  looked  very 

1  Merriam,  Bowles,  I.,  138. 

2  Scisco,  Political  Nativism,  154-169. 


i855]       FAILURE    OF    KNOW-NOTHINGS          143 

much  as  if  the  old  situation  had  returned,  with  the 
Know-Nothings  occupying  the  place  of  the  Whigs, 
the  Republicans  standing  as  an  enlarged  Free  Soil 
party,  and  the  Democrats  likely  to  maintain  them- 
selves against  a  divided  opposition. 

But  by  this  time  the  rising  excitement  over  the 
situation  in  Kansas  began  to  influence  the  situa- 
tion. The  enthusiasm  of  the  people  of  the  north  for 
the  Free  State  cause  in  Kansas  resembled  that  of  a 
country  at  the  beginning  of  a  war.  Newspapers 
were  crowded  with  inflammatory  editorials,  articles, 
and  extracts  from  letters  of  northern  emigrants  de- 
scribing acts  of  violence  and  cruelty.1  Public  meet- 
ings were  held  everywhere,  in  which  speakers  made 
urgent  appeals  for  volunteers,  subscriptions,  and 
arms  for  Kansas.  One  such,  at  New  Haven,  Con- 
necticut, attained  national  fame.  After  an  address 
by  Henry  Ward  Beecher,  fifty  rifles  were  subscribed 
for  to  fit  out  a  party  of  emigrants  sent  under  the 
auspices  of  the  Congregationalist  clergy  and  church- 
members  of  the  city.2  Beecher's  advocacy  of  the 
use  of  Sharps  rifles  by  the  Kansas  settlers  led  to 
their  being  termed  "  Beecher's  Bibles"  by  friend  and 
foe. 

On  the  other  side,  the  south  was  thrilled  with 
anger  and  alarm.  Atchison,  of  Missouri,  made  ur- 
gent appeal  for  southern  aid,  reiterating  that  the 
future  of  the  institution  of  slavery  was  bound  up  in 

1  Thayer,  Kansas  Crusade,  164  et  seq. 

2  N.  Y.  Independent,  March  26,  1856. 


144  PARTIES  AND    SLAVERY  [1855 

the  outcome  of  the  contest  for  Kansas.  "  If  Kansas 
is  abolitionized,"  he  wrote,  "Missouri  ceases  to  be  a 
slave  state,  New  Mexico  becomes  a  free  state,  Califor- 
nia remains  a  free  state ;  but  if  we  secure  Kansas  as 
a  slave  state,  Missouri  is  secure,  New  Mexico  and 
southern  California,  if  not  the  whole  of  it,  becomes 
a  slave  state ;  in  a  word,  the  prosperity  or  rum  of 
the  whole  south  depends  on  the  Kansas  struggle."  1 
In  response  to  such  appeals,  an  agitation  for  money 
and  men  spread  over  the  south,  with  public  meet- 
ings, fiery  speeches,  subscriptions,  and  the  raising 
of  companies  of  emigrants.2  Attempts  were  even 
made  in  the  Alabama  and  Georgia  legislatures 
to  pass  acts  offering  state  aid  to  Kansas  emi- 
grants. 

Yet,  although  southern  feeling  was  deeply  stirred, 
the  results  of  this  agitation  did  not  equal  those  of 
the  simultaneous  northern  propaganda ;  and  the  only 
important  reinforcement  provided  in  the  winter  of 
1856  was  a  company  of  less  than  three  hundred  men 
raised  by  Colonel  Buford,  of  Alabama,  largely  at  his 
own  personal  expense.  This  force,  which  went  un- 
armed, in  deference  to  a  proclamation  of  President 
Pierce,  set  forth  from  Montgomery  with  gifts  of 
Bibles,  amid  prayers  and  enthusiastic  popular  sym- 
pathy; but  upon  its  arrival  in  the  territory  it  was 
immediately  armed  as  part  of  the  territorial  militia. 
By  the  end  of  February  it  was  clear  that  the  coming 

1  N.  Y.  Tribune,  November  7,  1855. 

2  De  Bow's  Review,  June,  1856,  p.  741. 


i8ss]       FAILURE    OF   KNOW-NOTHINGS          145 

spring  would  find  men  swarming  into  Kansas,  with 
what  results  no  one  could  foresee.1 

In  the  midst  of  this  increasing  excitement,  the 
ill-fated  American  party  tore  itself  to  pieces  upon 
the  unavoidable  issue.  The  first  proof  of  its  fatal 
weakness  appeared  in  a  contest  for  the  speakership 
of  the  House  of  Representatives,  which  delayed  the 
conduct  of  all  public  business  from  the  meeting 
of  Congress  in  December,  1855,  until  the  end  of 
February,  1856.  The  regular  administration  Demo- 
crats numbered  only  seventy-five  in  place  of  the  one 
hundred  and  fifty-nine  who  controlled  the  previous 
Congress,  and  their  candidate  was  Richardson.  The 
opposition,  elected  in  the  political  whirlwind  of  1854, 
was  too  heterogeneous  to  combine.  The  largest  sin- 
gle group  comprised  about  one  hundred  and  seven- 
teen Americans,  leaving  about  forty  "straight"  Re- 
publicans and  a  number  of  independents.  But  of  the 
Know-Nothing  plurality,  only  about  forty  could  be 
held  together  in  support  of  Fuller,  of  Pennsylvania, 
the  avowedly  American  candidate.  Nearly  all  the 
rest  joined  the  Republicans  in  voting  for  Banks,  of 
Massachusetts,  who  had  just  abandoned  the  Know- 
Nothing  party  for  the  Republican.  For  weeks, 
running  into  months,  the  tripartite  struggle  went 
on,  in  an  irregular  running  debate,  mainly  on 
the  Kansas  issue,  interrupted  with  ballotings  for 
speaker. 

Fleming,  "Buford's  Expedition  to  Kansas,"  in  Am.  Hist. 
Rev.,  VI.,  38;   Hodgson,  Cradle  of  the  Confederacy,  347-353. 


146  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1856 

January  12,  1856,  the  three  candidates  explained 
their  views.  Banks  insisted  that  Congress  had  both 
the  power  and  the  duty  to  prohibit  slavery  in  the 
territories ;  Fuller  denied  that  either  Congress  or  the 
territorial  legislature  had  any  power  except  to  pro- 
tect slavery;  while  Richardson  stood  on  Douglas's 
ground  that,  whether  Congress  had  the  right  to  pro- 
hibit slavery  or  not,  it  rested  with  the  territorial 
government  to  afford  protection.1  Incessant  at- 
tempts at  coalition  between  Democrats  and  southern 
Know-Nothings,  and  between  Republicans  and  all 
other  anti-Nebraska  men,  were  fruitless.  The  House 
in  exhaustion  voted  to  elect  by  a  plurality,  and 
Banks  was  chosen,  February  2,  by  103  votes  to  100 
for  Aiken,  of  South  Carolina.2  This  victory  ended  a 
long  period  of  suspense;  the  defeated  southerners 
acquiesced  in  the  result,  and  the  House  was  finally 
ready  for  business. 

A  few  days  later  the  Know-Nothing  party,  shat- 
tered as  a  congressional  group,  also  broke  into  pieces 
as  a  political  organization.  February  18  a  national 
council  of  the  order  met  at  Philadelphia,  modified 
the  party  platform  by  striking  out  the  objectionable 
twelfth  section,  and  inserting  a  clause  which  demand- 
ed congressional  non-interference  with  "domestic 
and  social  affairs  "  in  a  territory,  and  condemned  the 
Pierce  administration  for  reopening  sectional  agita- 

1  Cong.  Globe,  34  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  n  et  seq. 

2  Rhodes,    United  States,   II.,    112-116;     Von   Hoist,    United 
States,  V.,  220-223;    Follett,  Speaker  of  the  House,  56-60. 


1856]       FAILURE    OF    KNOW-NOTHINGS          147 

tion  by  the  repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise.1  No 
such  attempt  to  befog  the  issue  could  prevent  a 
crisis  when  the  nominating  convention  of  the  Amer- 
ican party  assembled  four  days  later  in  the  same 
place.  The  anti-slavery  northern  members  refused 
to  be  bound  by  the  platform  just  adopted  by  the 
order,  and  demanded  that  no  candidates  be  nomi- 
nated who  were  not  in  favor  of  interdicting  slavery 
north  of  36°  30'  by  congressional  action.  When 
this  proviso  was  laid  on  the  table,  at  once  a  score 
of  members  withdrew.  The  next  day  the  conven- 
tion nominated  ex -President  Fillmore,  the  man 
who  had  signed  the  fugitive-slave  law,  with  Donel- 
son,  of  Tennessee,  for  vice-president.  Thereupon 
more  members  seceded  and  joined  the  earlier  bolters 
in  a  call  for  a  national  convention  of  all  " Americans 
opposed  to  the  establishment  of  slavery  in  any  of 
the  territory  which  was  covered  by  the  Missouri 
Compromise,"  at  New  York  in  June.2  Plainly  the 
American  party  as  a  national  organization  was  bank- 
rupt. Sectional  passions  were  too  strong  to  enable 
men  from  north  and  south  to  stand  on  a  common 
platform  ignoring  slavery,  and  the  party  was  mori- 
bund before  it  was  two  years  old. 

On  the  same  day  with  the  American  convention, 
the  first  Republican  national  convention  met  at 
Pittsburg,  under  a  call  from  the  state  committees  of 
nine  states,  but  with  delegates  present  from  twenty- 

1  Scisco,  Political  Nativism,  173  et  seq.;  Wilson,  Slave  Power, 
II.,  508.  2  N.  Y.  Times,  June  13,  1856. 


148  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1856 

three.  The  proceedings  were  full  of  enthusiasm,  for 
the  leaders  felt  that  with  ordinary  prudence  and 
adequate  organization  their  party  might  absorb 
all  the  dissatisfied  Know-Nothings  and  follow  up 
its  victory  in  the  speakership  contest  with  one  in 
the  coming  presidential  election.  Resolutions  were 
adopted  looking  to  a  thorough  political  organization ; 
a  national  committee  was  appointed,  one  of  whose 
members  was  Governor  Robinson,  of  Kansas ;  and  a 
national  nominating  convention  was  called  for  June 
17.  On  the  Kansas  question,  the  party  took  the  full 
Free  State  position  by  demanding  the  admission  of 
the  territory  as  a  state  under  the  Topeka  constitu- 
tion.1 

By  the  end  of  February,  1856,  the  results  of  the 
Kansas  excitement  were  visible  in  the  definite  failure 
of  the  American  party  and  the  practical  certainty 
that  the  Republican  party  would  take  its  place  in 
the  north.  The  presidential  election  was  to  be  con- 
tested by  a  northern  sectional  party,  long  dreaded 
by  all  conservatives ;  and  the  outcome  must  depend 
largely  on  the  course  of  events  in  Kansas  and  the 
way  in  which  Congress  and  the  administration  dealt 
with  them.  The  situation  was  highly  critical,  in- 
creasing in  tension  with  every  week. 

1  Errett,  "Formation  of  the  Rep.  Party,"  in  Mag.  West.  Hist., 
X.,  180;  Julian,  "First  Rep.  Nat.  Conv.,"  in  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  IV., 
313- 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE   KANSAS  QUESTION  BEFORE  CONGRESS 
(1856) 

WHEN  Congress  was  ready  for  action,  the  Kan- 
sas situation  presented  a  threefold  problem: 
the  policy  of  the  federal  government  towards  the 
territory ;  the  attitude  which  parties  should  take  on 
the  pressing  question;  and  the  effect  of  the  contro- 
versy on  the  election  of  a  president,  vice-president, 
and  congressmen.  By  this  time  Pierce  had  definitely 
committed  himself.  During  the  early  stages  of  the 
Kansas  difficulties  the  administration  had  not  inter- 
vened directly  except  to  remove  Reeder ;  while  noth- 
ing was  done  against  the  fraudulent  territorial  legis- 
lature, no  impediment  was  placed  in  the  way  of  the 
Free  State  party  movements ;  and  Shannon,  in  the 
"Wakarusa  War,"  tried  in  vain  to  get  the  use  of 
federal  troops  against  Lawrence.  Every  instinct  of 
caution  urged  Pierce  to  avoid  a  decisive  stand  which 
would  furnish  an  opportunity  for  further  party  at- 
tacks. But  to  expect  Pierce  to  separate  himself 
from  his  party  leaders,  or  even  to  restrain  them,  was 
out  of  the  question.  With  his  cabinet  and  Douglas, 
as  well  as  the  southern  spokesmen,  united  in  disap- 


150  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1856 

proving  the  Free  State  programme,  it  was  inevitable 
that  he  should  adopt  their  attitude. 

On  January  24,  1856,  he  sent  a  special  message  on 
Kansas,  which  totally  condemned  the  Topeka  move- 
ment in  precisely  the  terms  employed  by  the  lead- 
ing southern  newspapers  and  speakers.  The  whole 
trouble,  he  said,  arose  from  the  Emigrant  Aid  Society, 
"that  extraordinary  measure  of  propagandist  coloni- 
zation of  the  Territory  of  Kansas  to  prevent  the 
free  and  natural  action  of  its  inhabitants  in  its  inter- 
nal organization."  After  criticising  Reeder's  career 
with  severity,  he  declared  the  Topeka  organization 
to  be  " revolutionary. "  "It  will  become  treasonable 
insurrection,"  he  said,  "if  it  reaches  the  length  of 
organized  resistance  to  the  fundamental  or  to  any 
other  federal  law  and  to  the  authority  of  the  general 
government."  In  phraseology  which  to  Republi- 
cans seemed  intended  as  a  direct  offer  of  aid  to  the 
"Border  Ruffians,"  he  intimated  his  purpose  to  use 
force  to  suppress  insurrection,  and,  if  summoned  by 
territorial  authority,  to  prevent  invasions  of  citizens 
of  other  states.  "But,"  he  added,  "it  is  not  the 
duty  of  the  president  of  the  United  States  to  volun- 
teer interposition  by  force  to  preserve  the  purity  of 
elections."  His  sole  recommendation  to  Congress 
was  the  passage  of  an  enabling  act  for  the  formation 
of  a  state  constitution.1 

On  February  1 1  he  issued  a  proclamation  directed 
against  both  "  Border  Ruffians  "  and  Free  State  men, 

1  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V.,  350. 


i8s6]  KANSAS    AND    CONGRESS  151 

warning  persons  planning  insurrection  or  invasion  to 
disperse,  announcing  his  purpose  to  use  federal  troops 
to  maintain  order,  and  calling  upon  citizens  of  other 
states  "to  abstain  from  unauthorized  intermeddling 
in  the  local  affairs  of  the  territory."  *  Regarded  as 
a  tactical  move,  Pierce's  action  was  needless  unless 
the  immediate  necessity  of  satisfying  his  southern 
constituents  overbore  all  other  considerations.  The 
administration  needed  to  avoid  every  appearance  of 
partiality,  and  in  this  Pierce  was  wholly  unsuccessful. 
His  attitude  rendered  any  action  by  Congress  impos- 
sible unless  the  anti-slavery  majority  in  the  House 
chose  to  accept  his  ground;  and  it  furnished  at  the 
same  time  a  vulnerable  point  for  attacks  from  an 
excited  and  hostile  north.  The  upshot  was  the 
total  failure  of  action  by  Congress  and  a  steady  in- 
crease in  popular  agitation,  while  in  Kansas  the 
situation  went  from  bad  to  worse. 

The  congressional  contest  was  opened  by  a  report 
from  the  committee  on  territories,  by  Douglas,  who 
demonstrated  to  his  own  satisfaction  the  entire  legal- 
ity of  the  territorial  legislature  and  the  illegality  of 
the  Topeka  organization,  laying  the  blame  for  every- 
thing upon  the  Emigrant  Aid  Societies,  which  he 
called  "  combinations  to  stimulate  an  unnatural  and 
false  system  of  emigration  with  a  view  to  controlling 
elections."  Collamer,  of  Vermont,  in  a  minority 
report,  laid  emphasis  upon  the  Missourian  invasions, 
which  Douglas  contemptuously  minimized,  and  de- 
1  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V.,  390. 

VOL.  XVIII. —  II 


152  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1856 

fended  the  character  of  the  Free  State  leaders.1  A 
few  days  later,  March  17,  Douglas  introduced  a  bill 
for  the  settlement  of  Kansas  affairs  in  the  form  of 
an  enabling  act  for  the  election  of  a  constitutional 
convention,  and  advocated  it  in  a  powerful  speech. 
As  usual  he  took  the  offensive  from  the  start,  merci- 
lessly attacking  Reeder's  record,  and  pointing  out 
that  before  the  Free  State  men  determined  to  re- 
pudiate the  territorial  legislature  as  illegal  they  had 
repeatedly  recognized  it.  He  proved,  by  quota- 
tions from  utterances  of  the  more  hot  -  blooded 
Topeka  leaders,  including  a  phrase  of  Reeder's  about 
carrying  the  contest  to  "a  bloody  issue,"  that  the 
Free  State  movement  was  "a  case  of  open  and  un- 
disguised rebellion."  In  conclusion  he  savagely  de- 
nounced the  operations  of  the  Emigrant  Aid  Society. 
"The  people  of  Missouri,"  he  insisted,  "never  con- 
templated the  invasion  and  conquest  of  the  territory 
of  Kansas;  to  whatever  extent  they  had  imitated 
the  example  of  the  New  England  Emigrant  Aid 
Societies,  it  was  done  upon  the  principles  of  self- 
defence.  .  .  .  From  these  facts  it  is  apparent  that 
the  whole  responsibility  for  all  the  disturbances  in 
Kansas  rests  upon  the  Massachusetts  Emigrant  Com- 
pany and  its  affiliated  Societies. "  2  This  bill  and  the 
speech,  stripped  of  the  abuse  of  the  Emigrant  Aid 
Society  and  the  special  pleading  in  behalf  of  the 
territorial  government,  meant  that  Douglas  and 

1  Senate  Reports,  34  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  34. 

2  Cong.  Globe,  34  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  App.,  285. 


1856]  KANSAS    AND    CONGRESS  153 

Pierce  and  their  associates  recognized  the  difficul- 
ties of  the  existing  situation  to  the  extent  of  being 
willing  to  provide  an  opportunity  for  the  people  of 
the  territory  to  vote  on  the  slavery  problem. 

The  anti-Nebraska  opposition,  however,  was  not 
ready  to  abandon  the  Kansas  question  to  the  Pierce 
administration,  and  met  Douglas's  plan  by  advo- 
cating the  admission  of  Kansas  under  the  Topeka 
constitution.  When  the  application  of  the  Topeka 
legislature  was  brought  to  Washington  by  Lane,  the 
Free  State  leader,  it  was  done  in  such  a  bungling 
manner  as  to  enable  the  Democrats  to  handle  the 
memorial  without  mercy ; *  but  the  efficiency  of  the 
Republicans  in  debate  was  such  as  to  put  the  admin- 
istration on  the  defensive.  Hale,  Sumner,  Seward, 
and  Wade  were  now  joined  by  Trumbull,  of  Illinois, 
Harlan,  of  Iowa,  and  Wilson,  of  Massachusetts,  and 
they  made  a  series  of  severe  attacks  upon  the  pro- 
slavery  party  in  Kansas.  Wilson,  always  a  bold 
speaker,  filled  parts  of  two  days  with  a  description 
of  the  Missourians'  violence  and  the  fraudulent  vot- 
ing, and  a  defence  of  the  New  England  settlers. 
"Sir,"  he  said,  "the  Emigrant  Aid  Society  of  New 
England  has  violated  no  law,  human  or  divine. 
Standing  here,  sir,  before  the  Senate  and  the  Coun- 
try, I  challenge  the  Senator  from  Missouri  or  any 
other  Senator,  to  furnish  to  the  Senate  one  fact,  one 
authenticated  fact  to  show  that  the  Emigrant  Aid 
Society  has  performed  any  illegal  act,  any  act  incon- 

1  Con°.  Globe,  34  Conor. (  T  Sess.,  226,  239. 


154  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1856 

sistent  with  the  obligations  of  patriotism,  morality 
or  religion.  .  .  .  Those  who  charge  the  emigrants 
from  the  North  with  aggression  upon  the  members 
of  other  sections  of  the  country,  utter  that  which 
has  not  the  shadow  of  an  element  of  truth  in  it  and 
they  know  it  or  they  are  grossly  ignorant  of  Kansas 
affairs."1 

In  the  House  the  Kansas  question  took  the  form 
of  a  struggle  for  the  seat  of  congressional  delegate, 
which  was  contested  by  Whitfield  and  Reeder;  and 
after  a  month  of  heated  discussion  the  matter  was 
shelved  for  a  time  by  the  appointment  of  a  special 
committee  to  visit  Kansas  and  report  on  the  conduct 
of  elections  in  the  territory.  A  practical  result  of 
the  election  of  an  anti-Nebraska  speaker  was  the 
appointment  by  Banks  of  Sherman,  of  Ohio,  and 
Howard,  of  Michigan,  as  the  majority  of  the  com- 
mittee, with  Oliver,  of  Missouri,  as  the  only  Dem- 
ocrat. For  a  time,  after  the  departure  of  this 
committee,  Kansas  matters  occupied  a  less  promi- 
nent place. 

While  matters  were  thus  in  suspense  in  Congress, 
Pierce 's  message  and  proclamation  led  to  grave 
events  in  Kansas.  As  soon  as  spring  brought  the 
opening  of  navigation  on  the  Missouri  River,  northern 
and  southern  reinforcements  began  to  enter  the  ter- 
ritory where,  during  the  previous  cold  winter,  there 
had  been  an  entire  cessation  of  hostilities.  The  time 
had  now  come,  in  the  opinion  of  the  pro -slavery 
1  Cong.  Globe,  34  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  90,  95. 


1856]  KANSAS    AND    CONGRESS  155 

party,  for  a  decisive  stroke ;  and,  relying  on  Pierce 's 
utterances  and  the  speeches  of  dozens  of  Democrats 
as  promises  of  support  in  enforcing  their  authority, 
they  decided  to  expunge  the  Free  State  party  by 
legal  process.  A  pretext  came  when  Sheriff  Jones, 
whose  conduct  in  and  about  the  town  of  Lawrence 
can  only  be  interpreted  as  inspired  by  a  desire  to 
pick  a  quarrel,  was  shot  in  the  back  by  a  northern 
assassin.  Although  the  Free  State  leaders  made 
every  effort  to  disavow  the  attempted  murder,  Judge 
Lecompte,  of  the  territorial  court,  seizing  upon  this 
as  evidence  of  the  lawless  character  of  the  whole  Free 
State  party,  charged  a  grand  jury  that  all  who  resist 
the  territorial  laws  "resist  the  power  and  authority 
of  the  United  States  and  are  therefore  guilty  of  high 
treason.  If  you  find  that  no  resistance  has  been 
made,  but  that  combinations  have  been  formed  for 
the  purpose  of  resisting  them,  .  .  .  then  you  must 
find  bills  for  constructive  treason."  l 

The  jury,  composed  of  pro-slavery  men,  promptly 
indicted  Reeder,  Robinson,  Lane,  and  all  the  Free 
State  leaders  for  treason,  and  presented  the  Free 
State  Hotel  and  the  Free  State  newspaper  in  Law- 
rence as  nuisances.  The  blow  was  well  aimed. 
Reeder  fled  from  the  territory  in  disguise,  and  Rob- 
inson was  caught  in  Missouri,  brought  back  to  Kan- 
sas and  kept  a  prisoner,  in  danger  of  his  life  from 
a  pro-slavery  mob.  Then,  on  May  n,  the  United 
States  marshal  summoned  a  posse  to  abate  the 

1  Phillips,  Conquest  of  Kansas,  267. 


156  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1856 

nuisance  of  the  Free  State  Hotel,  and  at  once  the 
Border  Ruffians  came  over  the  river  and  were  joined 
by  the  Kansas  territorial  —  that  is,  pro  -  slavery- 
militia,  including  Buford's  band.  The  Free  State 
people,  hesitating  to  oppose  a  federal  officer,  tried  to 
placate  their  enemies  by  public  meetings  and  prom- 
ises, but  Jones,  Stringfellow,  Atchison,  and  the  rest 
were  not  to  be  balked  a  second  time.  Lawrence  was 
entered  on  May  21,  the  hotel  burned,  the  press 
destroyed,  some  leaders  arrested,  and  many  houses 
pillaged.  Though  only  two  lives  were  lost  in  this 
affair,  the  intensely  partisan  action  of  Lecompte  and 
the  grand  jury,  and  the  reckless  destruction  of 
property  by  the  so-called  posse,  made  a  profound 
impression  at  the  east.1 

Almost  simultaneously  with  this  action  in  Kansas, 
an  episode  in  Congress  stirred  popular  feeling  to 
the  depths.  May  19,  Sumner  delivered  a  speech  in 
the  Senate  which,  in  the  tension  of  the  time,  fairly 
drove  southern  members  to  fury.  It  was  entitled 
"The  Crime  against  Kansas,"  and  very  nearly  merit- 
ed the  name  he  attached  to  it — "the  most  thorough 
philippic  ever  uttered  in  a  legislative  body."  Sum- 
ner was  a  high-minded  philanthropist,  utterly  inca- 
pable of  understanding  an  opponent,  and  to  him  the 
attempt  to  make  Kansas  a  slave  state  was  something 
inconceivably  repulsive.  On  this  occasion  he  freed 
his  mind  with  almost  hyperbolical  language  in  a 
speech  as  offensive  and  insulting  to  the  south  as  the 
1  Robinson,  Kansas,  234-264. 


i8s6]  KANSAS   AND   CONGRESS  157 

fertile  imagination  of  the  author  could  possibly  make 
it.  Mixed  in  were  personalities  as  contemptuous  and 
sneering  as  could  be  uttered  in  the  Senate,  aimed  at 
Douglas  and  especially  at  Butler,  of  South  Carolina, 
who  had  made  a  savage  attack  on  Sumner  two  years 
before,  which  had  not  been  forgotten.1 

Douglas  rose  on  the  spot  and  repaid  Sumner 's 
attack  with  vituperation  of  equal  bitterness  and 
scorn;  but  southern  leaders,  when  insulted,  felt  that 
they  needed  a  different  sort  of  satisfaction,  for  in 
their  eye  Sumner  had  put  himself  so  far  below  the 
plane  of  decency  as  to  be  worthy  only  of  such  chastise- 
ment as  one  would  give  to  a  dog  or  an  impudent  slave. 
Two  days  after  the  conclusion  of  Sumner's  speech, 
a  relative  of  Senator  Butler's,  a  member  of  the  House 
from  South  Carolina  named  Preston  S.  Brooks,  who 
was  personally  unknown  to  Sumner,  entered  the  Sen- 
ate chamber  at  the  close  of  the  session,  stood  by  Sum- 
ner's desk,  and,  after  stating  who  he  was,  struck  him, 
without  further  warning,  a  heavy  blow  on  the  head. 
Stunned  and  blinded,  Sumner  was  unable  to  make 
any  resistance,  and  was  quickly  beaten  into  insensi- 
bility, while  Keitt,  of  South  Carolina,  and  Edmund- 
son,  of  Virginia,  stood  by  to  prevent  interference, 
and  Toombs,  Douglas,  and  a  number  of  other  Dem- 
ocrats remained  quietly  in  the  vicinity.2 


1  Cong.  Globe,  34  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  App.,  329-347 ;  Pierce,  Sumner, 
III.,  441-460. 

2  House  Reports,  34  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  182,  p.  3;  Pierce,  Sumner, 
III.,  462-477. 


158  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1856 

This  affair  produced  a  tremendous  sensation.  The 
Senate  could  take  no  action,  since  Brooks  was  a 
member  of  the  other  branch  of  Congress,  but  the 
House  appointed  an  investigating  committee,  which 
took  evidence  and  reported  on  June  2.  An  attempt 
to  expel  Brooks  and  Keitt  failed  to  receive  a  two- 
thirds  vote,  but  each  resigned,  to  be  triumphantly 
returned  by  his  admiring  constituents.  Although 
Sumner  barely  escaped  with  his  life  and  was  practi- 
cally unable  to  occupy  his  seat  in  the  Senate  for 
three  years,  he  was  commonly  sneered  at  in  the 
south  for  simulating  illness  in  order  to  win  sympathy. 
''Sumner  and  his  friends,"  wrote  hot-blooded  Gov- 
ernor Wise,  of  Virginia,  "  lie  like  people  with  brains 
already  soft.  .  .  .  Such  skulking  poltroonery  would 
hurt  a  man  anywhere  that  the  institution  of  slavery 
exalts  masters  to  a  pride  of  genteel  manhood.  At 
first  I  regretted  the  caning,  now  I  am  glad  of  it."  1 
Almost  two  years  later,  when  Sumner  had  recovered 
sufficiently  to  vote  in  the  Senate  but  not  to  speak, 
the  correspondent  of  the  Charleston  Mercury  de- 
scribed him  as  a  "masterpiece  of  hypocrisy,  cow- 
ardice and  infamy,"  exciting  the  " ridicule  and  con- 
tempt of  the  spectators  as  they  looked  at  his  gross, 
beefy,  carcass,  which  he  would  have  his  nigger- 
worshipping  friends  believe  was  still  laboring  under 
the  affliction  of  great  feebleness  and  debility. ' ' 2 

The  differing  points  of  view  of  north  and  south 

1  Unpublished  letter,  July  13,  1856. 
3  Charleston  Mercury,  March  26,  1858. 


1856]  KANSAS    AND    CONGRESS  159 

were  clearly  brought  out  by  this  assault.  In  the 
north  the  provocation  given  by  the  coarse  personali- 
ties of  Sumner's  speech  was  ignored,  and  the  action 
of  Brooks  was  regarded  as  typical  of  the  slave- 
holder. The  cowardice  shown  in  attacking  a  man 
under  such  a  disadvantage  was  the  chief  feature 
which  impressed  the  north.  "I  denounce  it,"  cried 
Burlingame,  of  Massachusetts,  in  the  House,  "in  the 
name  of  that  fair  play  which  bullies  and  prize-fighters 
respect.  What!  strike  a  man  when  he  is  pinioned 
— when  he  cannot  respond  to  a  blow!  Call  you 
that  chivalry?"1  On  the  other  hand,  Brooks  was 
enthusiastically  praised  by  southern  congressmen, 
newspapers,  and  public  meetings,  was  given  canes 
by  admiring  young  men,  and  eulogized  as  the  person- 
ification of  "gallantry."  To  them  he  had  soundly 
thrashed  an  abolitionist,  and  the  circumstances  of 
the  deserved  punishment  did  not  matter.2  The  vio- 
lence which  shocked  northern  men  struck  the 
southerners  as  normal.  A  writer  in  the  Southern 
Literary  Messenger  summed  up  the  affair  by  saying 
that  a  "foul-mouthed  blackguard,  presuming  upon 
his  senatorial  prerogative  for  immunity  from  casti- 
gation,  thought  fit  to  malign  an  old  gentleman  and 
received  a  severe  caning  at  the  hands  of  a  kinsman," 
and  expressed  surprise  at  so  much  stir  over  "the 
ordinary  occurrence  of  one  man's  chastising  an- 

1  Cong.  Globe,  34  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  App.,  655. 

2  Pierce,  Sumner,   III.,   488;  Von   Hoist,   United  States,  V., 
328. 


i6o  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1856 

other."1  Brooks  himself  showed  sufficient  sensi- 
tiveness to  the  persistent  accusation  of  cowardice  to 
challenge  Senator  Wilson  and  Representative  Bur- 
lingame,  but  although  the  latter  accepted,  the  duel 
did  not  come  off,  owing  to  the  well-justified  hesita- 
tion of  Brooks  to  risk  crossing  New  York  to  reach 
the  appointed  fighting-ground  at  Niagara. 

By  June  the  situation  in  Kansas  was  growing  more 
serious  every  day;  the  policy  of  the  administration 
had  not  prevented  matters  from  growing  worse,  and 
the  debates  in  Congress  served  no  purpose  but  to 
inflame  sectional  feeling.  Congressmen  now  went 
armed  and  were  prepared  to  meet  violence  with 
violence.2  Under  these  conditions  the  various  na- 
tional nominating  conventions  met,  and  the  presi- 
dential campaign  opened. 

1  Southern  Literary  Messenger,  XXIV.,  29  (January,  1857). 
*  Riddle,  Wade,  215;   Pike,  First  Blows  of  the  Civil  War,  339. 


CHAPTER   XII 

THE   PRESIDENTIAL  ELECTION 
(1856) 

IN  the  campaign  of  1856  it  was  seen  that  the  new, 
long  -  dreaded  sectional  party,  although  confined 
to  the  free  states,  might  still  elect  a  president  should 
it  carry  all  of  them.  That  could  be  done  only  by 
destroying  the  hold  upon  northern  voters  of  both 
Know-Nothings  and  Democrats,  and  nothing  was  so 
likely  to  accomplish  this  result  as  the  continuance 
of  the  sectional  anger  stirred  up  by  the  Kansas 
troubles.  Hence,  the  Democrats  and  Know-Noth- 
ings were  eager  to  settle  the  Kansas  difficulty  and 
remove  this  source  of  Republican  votes;  but  the 
control  by  the  Republicans  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives and  their  insistence  on  the  admission  of 
Kansas  under  the  Topeka  constitution  prevented 
any  compromise.  The  new  party  would  accept  no 
settlement  of  Kansas  except  on  its  own  terms,  and 
did  not  intend  in  the  mean  time  to  destroy  its  chief 
political  asset  by  concessions.  Under  such  circum- 
stances the  question  of  party  nominations  and  plat- 
forms became  one  of  the  utmost  importance. 

The  Democrats  led  the  way  on  June  2  at  Balti- 


i62  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1856 

more.  Their  problem,  although  requiring  caution, 
was  comparatively  simple,  for  the  elections  of  the 
preceding  year  had  assured  them  that  the  American 
movement  would  not  disturb  the  normal  Demo- 
cratic majorities  at  the  south;  and  the  party  must 
simply  nominate  a  candidate  who  would  recall  the 
wanderers  in  the  north.  Hence,  the  convention 
discarded  both  Pierce  and  Douglas,  who  were  far 
too  intimately  connected  with  Kansas  affairs,  and 
chose  Buchanan  on  the  seventeenth  ballot,  with 
Breckinridge,  of  Kentucky,  for  vice-president.  Bu- 
chanan was  a  conservative  man,  an  original  Jackson 
Democrat,  a  resident  of  the  doubtful  state  of  Penn- 
sylvania, and  had  been  minister  to  England  during 
most  of  the  Kansas  controversy.  The  platform  con- 
tained the  substance  of  earlier  ones  and  added  a 
recognition  of  "the  principles  contained  in  the  or- 
ganic laws  establishing  the  territories  of  Kansas 
and  Nebraska  as  embodying  the  only  sound  and 
safe  solution  of  the  slavery  question,"  asserting  the 
right  of  the  people  of  the  territories,  "  acting  through 
the  legally  and  fairly  expressed  will  of  the  majority 
of  the  actual  residents  and  whenever  the  number 
of  their  inhabitants  justifies  to  form  a  constitution, 
with  or  without  slavery."  l 

On  the  same  day,  in  New  York,  met  the  national 
convention  called  by  the  anti-slavery  Know-Nothings. 
This  body  drew  up  a  platform  almost  wholly  Republi- 
can in  character,  demanding  "  Free  territory  and  Free 
1  Stanwood,  Hist,  of  the  Presidency,  266-268. 


1856]  PRESIDENTIAL  ELECTION  163 

Kansas, ' '  and  after  much  debate  and  ten  ballots  nom- 
inated Banks,  the  speaker,  for  president,  evidently 
hoping  that  the  Republicans  would  ratify  this  choice.1 
The  Republican  convention  met  a  few  days  later, 
on  June*  1 7.  For  this  new  body,  the  problem  was 
to  find  a  candidate  who  should  be  sufficiently  strong 
on  the  Kansas  issue  and  who  should  not  antagonize 
any  of  the  elements  of  a  new  coalition.  To  the  poli- 
ticians who  led  the  nascent  party  it  was  clear  that 
none  of  the  congressional  leaders  would  do — Chase 
was  obnoxious  to  Whigs,  Wade  and  Seward  to 
Democrats  and  Know-Nothings,  and  Banks  had  too 
recently  been  a  Democrat.  So,  with  a  shrewdness 
born  of  long  practical  experience,  a  "boom"  was 
worked  up  for  John  C.  Fremont,  a  young  man  al- 
most unknown  in  politics,  with  a  reputation  as  an 
explorer  in  the  far  west,  the  son-in-law  of  Benton 
through  a  romantic  marriage.  He  had  been  a 
Democrat,  but  was  anti-slavery  in  sentiment,  had  no 
connection  with  the  Know-Nothings,  and  was  sup- 
posed to  have  a  strong  hold  upon  the  German  vote. 
The  general  feeling  was  well  expressed  by  Mace,  of 
Indiana,  when  he  wrote  to  a  friend:  "It  will  never 
do  to  go  into  this  contest  and  be  called  upon  to 
defend  the  acts  and  speeches  of  old  stagers.  We 
must  have  a  position  that  will  enable  us  to  be  the 
charging  party.  Fremont  is  the  man."  2  By  April 

1  N.  Y.  Times,  June  13-17,  1856. 

2  N.  Y.  Evening  Post,  April,  1856,  quoted  by  Rhodes,  United 
States,  II.,  178. 


1 64  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1856 

his  candidacy  was  well  under  way ;  he  had  written  a 
suitable  letter  on  Kansas,  and  when  the  convention 
met  he  was  easily  nominated  by  359  votes  to  196 
over  old  Judge  McLean,  the  candidate  of  the  Penn- 
sylvania delegation  and  other  conservatives.  Nei- 
ther Chase's  nor  Seward's  name  went  before  the 
convention.  For  vice-president,  W.  L.  Dayton,  of 
New  Jersey,  a  former  Whig,  was  nominated  over 
Abraham  Lincoln,  of  Illinois,  the  western  candidate. 

The  platform  made  the  Kansas  issue  the  basis  of 
the  Republican  party.  It  asserted  that  Congress 
had  no  right  to  establish  slavery,  but  that  it  could 
and  ought  to  abolish  it  in  the  territories,  together 
with  polygamy,  "those  twin  relics  of  barbarism." 
It  demanded  the  admission  of  Kansas  under  the 
Topeka  constitution,  denounced  the  Missourian  in- 
vasions and  the  pro-slavery  territorial  government, 
and  concluded,  "For  this  high  crime  against  the 
Constitution,  the  Union  and  humanity,  we  arraign 
the  administration,  the  president,  his  advisers, 
agents,  supporters,  apologists,  and  accessories  .  .  . 
before  the  country  and  the  world."  The  new  party 
in  its  first  campaign  took  the  field  with  a  "dark 
horse"  for  a  candidate,  conscious  that  it  must  rely 
upon  its  principles  rather  than  upon  its  leader- 
ship.1 

By  the  time  that  the  party  nominees  were  fairly 
before  the  people,  the  long-dreaded  civil  war  had 

1  Stanwood,  Hist,  of  the  Presidency,  271;  Errett,  "  Nomimat- 
ing  Convention  of  1856,"  in  Mag.  West.  Hist.,  X.,  257. 


i856]  PREvSIDENTIAL    ELECTION  165 

broken  out  in  Kansas  in  the  form  of  guerilla  fighting 
and  reprisals.  The  later  Free  State  settlers  included 
many  men  who  differed  from  the  "  Border  Ruffians  " 
only  in  their  objects,  and  within  a  month  from  the 
time  of  the  sack  of  Lawrence  they  had  set  the  terri- 
tory aflame  with  alarms  and  shooting  affrays.  At 
the  start  "  Old  John  Brown,"  an  anti-slavery  fanatic, 
avenged  the  death  of  various  Free  State  settlers  by 
dragging  five  pro  -  slavery  men  at  night  from  their 
cabins  along  Ossawatomie  creek  and  butchering  them 
in  cold  blood.  He  did  this  by  the  simple  law  of 
retaliation  current  among  North  American  Indians, 
without  any  special  animosity  against  those  particu- 
lar men,  and  seems  to  have  felt  that  it  was  "God's 
work."  1  The  other  Free  State  men  disavowed  this 
brutal  act,  but  the  fighting  went  on.  Shannon  is- 
sued proclamations,  and  used  Colonel  Sumner,  with 
federal  troops,  to  turn  back  "  Border  Ruffians"  and 
head  off  Free  State  bushwhackers,  finally  dispersing 
the  Topeka  legislature  on  July  2  ;  but  he  was  wholly 
unable  to  keep  the  peace.  Bands  of  men  from  each 
side  wandered  over  the  territory,  plundering  and 
shooting;  arson  and  assassination  went  on  until 
"the  smoke  of  burning  buildings  darkened  the  air," 
agriculture  was  neglected,  two  hundred  lives  were 
lost,  and  two  million  dollars'  worth  of  property 
destroyed.  Since  the  Free  State  party  brought 
more  capital  with  them,  they  suffered  the  most, 

1  House  Reports,   34  Cong.,   i    Sess.,  No.   200,  pp.    104-109; 
Sanborn,  Brown,  247;   Connelly,  Brown,  153. 


i66  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1856 

and  since  they  were  less  used  to  arms  and  fight- 
ing, their  military  operations  were  less  success- 
ful.1 

Not  until  Shannon  was  replaced  by  J.  W.  Geary, 
of  Pennsylvania,  a  stronger  man,  was  this  reign  of 
brutality  and  terror  brought  to  a  close.  Geary's 
vigorous  action  managed  to  prevent  an  attack  by 
twenty-five  hundred  Missourians  with  cannon  upon 
Lawrence;  and  by  November  he  had  succeeded  in 
inducing  most  of  the  armed  bands  to  dissolve.  While 
this  was  going  on,  the  Missouri  River  had  been 
closed  to  northern  immigrants  by  Missourian  pro- 
slavery  sympathizers,  who  disarmed  them  and  turned 
them  back;  but  a  new  route  was  opened  through 
Iowa  and  Nebraska,  and  so  supplies  kept  coming  in. 
Clearly,  the  superior  resources  of  the  north  were 
bound  to  tell  in  the  long  run. 

Meanwhile,  the  administration  leaders  made  a  last 
futile  effort  to  deal  with  the  situation,  for  they  saw 
that  every  day  of  anarchy  in  Kansas  raised  new 
recruits  for  the  Republicans.  At  the  end  of  June, 
Douglas  accepted  a  bill  introduced  by  Toombs,  as 
an  amendment  to  his  original  Kansas  enabling  act, 
and  in  a  hard-fought  all-night  session  it  was  forced 
through  the  Senate  on  July  2  by  a  majority  of  33  to 
12.  "  When  you  say  that  we  intend  to  make  Kansas 
a  slave  state,"  said  Toombs,  "you  say  what  every 
man  of  us  has  stated  is  not  true.  .  .  .  We  said  we 
would  leave  the  people  free  to  act  for  themselves, 
1  Gihon,  Geary,  293;  Rhodes,  United  States,  II.,  216. 


i8$6]  PRESIDENTIAL    ELECTION  167 

and  if  they  made  it  a  slave  state  I  should  demand 
its  admission  as  such;  and  if  they  made  it  free  I 
should  stand  by  them.  .  .  .  We  require,  however, 
that  there  shall  be  a  fair  vote.  .  .  .  The  Black  Re- 
publicans have  told  us,  time  and  again  at  this  ses- 
sion, that  a  majority  of  the  people  of  Kansas  are  in 
favor  of  a  free  state  constitution.  I  propose  a  means 
of  ascertaining  it."  * 

The  Toombs  bill  was  extremely  fair  in  its  pro- 
visions for  securing  an  authentic  registration  of 
voters  and  a  free  ballot  upon  the  choice  of  a  consti- 
tutional convention ;  but  the  Republicans,  although 
invited  to  suggest  such  amendments  as  would  render 
the  bill  acceptable,  would  not  support  it  on  any 
terms.  "  So  far  as  the  subject  of  slavery  is  con- 
cerned," said  Seward,  "the  most  that  can  be 
claimed  for  this  bill  is  that  it  gives  an  equal  chance 
to  the  people  of  Kansas  to  choose  between  freedom 
and  slavery.  .  .  .  The  standard  of  political  justice 
which  commends  itself  to  me  is  a  more  rigid  one.  I 
recognize  no  equality  in  moral  right  or  political  ex- 
pediency between  slavery  and  freedom.  I  hold  one 
to  be  decidedly  good  and  the  other  to  be  positively 
bad.  I  do  not  think  it  wise,  just  or  necessary  to 
give  to  the  people  of  a  territory  .  .  .  the  privilege 
of  choosing  slavery.  ...  On  this  principle  I  have 
acted  throughout  in  regard  to  Kansas.  .  .  .  On  this 
principle,  God  give  me  grace,  I  shall  act  in  regard 
to  all  the  territories  of  the  United  States  so  long 

1  Cong.  Globe,  34  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  App.,  871. 
VOL.  xvni. — 12 


i68  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1856 

as  I  shall  remain  here — so  long  as  I  shall  live."  * 
When  the  bill  came  to  the  House  it  was  not  even 
considered.  There  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  Re- 
publican leaders  were  strengthened  in  their  unwill- 
ingness to  consent  to  any  Kansas  compromise  by 
their  clear  comprehension  of  the  importance  to  their 
party's  campaign  of  the  Kansas  situation. 

At  this  time  the  special  committee  of  the  House 
returned  from  Kansas  and  made  a  report  upon  the 
conduct  of  territorial  elections,  which  proved  a  sen- 
sational campaign  document  for  the  Republicans. 
" Every  election,"  it  summed  up,  "has  been  con- 
trolled not  by  the  actual  settlers  but  by  citizens  of 
Missouri  and  .  .  .  your  committee  have  been  unable 
to  find  that  any  political  power  whatever,  however 
unimportant,  has  ever  been  exercised  by  the  people 
of  the  territory. ' '  It  held  that  neither  Whitfield  nor 
Reeder  had  any  legal  claim  to  the  delegate's  seat, 
and  concluded  that  "  in  the  present  condition  of  the 
territory  a  fair  election  cannot  be  held  without  .  .  . 
the  selection  of  impartial  judges  and  the  presence  of 
United  States  troops  at  every  place  of  election." 
Oliver's  minority  report  gave  the  full  history  of  the 
Ossawatomie  massacre,  but  it  made  surprisingly  little 
impression  in  the  country ;  and  few  believed  his  asser- 
tion that  there  was  "  no  evidence  that  any  violence  was 
resorted  to  or  force  employed  by  which  men  were  pre- 
vented from  voting  at  any  single  election  precinct." 

1  Cong.  Globe,  34  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  App.,  790,  792. 

3  House  Reports,  34  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  200,  pp.  2,  67,  75,  105. 


1856]  PRESIDENTIAL    ELECTION  169 

On  the  same  day  the  House,  by  a  margin  of  two 
votes  only,  passed  a  bill  to  admit  Kansas  under  the 
Topeka  constitution,  which  was  promptly  killed  in 
the  Senate.  Later,  just  before  the  end  of  the  ses- 
sion, the  House  tried  to  force  the  hand  of  the  presi- 
dent by  attaching  a  " rider"  to  the  army  appropria- 
tion bill,  prohibiting  the  use  of  federal  troops  to 
enforce  the  laws  of  the  territorial  legislature;  but 
although  this  caused  the  failure  of  the  bill  in  the 
regular  session,  enough  votes  shifted  in  a  special 
session,  which  was  immediately  called,  to  give  a 
majority  of  three  for  a  bill  without  the  proviso. 
Congress  then  adjourned,  August  30,  leaving  Kan- 
sas still  in  anarchy,  as  the  Republicans  intended  it 
should  be. 

The  campaign  was  now  in  full  blast,  and  the  one 
issue,  in  the  words  of  Republican  stump  orators,  was 
"  Bleeding  Kansas."  The  question  of  native- Ameri- 
canism vanished,  and  Fillmore's  candidacy,  although 
ratified  by  a  Whig  national  convention  in  Septem- 
ber, had  nothing  left  for  its  support  except  tradi- 
tional conservative  sentiment.  In  every  eastern 
state  the  Republican  party,  spurred  on  by  the 
bloody  news  from  Kansas,  organized  on  the  wreck 
of  the  American  party  through  a  series  of  bolts  and 
secessions,  and  drew  to  itself  the  bulk  of  the  former 
Know-Nothing  vote.1  The  anti-slavery  Americans, 
whose  candidate,  Banks,  withdrew,  ratified  Fr6- 
mont's  nomination,  and  in  every  free  state  enthusi- 

1  Scisco,  Political  Nativism,  179-187. 


170  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1856 

astic  stump-speakers  denounced  the  administration 
and  predicted  a  Republican  sweep. 

As  the  summer  wore  on  and  the  Republican  pros- 
pects grew  ever  brighter,  a  new  and  ominous  move- 
ment began  in  the  south,  whose  press  and  leaders 
now  announced  that  in  the  event  of  a  Republican 
success  the  only  thing  for  the  slave-holding  states  to 
do  would  be  instantly  to  secede.  In  a  few  weeks 
this  new  spirit  overran  the  south  and  interjected  an 
altogether  new  note  into  the  contest.  It  began  to 
look  as  though  not  merely  the  future  of  Kansas  but 
the  integrity  of  the  Union  itself  was  at  stake.  "  If 
Fremont  is  elected,"  wrote  Governor  Wise,  of  Vir- 
ginia, "  there  will  be  a  revolution.  .  .  .  We  will  not 
remain  in  confederacy  with  enemies."  Wise  meant 
no  empty  threats:  he  bestirred  himself  to  get  the 
Virginia  militia  in  readiness  for  active  service  and 
summoned  a  conference  of  governors  of  the  slave 
states  to  meet  at  Raleigh  on  October  I3.1  In  sup- 
port of  his  movement,  Senator  Mason,  of  Virginia, 
wrote  to  Davis,  the  secretary  of  war,  asking  that 
arms  be  supplied  for  the  state  troops,  repeating  that 
if  Fremont  were  elected  "  the  south  should  not  pause 
but  proceed  at  once  to  immediate,  absolute  and 
eternal  separation."  2 

Under  this  sinister  cloud  the  last  part  of  the 
presidential  campaign  took  a  new  form.  Although 
most  of  the  Republican  leaders  and  newspapers 

1  Unpublished  letter,  September  16,  1856. 

2  Mason,  Life  and  Corresp.  of  J.  M.  Mason,  117. 


1856]  PRESIDENTIAL    ELECTION  171 

laughed  at  "the  stale  disunion  threat,"  conserva- 
tives at  the  north  were  visibly  affected;  and  the 
advocates  for  Buchanan  and  Fillmore  concentrated 
their  efforts  against  the  Republicans  as  a  sectional 
party  whose  success  meant  the  end  of  the  Union. 
The  plea  which  had  proved  successful  in  1850  be- 
came the  chief  ground  upon  which  the  two  conserva- 
tive parties  appealed  for  votes.  "We  see  a  political 
party,"  said  Fillmore,  "presenting  candidates  from 
the  Free  States  alone.  .  .  .  Can  they  have  the  mad- 
ness or  folly  to  believe  that  our  Southern  brethren 
would  submit  to  be  governed  by  such  a  chief  magis- 
trate ?  I  tell  you  that  we  are  treading  on  the  brink 
of  a  volcano.  ...  If  it  breaks  asunder  the  bonds 
of  our  Union,  and  spreads  anarchy  and  civil  war 
through  the  land,  what  is  it  less  than  moral  trea- 
son ? "  1  Buchanan  wrote  in  similar  strain :  "  Should 
Fremont  be  elected,  the  outlawry  pronounced  by  the 
Republican  Convention  at  Philadelphia  against  fif- 
teen Southern  states  will  be  ratified  by  the  people 
of  the  North.  The  consequences  will  be  immediate 
and  inevitable."  2 

To  conciliate  northern  sentiment  on  the  Kansas 
question,  Buchanan  declared  continually,  and  in 
unqualified  terms,  that  if  elected  he  would  secure  a 
fair  and  free  vote  in  the  territory.  "  There  is  not  a 
county  in  Pennsylvania,"  said  J.  W.  Forney,  the 
campaign  manager,  "in  which  my  letters  may  not 

1Cong.  Globe,  34  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  App.,  716. 
'Curtis,  Buchanan,  II.,  180. 


172  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1856 

be  found,  almost  by  the  hundred,  pledging  Mr.  Bu- 
chanan, in  his  name  and  by  his  authority,  to  the  full, 
complete  and  practical  recognition  of  the  right  of 
the  people  of  Kansas  to  decide  upon  their  own 
affairs."  1  Whatever  might  be  the  constitutional 
shortcomings  of  the  non-intervention  doctrine,  and 
however  much  it  fell  short  of  anti -slavery  principle, 
it  had  undeniable  elements  of  popularity;  besides 
the  apparent  merits  of  fairness  and  democracy,  it  ap- 
pealed to  the  liking  for  local  self-government  which 
was  ingrained  in  the  north.  In  Pennsylvania,  the 
critical  state,  this  carried  especial  weight,  for  there 
anti-slavery  sentiment  was  not  strong;  and  when, 
in  the  state  election  in  September,  the  Democratic 
candidate  for  canal  commissioner  was  chosen  over  a 
combined  Republican  and  Know-Nothing  opposi- 
tion, it  was  felt  that  the  state  was  safe. 

The  campaign  went  on  with  undiminished  vigor 
up  to  the  end,  but  when  the  votes  were  counted 
in  November  it  was  found  that  conservatism  had 
triumphed;  Buchanan  was  elected  by  174  electoral 
votes,  carrying  every  slave  state  except  Maryland, 
which  fell  to  Fillmore,  and  securing  not  merely 
Pennsylvania,  but  four  other  northern  states — New 
Jersey,  Indiana,  Illinois,  and  California.  Fremont, 
whose  personality  added  nothing  to  the  strength  of 
the  Republican  ticket,  received  114  votes  from  the 
remaining  northern  states ;  while  the  Know-Nothing 

1  Pike,  First  Blows  of  the  Civil  War,  346;  Rhodes,  United 
States,  II.,  229. 


i8S7l  PRESIDENTIAL    ELECTION  173 

party,  which  a  year  before  claimed  to  hold  the  coun- 
try in  its  grasp,  shrank  to  small  dimensions  in  the 
north  and  held  only  the  old,  immovable,  and  con- 
servative Whig  substratum  in  the  south.  The  Kansas 
question  had  killed  it.  In  the  total  popular  vote, 
greatly  increased  since  1852,  the  Democrats  led;  but 
their  total  vote  was  about  four  hundred  thousand 
behind  the  combined  opposition. 

After  this  election  the  country,  exhausted  by 
months  of  excitement,  relapsed  into  quiet.  Kansas, 
under  Geary's  rule,  ceased  to  bleed,  and  all  were  will- 
ing to  rest  and  wait  for  further  developments.  The 
Democrats,  triumphant  with  president  and  each 
House  of  Congress,  felt  that  if  Kansas  could  only  be 
promptly  dealt  with  their  party  might  enter  on  a 
new  and  long  tenure  of  power.  The  Republicans, 
disappointed  at  their  defeat  but  inclined  to  feel  that 
their  young  party  had  made  as  good  a  showing  as 
could  be  hoped  for  in  its  first  election,  were  ready  to 
wait  and  see  how  Buchanan  carried  out  his  pledges. 
The  south  slowly  settling  to  a  normal  condition,  gave 
over  secession  plans  for  the  time,  and  the  last  session 
of  the  thirty-fourth  Congress,  whose  members  at  first 
wrangled  to  the  point  of  violence,  devoted  itself  to 
business,  scarcely  pausing  to  consider  Kansas  affairs. 
Politics  were  on  the  ebb  after  the  flood-tide  of  the 
summer,  and  Pierce's  stormy  term  closed  with  all 
parties  under  a  sort  of  armistice. 


CHAPTER   XIII 

THE   PANIC   OF   1857 
(1856-1858) 

WHEN  Buchanan  assumed  office  the  era  of  un- 
restrained commercial  optimism,  which  had 
prevailed  for  a  dozen  years,  began  to  show  signs  of 
coming  to  an  end;  and  before  the  new  president 
met  his  first  Congress  a  financial  storm  broke  out 
which  did  not  completely  clear  away  during  his 
term.  The  expansion  before  1857  was  too  great  to 
last;  the  sense  of  the  unbounded  resources  of  the 
country  and  the  unqualified  rapidity  with  which 
they  might  be  utilized  had  pushed  the  industrial 
and  financial  world  into  an  excessive  inflation  of 
credit  and  a  dangerous  sinking  of  capital.1  By  1857 
the  amount  of  indebtedness  incurred  by  railways, 
manufacturers,  and  promoters  of  all  kinds  to  the 
banks  of  the  country  and  to  each  other  stood  beyond 
the  point  where  it  could  be  absorbed  by  the  public. 
The  railroad  mania  resulted  in  the  hasty  construc- 
tion of  hundreds  of  miles  of  track  in  the  thinly 

1  Dunbar,  Economic  Essays,  269;  cf.  above,  chap.  v.  For  the 
panic  of  1837,  see  Hart,  Slavery  and  Abolition  (Am.  Nation, 
XVI.),  chap.  xx. 


1856]  PANIC    OF    1857  i?5 

settled  west,  whose  earning  power  was  found  not  to 
be  such  as  to  enable  the  corporations  to  meet  the 
obligations  incurred  by  the  mortgage  bonds  so  freely 
and  recklessly  sold.  At  the  same  time  manufactur- 
ers incurred  debt  to  extend  their  plants  in  anticipa- 
tion of  an  ever-increasing  internal  trade,  depending 
on  the  railroads;  and  banks  all  over  the  country 
were  loaning  freely  to  them  on  long  terms. 

The  first  signs  of  alarm  appeared  when  the  stock 
of  the  new  railway  systems  began  to  decline  in  the 
winter  of  1856-1857.  In  the  summer,  signs  of  dan- 
ger thickened,  and  by  August  it  was  evident  to 
nearly  all  financiers  that,  without  any  one  assignable 
cause,  the  public  mind  was  undergoing  that  inde- 
scribable change  from  optimism  to  distrust  which  is 
the  real  origin  of  a  panic.  Banks  all  over  the  coun- 
try began  to  contract  loans,  a  process  which  increased 
uneasiness ;  and,  on  August  24,  the  suspension  of  the 
Ohio  Life  Insurance  and  Trust  Company,  which  did 
a  large  general  banking  business  in  the  west  and  in 
New  York,  precipitated  the  crash.  A  sharp  break  in 
stocks  took  place,  railroad  securities  dropping  rapidly 
thirty  or  even  fifty  per  cent,  in  a  few  weeks.1  Then 
came  failures  on  the  stock-exchanges,  followed  by 
mercantile  failures  in  September;  and  in  October 
some  of  the  leading  railroads — the  Erie,  Reading, 
Illinois  Central,  and  Michigan  Central — went  to  the 
wall.  The  pressure  upon  the  banks,  struggling  as 
they  were  to  contract  loans,  became  too  severe  to  be 

1  Bankers'  Mag.,  XII.,  335  (October,  1857). 


176  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1857 

endured,  and  on  September  24  and  25  those  of 
Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  and  most  of  the  western 
states  suspended. 

The  New  York  banks  held  out  a  little  longer,  but 
their  turn  came  in  October,  after  notes  of  railroads 
began  to  go  to  protest ;  runs  by  depositors  were  soon 
started,  weaker  firms  were  unable  to  stand,  and  a 
general  suspension  was  announced  October  14.  This 
action  carried  with  it  the  suspension  of  specie  pay- 
ments in  New  England,  and  for  a  time  the  country 
was  plunged  into  the  abysses  of  "general  bank- 
ruptcy." 1  Among  the  few  banks  which  weathered 
the  storm  were  the  Chemical  Bank  of  New  York,  the 
Indiana  State  Bank,  the  Kentucky  banks,  and  four 
of  the  New  Orleans  banks,  the  results  in  the  last 
cases  being  due  to  the  careful  legislation  of  these 
states  in  the  years  preceding  the  panic.2 

The  effect  of  the  collapse  of  credit  upon  the  in- 
dustries of  the  country  was  sudden  and  severe. 
Prices  dropped  a  fourth  to  a  third  "  in  all  domestic 
fabrics,  in  meat,  provisions  and  general  merchan- 
dise," while  "speculative  real  estate"  declined  one- 
half  in  value.3  Factories  closed,  throwing  tens  of 
thousands  out  of  work,  and  such  industries  as  the 
New  England  shoe  manufacture  and  the  Pennsyl- 
vania iron-works  remained  idle  for  months  at  a  time. 

1  Hunt's  Merchants'  Mag.,  November,  1857,  p.  582;    Bankers1 
Mag.,  Novemoer,  1857,  p.  411. 

2  McCulloch,  Men  and  Events,  120-139. 

3  Hunt's  Merchants'  Mag.,  February,    1858,  p.   195;     Evans, 
Crisis  of  1857,  pp.  114—121. 


i857l  PANIC    OF    1857  177 

In  all,  a  total  of  six  thousand  firms  failed,  with 
liabilities  estimated  at  about  three  hundred  millions, 
with  an  eventual  payment  of  probably  a  quarter  to 
a  half  of  the  amount.1  No  less  than  fourteen  rail- 
roads failed,  and  the  volume  of  traffic  upon  all  the 
lines  in  the  north  and  west  diminished  sharply. 

The  farmer  was  equally  depressed  with  the  man- 
ufacturer and  financier,  since  the  reopening  of  the 
Russian  grain  trade  after  the  cessation  of  the 
Crimean  War  added  to  the  effects  of  the  panic  in 
causing  a  lessening  demand  for  bread-stuffs.  The 
crops  were  scarcely  moved  in  some  localities,  and 
the  exports  of  grain  diminished  by  one-half.  In  the 
last  months  of  the  year  general  distrust  and  depres- 
sion reigned,  and  the  president,  in  his  first  message 
to  Congress,  December,  1857,  summed  up  the  situa- 
tion by  saying:  "  Our  country,  in  its  monetary  inter- 
ests, is  at  the  present  moment  in  a  deplorable 
condition.  In  the  midst  of  unsurpassed  plenty,  .  .  . 
in  all  the  elements  of  national  wealth,  we  find  our 
manufactures  suspended,  our  public  works  retarded, 
our  private  enterprises  of  different  kinds  abandoned, 
and  thousands  of  useful  laborers  thrown  out  of  em- 
ployment and  reduced  to  want."  2 

The  suspension  of  the  banks  did  not  last  long,  for 
by  December,  1857,  the  New  York  and  Boston  banks 
felt  able  to  resume  specie  payments,  the  Philadelphia 

1  Hunt's  Merchants'  Mag.,  February,   1858,  p.   195;    Evans, 
Crisis  of  1857,  pp.  122-137. 

2  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V.,  436. 


178  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1858 

and  Baltimore  banks  followed  in  February,  1858,  and 
by  midsummer  the  period  of  prostration  was  at  an 
end  and  the  process  of  recovery  started .  During  1858 
and  1859  "hard  times"  prevailed,  marked  by  liqui- 
dation of  all  sorts  and  by  an  almost  complete  cessa- 
tion in  demand  for  speculative  investments.  Land 
purchases  and  mortgages  declined  seriously  in  value, 
factories  were  reluctant  to  start  up,  and  prices  in 
many  commodities  remained  low.  The  writers  of 
the  day,  such  as  Greeley,  in  the  New  York  Tribune, 
represented  that  prices  were  "from  25  to  75  per  cent, 
lower" ;  and  in  some  localities,  and  especially  in  cer- 
tain lines,  such  as  land,  this  was  true ;  but  the  effects 
of  the  panic  were  not  in  reality  so  severe  as  people 
thought.  Tables  of  prices,  made  out  from  a  study 
of  market  quotations,  do  show  a  decline  in  1858  and 
1859  in  some  important  commodities,  such  as  wheat 
and  iron ;  but  it  should  be  noticed  that  even  in  these 
the  prices  remained  above  the  range  previous  to 
1856-1857;  and  in  many  other  products,  such  as 
corn,  hides,  and  wool,  there  was  little  effect  after  the 
months  of  suspension  were  over.  The  iron  industry, 
undoubtedly,  suffered  severely;  the  production  of 
pig-iron  fell  off  one-fifth  in  1858,  and  the  state  of 
Pennsylvania  was  considered  "prostrate."  * 

While  factories  were  idle  and  while,  by  an  unfort- 
unate coincidence,  crops  were  poor  in  the  west,  there 
was  bitter  complaint  of  lack  of  employment  in  the 
cities,  giving  rise  in  New  York  to  working-men's 
1  Swank,  Iron  in  All  Ages,  376. 


1858]  PANIC    OF    1857  179 

demonstrations  of  a  semi-revolutionary  character, 
demanding  work  or  bread.  These  did  not,  however, 
lead  to  any  actual  conflicts.1  The  pictures  drawn  by 
observers  were  full  of  the  depression  which  replaced 
the  extravagant  enthusiasm  of  1857.  "The  general 
movement  of  the  country,"  said  one,  "is  still  tow- 
ard liquidation  and  there  has  been  therefore  no 
general  revival  of  trade.  .  .  .  How  far  the  country 
can  be  relied  upon  for  payment  in  full  for  past  or 
present  indebtedness  is  a  question  not  easily  solved. 
Those  who  thought  themselves  rich  with  wheat  at 
$2  a  bushel  will  find  their  assets  miserably  shrunken 
with  wheat  at  75  c.  for  the  same  measure."  2  The 
condition  of  the  west  was  summed  up  by  Greeley 
in  dark  colors.  "Railroads  partly  constructed  and 
there  stopped  for  want  of  means;  blocks  of  build- 
ings ditto ;  counties  and  cities  involved  by  the  issue 
of  railroad  bonds  and  practically  insolvent;  indi- 
viduals striving  to  stave  off  the  satisfaction  of  debts, 
obligations,  judgments,  executions — such  is  the  all 
but  universal  condition."  3 

To  this  gloomy  picture  in  the  northern  and  western 
states  there  stood  forth  a  striking  contrast  in  the 
continued  prosperity  of  the  "cotton  states."  Bank 
failures  and  suspensions  occurred  among  them,  it  is 
true,  since  the  connection  of  southern  with  northern 


1  Dunbar,  Economic  Essays,  290;  Rhodes,  United  States,  III., 
49.  2  Hunt's  Merchants'  Mag.,  January,  1858,  p.  71. 

3  N.  Y.  Tribune,  December  25,  1858,  in  Rhodes,  United  States, 
HI.,  55- 


i8o  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1857 

banking  was  too  intimate  to  permit  of  escape;  but 
the  great  staple  industry  of  the  south,  the  cotton 
production,  upon  which  prosperity  rested,  was  al- 
most undisturbed  by  the  panic.1  The  crops  of  1856 
and  1857  were  large  and  that  of  1858  was  up  to  the 
average,  the  price  of  cotton  held  firm,  exports  in- 
creased, and  while  the  whole  north  waited  in  sullen 
stagnation  to  recover  courage,  the  southern  planters 
felt  a  confidence  in  their  present  strength  and  future 
prosperity  which  passed  all  bounds. 

"The  wealth  of  the  South,"  said  De  Bow's  Review, 
"is  permanent  and  real,  that  of  the  North  fugitive 
and  fictitious.  Events  now  transpiring  are  exposing 
the  fiction  as  humbug  after  humbug  explodes."2 
The  price  of  negroes,  a  good  index  of  commercial 
confidence,  as  indicating  a  demand  for  capital,  rose 
in  these  years  to  unheard  -  of  figures,  good  field 
hands  bringing  in  places  from  fifteen  hundred  to 
two  thousand  dollars.  The  contrast  between  the 
two  sections  confirmed  the  belief  of  southern  lead- 
ers in  the  world  supremacy  of  cotton.  "Cotton  is 
king,"  exulted  Hammond,  of  South  Carolina,  in  the 
Senate.  "  Who  can  doubt  it,  that  has  looked  upon 
recent  events?  When  the  abuse  of  credit  had  an- 
nihilated confidence,  .  .  .  when  you  came  to  a  dead- 
lock and  revolutions  were  threatened,  what  brought 
you  up  ?  Fortunately  for  you  it  was  the  commence- 
ment of  the  cotton  season  and  we  have  poured  in 

1  Hammond,  Cotton  Industry,  I.,  App.  i. 

2  De  Bow's  Review,  XXIII.,  592  (December,  1857). 


i859l  PANIC    OF    1857 

upon  you  one  million  six  hundred  thousand  bales 
of  cotton  just  at  the  crisis  to  save  you."  1  A  still 
more  exalted  enthusiast  called  the  cotton  crop  "  The 
gravitating  power  that  keeps  the  civilized  world 
in  its  proper  orbit  as  it  whirls  through  the  grand 
cycles  of  its  existence."  2 

During  this  panic  the  financial  situation  of  the 
federal  government  depended  to  a  great  extent  upon 
the  disturbances  produced  in  foreign  trade,  since  at 
that  time  about  nine-tenths  of  the  revenue  was  de- 
rived from  the  tariff.3  As  soon  as  the  crash  came, 
the  demand  for  imports  fell  off  sharply,  and  for  the 
year  1858  they  amounted  to  little  more  than  two- 
thirds  of  what  they  had  been  in  1857.  In  1859  they 
increased  again,  but  still  did  not  reach  the  figures  of 
1857.  Although  exports  fell  off,  mainly  in  grain  and 
tobacco,  their  decline  was  so  much  less  than  that  of 
imports  that  in  1858,  for  the  first  time  in  years,  there 
was  an  international  balance  in  favor  of  the  United 
States.  In  the  next  two  years  the  flow  of  imports 
once  more  exceeded  exports,  and  the  normal  relation 
of  the  United  States  to  the  outside  world  as  a  gold- 
producing  nation  was  established,  showing  that  the 
effects  of  the  loss  of  confidence  in  1857  had  worn 
off.4 

Meanwhile   the   government   revenue   had   been 

1  Cong.  Globe,  35  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  961. 

2  Charleston  Mercury,  July  10,  1857. 

'Senate  Exec.  Docs.,  37  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  No.  2,  p.  228;    Dewey, 
Financial  Hist,  of  the  U.  S.,  264. 
4  Dunbar,  Economic  Essays,  296. 


182  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1857 

affected.  The  receipts  from  customs  dropped  one- 
third  in  1858,  and  the  surplus,  habitual  before  the 
tariff  reduction  of  1857,  was  changed  into  a  deficit 
of  twenty  million  dollars.  In  1859  and  1860  this 
condition  continued  until  the  accumulated  deficits 
amounted  to  over  fifty  millions,  a  result  due  in  part, 
no  doubt,  to  the  lower  rates  of  the  tariff  of  1857,  but 
primarily  to  the  decline  in  imports.  The  policy  of 
Secretary  Cobb,  to  whom  it  fell  to  meet  the  panic, 
was  devoid  of  originality  and  offers  little  of  interest. 
Cobb  was  an  intelligent  man,  and  he  found  the  treas- 
ury department  in  such  good  condition  after  Guth- 
rie's  administration  that  not  even  the  rotation  of 
office-holders  was  enough  to  prevent  its  easy  opera- 
tion. Cobb,  however,  was  not  primarily  a  financier, 
but  a  politician,  and  a  southern  one  at  that,  and  his 
relations  with  the  financial  world  were  neither  close 
nor  cordial.  Further,  the  majorities  in  each  House 
of  Congress  were  northern  in  business  and  financial 
feeling,  and  stood  in  no  relations  of  confidence  with 
the  administration  or  with  Cobb  himself.  Conse- 
quently the  action  of  the  government  was  unimpor- 
tant and  rather  ineffective. 

When  the  panic  began,  Cobb  tried  to  unlock  some 
of  the  gold  in  the  sub-treasuries  by  bond  purchases 
to  the  extent  of  several  millions,  but  without  any 
particular  result  except  to  transfer  some  specie  to 
the  banks  and  to  force  government  securities  up  a 
few  points  in  the  market.1  When  Congress  met,  the 

1  Kinley,  Independent  Treasury,  176. 


i86o]  PANIC    OF    1857  183 

deficit  was  visible  and  Cobb  was  forced,  under  au- 
thorization of  an  act  dated  December  23,  1857,  to 
resort  to  the  issue  of  treasury  notes.  Later  in  the 
same  session,  as  the  deficit  grew  steadily  larger, 
Congress  authorized  a  loan  of  twenty  millions,  in 
response  to  a  report  of  Cobb  and  a  message  of  Bu- 
chanan ;  and  a  year  later  it  authorized  the  reissue  of 
treasury  notes.1  This  comprises  the  entire  policy  of 
the  government.  No  attempt  was  made  to  reduce 
expenses,  nor  were  any  new  sources  of  revenue  pro- 
vided ;  and  the  debt  steadily  increased  from  under 
twenty-nine  millions  in  1857  to  nearly  sixty-five 
millions  in  1860.  This  was  not,  however,  considered 
as  in  any  degree  impairing  the  government  credit, 
which  stood  untouched  during  the  panic,  the  sub- 
treasuries  maintaining  specie  payments  through  the 
months  of  bank  suspension,  and  government  bonds 
commanding  a  considerable  premium  when  railway 
securities  were  prostrate  and  state  bonds  were  at  a 
considerable  discount.  It  was  not  until  after  1860, 
when  political  dangers  thickened,  that  confidence  in 
government  solvency  was  shaken. 

In  these  years  appeared  a  significant  forerunner 
of  later  economic  changes  in  the  shape  of  a  revival 
of  protectionist  sentiment  in  Pennsylvania  under 
the  stress  of  hard  times.  Some  influential  papers, 
notably  the  New  York  Tribune  under  Greeley,  de- 
clared that  the  panic  was  a  result,  direct  or  indirect, 
of  the  tariff  of  1846,  and  urged,  unremittingly,  a 

1  Dunbar,  Laws  Relating  to  Currency,  149,  151. 

VOL.  XVIII. — 13 


1 84  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1858 

return  to  protective  duties.1  Buchanan  was  so  far 
influenced  by  the  feeling  of  his  state  as  to  urge,  in 
his  message  of  December,  1858,  an  increase  in  the 
tariff  for  the  purpose  of  incidental  protection  as  well 
as  for  increased  revenue,  recommending  in  addition 
a  change  to  specific  duties.2  Cobb  was  ready  to 
advocate  a  return  to  the  rates  of  1846,  but  although 
an  attempt  was  made  at  the  end  of  the  session  to 
introduce  a  tariff  bill,  a  two-thirds  vote,  necessary 
under  the  rules,  could  not  be  obtained.  In  Decem- 
ber, 1859,  Buchanan  again  asked  for  an  increase  in 
import  duties,  and  again  an  attempt  was  made  to 
meet  the  situation  by  the  introduction,  in  April, 
1860,  of  the  so-called  Morrill  tariff.  After  a  brief 
consideration,  this  bill,  which  was  not  much  more 
protective  than  the  tariff  of  1846,  passed  the  House 
on  May  10  by  105  to  .64.  The  Senate,  however, 
postponed  its  consideration,  influenced  by  the  strong 
southern  feeling  against  tariffs  and  the  Democratic 
party  tradition,  now  firmly  implanted.3 

The  slight  interest  felt  in  the  subject  by  most 
northern  members  was  sufficient  to  prevent  any 
action  by  Congress  to  provide  additional  revenue 
during  Buchanan's  term ;  and  the  decade  ended  with 
an  empty  treasury,  an  increasing  debt,  and  much  dis- 
comfort in  the  government  departments.  Had  Con- 
gress shown  any  desire  to  reduce  the  expenditures  it 

1  Stan  wood,  Tariff  Controversies,  II.,  116. 

2  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V.,  522. 

3  Stan  wood,  Tariff  Controversies,  II.,  99. 


i86o]  PANIC   OF    1857  185 

would  not  have  been  difficult  to  relieve  the  embar- 
rassment, but  the  appropriations  continued  undi- 
minished  and  the  whole  scale  of  government  expendi- 
tures remained  at  the  point  reached  in  the  "flush 
times"  immediately  preceding  the  panic.  Although 
Buchanan  and  Cobb  in  hesitating  tones  suggested 
retrenchment,  no  notice  was  taken ;  and  the  govern- 
ment remained  unable  to  cover  running  expenses 
without  repeated  issues  of  bonds  and  treasury  notes.1 
By  1860,  although  the  federal  treasury  still  felt 
the  effects  of  the  crisis,  the  country  as  a  whole  had 
begun  to  recover  its  confidence  and  prosperity. 
Manufactures  started  up  again,  railroads  operated 
with  greater  ease,  and  capital  again  began  to  be 
loaned  with  freedom.  By  the  time  of  the  census  of 
1860,  even  the  production  of  iron,  which  was  the 
worst  sufferer  in  public  estimation,  had  so  far  re- 
covered as  to  surpass  any  previous  figures.  Railway 
stock,  which  had  been  at  a  low  level  in  the  market, 
rose  on  the  average  by  a  third  or  more ;  and  railway 
construction,  which  had  been  reduced  one-third  in 
1858,  now  increased  to  the  average  rate  of  the  earlier 
years  of  the  decade,  until  by  1860  there  were  no  less 
than  30,592  miles  of  track  laid  down,  as  compared 
with  8585  in  1850.  The  superior  prosperity  of  the 
southern  states  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  con- 
struction there  was  not  affected  by  the  panic,  but 
went  on  at  a  higher  rate  than  before.  In  these  years 
the  southern  connections  between  the  Atlantic  sea- 
1  Buchanan,  Buchanan's  Administration,  231. 


i86  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1858 

board  and  the  interior  were  completed,  the  system 
of  roads  from  Virginia  and  South  Carolina  reaching 
Memphis  on  the  Mississippi  through  Chattanooga  in 
1858  and  1859.  Still  the  south  remained  far  behind 
the  north  as  a  whole,  having  less  than  a  third  of  the 
total  railway  mileage.1 

The  year  1858  was  signalized  by  the  partial  suc- 
cess, of  an  invention  which  was  to  revolutionize 
modern  commerce  and  modern  diplomacy.  On  Au- 
gust 5,  1858,  the  third  attempt  to  lay  an  electric 
telegraph  across  the  Atlantic  was  successfully  car- 
ried through.  Although  the  excitement  and  con- 
gratulation over  this  event,  "  exceeding  the  capacity 
of  language,"  was  suddenly  cut  short  by  the  break- 
down of  the  cable  on  September  i,  the  fact  that  four 
hundred  messages  had  meanwhile  been  sent  encour- 
aged Cyrus  W.  Field,  the  promoter  of  this  enterprise, 
to  renew  his  efforts  until  complete  success  was  at- 
tained eight  years  later.2 

The  reverse  side  of  this  tremendous  extension  of 
railways  into  the  interior  and  the  expansion  of  in- 
ternal trade,  is  to  be  seen  in  the  fact  that  the  Ameri- 
can merchant  marine  came  in  these  years  to  a  stand- 
still. After  1856  the  disorganization  of  British  com- 
merce due  to  the  Crimean  War  was  at  an  end,  and 
British  competition,  especially  in  the  import  trade, 
was  much  more  vigorous.  American  tonnage,  while 
continuing  to  be  the  greatest  in  the  world,  ceased  to 

1  Eighth  Census  of  the  U.  S.,  Miscellaneous  Statistics,  323. 
'Field,  The  Atlantic  Telegraph,  106-261. 


i86o]  PANIC    OF    1857  187 

increase  in  amount  and  began  to  show  the  effects  of 
the  change  from  wood  to  iron.  The  Collins  line  of 
steamers,  which  up  to  1856  maintained  a  spirited 
rivalry  with  the  Cunard  line  for  the  Atlantic  passen- 
ger trade,  was  ruined  by  the  shipwrecks  of  the  Arctic 
in  1854  and  the  Pacific  in  1856;  the  congressional 
subsidy  was  withdrawn  in  that  year,  and  in  1858  the 
remaining  vessels  were  sold.1  The  future  loss  of  the 
carrying-trade,  as  a  result  of  the  turning  of  capital 
and  invention  into  the  more  profitable  fields  of  in- 
ternal development,  was  foreshadowed. 

The  return  of  prosperity  was  indicated  by  the 
revival  of  banking.  Although  the  long  credits  com- 
mon before  the  panic  were  curtailed,  the  extension  of 
loans  was  resumed  and  new  charters  taken  out,  until 
by  1860  there  were  nearly  sixteen  hundred  banks 
with  loans  of  $692,000,000  as  against  $648,000,000  in 
1857,  and  a  circulation  of  $207,000,000  as  against 
$215,000,000  in  i857.2  Surveying  the  country  as  a 
whole,  it  may  be  said  that  the  census  of  1860  found 
all  regions  except  the  northwest,  where  the  recovery 
was  less  complete,  in  substantially  the  same  situation 
as  in  the  years  before  the  panic. 

The  economic  changes  of  the  decade  were  reflected 
in  alterations  of  population  both  in  distribution  and 
density.  The  increase  in  numbers  since  1850  was  at 
about  the  same  rate  as  in  preceding  decades,  the 

1  Bates,  American  Marine,  146  et  seq.;  Wells,  Our  Merchant 
Marine,  18-25,  4^~57I   Rhodes,  United  States,  III.,  9—12. 

2  Dunbar,  Economic  Essays,  314  et  seq. 


1 88  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1860 

total  population  growing  from  twenty-three  millions 
to  thirty-one  and  a  half,  but  the  gain  was  very  un- 
equally distributed.  The  rural  states  in  New  Eng- 
land and  the  older  slave  states  gained  little  or 
nothing,  but  the  manufacturing  states,  from  Massa- 
chusetts to  Pennsylvania,  increased  a  fourth,  the 
cotton  states  nearly  a  third,  and  the  grain-growing 
interior  more  than  two-thirds,  showing  how  the  new 
railroads  had  stimulated  western  settlement. 

The  increase  of  urban  population,  a  feature  of 
modern  industrialism  which  had  already  appeared 
in  the  earlier  censuses,  continued  until  the  propor- 
tion of  urban  population  was  now  almost  exactly 
one-sixth  of  the  whole.1  All  cities  did  not  profit 
equally  by  this  increase :  the  lake  cities,  at  the  junc- 
tion of  water  and  rail  transportation,  made  the  first 
great  strides,  and  Chicago,  Buffalo,  Cleveland,  De- 
troit, and  Milwaukee  sprang  ahead  of  the  river  cities 
— Pittsburg,  Cincinnati,  Louisville,  and  St.  Louis, 
which  had  hitherto  been  foremost  in  the  west.  On 
the  seaboard,  New  York,  Brooklyn,  and  Philadelphia 
swelled  prodigiously,  and  by  1860  the  modern  great 
city  had  come  into  being  all  over  the  north. 

This  increase  in  population,  it  should  be  observed, 
was  due  in  part  to  an  immigration  such  as  the  coun- 
try had  never  experienced  before.  The  Irish  influx 
which  began  after  the  famine  in  the  preceding  dec- 
ade, continued  undiminished,  settling  in  great  num- 
bers in  the  eastern  cities,  furnishing  cheap  labor  for 
1  Weber,  Growth  of  Cities,  25. 


1860]  PANIC    OF    1857  189 

railway  construction,  and  introducing  new  social 
elements.  But  still  more  striking  was  the  inflow 
from  Germany,  which  began  after  the  revolutions 
of  1848  and  sent  hundreds  of  thousands  to  settle  in 
the  northern  states,  the  west  as  well  as  the  east. 
By  1860  the  United  States  had  not  only  revolution- 
ized its  system  of  internal  transportation  and  begun 
the  era  of  great  internal  industrial  expansion,  as 
well  as  the  epoch  of  grain-raising  for  the  world  mar- 
ket, but  had  opened  the  continent  to  the  easy  settle- 
ment of  European  immigrants,  differing  in  race, 
speech,  social  habits,  and  economic  ideals,  and  des- 
tined profoundly  to  affect  the  future  development 
of  the  country. 


CHAPTER   XIV 

THE   SUPREME  COURT  AND  THE 
SLAVERY  QUESTION 

(1850-1860) 

TN  his  inaugural  address,  President  Buchanan,  after 
1  referring  to  the  dispute  over  the  legal  power  of 
the  inhabitants  of  a  territory  to  prohibit  slavery, 
added,  "This  is,  happily,  a  matter  of  but  little  prac- 
tical importance.  Besides,  it  is 'a  judicial  question, 
which  legitimately  belongs  to  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States,  before  whom  it  is  now  pending, 
and  will,  it  is  understood,  be  speedily  and  finally  set- 
tled. To  their  decision,  in  common  with  all  good  citi- 
zens, I  shall  cheerfully  submit,  whatever  this  may 
be/ ' 1  Two  days  later  the  supreme  court  delivered  the 
decision  to  which  Buchanan  referred,  and  in  so  doing 
stepped  suddenly  into  the  very  midst  of  the  political 
controversy,  by  announcing  that  Congress  had  no 
power  to  prohibit  slavery  in  any  territory ;  and  that 
the  only  authority  touching  slavery  conferred  upon 
Congress  by  the  Constitution  was  "  the  power  coupled 
with  the  duty  of  guarding  and  protecting  the  owner 

1  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V.,  431. 


i857]  DRED    SCOTT    DECISION  191 

in  his  rights."  The  federal  judiciary  had  hitherto 
borne  no  part  in  the  territorial  controversy,  and  this 
sudden  plunge  into  the  heart  of  the  problem  was  due 
only  to  a  sort  of  revolution  within  the  court  itself, 
a  revolution  whose  significance  can  be  fully  grasped 
only  by  comprehending  the  policy  of  the  supreme 
court  upon  similar  matters  and  upon  constitutional 
interpretation  in  general  immediately  prior  to  the 
decision. 

Ever  since  the  reconstruction  of  the  supreme 
court,  in  the  days  of  Jackson  and  Van  Buren,1  the 
new  Democratic  judges  had  been  disposed  to  restrict 
its  activity  to  purely  legal  matters,  avoiding  any 
such  constructive  policy  as  that  carried  out  by  Mar- 
shall in  the  famous  decisions  of  the  last  half  of  his 
career.2  In  the  ten  years  from  1850  to  1860,  opin- 
ions were  delivered  in  nearly  a  thousand  cases,  and 
the  time  of  the  court  was  absorbed  in  litigation  aris- 
ing from  the  commercial  expansion  of  the  country. 
Public  land  cases  from  the  newer  states  and  the  terri- 
tories grew  to  be  a  heavy  burden,  especially  those 
from  California,  where  titles  were  in  great  confusion ; 
admiralty  cases  from  sea-coast,  lake,  and  river  traffic 
increased  in  number,  and  a  rapidly  growing  mass  of 
inter-state  cases  came  up  from  the  circuits  and  the 
state  courts.  Among  the  important  decisions  of 

1  Cf .  MacDonald,  Jacksonian  Democracy  (Am.  Nation,  XV.), 
chap.  xiv. 

2  Cf .  Babcock,  Am.  Nationality  (Am.  Nation,  XIII.),  chap. 
xviii. 


192  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

these  years  were  those  in  patent  suits,  concerning 
the  Morse  electric  telegraph,  the  McCormick  reaper, 
and  the  Goodyear  rubber  process.  In  all  directions 
the  court  was  called  upon  to  play  its  part  in  the  new 
era  of  industrial  competition.1 

Whenever  the  court  was  obliged  to  face  questions 
involving  constitutional  construction,  the  Jackso- 
nian  Democracy  of  most  of  the  judges  prevented 
any  firm  and  consistent  policy.  While  the  general 
lines  of  federal  authority  were  too  firmly  established 
by  Marshall  to  be  disturbed,  the  strong  reverence  of 
most  of  the  judges  for  state  -  rights  led  them  to 
favor  the  authority  of  the  states  at  the  expense  of 
federal  supremacy,  wherever  it  was  possible  without 
a  direct  reversal  of  Marshall's  decisions.  Of  the  nine 
judges  who  took  part  in  important  constitutional 
cases  in  this  period,  only  three — McLean,  of  Ohio, 
Wayne,  of  Georgia,  and  Curtis,  of  Massachusetts- 
were  federalist  in  tendency,  and  no  one  of  these  held 
to  his  position  with  entire  consistency.  Taney,  of 
Maryland,  the  aged  chief-justice,  was  uncertain  in 
his  attitude,  at  times  maintaining  with  vigor  a  po- 
sition identical  with  Marshall's,  and  at  other  times 
adopting  the  full  state  -  rights  phraseology.  The 
remaining  five — Nelson,  of  New  York,  Catron,  of 
Tennessee,  Grier,  of  Pennsylvania,  Campbell,  of  Ala- 
bama, and  Daniel,  of  Virginia — were  almost  invaria- 
bly found  using  the  state-rights  arguments,  Daniel 
going  so  far  as  to  employ  habitually  the  political  con- 
1  Carson,  Supreme  Court,  II.,  354-360. 


1856]  DRED    SCOTT    DECISION  193 

ceptions  of  Calhoun.     It  was  in  the  court  an  era  of 
constitutional  reaction . 1 

In  but  one  direction  was  federal  jurisdiction  sub- 
stantially strengthened  in  this  period,  and  that  was 
in  a  field  where  state -rights  views  presented  ob- 
vious practical  difficulties.  In  the  cases  of  the 
Propeller  Gene  see  Chief  (1852)  and  the  Wheeling 
Bridge  (1856)  the  court  extended  the  authority  of 
Congress  and  the  jurisdiction  of  the  federal  courts 
over  the  Great  Lakes  and  the  Ohio  River,  declaring 
both  to  be  "navigable  waters  of  the  United  States." 
The  English  precedent  of  a  merely  tide-water  juris- 
diction was  abandoned  as  inapplicable  to  American 
conditions,  as  was  stated  in  the  Genesee  Chief 
case  by  Taney,  in  an  opinion  which  for  clearness, 
force,  and  breadth  was  worthy  of  Marshall  himself. 
Only  the  unbending  Daniel  dissented  on  his  usual 
strict -constructionist  grounds.2  In  the  Wheeling 
Bridge  case,  however,  when  the  court,  at  the  in- 
stance of  the  state  of  Pennsylvania,  ordered  a 
bridge  chartered  by  Virginia  to  be  altered  to  con- 
form to  the  necessities  of  Ohio  River  traffic,  Taney 
joined  Daniel  in  dissenting,  largely  on  the  ground 
that  the  sovereign  authority  of  Virginia  was  not  open 
to  question.  But  in  this  case  even  Catron  and  Nel- 
son concurred  with  the  opinion  of  McLean  for  the 
court.8  It  was  so  clearly  a  matter  of  public  neces- 

1  Carson,  Supreme  Court,  II.,  339-354. 

2  12  Howard,  443;   Tyler,  Taney,  302. 

3  13  Howard,  518;   Gorham,  Stanton,  I.,  38. 


194  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1851 

sity  that  federal  jurisdiction  should  be  complete  over 
the  interior  waterways  that  Democratic  scruples 
lost  their  force. 

In  other  regions  where  federal  and  state  authority, 
clashed,  the  court  spoke  in  hesitating  tones ;  dissent- 
ing opinions  were  habitual,  and  few  decisions  upon 
constitutional  points  were  made  by  a  united  bench. 
In  the  sphere  where  Marshall,  by  the  Dartmouth 
College  case,  had  sharply  restricted  state  power,  no 
less  than  a  score  of  decisions  were  rendered  by  which 
the  prohibition  upon  state  interference  with  con- 
tracts was  less  rigidly  construed.  Only  with  diffi- 
culty and  by  a  divided  court  were  any  decisions 
attained  invalidating  state  laws  on  this  ground.  In 
1851  an  Arkansas  law,  refusing  further  reception  to 
bills  of  a  defunct  state  bank,  was  held  to  be  a  viola- 
tion of  a  contract  in  the  original  bank  charter ;  and 
three  years  later  this  decision  was  reaffirmed  in  a 
similar  case.  But  four  of  the  state -rights  judges 
dissented  the  first  time  and  three  the  second.1 
When  Ohio  tried,  at  first  by  legislation  and  then 
by  a  new  state  constitution,  to  impose  a  tax 
upon  banks  greater  than  that  provided  for  in 
the  original  banking  act  of  1845,  the  court  in 
two  cases,  over  the  dissent  of  Catron,  Daniel,  and 
Campbell,  held  these  to  be  impairments  of  a  con- 
tract and  invalid ;  but  in  a  third  case  Taney 
and  Grier  shifted  their  ground,  joined  the  three 

•Woodruff  vs.  Trapnall,  10  Howard.  190;    Curran  vs.  Ark., 
15  Howard,  304. 


i8sa]  DRED    SCOTT    DECISION  195 

state  -  rights  advocates,  and  secured  a  different 
result.1 

In  the  field  of  federal  control  over  commerce,  the 
doctrines  of  Marshall  were  generally  upheld,  as  in  the 
earlier  "Passenger  Cases"  (1848) ;  but  in  Cooley  vs. 
the  Port  Wardens  (1852)  the  court  held  that  a  law 
of  Pennsylvania,  forcing  the  payment,  if  a  vessel  de- 
clined a  pilot,  of  one-half  of  the  pilotage  fee  to  the 
Society  for  the  Relief  of  Distressed  and  Decayed 
Pilots,  was  not  a  regulation  of  commerce  and  hence 
was  valid.  The  majority  in  this  case  was  composed 
of  the  state-rights  group  with  the  chief -justice,  and, 
oddly  enough,  the  Whig  Curtis,  who  himself  delivered 
the  opinion.  Wayne  and  McLean  dissented  on  the 
grounds  of  the  reasoning  in  Marshall's  fundamental 
opinion  in  Gibbons  vs.  Ogden.2  These  decisions  il- 
lustrate the  disconnected  attitude  of  the  court  upon 
constitutional  questions  and  its  lack  of  controlling 
principles. 

The  uncertainty  of  the  court  in  constitutional 
matters  did  not  prevent  it  from  standing  higher  in 
public  estimation  than  ever  before.  To  most  Ameri- 
cans it  appeared  the  type  of  conservatism,  imparti- 
ality, and  safety.  The  learning,  mental  vigor,  and 
thoroughness  of  its  members  had  won  the  highest 


1  State  Bank  vs.  Knoop,  16  Howard,  369;  Dodge  vs.  Woolsey, 
18  Howard,  331;  Ohio  Life  Ins.  Co.  vs.  Debolt,  16  Howard, 
416. 

1  Cooley  vs.  Port  Wardens,  12  Howard,  299;  Gurtis,  Curtis, 
I.,  168. 


196  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1842 

respect  of  the  legal  profession  and  the  public.1  It 
seemed  to  be  the  one  branch  of  the  federal  govern- 
ment wholly  untouched  by  the  sectional  controversy, 
more  especially  since  in  cases  involving  slavery  it 
had  shown  consistent  caution.  In  the  two  best- 
known  cases,  those  of  Prigg  in  1842,  and  Van  Zandt 
in  1847,  the  court  had  held  the  fugitive-slave  law  of 
1793  to  be  a  constitutional  enactment  based  upon 
the  power  implied  in  the  clause  of  the  Constitution 
prescribing  the  return  of  fugitives  from  service ;  but 
there  was  nothing  in  these  decisions  of  a  pro-slavery 
or  anti-slavery  character.  They  were  purely  legal 
arguments,  simply  applying  the  reasoning  customary 
since  Marshall's  day  to  the  interpretation  of  a  clause 
of  the  Constitution.  In  the  Prigg  case,  the  court 
further  held  a  state  law  invalid  which  conflicted  with 
the  federal  statute,  by  assuming  to  punish  kidnap- 
ping.2 During  the  struggle  over  slavery  in  the  ter- 
ritories, repeated  suggestions  were  made  that  the 
legality  of  territorial  slavery  should  be  left  to  the 
supreme  court,  and  the  New  Mexico  act  of  1850 
contained  a  provision  that  cases  involving  the  title 
to  slaves  and  those  involving  the  question  of  per- 
sonal freedom  were  to  be  brought  directly  to  it.8 
Still,  nothing  had  yet  come  to  test  its  temper,  and 

1  Carson,  Supreme  Court,  II.,  66;    Biddle,  "Constitutional  De- 
velopment as  Influenced  by  Taney,"  in  Rogers,  etc.,  Constitu- 
tional History,  125-127,  195. 

2  Prigg  vs.  Pennsylvania,  16  Peters,  539;  Jones  vs.  Van  Zandt, 
5  Howard,  215;  Hart,  Slavery  and  Abolition  (Am.  Nation,  XVI.), 
chap.  xix.  3  U.  S.  Statutes  at  Large,  IX.,  450,  455. 


i855]  DRED    SCOTT    DECISION  197 

nothing  but  the  known  state -rights  tendencies  of 
six  of  the  judges  and  the  fact  that  five  of  the  nine 
were  from  slave  states  seemed  to  point  to  any  but 
cautious  action  when,  in  1855,  the  suit  of  Dred 
Scott  vs.  Sandford  was  brought  before  it  on  appeal 
from  one  of  the  circuit  courts.1 

The  facts  in  the  case  were  simple,  and  admitted 
of  an  easy  decision  without  touching  upon  any  vital 
points.  Scott,  a  slave,  had  been  taken  by  his  mas- 
ter, an  army  surgeon,  to  places  in  Illinois  where 
slavery  was  prohibited  by  the  Northwest  Ordinance 
and  by  the  state  constitution,  and  to  a  post  in  the 
northern  part  of  Louisiana  territory  where  slavery 
was  excluded  by  the  Missouri  Compromise  of  1820. 
Scott  returned  with  his  master  to  Missouri  without 
protest,  but  after  several  years  brought  suit  for  his 
freedom  in  the  state  courts  against  his  master's 
widow,  on  the  ground  of  residence  in  free  territory, 
supported,  in  fact,  by  Missourians  to  make  a  test  case. 
In  1852  the  Missouri  supreme  court  decided  against 
him,  but  meanwhile  he  had  come  into  the  possession 
of  the  executor  of  his  former  owner,  Sandford,  of  New 
York,  against  whom  he  brought  suit  in  the  federal 
circuit  court  as  a  citizen  of  another  state.  In  the 
federal  court,  Sandford  raised  a  preliminary  objec- 
tion that  Scott,  as  a  negro  descended  from  slaves, 
could  not  possibly  be  a  citizen  and  so  could  not  sue. 
This  the  court  overruled,  but  then  went  on  to  hold 
that  in  such  cases  of  personal  freedom  the  federal 
1  Dred  Scott  vs.  Sandford,  19  Howard  393. 


1 98  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1856 

practice  was  to  follow  the  decision  of  the  highest 
state  court,  and  hence,  since  the  Missouri  court  had 
decided  against  Scott,  the  circuit  court  must  so 
decide. 

When  the  case  came  before  the  federal  supreme 
court,  the  only  point  to  be  adjudicated  was  the 
decision  of  the  circuit  court  to  follow  the  Missouri 
court,  and  the  way  seemed  to  be  clearly  marked  out 
by  the  case  of  Strader  vs.  Graham  (1851),  where 
precisely  this  rule  of  following  state  decisions  had 
been  laid  down.1  Upon  all  the  principles  of  legal 
caution  and  court  practice  the  duty  laid  upon  the 
supreme  court  was  an  unimportant  one.  When  the 
case  was  first  argued,  this  view  prevailed  with  the 
majority  of  the  judges ;  but  since  Taney  was  in  doubt 
as  to  whether  the  plea  regarding  Scott's  citizenship 
might  not  properly  come  before  them,  a  second  argu- 
ment was  ordered  on  that  question  for  December, 
i856.2  After  the  second  argument,  it  still  appeared 
that  the  majority  held  to  the  plain  path  marked 
out  by  precedent,  and  Nelson,  of  New  York,  a  rigid 
state-rights  judge,  was  instructed  to  write  an  opin- 
ion sustaining  the  decision  of  the  circuit  court. 

At  this  point  a  new  influence  suddenly  appeared. 
Judge  Wayne,  of  Georgia,  was  impressed  after  the 
recent  victory  of  the  Democratic  party  in  the  presi- 
dential election  with  the  idea  that  the  time  was  ripe 
for  the  supreme  court  to  end  the  slavery  controversy 

1  10  Howard,  82. 

3  Curtis,  Curtis,  I.,  180 ;  J.  A.  Campbell,  in  20  Wallace,  p.  ix. 


i8S7]  DRED    SCOTT    DECISION  199 

once  for  all,  and  he  urged  the  court  to  make  the  pend- 
ing Dred  Scott  case  the  opportunity  for  a  decision 
which  should  take  the  whole  subject  of  regulating 
slavery  out  of  the  power  of  the  federal  government.1 
His  animated  arguments  with  his  colleagues  were 
undoubtedly  made  effective  by  the  sense  of  the  crisis 
through  which  the  country  had  just  passed,  and  in 
the  end  he  prevailed  upon  the  southern  justices  and 
Grier,  of  Pennsylvania.  A  motion  was  then  adopted 
that  Chief- Justice  Taney  should  write  an  opinion 
"upon  all  questions  involved,"  but  the  moment  the 
court  departed  from  the  plain  road  marked  out  by 
precedent  there  was  no  possibility  of  unanimity. 
When  Taney  read  his  opinion  "upon  all  questions 
involved,"  one  judge  only — Wayne — concurred  with 
him,  five  others  concurred  separately  in  partial  and 
irregular  fashion,  and  two  dissented  point-blank. 

Upon  the  original  issue  of  Dred  Scott's  freedom 
the  decision  of  the  court  stood,  as  it  had  been  from 
the  start,  adverse,  only  Curtis  and  McLean  dissent- 
ing. Taney's  opinion,  assigning  reasons  for  the  de- 
cision which  stood  formally  as  the  opinion  of  the 
court,  was,  however,  not  so  much  a  judicial  state- 
ment as  an  elaborate  essay  upon  the  history  of 
slavery  under  the  Constitution,  and  a  justification 
of  the  most  radical  southern  positions  regarding 
the  institution.  No  negro,  the  chief -justice  said, 
could  possibly  be  a  citizen  in  the  constitutional 
sense,  whatever  action  a  state  might  take  with  re- 
1  Curtis,  Curtis,  I.,  206,  234-242;  Tyler,  Taney,  382-388. 

VOL.   XVIII. — 14 


200  PARTIES  AND  SLAVERY  [1857 

gard  to  him,  for  the  Constitution  was  not  intended 
to  apply  to  any  but  the  white  race.  The  negroes,  he 
concluded,  in  words  which  became  inseparably  at- 
tached to  his  name,  were  considered  at  the  time  of 
the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  "  so  far  inferior  that 
they  had  no  rights  which  the  white  man  was  bound 
to  respect."  l  Hence  Dred  Scott  could  not  sue  in 
the  United  States  court  as  a  citizen  of  Missouri. 

At  this  point,  having  denied  the  right  of  the 
plaintiff  to  sue,  Taney  was  bound  in  logic  to  dis- 
miss the  case,  but  instead  of  so  doing  he  took  up  the 
question  of  Scott's  freedom,  as  affected  by  residence 
in  Louisiana  territory  and  in  Illinois.  The  right  of 
property  in  slaves,  he  argued,  was  specifically  men- 
tioned and  recognized  in  the  Constitution ;  no  power 
over  it  was  given  to  Congress ;  the  United  States  held 
territories  simply  as  "representative  and  trustee" 
for  the  states,  and  could  make  no  discrimination  be- 
tween citizens  of  the  several  states  in  respect  to 
property  rights  in  them.  Hence,  he  concluded,  a  pro- 
hibition of  slavery  in  the  territories  was  invalid,  the 
Missouri  Compromise  had  been  unconstitutional,  and 
Scott  could  not  acquire  freedom  because  of  tempo- 
rary residence  in  such  territory.  Finally,  as  to  the 
effect  of  residence  in  Illinois,  Taney  turned  to  the 
decision  of  the  Missouri  court,  which  he  held  to  be 
decisive  against  any  claim  to  freedom  on  that  ground. 
Hence,  from  all  points  of  view,  Scott  had  not  proved 
a  right  to  his  freedom.2 

1  19  Howard,  407.  2  Tyler,  Taney,  380-391. 


i857]  DRED    SCOTT   DECISION  201 

Had  this  opinion,  with  all  its  glaring  inconsisten- 
cies, stood  as  that  of  a  united  court,  its  length,  learn- 
ing, and  authority  would  have  made  it  impressive, 
but  it  was  almost  as  much  damaged  as  supported  by 
the  variety  in  the  concurring  opinions.  In  the  first 
place,  Taney 's  main  position,  that  of  the  impossibility 
of  citizenship  for  a  negro  descended  from  slaves,  was 
concurred  in  by  only  two  judges,  while  one  dissented 
and  the  other  five  expressly  declined  to  consider  the 
point.  Then  as  to  reaffirming  the  decision  of  the 
circuit  court  that  the  Missouri  decision  must  be  fol- 
lowed, one  judge — Nelson — rested  his  whole  opinion 
upon  it,  and  five  others,  including  Taney  himself, 
concurred.  But  if  this  position  were  valid,  there 
was  no  necessity  for  any  consideration  of  the  Mis- 
souri Compromise ;  for  if  Scott  was  not  freed  by  the 
Illinois  prohibition,  which  was  undoubtedly  consti- 
tutional, then  the  prohibition  in  the  Louisiana  terri- 
tory, whether  constitutional  or  not,  could  not  affect 
his  status.1 

Nevertheless,  Taney  received  the  concurrence  of  five 
other  judges  in  declaring  the  Missouri  Compromise 
to  have  been  illegal  and  void,  although  such  an 
opinion  was  an  obiter  dictum,  dragged  into  the  case. 
Justice  Catron,  in  his  desire  to  stand  with  the  major- 
ity, took  the  extraordinary  ground  that,  although 
there  was  no  question  of  the  power  of  Congress  over 
the  territories,  the  third  article  of  the  treaty  of  1803, 
which  guaranteed  the  inhabitants  of  Louisiana  their 

1  Gray  and  Lowell,  Legal  Review,  25. 


202  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1857 

rights,  stood  protected  by  the  Constitution  and  could 
not  be  repealed.  Hence,  the  Missouri  Compromise 
was  invalid,  not  because  of  any  special  sanctity  of 
slave  property,  but  because  it  conflicted  with  a 
treaty,  a  position  wholly  foreign  to  American  consti- 
tutional law.1  The  political  character  of  the  whole 
performance  was  stamped  upon  it  in  the  phraseol- 
ogy of  the  opinions  as  well  as  in  the  logical  inco- 
herence and  superfluousness  of  the  arguments,  how- 
ever able  most  of  the  individual  opinions  were  if 
taken  singly. 

Of  the  two  dissenting  opinions,  McLean's  was  vig- 
orous in  language  and  argument,  but  Curtis 's  was 
undeniably  superior  and  has  gained  a  fame  seldom 
acquired  by  dissenting  views.  He  took  up  categori- 
cally, and,  by  a  complete,  logical  argument,  refuted 
every  one  of  the  chief -justice's  points.  He  began  by 
disproving  on  historical  grounds  the  assertion  that 
no  negro  could  be  a  citizen ;  hence  Dred  Scott  could 
not  legally  be  debarred  from  bringing  suit  on  the 
mere  ground  of  color.  In  continuing,  he  held  that 
the  Missouri  decision  was  not  binding  upon  the  su- 
preme court,  and  that  a  slave  did  gain  a  right  to  free- 
dom by  residence  in  a  region  where  slavery  was  pro- 
hibited. The  contention  that  the  United  States  had 
no  power  to  exclude  slavery  from  a  territory,  Curtis 
showed  to  be  contrary  to  the  uniform  practice  of  the 
government  since  1789,  and  a  practical  reversal  of 
several  fundamental  decisions  of  the  court  concern- 

1  19  Howard,  527. 


i857]  DRED   SCOTT   DECISION  203 

ing  the  powers  of  Congress  over  territories.  He  held, 
therefore,  that  the  Missouri  Compromise  had  been 
constitutional  up  to  its  repeal  in  1854,  and  that  Scott 
ought  to  be  declared  free  because  of  his  residence  in 
the  territory  to  which  it  referred.1 

As  an  exposition  of  the  Websterian  or  Federalist 
conception  of  the  nature  of  the  government  and  the 
powers  of  Congress,  this  dissenting  opinion  was  a 
masterpiece.  It  overthrew  the  labored  arguments 
of  Taney,  and  showed  the  majority  to  be  innova- 
tors and  practical  revolutionists.  Curtis  plainly  said 
that,  in  his  eyes,  the  decision  was  worthless.  "  On  so 
grave  a  subject  as  this,"  he  said,  "I  feel  obliged  to 
say  that  in  my  opinion  such  an  exertion  of  judicial 
power  transcends  the  limits  of  the  authority  of  the 
court,  as  described  by  repeated  decisions.  ...  I  do 
not  consider  it  to  be  within  the  scope  of  the  judicial 
power  of  the  court  to  pass  upon  any  question  respect- 
ing the  plaintiff's  citizenship  in  Missouri  save  that 
raised  by  the  plea  to  the  jurisdiction,  and  I  do  not 
hold  an  opinion  of  this  court,  or  of  any  court,  bind- 
ing when  expressed  on  a  question  not  legitimately 
before  it."2  The  only  point  where  Curtis 's  argu- 
ment failed  to  overthrow  the  majority  opinions  was 
his  denial  of  the  binding  force  of  the  Missouri  deci- 
sion upon  the  United  States  courts.  The  original 
decision  of  the  court,  as  expressed  in  Nelson's  opin- 
ion, agreed  in  this  respect  with  the  usual  practice  of 
the  supreme  court  in  following  state  precedents,  and 

1  19  Howard,  564-633.  8  Ibid.,  589. 


204  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1857 

was  a  sufficient — in  fact,  the  only  sufficient — ground 
for  the  decision. 

The  effect  of  this  decision  was  weakened  both  by 
the  patent  and  almost  avowed  purpose  to  settle  a 
political  question  as  well  as  by  the  intrinsic  disagree- 
ments and  inconsistencies  of  the  judges.  Lawyers 
were  quick  to  expose  the  extra-legal  character  of 
much  of  Taney's  opinion  and  to  doubt  the  binding 
character  of  anything  but  the  bare  decision  itself. 
Yet,  after  all  judicial,  legal,  and  logical  criticisms 
were  made,  the  fact  remained  that  a  two -thirds 
majority  of  the  judges  was  on  record  as  hold- 
ing the  extreme  southern  position  regarding  the 
power  of  Congress  over  the  territories.  It  seemed 
to  be  a  positive  intervention  on  behalf  of  slavery, 
and  as  such  it  was  welcomed  by  southern  leaders, 
writers,  and  political  agitators,  in  a  chorus  of  praise 
which  showed  how  substantial  they  thought  their 
gain.  "The  nation  has  achieved  a  triumph,"  said 
the  Enquirer,  "sectionalism  has  been  rebuked  and 
abolitionism  has  been  staggered  and  stunned.  An- 
other supporting  pillar  has  been  added  to  our  insti- 
tutions. "  1 

At  the  north  the  impression  was  universal  that 
the  "slave  power"  had  gained  another  victory  at 
the  expense  of  legal  impartiality  and  honor.  Al- 
though the  decision  had  been  foreshadowed  before 
Buchanan's  inauguration,  it  came  as  a  surprise  and 
irritation,  and  provoked  a  storm  of  criticism.  "Alas, 
1  Richmond  Enquirer,  March  n,  1857. 


1858]  DRED    SCOTT    DECISION  205 

that  the  character  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  Unit- 
ed States  as  an  impartial  judicial  body  has  gone!" 
cried  a  writer  in  the  New  York  Tribune.  "  It  has 
abdicated  its  just  functions  and  descended  into  the 
political  mire.  It  has  sullied  the  ermine;  it  has 
draggled  and  polluted  its  garments  in  the  filth  of 
pro-slavery  politics ! "  *  "The  ma  j  ori  t  y  of  the  court , ' ' 
said  the  Springfield  Republican,  "rushed  needlessly 
to  the  conclusions,  and  are  justly  open  to  the  suspi- 
cion of  being  induced  to  pronounce  them  by  partisan 
or  sectional  influences.  .  .  .  The  people  are  the  court 
of  last  resort  in  this  country.  They  will  discuss 
and  review  the  action  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  if 
it  presents  itself  as  a  practical  question  will  vote 
against  it."  2 

The  Republicans,  declining  to  bow  to  a  decision 
which  would  cut  the  ground  from  under  their  feet, 
denounced  the  Dred  Scott  doctrines  as  unworthy  of 
obedience,  and  reasserted  their  purpose  to  oppose  the 
extension  of  slavery  into  the  territories.  The  radi- 
cals among  them  threatened  to  override  or  recon- 
struct the  court.  Seward,  in  the  Senate,  exclaimed, 
defiantly,  "The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
attempts  to  command  the  people  of  the  United 
States  to  accept  the  principle  that  one  man  can  own 
other  men;  and  that  they  must  guarantee  the  in- 


1  Pike,  First  Blows  of  the  Civil  War,  368. 

2  Springfield  Republican,  March  n,  1857;  Merriam,  Bowles,  I., 
222;  extracts  from  various  authors,  in  Hart,  Am.  Hist,  told  by 
Contemporaries,  IV.,  §§  41-43. 


206  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1858 

violability  of  that  false  and  pernicious  property. 
The  people  of  the  United  States  never  can,  and  they 
never  will,  accept  principles  so  unconstitutional  and 
abhorrent.  .  .  .  We  shall  reorganize  the  Court,  and 
thus  reform  its  political  sentiments  and  practices, 
and  bring  them  into  harmony  with  the  Constitution 
and  the  laws  of  nature."  * 

Many  believed  that  it  was  part  of  a  plot  concocted 
between  Douglas,  Pierce,  Taney,  and  Buchanan,  or, 
as  Lincoln  expressed  it,  "When  we  see  a  lot  of 
framed  timbers,  different  portions  of  which  we  know 
to  have  been  gotten  out  at  different  times  and  places 
and  by  different  workmen  —  Stephen,  Franklin, 
Roger  and  James,  for  instance — and  when  we  see 
these  timbers  joined  together  and  see  that  they  ex- 
actly make  the  frame  of  a  house,  ...  in  such  a  case, 
we  find  it  impossible  not  to  believe  that  Stephen  and 
Franklin  and  Roger  and  James  all  understood  one 
another  from  the  beginning,  and  all  worked  upon  a 
common  plan  or  draft,  drawn  up  before  the  first  blow 
was  struck."  2  This  charge  enraged  Taney  and  Bu- 
chanan, and  was,  in  fact,  a  mere  assumption,  unsup- 
ported by  any  other  evidence  than  the  reference  by 
Buchanan,  in  his  inaugural,  to  the  approaching  de- 
cision. 

Within  the  next  three  years  the  court  was  called 
upon  to  give  decisions  in  two  other  cases  involving 
slavery;  and  each  time,  although  its  action  was  in 

1  Cong.  Globe,  35  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  943. 

2  Lincoln  and  Douglas  Debates,  3;   Tyler,  Taney,  374. 


i86i]  DRED    SCOTT    DECISION  207 

reality  conservative,  it  appeared  to  the  suspicious 
north  to  be  tinged  with  pro-slavery  bias.  In  Able- 
man  vs.  Booth  (1859),  a  case  where  the  Wisconsin 
supreme  court  interfered  in  behalf  of  a  person  guilty 
of  aiding  a  fugitive  slave  to  escape  from  the  custody 
of  federal  officials,  on  the  ground  that  the  fugitive- 
slave  law,  which  he  had  violated,  was  unconstitu- 
tional, Taney,  in  a  severe  opinion,  pronounced  the 
action  of  the  Wisconsin  court  to  be  revolutionary 
and  the  fugitive-slave  law  to  be  perfectly  valid.1 
In  1 86 1  the  court  was  asked  to  issue  a  mandamus  to 
compel  the  governor  of  Ohio  to  deliver  to  the  Ken- 
tucky authorities  a  man  charged  with  aiding  a  slave 
to  escape.  Taney's  opinion  stated  strongly  the  duty 
of  the  governor  of  Ohio  to  deliver  the  criminal,  but 
admitted  the  impotence  of  the  supreme  court  to 
compel  him  to  act.  "When  the  Constitution  was 
framed,"  said  Taney,  "and  when  this  law  was  passed 
it  was  confidently  believed  that  a  sense  of  justice  and 
of  mutual  interest  would  insure  the  faithful  execu- 
tion of  this  constitutional  provision  by  the  executive 
of  every  state.  .  .  .  But  if  the  Governor  of  Ohio  re- 
fuses to  discharge  this  duty,  there  is  no  power  dele- 
gated to  the  general  government  ...  to  use  any 
coercive  means  to  compel  him."2 

The  words  of  the  aged  chief -justice  fittingly  closed 
an  epoch  in  the  history  of  the  supreme  court.  The 
time  had  come  when  justice  and  mutual  interest 

J2i  Howard,  506. 

2  Kentucky  vs.  Dennison,  24  Howard,  66,  109. 


208  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1857 

were  no  longer  adequate  to  settle  sectional  disputes. 
The  intervention  of  the  court  in  the  slavery  contro- 
versy proved  utterly  futile,  for  the  differences  be- 
tween north  and  south  were  too  deep-seated  to  be 
affected  by  a  mere  court  decision.  The  only  results 
of  the  Dred  Scott  case  was  to  damage  the  prestige  of 
the  court  in  the  north  and  to  stimulate  a  sectional 
hostility  which  threatened  to  recoil  upon  the  heads 
of  the  judges  themselves. 


CHAPTER    XV 

THE  FINAL  STAGE  OF  THE  KANSAS  STRUGGLE 
(1857-1858) 

IN  the  opening  year  of  Buchanan's  administra- 
tion political  prospects  were  brighter  for  the 
Democratic  party  than  for  several  years  previous. 
It  was  true  that  the  dreaded  northern  sectional  party 
had  at  last  appeared  with  formidable  strength ;  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  forces  of  conservatism  repre- 
sented by  the  Democratic  and  American  organiza- 
tions equalled  it  in  the  north  and  outnumbered  it  in 
the  country  at  large.  Popular  sentiment,  tired  of 
the  wrangles  over  slavery,  subsided  into  the  quietude 
which  habitually  marks  the  year  succeeding  a  presi- 
dential contest.  The  Republican  party  now  seemed 
to  be  undergoing  a  reaction;  for  in  the  local  elec- 
tions of  1857  it  lost  ground  nearly  everywhere,  barely 
carrying  several  states  which  had  given  good  majori- 
ties in  1 85 6  and  failing  in  New  York.  In  Ohio,  where 
Chase  was  elected  in  1855  by  fifteen  thousand  plu- 
rality, he  narrowly  secured  a  second  term  by  a  mar- 
gin of  1481  votes.  Democratic  papers  even  affected 
to  think  that  the  Republican  party  was  about  to 
expire.  "Black  Republicanism  is  dead  in  Ohio," 


210  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1857 

said  one.  "  The  strong  tide  of  public  feeling  is  surg- 
ing against  it  everywhere  and  the  Democrats  have 
fought  their  last  battle  against  it  in  this  state  and 
in  the  Union."  *  It  seemed  quite  within  the  range 
of  possibility  that  if  Buchanan  successfully  adopted 
towards  Kansas  the  fair,  impartial  course  to  which 
he  had  pledged  himself,  he  might  end  the  whole  ter- 
ritorial controversy  and  leave  the  Republican  party 
with  no  grievance  and  no  excuse  for  existence. 

With  such  hopeful  prospects  before  him,  Buchanan 
took  up  the  Kansas  situation  in  the  spring  of  1857. 
His  course  was  clear,  marked  out  for  him  by  the  ac- 
tion of  his  party  on  the  Toombs  bill  of  1856,  by  the 
declaration  in  the  Democratic  platform,  and  by  his 
own  explicit  statements  during  and  after  the  cam- 
paign. All  that  was  necessary  was  to  appoint  an  im- 
partial governor,  secure  a  fair  registration  of  voters, 
provide  an  honest  election  to  a  convention,  and 
furnish  an  opportunity  for  the  people  of  Kansas 
to  accept  or  reject  any  constitution  which  might  be 
draughted.  Nothing  in  the  Dred  Scott  decision  ob- 
structed this  programme ;  for  admitting  the  validity 
of  the  principle  that  neither  Congress  nor  the  territo- 
rial legislature  could  exclude  slaves  from  a  territory, 
the  supreme  court  did  not  deny  that  in  forming  a 
state  constitution  the  people  of  a  territory  could 
pass  upon  the  point.  "It  is  the  imperative  and  in- 
dispensable duty  of  the  government  of  the  United 
States,"  said  Buchanan  in  his  inaugural  address,  "to 
1  Cleveland  Plain  Dealer,  October  17,  1857. 


1857]  BUCHANAN  AND   KANSAS  211 

secure  to  every  resident  inhabitant  the  free  and  inde- 
pendent expression  of  his  opinion  by  his  vote.  .  .  . 
That  being  accomplished,  nothing  can  be  fairer  than 
to  leave  the  people  of  a  territory  free  from  all  foreign 
interference  to  decide  their  own  destiny  for  them- 
selves." Still  more  definitely,  in  a  letter  of  July,  he 
said,  "  On  the  question  of  submitting  the  constitution 
to  the  bo na  fide  resident  settlers  of  Kansas,  I  am  will- 
ing to  stand  or  fall."  l 

To  carry  out  his  policy,  Buchanan  sent  Robert  J. 
Walker,  of  Mississippi,  to  succeed  Geary,  whose  im- 
partial course  had  been  so  ill  supported  by  the 
Pierce  administration  that  he  resigned  in  disgust 
on  March  4,  1857,  and,  like  his  predecessors,  left 
the  territory  in  fear  for  his  life.2  Walker,  to  whom 
fell  the  ungrateful  task,  was  a  figure  of  national 
reputation,  formerly  senator  from  Mississippi,  secre- 
tary of  the  treasury  under  Polk,  and  author  of  the 
tariff  of  1846,  an  energetic,  irascible  man,  honora- 
ble and  fearless  of  criticism,  determined,  although 
from  a  slave  state,  to  adhere  strictly  to  the  im- 
partial course  agreed  upon  by  him  with  Buchanan. 
In  his  inaugural  address,  on  May  26,  he  urged  all 
the  settlers  to  co-operate  in  forming  a  state  gov- 
ernment, announcing  that  the  administration  was 
pledged  to  secure  a  fair  vote,  and  that  any  consti- 
tution adopted  would  be  submitted  "  for  ratification 

1  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V.,  431;    House  Reports, 
36  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  648,  p.  112. 
'Gihon,  Geary,  288-291. 


212  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1856 

or  rejection  by  a  majority  of  the  then  actual,  bona 
fide  settlers  of  Kansas."  * 

This  plan,  however,  encountered  a  serious  obsta- 
cle in  the  form  of  a  movement  by  the  pro-slavery 
party  in  Kansas  towards  the  framing  of  a  consti- 
tution. It  was  seen  that  if  the  Free  State  party 
continued  its  policy  of  refusing  to  take  part  in  any 
territorial  elections,  it  would  be  easy  to  secure  a 
pro  -  slavery  constitution  and  •  ask  the  admission 
of  Kansas  into  the  Union  as  a  slave  state.  Acting 
under  this  idea,  the  territorial  legislature,  after 
a  favorable  popular  vote  in  October,  1856,  set 
June  15,  1857,  for  the  election  of  delegates.  More- 
over, Stanton,  the  secretary  of  the  territory  and 
acting  governor  before  the  arrival  of  Walker,  ap- 
portioned delegates  upon  the  basis  of  the  pro- 
slavery  electoral  registration,  defective  as  it  was, 
and  Walker  found  himself  confronted  with  a  con- 
stitution-making process  which  altogether  failed  to 
correspond  with  the  impartial  intentions  of  himself 
and  Buchanan. 

In  the  attempt  to  induce  the  Free  State  men  to 
participate  in  the  affair,  Walker  was  unsuccessful, 
and  the  election  of  delegates  at  this  critical  point 
drew  out  less  than  one-eighth  of  the  voters  in  the 
territory  and  resulted  in  the  choice  of  a  unanimous- 
ly pro -slavery  convention.2  Not  disheartened  by 

1  Holloway,  Kansas,  49. 

2  Walker  to   Buchanan,   June   28,    1857,   House  Reports,   36 
Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  68,  p.  118. 


i857]  BUCHANAN   AND    KANSAS  213 

this  set-back,  Walker  continued  to  urge  the  Free 
State  party  to  share  in  the  coming  territorial  elec- 
tion of  October,  1857,  and  during  the  summer  suc- 
ceeded in  convincing  them  of  his  impartiality  and 
of  the  wisdom  of  abandoning  the  hopeless  effort  to 
maintain  the  Topeka  government.  Many  eastern 
Republicans  approved  such  a  change  of  policy,  be- 
lieving that  the  majority  of  Free  State  men  was  so 
large  that  they  could  be  certain,  under  a  fair  count, 
of  controlling  the  territorial  election.1  Walker  him- 
self saw  clearly  that  the  pro-slavery  element  was 
outnumbered,  but  he  felt  sure  that  if  Kansas  were 
admitted  as  a  state,  free  or  slave,  it  would  be  con- 
trolled by  the  Democratic  party  and  would  furnish 
two  more  senators  to  aid  in  holding  the  Senate 
against  the  danger  of  Republican  control. 

By  this  time,  however,  Walker's  policy  had  be- 
gun to  evoke  criticism  from  southern  leaders.  His 
repression  of  Lane  and  the  violent  Free  State  men 
did  not  atone  in  their  eyes  for  his  attempts  to  win 
the  confidence  of  the  moderate  anti-slavery  leaders ; 
and  his  hopes  for  an  additional  Democratic  state 
offered  small  compensation  for  the  loss  of  an  ex- 
pected slave-holding  community.  His  pledge  that 
the  constitution  should  be  submitted  to  the  people 
was  termed  "a  breach  of  neutrality  and  an  insidi- 
ous and  high-handed  breach  of  faith  towards  the 
South  and  the  Southern  men  in  Congress."  He  was 
denounced  by  the  Alabama  senate  and  censured  by 

1  Robinson,  Kansas,  354  et  seq. 


214  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1857 

the  Democratic  state  convention  of  Mississippi,  and 
in  August  the  Charleston  Mercury  declared:  "We 
do  not  believe  that  since  the  Union  began  there  has 
been  any  question  which  has  brought  the  South  into 
more  complete  union  than  the  proceedings  of  Gov- 
ernor Walker  in  Kansas.  .  .  .  We  do  not  believe 
that  a  single  man  who  sought  the  suffrages  of  our 
people  would  dare  to  support  or  defend  Walker's 
villainy  in  Kansas."  *  The  danger  that  the  Free 
State  men  might  vote  against  a  pro -slavery  con- 
stitution now  led  the  radical  southern  papers  to 
urge  that  the  pro-slavery  convention  already  elect- 
ed in  the  spring  should  enact  any  constitution  it 
might  draught  without  submitting  it  to  popular  vote, 
notwithstanding  the  unqualified  pledges  of  both 
Walker  and  Buchanan. 

In  the  territorial  election  of  October,  1857,  Wal- 
ker honorably  redeemed  his  promises  by  throwing 
out  the  returns  from  counties  where  the  pro-slavery 
party  cast  its  usual  fraudulent  votes,  with  the  re- 
sult that  the  Free  State  party  secured  a  clear  ma- 
jority of  both  Council  and  House  of  Representatives.2 
Had  Reeder  or  Shannon  played  their  parts  with 
equal  firmness,  this  result  might  have  been  antici- 
pated by  many  months,  for  at  all  times  since  the 
election  of  1855  there  seems  to  have  been  a  Free 
State  majority  in  the  territory.  Certainly  from  this 
moment  it  was  clear  that  Kansas  could  not  be  made 

1  Charleston  Mercury,  May  19,  August  19,  1857. 

2  Brown,  Reminiscences  of  Walker,  74-103. 


i857]  BUCHANAN   AND    KANSAS  215 

a  slave  state  except  against  the  will  of  its  voters. 
A  turning-point  was  reached. 

The  constitutional  convention  elected  in  the  pre- 
vious spring  now  met  at  the  pro-slavery  town  of 
Lecompton,  with  the  certainty  that  its  work  would 
be  rejected  if  submitted  to  the  voters.  Protected 
from  the  angry  Free  State  men  by  federal  troops, 
this  body,  under  the  leadership  of  John  Calhoun, 
the  surveyor  of  the  territory,  played  a  desperate 
game.  Not  daring  to  follow  the  suggestions  show- 
ered upon  them  by  southern  newspapers,  that  they 
should  enact  a  constitution  without  any  popular 
vote,  they  draughted  a  document  which  contained  a 
special  article  on  slavery  and  voted  to  submit  that 
alone  to  popular  suffrage.  It  declared  that  the 
right  of  property  was  higher  and  before  any  con- 
stitutional sanction;  that  the  right  to  slave  prop- 
erty and  its  increase  was  inviolable ;  and  that  there 
was  no  power  in  the  state  to  emancipate  slaves 
without  their  owners'  consent,  nor  to  prevent  their 
entrance.  If  this  article  should  be  stricken  out, 
slavery  should  no  longer  exist,  except  that  the  right 
of  property  in  slaves  already  in  the  territory  should 
not  be  interfered  with.  The  vote  was  to  be  "For 
the  Constitution  with  Slavery"  or  "For  the  Con- 
stitution without  Slavery,"  and  was  to  be  con- 
ducted by  officials  appointed  by  the  convention 
itself.1 

1  Poore,  Charters  and  Constitutions,  605-611;  MacDonald, 
Select  Documents,  436. 

VOL.  XVIII. —  IS 


216  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1857 

The  plan  was  not  unskilful.  It  certainly  seemed 
to  submit  the  crucial  point  to  the  people  of  Kan- 
sas, and  thereby,  if  the  voters  were  only  concerned 
to  pass  upon  the  existence  of  slavery,  to  carry  out 
the  pledges  of  Buchanan  and  Walker.  It  was  true 
that  if  the  " Constitution  without  Slavery"  were 
adopted,  the  slaves  already  in  Kansas  would  not  be 
freed,  and  amendment  would  not  be  possible  until 
1864;  but  from  the  southern  point  of  view  the  main 
question  would  have  been  settled.  The  non- sub- 
mission of  the  constitution  itself  did  not  strike  a 
southerner  as  peculiar,  for  this  method  of  enact- 
ment was  common  in  the  slave  states. 

The  intense  indignation  in  Kansas  over  this  plan 
of  submission  was  quickly  communicated  to  the 
north,  where  the  proposition  was  at  once  stigma- 
tized as  a  swindle.  "The  pretense  of  submission 
is  a  fraud,"  said  the  Tribune,  "and  the  refusal  to 
submit  the  entire  constitution  itself  an  outrage."1 
Probably  the  angriest  person  in  the  United  States 
was  Walker,  who  found  all  his  plans  thwarted.  He 
told  Calhoun  plainly  that  if  the  scheme  were  car- 
ried through  he  should  oppose  it  with  all  his  power. 
Calhoun  replied  that  Buchanan  himself  favored  the 
idea,  whereat  Walker  in  a  passion  retorted :  "  I  con- 
sider such  a  submission  of  the  question  a  vile  fraud, 
a  base  counterfeit,  and  a  wretched  device  to  keep 
the  people  from  voting.  ...  I  will  not  support  it, 
but  I  will  denounce  it,  no  matter  whether  the  ad- 
1N.  Y.  Tribune,  November  16,  1857. 


i857]  BUCHANAN   AND   KANSAS  217 

ministration  sustains  it  or  not."  *  When  the  con- 
vention adjourned,  leaving  the  vote  to  be  taken  on 
December  21  through  its  agents,  the  exasperated 
governor  returned  to  Washington,  as  each  of  his 
predecessors  had  done,  to  lay  the  matter  before  the 
president. 

A  highly  critical  decision  now  lay  in  Buchanan's 
hands.  In  spite  of  recent  Democratic  victories  and 
the  large  Democratic  majority  in  each  House  of 
Congress,  the  administration  trembled  on  the  brink 
of  a  disaster  as  complete  as  that  which  had  over- 
taken Pierce  when  his  outlook  seemed  equally  pros- 
perous, for  the  cry  of  broken  faith  had  wrecked 
Pierce  and  it  might  also  ruin  Buchanan.  The  Le- 
compton  constitution  tested  the  sincerity  of  Bu- 
chanan's pledges,  for  if  he  were  to  support  his  agent, 
Walker,  he  could  not  avoid  repudiating  that  docu- 
ment as  Walker  had  done.  It  was  asserted  at  the 
time  that  this  half-way  method  of  submitting  the 
constitution  was  a  plot  concocted  in  the  cabinet  by 
Thompson,  the  secretary  of  the  interior  and  Cal- 
houn's  superior,  but  that  Buchanan  himself,  up  to 
this  period,  was  innocent,  seems  to  be  proved  by  his 
correspondence  with  Walker.  He  was  still  free  to  act.2 

But  Buchanan  was  never  in  his  prime  a  strong- 
willed  man,  and  now  he  was  old  and  weak.  When 


1  House  Reports,  36  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  648,  p.  no. 

2  Buchanan  to  Walker,  October  22,  1857;    Nicolay  and  Hay, 
Lincoln,  II.,  no;    House  Reports,  36  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  648, 
p.  114. 


218  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1857 

Walker  reached  Washington  he  found  that  the  presi- 
dent had  been  fairly  terrified  by  Cobb,  Thompson, 
Davis,  and  other  southerners  into  deciding  to  uphold 
the  work  of  the  Lecompton  convention,1  and  the  only 
course  for  Walker  was  to  resign,  which  he  did  in  a 
stinging  public  letter.2  In  taking  this  step,  Bu- 
chanan committed  a  blunder  worse  even  than  that 
of  Pierce  when  he  upheld  the  fraudulent  Kansas 
legislature,  for  Buchanan  not  merely  furnished  a 
grievance  for  the  languishing  opposition;  he  took, 
as  it  proved,  the  first  step  towards  the  disruption 
of  the  Democratic  party. 

At  this  juncture  the  one  personality  upon  whom 
most  depended  was  Douglas,  the  idol  of  the  western 
Democrats,  the  ablest  senatorial  debater,  and  the 
strongest  single  leader  in  the  party.  He  had  not 
found  it  hard  to  extenuate  the  pro-slavery  frauds 
and  the  Missourian  invasions  and  to  uphold  the  ter- 
ritorial legislature  against  the  Free  State  "Rebels" 
with  all  his  powers  of  argument.  If  ambition  was 
his  guide,  it  seemed  as  though  he  could  not  hesitate 
to  remain  a  stalwart  defender  of  the  administration 
and  of  the  Lecompton  constitution.  But  Douglas 
and  his  constituents  understood  something  real  by 
1 '  popular  sovereignty. "  By  even  the  narrowest  con- 
struction, this  must  mean  that  the  people  of  a  ter- 
ritory actually  should  vote  upon  a  proposed  consti- 

>      >  Rhodes,  United  States,  II.,  280. 

2  Walker  to  Cass,  December  15,  1857,  Senate  Exec.  Docs.,  35 
Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  8,  p.  130. 


i857]  BUCHANAN   AND    KANSAS  219 

tution,  in  whole  and  in  part,  as  had  been  done  in 
every  one  of  the  northwestern  states  between  1846 
and  1851.  For  Douglas  to  approve  the  plan  of  the 
Lecompton  constitution  was  to  put  himself  square- 
ly athwart  every  tradition  of  his  section,  and  he 
knew  this  perfectly  well.  Accordingly,  in  a  dra- 
matic interview,  he  told  the  indignant  Buchanan 
that  he  should  denounce  it.  "Mr.  Douglas/'  said 
Buchanan,  "  I  wish  you  to  remember  that  no  Dem- 
ocrat ever  yet  differed  from  an  administration  of 
his  own  choice  without  being  crushed.  Beware  of 
the  fate  of  Tallmadge  and  Rives."  To  which  Doug- 
las pithily  re  orted:  "Mr.  President,  I  wish  you  to 
remember  that  General  Jackson  is  dead."  * 

Events  now  moved  straight  to  a  party  crisis.  In 
his  annual  message,  Buchanan  said  that  the  Le- 
compton convention  was  legal,  and  that  by  the 
method  of  submission  "every  citizen  shall  have  an 
opportunity  of  expressing  his  opinion  by  his  vote 
whether  Kansas  shall  be  received  into  the  Union 
with  or  without  slavery,  and  thus  the  exciting  ques- 
tion may  be  peacefully  settled  in  the  very  mode 
required  by  the  organic  law.  The  election  will  be 
held  under  legitimate  authority,  and  if  any  portion 
of  the  inhabitants  shall  refuse  to  vote,  a  fair  oppor- 
tunity to  do  so  having  been  presented,  this  will  be 
their  own  voluntary  act  and  they  alone  will  be  re- 
sponsible for  the  consequences."  2 

1  Nicolay  and  Hay,  Lincoln,  II.,  120. 

2  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V.,  453. 


220  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1857 

Two  days  later  Douglas  rose  and  announced  his 
purpose  to  oppose  the  Lecompton  constitution.  He 
asserted  that  the  Kansas-Nebraska  act  had  for  its 
fundamental  principle  the  right  of  the  people  of  the 
territory  to  decide  on  all  their  "domestic  concerns," 
not  merely  slavery;  that  the  universal  understand- 
ing in  the  country  and  in  the  territory  had  been 
that  any  constitution,  however  framed,  would  have 
to  be  submitted  as  a  whole  to  the  bo na  fide  voters; 
and  that  on  this  issue  the  national  election  of  1856 
had  been  won.  "They  have  a  right,"  he  said,  "to 
judge  for  themselves  whether  they  like  it  or  not. 
...  It  is  no  answer  to  tell  me  that  the  constitution 
is  a  good  one  and  unobjectionable.  .  .  .  Whether 
good  or  bad,  it  is  none  of  my  business  and  none  of 
yours.  .  .  .  Let  me  ask  you  why  force  this  constitu- 
tion down  the  throats  of  the  people  of  Kansas  in 
opposition  to  their  wishes  and  in  violation  of  their 
pledges?'.  .  .  Frame  any  other  bill  that  carries  out 
the  pledge  that  the  people  shall  be  left  free  to 
decide  on  their  own  domestic  institutions  for  them- 
selves and  I  will  go  with  you.  .  .  .  But  if  this  con- 
stitution is  to  be  forced  down  our  throats,  in 
violation  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  free 
government,  under  a  mode  of  submission  that  is  a 
mockery  and  an  insult,  I  will  resist  it  to  the  last."  1 
This  message  and  speech  produced  a  sensation 
throughout  the  country,  for  it  presaged  a  serious 
rupture  between  Douglas  and  the  administration. 
1  Cong.  Globe,  35  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  17,  18. 


1858]  BUCHANAN   AND   KANSAS  221 

While  southern  papers  commented  severely  upon 
Douglas's  position,  most  of  the  northern  Demo- 
cratic sheets  applauded  his  stand  and  condemned 
the  Lecompton  constitution. 

In  Kansas  the  situation  now  developed  rapidly 
into  another  deadlock;  for  when,  on  December  21, 
the  vote  on  the  Lecompton  constitution  took  place, 
the  Free  State  men,  who  opposed  the  document 
as  a  whole,  refused  to  participate.  Hence  the  re- 
sults stood:  for  the  constitution  with  slavery,  6226 
(of  which  2720  were  later  proved  fraudulent);  for 
the  constitution  without  slavery,  569.  Meanwhile 
the  territorial  legislature,  convened  by  Stanton  at 
the  urgent  demand  of  the  Free  State  party,  had 
provided  for  another  vote  on  January  4,  1858,  in 
which  ballots  might  be  cast  against  the  constitu- 
tion as  well  as  for  it.  Stanton  was  promptly  pun- 
ished for  this  indiscretion  by  removal,  but  the 
second  vote  came  off  with  the  following  *  results : 
for  the  constitution  with  slavery,  138;  for  the  con- 
stitution without  slavery,  24;  against  the  constitu- 
tion, 10,226.  In  this  confused  form  the  verdict  of 
Kansas  upon  the  Lecompton  constitution  came  be- 
fore the  president  and  Congress. 

Buchanan  was  by  this  time  fully  committed  to 
the  extreme  southern  position  and  had  cast  aside 
every  vestige  of  the  impartiality  he  had  avowed  in 
the  preceding  year.  February  2,  1858,  he  sent  the 
Lecompton  constitution  to  Congress  and  recom- 
mended the  admission  of  Kansas  under  it  as  a 


222  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1858 

slave  state.  He  stigmatized  the  refusal  of  the  Free 
State  party  to  vote  on  December  2 1  as  part  of  their 
"treasonable  system,"  especially  unpardonable, 
since,  at  this  time,  "the  all-important  question" 
was  submitted.  If  they  really  wished  to  make  Kan- 
sas a  free  state,  he  concluded,  the  only  way  they 
could  do  so  was  by  submitting  to  the  Lecompton 
constitution.  "  It  has  been  solemnly  adjudged,"  he 
urged,  "by  the  highest  judicial  tribunal,  .  .  .  that 
slavery  exists  in  Kansas  by  virtue  of  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States.  Kansas  is  therefore  at 
this  moment  as  much  a  slave  state  as  Georgia  or 
South  Carolina."  l  By  this  action  the  irretrievable 
step  was  taken  and  the  fate  of  the  administration 
and  the  Democratic  party  was  staked  on  the  effort 
to  force  Kansas  in  as  a  slave  state.  From  the  point 
of  view  of  political  expediency  and  of  party  man- 
agement, no  president  ever  made  a  worse  mistake. 
1  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V.,  479. 


CHAPTER   XVI 

THE   TRIUMPH    OF   DOUGLAS 
(1858) 

IN  the  controversy  into  which  the  country  was 
now  plunged  by  the  new  turn  of  the  Kansas 
struggle,  the  storm  no  longer  raged  in  that  terri- 
tory, for  the  ascendency  of  the  Free  State  party  was 
seen  to  be  assured ;  nor  did  it  convulse  the  country 
at  large,  for  a  sense  of  fatigue  and  disgust  over  the 
whole  Kansas  affair  made  itself  felt,  and  the  finan- 
cial depression  served  to  distract  public  attention. 
The  vital  matter  was  now  the  complicated  and  ex- 
ceedingly bitter  party  situation  resulting  from  Bu- 
chanan's attempt  to  force  the  admission  of  Kansas 
under  the  Lecompton  constitution,  the  dramatic 
bolt  of  Douglas,  and  the  consequent  likelihood  of 
the  disruption  of  the  Democratic  party. 

The  contest  began  in  Congress  with  an  attempt 
to  punish  Douglas  for  his  desertion  at  this  crisis, 
when  victory  seemed  in  the  grasp  of  the  south,  by 
breaking  him  down  altogether.  The  Lecompton  de- 
bate in  the  Senate  took  the  form  of  a  savage  attack 
upon  Douglas  and  three  other  Democratic  senators 
who  stood  with  him — Stuart,  of  Michigan,  Pugh,  of 


224  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1858 

Ohio,  and  Broderick,  of  California.  At  the  same 
time  an  official  proscription  which  surprised  even 
the  hardened  spoilsmen  of  that  day  was  carried 
through,  every  adherent  of  Douglas  being  merci- 
lessly turned  out  of  the  public  service,  while  con- 
gressmen were  given  to  understand  that  a  vote 
against  the  Lecompton  bill  meant  political  death.1 

Under  this  heavy  fire  the  conduct  of  Douglas 
was  admirable.  Carefully  refraining  from  assailing 
either  the  president  or  any  of  his  defenders,  he 
confined  himself  to  justifying  his  right  to  an  inde- 
pendent opinion  and  delivering  a  series  of  crushing 
attacks  upon  the  Lecompton  constitution,  as  a  vio- 
lation not  only  of  "popular  sovereignty"  but  of 
common  fairness  and  equity.  The  Republicans,  for 
obvious  reasons,  gladly  allowed  him  to  take  the 
brunt  of  the  conflict.  On  the  other  side  the  argu- 
ments did  little  more  than  repeat  those  of  Buchan- 
an's messages,  but  underneath  all  that  the  southern 
senators  said  ran  the  assumption  that  Kansas  was 
by  right  theirs  and  ought  to  be  a  slave  state;  and 
that  a  refusal  to  admit  it  under  the  Lecompton 
constitution  was  sufficient  ground  for  secession. 

Feeling  ran  extremely  high  in  Congress  during  the 
contest,  especially  between  the  administration  Dem- 
ocrats and  those  who  followed  Douglas,  and  the 
session  of  the  House  in  which  the  bill  was  intro- 
duced broke  up  in  a  series  of  fist-fights  between 

1  Sheahan,  Douglas,  387;  House  Reports,  36  Cong.,  i  Sess., 
No.  648,  p.  296. 


i858]  TRIUMPH   OF   DOUGLAS  225 

northern  and  southern  members.1  The  struggle  was 
not  long,  however.  On  March  23  the  Senate  voted 
to  admit  Kansas  under  the  Lecompton  constitution, 
by  33  to  25,  two  southern  Americans — Bell,  of  Ten- 
nessee, and  Crittenden,  of  Kentucky — voting  in  the 
minority  with  the  Republicans  and  the  four  bolting 
Democrats.  In  the  House,  however,  on  April  i,  no 
less  than  22  Democrats  joined  with  6  Americans 
and  92  Republicans  to  carry  an  amendment  pro- 
viding for  a  resubmission  of  the  constitution;  the 
administration  retaining  104  Democrats  and  8  of  the 
Americans.  In  accepting  this  amendment,  the  Re- 
publicans abandoned  their  earlier  principle  of  un- 
qualified opposition  to  slavery,  and  accepted  the 
ground  which  they  rejected  in  the  discussion  of  the 
Toombs  bill  of  1856;  but  the  practical  certainty 
that  the  constitution  would  be  rejected,  coupled 
with  the  unsettling  effect  of  the  Dred  Scott  deci- 
sion, made  them  willing  to  use  the  opportunity  even 
at  the  risk  of  a  violation  of  consistency.2 

The  administration  could  not  afford  to  let  this 
amendment  kill  the  bill,  for  a  settlement  of  the 
Kansas  question  had  become  an  absolute  political 
necessity.  Accordingly,  in  conference  committee, 
W.  H.  English,  of  Indiana,  offered  a  compromise 
by  which  the  resubmission  was  granted,  but  on  the 
condition  that  if  Kansas  rejected  the  Lecompton 
constitution  it  was  to  lose  part  of  the  public  land  it 

1  Johnston  and  Browne,  Stephens,  329. 

2  Von  Hoist,  United  States,  VI.,  228. 


226  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1858 

desired,  and  was  not  to  be  admitted  as  a  state  until 
its  population  equalled  the  ratio  necessary  for  a 
representative  in  Congress.  This  proposition  bore 
marks  of  the  same  kind  of  statesmanship  as  that 
which  framed  the  Lecompton  constitution  itself, 
joining  as  it  did  a  penalty  and  a  bribe  to  induce 
the  voters  of  Kansas  to  accept  the  objectionable 
document.  Yet  the  fact  that  it  yielded  the  main 
point  induced  nine  of  the  anti-Lecompton  Demo- 
crats in  the  House  to  change  front,  and  thereby  the 
compromise  was  accepted,  by  a  vote  of  120  to  112. 
In  the  Senate  Douglas  fought  the  English  bill  to 
the  end,  but  it  passed  easily  on  April  30. 

The  final  decision  was  now  remitted  to  the  voters 
of  Kansas;  their  response  was  made  on  August  2, 
when  the  vote  stood,  for  accepting  the  constitution, 
1926;  for  rejecting  it,  11,812.  The  Free  State  ma- 
jority preferred  to  remain  in  the  territorial  status 
rather  than  to  enter  the  Union  under  a  pro-slavery 
constitution.  With  this  decision  the  Kansas  diffi- 
culty came  to  an  end.  Legally,  according  to  the 
Dred  Scott  doctrine,  slavery  might  exist  in  Kansas, 
but  practically  it  was  excluded,  through  the  con- 
trol of  the  territory  by  northern  men. 

The  Kansas  question  had  been  settled  by  Bu- 
chanan, at  last,  although  in  a  manner  which  brought 
him  neither  glory  at  the  south  nor  popularity  at 
the  north,  but  the  party  problem  created  by  it  re- 
mained to  be  solved.  Was  Douglas  to  be  pardoned 
and  restored  to  good  standing  in  the  Democratic 


1858]  TRIUMPH   OF   DOUGLAS  227 

ranks,  or  would  the  administration  and  its  southern 
counsellors  persist  in  the  effort  to  ruin  the  man  who 
had  been  their  strongest  northern  ally?  The  an- 
swer to  this  question  in  the  summer  of  1858  was 
unmistakable.  From  the  southern  leaders  and  news- 
papers and  from  the  administration  organs  in  the 
north  came  an  uninterrupted  chorus  of  condemna- 
tion of  the  traitor.  "We  shall  treat  Judge  Doug- 
las," said  a  Tennessee  newspaper,  "  just  as  we  should 
treat  any  other  Democrat  who,  in  an  emergency, 
abandoned  his  principles  and  made  common  cause 
with  the  enemy."  *  When  Douglas  was  renomi- 
nated  to  succeed  himself  as  senator  from  Illinois,  the 
south  repudiated  the  action  of  the  Illinois  Demo- 
crats, and,  with  the  exception  of  Wise,  of  Virginia, 
and  the  Richmond  Enquirer,  expressed  a  desire  for 
his  defeat ;  and  the  federal  office  -  holders  in  the 
state,  with  the  support  of  the  administration,  or- 
ganized separate  anti-Douglas  nominations  for  state 
and  legislative  offices  in  order  to  divide  the  Demo- 
cratic vote.2 

It  now  became  a  question  in  the  minds  of  many 
Republican  leaders,  notably  Greeley,  of  the  New 
York  Tribune,  and  Senator  Wilson,  of  Massachusetts, 
whether  their  party  ought  not  to  seek  to  enlist 
Douglas  as  a  new  recruit  in  order  to  use  his  great 
powers  in  behalf  of  their  cause.3  Accordingly,  they 

1  Nashville  Union,  June  24,  1858. 

2  Nicolay  and  Hay,  Lincoln,  II.,  144  et  seq. 

3  Macy,  Political  Parties,  259-262;  Wilson,  Slave  Power,  II. ,  567. 


228  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1858 

urged  that  the  Illinois  Republicans  should  not  con- 
test his  return  to  the  Senate,  thinking  that  he  would 
be  more  troublesome  to  the  Democrats  than  any 
Republican  who  could  be  elected;  but  the  western 
Republicans  saw  insurmountable  obstacles.  "  What 
we  have  seen,  heard  and  felt  of  him,"  said  Chase, 
"will  make  it  impossible  for  us  to  trust  him  until 
after  a  very  sufficient  probation,  .  .  .  which  he  has 
not  the  slightest  intention  of  undergoing.  In  fact, 
he  neither  expects  nor  wishes  more  from  us  than  a 
suspension  of  hostilities  until  his  re-election  is  made 
secure."  l  "The  fact  is,"  said  the  Chicago  Tribune, 
"Mr.  Douglas  has  recanted  none  of  his  political 
heresies.  .  .  .  The  exigencies  by  which  he  was  sur- 
rounded brought  him  into  conflict  with  the  admin- 
istration upon  a  simple  question  of  fact  as  to  whether 
the  Lecompton  constitution  had  been  sufficiently 
submitted  to  the  people ;  upon  matters  of  principle 
his  views  are  substantially  those  of  Mr.  Buchanan. 
...  It  is  asking  too  much  of  the  freemen  of  Illinois 
...  to  support  a  man  for  Senator  who,  if  not  avow- 
edly a  champion  of  slavery  extension,  gives  all  his 
influence  to  it."  2  The  nomination  by  the  Illinois 
Republicans  in  state  convention  on  June  16,  1858, 
of  Abraham  Lincoln  as  their  party  candidate  for 
senator  ended  the  hopes  of  any  coalition. 

In  the  congressional  and  state  elections  of  1858, 
the  people  of  the  country  passed  their  verdict  upon 

1  Chase  to  Sumner,  January  18,  1858,  in  Am.  Hist.  Assoc., 
Report,  1902,  II.,  276.  2  Chicago  Tribune,  July  10,  1858. 


i8s8]  TRIUMPH    OF    DOUGLAS  229 

the  administration  of  Buchanan.  In  the  south  the 
Democrats  found  the  opposition  party  still  in  the 
field — once  Whig,  later  American,  and  now  name- 
less— but  had  no  difficulty  in  preserving  their  ascen- 
dency. In  the  north,  however,  the  Republicans  made 
a  vigorous  campaign  on  the  issue  of  rebuking  the 
administration  for  the  "Lecompton  swindle,"  and 
were  aided  in  a  decisive  way  by  the  commercial  de- 
pression following  the  panic  of  1857.  In  the  state 
of  Pennsylvania,  which  had  remained  unswerving- 
ly Democratic  through  the  Kansas  excitement,  the 
prostration  of  the  iron  industry  caused  a  sharp 
revival  of  protectionist  feeling  and  a  desire  to  re- 
buke the  Democratic  administration.  Fired  by 
these  sentiments,  the  Republicans  and  Americans, 
joined  by  a  group  of  anti-Lecompton  Democrats  led 
by  J.  W.  Forney,  met  in  a  People's  convention  at 
Harrisburg  on  July  14,  and  nominated  candidates  for 
state  judge  and  canal  commissioner  on  a  platform 
which  denounced  the  Lecompton  iniquity  and  de- 
manded "adequate  protection  for  American  indus- 
try." 1 

Public  interest  centred  in  Illinois,  for  Douglas, 
declining  to  submit  to  his  political  enemies,  made  a 
desperate  canvass  of  the  state.  So  great  was  his 
hold  over  the  Illinois  farmers  that  the  utmost  efforts 
of  the  administration  agents  failed  to  undermine  his 
popularity ;  from  the  opening  of  the  campaign  he  was 
greeted  by  crowds  in  every  town  and  country  with 
Pa.  Inquirer,  June  S.July  15,  16,1858. 


230  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1858 

cheers  and  enthusiasm.  Popular  excitement  was 
soon  increased  when  Lincoln  issued  a  challenge  to 
Douglas  to  hold  seven  joint  debates  in  various  parts 
of  the  state.  This  was  a  bold  step,  for  there  was  no 
better  debater  in  the  United  States  than  Douglas. 
He  was  quick,  adroit,  plausible,  wonderfully  gifted 
with  the  power  of  fallacious  and  mendacious  asser- 
tion in  a  way  that  made  exposure  seem  laborious 
and  ineffective.  No  man  in  the  Senate  could  hold 
him  to  the  point  or  avoid  being  driven  into  an  un- 
comfortable defensive  attitude  by  his  ruthless  per- 
sonalities. Lincoln,  on  the  other  hand,  was  less 
self-confident,  slower  in  thought,  clumsy  in  repartee, 
and  by  no  means  Douglas's  match  in  running  de- 
bate ;  but  he  never  lost  his  temper  or  allowed  him- 
self to  be  distracted  by  side  issues,  and  he  struck 
steadily  and  mercilessly  at  the  weak  points  in  Doug- 
las's armor.1  The  result  was  a  contest  which  stirred 
excitement  in  Illinois  beyond  anything  hitherto 
known.  To  see  such  debaters  matched  brought  enor- 
mous crowds  together  in  sheer  joy  of  sportsman- 
ship. Brass-bands  and  cannon  welcomed  the  candi- 
dates, processions  by  day  and  night  kept  enthusiasm 
from  flagging,  and  scores  of  political  orators  besides 
the  two  protagonists  took  the  stump  in  every  con- 
gressional and  legislative  district.2 

The  debates  showed  from  the  start  that  although 
Douglas  had  voted  with  the  Republicans  against  the 

1  Nicolay  and  Hay,  Lincoln,  II.,  146. 

2  Lincoln-Douglas  Debates  (Columbus  ed.,  1860). 


1860]  TRIUMPH   OF   DOUGLAS  231 

Lecompton  constitution,  there  was  no  real  ground 
of  common  principle  between  them.  He  attacked 
Lincoln,  precisely  as  he  would  have  done  in  1854, 
with  the  charge  that  he  was  an  abolitionist,  a  mem- 
ber of  a  sectional  party  whose  success  would  imperil 
the  Union.  As  to  the  existence  of  slavery  in  the 
territories,  he  declared  himself  absolutely  indifferent 
so  long  as  the  principle  of  "popular  sovereignty" 
were  adhered  to.  "I  will  vote,"  he  said,  "for  the 
admission  of  just  such  a  state  as  by  the  form  of  their 
constitution  the  people  show  they  want;  if  they 
want  slavery,  they  shall  have  it;  if  they  prohibit 
slavery,  it  shall  be  prohibited.  They  can  form  their 
institutions  to  suit  themselves."  *  He  spent  a  great 
deal  of  time  insisting  upon  the  natural  inferiority  of 
the  negro,  enlarged  upon  the  necessity  of  "a  white 
man's  government,"  sneered  at  the  Republicans  as 
"amalgamationists,"  and  in  every  way  showed  that 
he  had  not  changed  since  1854. 

One  of  his  principal  grounds  of  attack  upon  Lin- 
coln was  a  sentence  used  by  the  latter  in  his  speech 
accepting  the  senatorial  nomination.  Lincoln  had 
demonstrated  the  impossibility  of  ending  the  slavery 
agitation  so  long  as  slavery  existed,  and,  quoting  the 
Bible  to  the  effect  that  "  a  house  divided  against  it- 
self cannot  stand,"  had  predicted  that  the  Union 
could  not  exist  permanently  half  slave  or  half  free, 
but  must  become  all  one  thing  or  all  the  other.2 

1  Lincoln-Douglas  Debates  (Columbus  ed.,  1860),  103. 

2  Lincoln,  Works,  I.,  240. 

VOL.  XVIII. — 16 


232  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1858 

This  Douglas  denounced  as  a  virtual  declaration  of 
war  upon  the  southern  states,  "revolutionary  and 
destructive  of  the  existence  of  this  government," 
and  "  inviting  a  warfare  between  the  north  and  the 
south  to  be  carried  on  with  ruthless  vengeance  until 
the  one  section  or  the  other  shall  be  driven  to  the 
wall  and  become  the  victim  of  the  rapacity  of  the 
other."  1 

On  his  part,  Lincoln  was  obliged  to  devote  much 
time  to  defending  himself  from  the  charges  of  fa- 
naticism and  incendiarism  levelled  against  him, 
and  he  showed  by  his  replies  that  he  was  by  no 
means  radical  in  his  anti- slavery  views.  But  he 
showed  also  that  the  fundamental  difference  be- 
tween himself  and  Douglas  lay  in  the  fact  that  he 
regarded  slavery  as  wrong,  while  Douglas  reiterated 
his  entire  indifference.  Moreover,  he  made  an  un- 
remitting effort  to  force  Douglas  to  commit  himself 
concerning  the  effect  of  the  Dred  Scott  decision  upon 
his  doctrine  of  " popular  sovereignty"  in  the  terri- 
tories. This  put  Douglas  in  a  difficult  position,  for 
he  could  not  reject  Taney's  opinion,  nor  could  he 
afford  to  abandon  the  cherished  dogma  on  behalf  of 
which  he  had  fought  his  fight  against  the  Lecomp- 
ton  constitution.  With  characteristic  adroitness  he 
replied  that  undoubtedly  the  decision  stood,  and 
neither  Congress  nor  a  territory  could  expressly 
prohibit  slavery  in  a  territory,  but  that  practically 
slavery  could  not  exist  unless  supported  by  "local 
1  Lincoln-Douglas  Debates,  70,  115. 


1858]  TRIUMPH   OF   DOUGLAS  233 

police  regulations."  Hence,  he  concluded,  a  terri- 
tory might  effectually  exclude  slavery,  in  spite  of 
the  Dred  Scott  decision,  by  "unfriendly  legisla- 
tion." *  This  utterance  of  Douglas  at  Freeport, 
August  27,  became  known  as  his  "Freeport  doc- 
trine," and  showed  that,  regardless  of  law  or 
logic,  he  was  determined  to  adhere  to  his  cher- 
ished pretension  that  the  people  of  a  territory 
could  regulate  their  own  affairs  under  all  circum- 
stances. 

Lincoln  is  reported  to  have  said  that  he  was 
pushing  the  campaign  for  the  purpose  of  killing 
Douglas  as  a  presidential  candidate.  As  it  later 
appeared,  he  was  successful  in  this  aim,  but  in  the 
immediate  contest  he  was  beaten.  Aided  by  a  some- 
what favorable  legislative  apportionment,  Doug- 
las barely  carried  the  day  over  Republicans  and 
Lecompton  Democrats,  and  secured  a  majority  of 
both  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives.  It  was 
a  brilliant  personal  triumph,  and  made  him  the  most 
prominent  individual  in  the  party  and  in  the  coun- 
try. Instead  of  being  crushed,  he  returned  to  the 
Senate  with  greater  prestige  than  ever  before,  a 
prestige  accentuated  by  the  results  of  the  elections 
in  other  northern  states. 

Everywhere  the  verdict  of  the  voters  upon  the 

Lecompton  administration  was  decisive.     Outside 

of  Illinois  every  state  was  carried  by  the  opposition 

except  Indiana,  where  the  successful  Democratic 

1  Lincoln,  Works,  I.,  315. 


234  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1858 

candidate  for  governor  was  also  a  Douglas  follower.1 
In  Pennsylvania  the  hard  times  proved  disastrous 
for  Buchanan's  own  state,  and  the  fusion,  on  the 
tariff  issue,  won  a  complete  victory.  "Pennsyl- 
vania may  well  be  proud  of  the  high  position  she 
has  just  assumed,"  said  a  local  paper.  "She  has 
fully  identified  herself  with  the  Republican  cause  of 
Popular  Sovereignty,  and  at  the  same  time  has  taken 
a  bold  and  decided  stand  in  favor  of  Home  Mills, 
Home  Manufactories  and  American  Industry." 2  In 
the  congressional  elections  the  Republicans  gained 
twenty -one  seats.  The  northern  Know -No  thing 
party  now  ceased  to  be  of  importance  except  in  the 
states  where  its  coalitions  gave  the  Republicans  a 
victory.8 

As  a  result  of  the  events  of  1858,  the  Republican 
party  stood  forward  stronger  than  before,  undam- 
aged by  the  Dred  Scott  decision  and  confident  of 
victory  in  1860.  Its  leaders  everywhere  were  tak- 
ing bolder  ground  than  ever,  and  even  Seward,  who 
was  never  in  advance  of  popular  sentiment,  took 
occasion  to  make  a  speech  containing  a  passage 
parallel  to  the  phrase  of  Lincoln  which  had  been 
the  object  of  Douglas's  attack.  After  describing 
the  struggle  between  north  and  south  as  one  be- 
tween free  labor  and  slave  labor,  he  concluded,  "  It 
is  an  irrepressible  conflict  between  opposing  and 

1  Foulke,  Morton,  I.,  65. 

2  Pa.  Inquirer,  October  14,  1858. 

8  Scisco,  Political  Nativism,  231  et  seq. 


1858]  TRIUMPH   OF  DOUGLAS  23$ 

enduring  forces,  and  it  means  that  the  United  States 
must  and  will,  sooner  or  later,  become  either  en- 
tirely a  slave-holding  nation  or  a  free-labor  na- 
tion." 1 

The  result  of  Buchanan's  Kansas  policy  was  thus 
apparent.  By  his  mismanagement  he  had  present- 
ed his  recently  beaten  enemy  with  a  winning  issue, 
had  lost  the  cordial  support  of  the  Democrats  in 
the  north,  and  by  his  failure,  after  all,  to  retain 
Kansas  as  a  slave  state  had  damaged  the  prestige 
of  his  party  at  the  south.  No  president  has  a 
record  of  more  hopeless  ill-success. 

1  Seward,  Works,  IV.,  289. 


CHAPTER    XVII 

THE    IRREPRESSIBLE    CONFLICT 
(1858-1859) 

AFTER  the  first  session  of  the  Thirty-fifth  Con- 
gress there  remained  no  concrete  issue  between 
the  free  states  and  the  slave  states.  The  existence 
of  slavery  in  the  annexations  from  France  and 
Mexico,  Kansas  included,  was  legally  permitted  by 
the  Utah  and  New  Mexico  acts  of  1850  and  the 
Kansas-Nebraska  act  of  1854,  and  was  further  sanc- 
tioned in  these  territories,  and  in  those  on  the  Pacific 
as  well,  by  the  doctrine  laid  down  in  the  Dred  Scott 
decision  of  1857.  On  the  other  hand,  slavery  was 
practically  excluded  from  all  the  territories  then 
settled,  except  New  Mexico,  by  the  fact  that  they 
were  actually  occupied  by  settlers  opposed  to  its  in- 
troduction. In  New  Mexico  the  territorial  legislature 
passed  an  act  to  protect  slave  property  in  1 85  9, l  but  it 
was  well  known  that  the  nature  of  the  country  forbade 
any  considerable  influx.  Whatever  the  legal  rights  of 
slave-owners,  they  would  not  take  their  property  there. 
To  win  a  barren  technical  victory  the  south  had 
suffered  actual  defeat.  Only  by  further  tropical 

1  Bancroft,  Arizona  and  New  Mexico,  683. 


1858]  IRREPRESSIBLE   CONFLICT  237 

annexations  could  profitable  slave  territories  be  ob- 
tained; and  this  the  invincible  obstinacy  of  the 
north  was  sure  to  prevent.  There  was  slight  hope 
of  another  Mexican  war.  The  conviction  was  borne 
in  upon  all  thinking  southerners  that  the  destiny  of 
the  south  was  henceforth  to  remain  stationary  with- 
in the  limits  of  the  existing  slave  states,  while  the 
northwestern  territories,  continually  filling  up  from 
the  eastern  states,  were  to  add  a  succession  of  free 
states  to  increase  the  existing  northern  preponder- 
ance in  Congress.  The  admission  of  Oregon  in  1859 
and  Minnesota  in  1858  was  evidently  but  the  begin- 
ning. Territorially,  therefore,  the  south  was  even 
worse  off  than  it  had  been  in  1850. 

The  sectional  problem  now  changed  its  form. 
No  longer  was  it  a  contest  for  expansion  which 
pitted  north  against  south,  but  a  direct  struggle 
for  control  of  the  federal  government.  The  fatal 
blunder  of  the  Buchanan  administration  had  de- 
livered the  north  into  the  hands  of  the  avowedly 
anti- slavery  Republican  party,  whose  success  would 
mean  at  the  very  least  the  complete  exclusion  of 
southern  men  from  influence  and  the  systematic 
neglect  of  the  interests  of  slave-holders,  a  situation 
intolerable  to  southern  pride  or  prosperity.  The 
only  defence  against  Republican  success  in  1856  had 
been  the  strength  of  the  Democratic  party  in  the 
north,  but  now  that  strength  seemed  perilously 
shaken.  At  the  crisis  of  the  Kansas  contest  the 
defection  of  Douglas  turned  the  scale  against  south- 


238  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1847 

ern  desires  and  brought  on  an  open  rupture  between 
Buchanan  and  the  northern  Democrats,  which  could 
be  healed  only  by  caution,  wisdom,  and  coolness  on 
the  part  of  all  concerned.  From  1858  to  1860, 
then,  the  political  interest  of  the  country  centred 
upon  the  situation  in  the  Democratic  party.1 

The  first  steps  towards  reconciliation  came  from 
Douglas.  Although  flushed  with  triumph  after  his 
campaign  in  Illinois,  he  indulged  in  no  reflections 
upon  the  administration,  but  travelled  in  the  south, 
making  conciliatory  speeches  at  Memphis,  New  Or- 
leans, and  elsewhere.2  His  reception  was  cordial  on 
the  surface,  but  when  he  returned  to  Congress  he 
found  the  majority  still  vindictive.  In  organizing 
the  Senate,  the  Democratic  caucus  deposed  him 
from  the  chairmanship  of  the  committee  on  territo- 
ries, yet  he  submitted  in  silence,  determined  to  avoid 
a  quarrel  with  the  rest  of  his  party,  and  hoping  that 
by  showing  his  "regularity"  on  other  matters  his 
action  of  the  previous  year  might  be  allowed  to  fall 
into  oblivion  as  the  presidential  contest  drew  nearer. 

Buchanan's  annual  message  reported  the  success- 
ful conclusion  of  a  territorial  difficulty  into  which 
the  slavery  question  did  not  enter.  The  Mormon 
settlement,  made  in  the  Mexican  territory  in  1847, 
had  been  restless  ever  since  its  incorporation  in  the 
United  States  by  the  treaty  of  1848,  and  had  tried 
in  vain  to  secure  self-government  by  admission  as 

1  Macy,  Political  Parties,  244,  258. 

2  Nicolay  and  Hay,  Lincoln,  II.,  171-174. 


i858]  IRREPRESSIBLE   CONFLICT  239 

a  state  of  the  Union.  Only  the  designation  of  the 
spiritual  leader  of  the  Mormons,  Brigham  Young,  as 
the  territorial  governor,  served  to  allay  their  desire 
for  independence.  An  attempt  in  1857  to  displace 
Young  as  governor  of  Utah  brought  on,  therefore, 
something  very  like  an  insurrection,  for  the  territory 
supported  Young  in  refusing  to  submit.  Federal 
judges  and  land-officers  were  promptly  expelled  from 
the  region,  and  bands  of  "Danites"  committed  out- 
rages upon  non-Mormon  residents. 

In  his  message  of  December,  1857,  Buchanan 
asked  for  no  less  than  ten  regiments  of  troops,  with 
the  purpose  of  using  five  to  reassert  federal  authority 
in  Utah.  The  Republicans,  with  the  exception  of 
Seward,  strenuously  opposed  granting  any  new 
troops,  on  the  ground  that  Buchanan  could  not  be 
trusted  not  to  employ  them  against  the  Free  State 
party  in  Kansas,  but  they  were  unable  to  prevent 
the  authorization  of  two  volunteer  regiments.  As 
it  turned  out,  Buchanan  was  able  to  collect  enough 
regular  troops  to  carry  through  his  plans  without 
enlisting  the  volunteers.  In  the  spring  of  1858  he 
issued  a  proclamation  calling  upon  the  Mormons 
to  submit,  sent  a  new  governor,  Cumming,  over  the 
mountains  with  a  considerable  military  force,  and 
was  able  to  report  to  Congress  that  Young  and  the 
Mormons  had  ceased  to  resist.1 

1  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V.,  454-456,  493,  503-506; 
Bancroft,  Hist,  of  the  Pacific  States,  XXI.,  chaps,  xviii.-xxi.; 
Senate  Exec.  Docs.,  36  Cong.,  n  Sess.,  No.  42. 


240  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1858 

The  striking  feature  of  this  session  of  Congress 
was  the  revelation  that,  in  spite  of  the  settlement 
of  the  Kansas  question,  there  was  an  irrepressible 
conflict  between  north  and  south,  even  in  the  Demo- 
cratic party.  In  his  annual  message  Buchanan  once 
more  reviewed  the  history  of  the  Lecompton  affair, 
throwing  the  blame  for  all  trouble  upon  the  Free 
State  party,  and  concluding  by  saying,  in  reference 
to  his  support  of  the  Lecompton  constitution,  "  In 
the  course  of  my  long  public  life,  I  have  never  per- 
formed any  official  act  which  in  the  retrospect  has 
afforded  me  more  heartfelt  satisfaction."  x 

This  irreconcilable  attitude  on  the  part  of  Bu- 
chanan was  a  reflection  in  him  of  the  stiffly  sec- 
tional feelings  of  the  leading  southerners.  When  a 
Pacific  railroad  bill  was  under  consideration  and  it 
proved  impossible  to  get  the  two  parts  of  the 
country  to  agree  upon  an  eastern  terminus,  Iverson, 
of  Georgia,  explained  his  attitude  on  secessionist 
grounds.  "I  believe  the  time  will  come,"  he  said, 
"when  the  Slave  States  will  be  compelled  in  vindi- 
cation of  their  rights,  interests  and  honor,  to  sepa- 
rate from  the  Free  States  and  erect  an  independent 
confederacy.  ...  I  am  unwilling  to  vote  so  much 
land  and  so  much  money  to  build  a  railroad  to  the 
Pacific,  which,  in  my  judgment,  will  be  created  out- 
side of  a  Southern  confederacy.  What  I  demand, 
therefore,  is  that  .  .  .  the  South  shall  have  an  equal 
chance  to  secure  a  road  within  her  borders  ...  to 
1  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V.,  497. 


1859]  IRREPRESSIBLE   CONFLICT  241 

belong  to  her  when — if  ever — the  Union  is  dis- 
solved." * 

A  homestead  bill,  to  facilitate  the  settlement  of 
western  lands,  passed  the  House  but  was  shelved  in 
the  Senate,  since  the  southern  members  regarded  it 
with  great  disfavor  as  a  sort  of  national  Emigrant 
Aid  Society.2  In  its  place  the  Senate  insisted  on 
considering  an  appropriation  of  thirty  millions  for 
the  purchase  of  Cuba,  a  project  recommended  by 
Buchanan  in  his  message.  It  was  well  known  that 
the  Spanish  Cortes  had  applauded  vigorously  when 
one  of  the  ministry  said,  "  Never  will  Spain  abandon 
the  smallest  portion  of  its  territories,  and  any  prop- 
osition having  that  tendency  will  always  be  con- 
sidered by  the  Government  as  an  insult  to  the 
Spanish  people."  3  Nevertheless,  a  belief  was  cur- 
rent that  Spanish  ministers  would  be  accessible  to 
bribery,  and  the  Republicans  charged  that  the  thirty 
millions  were  to  be  used  for  a  corrupt  purchase, 
which  the  Democratic  senators  indignantly  denied. 
The  whole  Cuban  project  seemed  so  chimerical  to 
Republican  senators  that  they  left  the  debate 
mainly  to  advocates  of  annexation,  among  whom 
was  Douglas,  glad  to  stand  with  his  old  associates 
again. 

The  sectional  antagonism  flashed  out  when  Toombs, 

1  Cong.  Globe,  35  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  242,  244. 

2  Sanborn,  "Political  Aspects  of  Homestead  Legislation,"  in 
Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  VI.,  297. 

3  Callahan,  Cuba  and  International  Relations,  308. 


242  PARTIES  AND  SLAVERY  [1859 

of  Georgia,  ridiculing  the  phrase  "  land  for  the  land- 
less," sneered  at  the  homestead  bill  as  a  piece  of 
demagogy.  "Now,  sir,"  shouted  Wade,  "I  have 
been  trying  here  for  nearly  a  month  to  get  a  straight- 
forward vote  upon  this  great  measure  of  land  to  the 
landless.  .  .  .  The  question  will  be,  shall  we  give 
niggers  to  the  niggerless  or  lands  to  the  landless? 
When  you  come  to  niggers  for  the  niggerless,  all 
other  questions  sink  into  insignificance.  .  .  .  Are  you 
going  to  buy  Cuba  for  land  for  the  landless  ?  What 
is  there?  You  will  find  three-quarters  of  a  million 
of  niggers,  but  you  will  not  find  any  land;  not  one 
foot,  not  an  inch.  .  .  .  No  man  can  fail  to  see  that 
he  who  votes  and  prefers  one  to  the  other,  has  done 
it  because  his  soul  was  steeped  in  the  nigger  bill."  * 
The  event  of  greatest  significance  during  the  ses- 
sion, however,  was  a  debate  which  took  place  be- 
tween Douglas  and  the  southern  senators.  On 
February  22,  Hale,  in  his  usual  character  of  agitator, 
offered  an  amendment  to  the  general  appropriation 
bill  repealing  that  section  of  the  English  bill  which 
obliged  Kansas  to  wait  before  applying  for  admis- 
sion until  its  population  equalled  the  federal  ratio. 
The  next  day  Breckinridge,  the  vice-president,  hop- 
ing to  prevent  a  recurrence  of  sectional  debate,  tried 
to  hurry  on  a  vote,  but  Senator  A.  G.  Brown,  of 
Mississippi,  broke  in  with  a  direct  attack  upon 
Douglas.  "I  neither  want  to  cheat  nor  be  cheat- 
ed," he  said,  "in  the  great  contest  that  is  to  come 
1  Cong.  Globe,  35  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  1354. 


1859]  IRREPRESSIBLE   CONFLICT  243 

off  in  1860.  We  shall  claim  for  our  slave  property 
protection  in  the  territories.  ...  I  give  you  warning 
now  that  if  Kansas  legislates  in  a  spirit  of  hostility 
to  slavery  ...  a  vast  majority  of  the  Southern  peo- 
ple will  come  to  Congress  and  will  demand  of  you, 
in  obedience  to  the  written  Constitution,  .  .  .  that 
you  annul  their  legislation  and  substitute  laws  in- 
stead, giving  adequate  and  sufficient  protection  to 
slave  property.  ...  I  understand  from  the  Senator 
from  Illinois  that  when  I  make  that  appeal  he  will 
deny  it.  ...  I  want  in  the  next  presidential  election, 
that  we  shall  know  where  we  are,  what  we  are  and 
where  we  stand.  If  we  agree  let  us  stand  together 
like  honest  men.  If  we  disagree  let  us  separate 
like  honest  men."  * 

Douglas,  forced  to  break  the  silence  in  which, 
since  the  opening  of  the  session,  he  had  left  his 
views  on  territorial  slavery,  replied  with  his  custom- 
ary vigor,  restating  his  position  regarding  the  power 
of  a  territory  to  regulate  all  property  relations  and 
denying  the  possibility  of  Congress  furnishing  the 
"adequate  protection"  for  slaves  which  Brown  de- 
manded. "I  would  never  vote  for  a  slave  code  in 
the  territories  by  Congress,"  he  declared,  "and  I 
have  yet  to  learn  that  there  is  a  man  in  a  free  state 
of  this  Union,  of  any  party,  who  would.  ...  I  tell 
you,  gentlemen  of  the  South,  in  all  candor,  I  do  not 
believe  a  Democratic  candidate  can  ever  carry  one 
State  of  the  North  on  the  platform  that  it  is  the 
1  Cong. Globe,  35  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  1242. 


244  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1859 

duty  of  the  federal  government  to  force  the  people 
of  a  territory  to  have  slavery  when  they  do  not 
want  it."  l  There  followed  a  sharp,  defiant  debate 
between  Douglas  and  the  other  member  from  Mis- 
sissippi, Jefferson  Davis,  who  was  fast  coming  to  be 
regarded  as  the  leading  southern  senator.  In  heat- 
ed language  Douglas  reiterated  his  views,  and  Davis, 
in  reply,  warned  him  squarely  that  he  could  never 
receive  the  vote  of  Mississippi,  since  in  the  eyes  of 
the  south  he  "was  as  full  of  heresy  as  he  once  was 
of  adherence  to  the  doctrine  of  popular  sovereignty, 
correctly  construed,"  and  his  "Freeport  doctrine" 
was  "  a  thing  offensive  to  every  idea  of  the  supremacy 
of  the  laws  of  the  United  States  and  destructive  of 
every  prospect  to  preserve  peace."  2 

Thenceforward  the  country  realized  that,  how- 
ever ready  Douglas  was  for  a  reconciliation,  the 
southern  leaders  desired  none ;  unless  Douglas  chose 
to  surrender  everything  to  which  he  pledged  him- 
self a  hundred  times  and  to  withdraw  from  his  pres- 
idential candidacy,  a  disruption  between  northern 
and  southern  Democrats  was  inevitable. 

A  striking  feature  of  the  debate  was  the  new  doc- 
trine regarding  the  right  of  slave  property  to  federal 
protection  in  the  territories,  which  was  set  forth  as 
the  southern  ultimatum.  This  was  the  answer  to 
Douglas's  Freeport  doctrine,  with  its  uncertain  pop- 
ular sovereignty.  The  slave-holders  now  saw  that, 

1  Cong.  Globe,  35  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  1244,  1246, 
9  Ibid.,  1257. 


1859]  IRREPRESSIBLE   CONFLICT  245 

in  spite  of  the  Dred  Scott  decision,  they  had  no  real 
equality  in  Kansas  or  the  territories  farther  north, 
and  could  not  have  it  unless  their  slaves  could  enjoy 
the  same  protection  in  them  that  they  had  at  home. 
Thus  the  Calhoun  theory  of  1847  was  carried  to  a 
logical  conclusion :  Douglas's  "  popular  sovereignty  " 
was  now  in  the  eyes  of  southerners  as  much  a  denial 
of  their  rights  as  the  Wilmot  Proviso  itself.  To  be 
sure,  a  policy  of  federal  support  of  slavery  in  the  terri- 
tories could  never  pass  the  House  of  Representatives, 
three-fifths  of  whose  members  came  from  free  states ; 
but  the  demand  was  squarely  and  intentionally  made. 
The  elections  of  1859  were  uneventful,  for  with 
no  new  issues,  attention  was  turned  towards  the 
next  presidential  campaign,  and  in  all  parts  of  the 
country  politics  sank  to  a  quietude  not  experienced 
for  years.  The  exception  was  California,  where  the 
Lecompton  affair  led  to  a  dramatic  struggle  with  a 
tragic  ending.  The  local  Democratic  party  was  con- 
trolled from  the  start  by  Senator  Gwin,  a  pro- 
slavery  man,  and  was  so  strongly  "Hunker"  and 
southern  in  its  tendencies  that  Gwin  had  hopes  of 
using  it  to  detach  the  southern  half  of  California 
as  a  slave  state.  Besides  these  pro-slavery  Demo- 
crats, called  in  local  political  slang  the  "Chivalry," 
there  appeared  a  new  Democracy  of  the  northern 
type,  whose  representative  was  David  C.  Broderick, 
who  had  somehow  managed  to  rise  to  a  position  of 
leadership  through  methods  learned  in  the  school 
of  New  York  City  politics.  Accepted  as  a  colleague 


246  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1859 

by  Gwin  on  sufferance  only,  he  came  eventually  into 
open  antagonism  with  him  over  questions  of  offices, 
and  the  difficulty  culminated  in  a  rupture  when 
Broderick  followed  Douglas  in  the  Lecompton  contest. 
In  a  savagely  contested  election,  the  administration 
Democrats  of  California  won  by  a  large  majority 
over  the  Broderick  Democrats  and  the  Republicans, 
and  this  was  followed  by  a  duel  in  which  Broderick 
was  killed  by  Judge  Terry,  of  the  Gwin  party.  The 
loss  of  their  champion  completed  the  ruin  of  the 
bolters,  and  California  remained  for  the  time  in  the 
hands  of  southern  sympathizers.1 

The  results  of  the  state  elections  showed  the  Re- 
publicans still  in  control  in  the  north,  while  in  the 
south  the  Democrats  were  weakened  by  a  revi- 
val of  the  sometime  Whig  party  sufficiently  strong 
to  gain  a  number  of  congressmen,  besides  holding 
Maryland  and  casting  increased  votes  in  other 
states.2  The  future  of  the  Democratic  party  looked 
black.  Douglas  seemed  openly  defiant.  He  took 
occasion  to  express  semi  -  anti  -  slavery  sentiments 
when  asked  his  opinion  regarding  the  reopening  of 
the  slave-trade,  and  in  September  he  nailed  his 
colors  to  the  mast  by  publishing  in  Harper's  Maga- 
zine an  elaborate  defence  of  ''popular  sovereignty," 
with  an  attack  on  the  new  southern  dogma.3  At  the 

1  Bancroft,  Hist,  of  Pacific  States,  XVIII.,  chaps,  xxiii.,  xxiv.; 
Hittell,  California,  III.,  chaps,  i.-ix. 

2  Schmeckebier,  Know-Nothing  Party  in  Maryland,  99-101. 
*  Harper's  Magazine,  XIX.,  519  (September,  1859). 


1859]  IRREPRESSIBLE   CONFLICT  247 

same  time  Davis  took  occasion  to  repeat  his  views 
with  emphasis  before  the  Democratic  convention  at 
Jackson,  Mississippi.1  Between  these  two  men,  who 
had  worked  with  complete  harmony  to  pass  the 
Kansas-Nebraska  bill,  there  was  now  no  possibility 
of  a  common  understanding.  Neither  could  sup- 
port the  other  without  an  entire  sacrifice  of  princi- 
ple and  consistency,  and  each  was  spokesman  for 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  voters. 

During  these  months  the  Republican  party  was  at 
rest  from  its  efforts  and  the  dangers  of  the  preceding 
years.  It  no  longer  needed  to  concern  itself  to  find 
an  issue,  for  it  rested  on  a  fixed  sentiment  among 
the  majority  of  northern  people  that  slavery  must 
henceforward  be  shut  in  its  existing  limits.  The 
preoccupation  of  Republican  leaders  in  1859  was  to 
strengthen  the  organization  in  order  to  win  the 
election  of  1860.  Discussions  of  candidates  replaced 
denunciations  of  Buchanan  or  the  south,  and  at  this 
time  Seward,  of  New  York — politician,  leader  in  the 
largest  state,  and  philosophical  statesman — stood  in 
the  public  eye  as  the  acknowledged  Republican 
spokesman.  Radical  at  times  in  speech,  but  cau- 
tious in  action,  he  was  regarded  at  the  north  as  the 
shrewdest  party  leader  and  in  the  south  as  the  arch- 
abolitionist.2 

By  the  autumn  of  1859,  then,  the  parts  were 
assigned  and  the  scenes  ready  for  the  great  political 

1  N.  Y.  Tribune,  August  31,  1859. 

2  Bancroft,  Seward,  I.,  493. 
VOL.  xvm. — 17 


248  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1859 

drama  to  be  enacted  in  1860.  The  outcome  was 
hidden  from  even  the  wisest  at  the  time,  and  it  lay 
with  such  men  as  Douglas,  Davis,  Toombs,  Seward, 
and  their  followers  to  decide  whether  or  not  it 
should  be  secession.  The  time  of  preparation  was 
at  an  end  and  the  crisis  was  at  hand. 


CHAPTER    XVIII 

FOREIGN    AFFAIRS    DURING    THE    KANSAS 
CONTEST 

(1855-1860) 

FROM  1855  to  1860  the  key  to  the  diplomatic 
history  of  the  country  was  the  fact  that  the 
administrations  of  Pierce  and  Buchanan,  whose 
chief  desires  were  connected  with  a  policy  of  south- 
ern expansion,  were  rendered  almost  powerless  by 
the  renewed  sectional  feeling  of  the  north  during 
the  Kansas  controversy.1  The  old  opposition  to  ex- 
tension of  slave  territory  blazed  into  fresh  flame, 
taking  form  in  scores  of  speeches  in  Congress,  in 
newspaper  articles,  and  in  party  resolutions.  The 
Republican  platform  of  1856  declared  "  that  the  high- 
wayman's plea  that  might  makes  right  embodied 
in  the  Ostend  circular,  .  .  .  would  bring  shame 
and  dishonor  upon  any  government  or  people  that 
gave  it  their  sanction."  2  Hence,  in  view  of  this 
expressed  antipathy  of  the  north  to  extension  of 
slave  territory,  a  continuation  of  tn*e  policy  begun 

1  For  earlier  stages  of  diplomacy,  cf.  above,  chap,  vi.;  Garri- 
son, Westward  Extension,  chaps,  vii.-xii.  (Am.  Nation,  XVII.). 

2  Stanwood,  Hist,  of  the  Presidency,  272. 


250  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1856 

by  Marcy  in  regard  to  Cuba  and  Central  America 
was  out  of  the  question. 

Although  the  last  years  of  Pierce 's  term  were 
marked  by  a  cessation  of  efforts  for  annexations, 
Marcy's  conduct  of  foreign  affairs  continued  to  dis- 
play a  defiance  of  European  powers,  and  a  willingness 
to  risk  affronting  Great  Britain  in  minor  matters. 
During  the  Crimean  War,  some  recruiting  agents, 
claiming  to  be  authorized  by  Cramp  ton,  the  British 
minister,  showed  an  annoying  activity  in  eastern 
cities.  In  spite  of  Marcy's  vigorous  protests,  Lord 
Clarendon  declined  to  admit  the  slightest  laxity  on 
the  part  of  his  representative;  and  the  upshot  was 
that  in  May,  1856,  Pierce  took  the  grave  step  of 
declining  to  hold  any  further  diplomatic  intercourse 
with  Cramp  ton.  The  evidence  upon  which  Marcy 
and  Pierce  condemned  Crampton  was  of  a  highly 
questionable  character,  and  all  that  the  facts  seemed 
to  show  was  some  slight  indiscretion  on  the  Brit- 
ish minister's  part;  but  although  the  British  press 
exhibited  irritation,  the  British  government  took 
no  steps  to  resent  it  other  than  to  leave,  their 
country  unrepresented  until  Buchanan  was  inau- 
gurated.1 

A  similar  independent  attitude  was  shown  by 
Marcy  in  attempting  to  conclude  a  series  of  treaties 
recognizing  the  principle  of  "free  ships  and  free 
goods,"  and  when  these  were  apparently  superseded 

1  Senate  Exec.  Docs.,  34  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  80;  British  and 
For.  State  Papers,  XLVII.,  358,  XLVIIL,  189. 


1857]  FOREIGN   AFFAIRS  251 

by  the  Declaration  of  Paris,  in  1856,  he  declined  to 
commit  the  United  States  to  that  document,  partly 
because  it  did  not  recognize  the  full  exemption 
claimed  for  neutrals  by  the  United  States,  and 
partly  because  it  abolished  the  traditional  American 
practice  of  privateering  in  war-time.1  In  the  same 
years  Marcy  forced  the  Danish  government  to  con- 
sent to  abandon  its  ancient  "Sound  dues"  and  com- 
mute all  claims  by  a  money  payment  in  a  treaty 
concluded  in  1857. 2  In  these  cases  Marcy 's  conduct 
of  the  state  department  retained  to  the  end  its 
characteristic  vigor,  a  quality  which  causes  it  to 
stand  out  prominently  in  the  era  between  Polk  and 
Lincoln. 

The  Central  American  question,  meanwhile,  be- 
came so  complicated  as  to  justify  Marcy's  reluctance 
to  commit  the  United  States  to  any  responsibility 
in  that  quarter.  As  soon  as  it  became  manifest  that 
the  Pierce  administration  was  likely  to  fall  short  of 
the  desires  of  the  cotton  states  for  tropical  annexa- 
tion, the  filibustering  spirit  reappeared,  in  a  sudden 
and  dramatic  attempt  to  seize  Nicaragua,  the  very 
country  which  controlled  the  proposed  canal  and 
the  existing  Transit  Company.  William  Walker,  a 
military  adventurer  with  a  previous  record  of  un- 
successful filibustering  against  Mexico,  joined  in  the 
chronic  Nicaraguan  civil  wars  with  a  handful  of  fol- 
lowers as  an  adherent  of  the  "liberal"  faction,  and 

1  Senate  Exec.  Docs.,  34  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  104. 

2  Ibid.,  No.  i;  35  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  28. 


252  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1856 

by  force  or  trickery  succeeded  in  making  away  with 
Corral,  the  "  legitimate  "  leader,  and  establishing  him- 
self in  control  behind  Rivas,  a  nominal  president. 
For  two  years  he  remained  the  real  dictator  of  Nic- 
aragua, stirring  up  great  sympathy  in  the  south- 
ern states,  where  he  was  looked  upon  as  "  the  gray- 
eyed  man  of  destiny,"  a  second  Houston,  and  Nic- 
aragua was  regarded  as  another  Texas. 

Walker  soon  undermined  his  power  by  his  sever- 
ity and  by  a  series  of  mistakes,  the  most  serious  of 
which  was  the  confiscation  of  the  charter  and  the 
steamers  of  the  Accessory  Transit  Company,  upon 
an  outrageous  pretext,  for  the  benefit  of  two  con- 
federates. By  this  act  he  won  the  bitter  enmity  of 
the  steamship  company,  headed  by  Cornelius  Van- 
derbilt,  which  had  been  the  means  of  bringing  him 
supplies  and  reinforcements,  and  without  which  he 
was  cut  off  from  his  supporters  in  the  United  States. 
Then  he  deposed  Rivas,  caused  himself  to  be  elect- 
ed president  in  July,  1856,  issued  a  decree  opening 
Nicaragua  to  slavery,  and  invited  American  capital. 
His  government  was  recognized  at  Washington,  but 
by  this  time  his  behavior  had  set  all  the  other  Central 
American  states  against  him;  war  soon  broke  out, 
and  Walker  found  himself  attacked  by  overwhelm- 
ing numbers  while  cut  off  from  reinforcements  by 
the  vengeful  Transit  Company.  By  the  end  of 
Pierce's  term,  after  furious  fighting,  his  forces  were 
worn  down,  and  in  the  spring  of  1857  he  was  finally 
driven  out,  being  taken  from  the  city  of  Rivas, 


1857]  FOREIGN   AFFAIRS  253 

where  he  surrendered,  by  an  American  man-of- 
war.1 

The  result  of  these  events  was  the  destruction  of 
any  influence  possessed  by  the  United  States  with 
the  Central  American  states,  whose  leaders  looked 
upon  Walker  as  representing  the  sentiment  of  the 
American  people.  Marcy's  diplomacy  was  deprived 
of  all  support  from  Central  American  sources,  and 
was  hindered  by  the  uncertainty  attending  the  out- 
come of  Walker's  schemes.  All  that  was  accom- 
plished by  Dallas,  the  successor  of  Buchanan  at  the 
court  of  St.  James,  was  an  agreement  with  Lord  Clar- 
endon (October,  1856)  by  which  Great  Britain  under- 
took to  limit  Belize,  withdraw  from  the  Mosquito 
protectorate,  and  restore  the  Bay  Islands  to  Hon- 
duras, provided  Honduras  agreed  to  a  treaty  guar- 
anteeing to  the  Bay  Islands  a  sort  of  self-government. 
This  proposition  was  pending  before  the  Senate  at 
the  end  of  Pierce 's  term,  a  lame  conclusion  to  the 
strenuous  beginning  of  Marcy's  Central  American 
diplomacy.2 

When  Buchanan  assumed  control  of  the  govern- 
ment there  could  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  course  which 
the  Democratic  party  wished  him  to  adopt.  The 
party  platform  declared  that  "there  are  questions 
connected  with  the  foreign  policy  of  this  country 

1  Scroggs,  "Walker  and  the  Steamship  Co.,"  in  Am.  Hist.  Rev., 
X.,  792;  Bancroft,  Hist,  of  Pacific  States,  III.,  chaps,  xvi.,  xvii.; 
Hittell,  California,  III.,  bk.  X.,  chaps,  vi.,  vii. 

2  Travis,    Clayton-Bulwer    Treaty,    177;    Keasbey,    Nicaragua 
Canal,   250. 


254  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1857 

which  are  inferior  to  no  domestic  questions  what- 
ever," and  announced  its  approval  of  Walker's  at- 
tempt "  to  regenerate  that  portion  of  the  continent 
which  covers  the  passage  across  the  inter-oceanic 
isthmus."  The  platform  went  so  far  as  to  advocate 
the  control  by  the  United  States  of  the  transit  route, 
which  "no  power  on  earth  should  be  suffered  to 
impede,"  and  declared  for  the  maintenance  of  "our 
ascendency  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico."  l  Buchanan 
himself  was  part  author  of  the  Ostend  Manifesto, 
and  had  a  large  majority  of  each  House  of  Congress 
at  his  back.  But  Buchanan  was  not  a  president  to 
venture  any  positive  policy  unless  he  felt  a  secure 
backing  from  the  other  departments  of  government. 
He  was  by  this  time  an  old  man,  whose  entire  record 
had  been  one  of  caution  in  action  and  of  reluctance 
to  incur  responsibility.  Heartily  anxious  to  please 
the  southern  advocates  of  annexation,  as  he  was  to 
satisfy  their  desires  in  Kansas,  he  would  have  been 
glad  to  gratify  their  utmost  hopes;  but  unless  he 
could  secure  definite  authorization  in  advance  from 
Congress  he  would  not  take  a  step.  No  more  radical 
action  was  to  be  expected  from  the  secretary  of 
state,  Lewis  Cass,  once  a  belligerent  Anglophobe, 
but  now  a  man  of  seventy-five  years,  and,  if  Bu- 
chanan's later  testimony  be  believed,  grown  help- 
lessly inert  and  irresolute.2  A  more  cautious  pair 
of  statesmen  never  undertook  to  deal  with  the 

1  Stanwood,  Hist,  of  the  Presidency,  268. 

2  Curtis,  Buchanan,  II.,  379. 


1857]  FOREIGN   AFFAIRS  255 

foreign  affairs  of  a  country  on  a  radical  plat- 
form. 

The  first  annual  message  of  Buchanan,  December, 
1857,  stigmatized  filibustering  as  "robbery  and  mur- 
der, ' '  and  recommended  that  Congress  take  the  mat- 
ter in  hand.1  This  was  characteristic  of  Buchanan, 
to  take  strong  ground  in  a  public  message  and  end  by 
laying  all  responsibility  upon  Congress.  At  that  very 
moment,  Walker,  still  claiming  to  be  president  of 
Nicaragua,  travelled  in  the  south  as  a  popular  hero, 
raised  a  new  expedition,  and  prepared  to  try  his  luck 
again  on  the  isthmus.  The  Central  American  min- 
isters sent  heated  protests,  and  Walker  was  compelled 
to  give  bonds  for  two  thousand  dollars  to  obey  the 
laws;  but,  undisturbed  by  Buchanan's  censure,  he 
evaded  federal  collectors  and  attorneys  and  sailed  to 
the  San  Juan  River  in  November,  1857.  Here  his 
career  was  brought  to  a  sudden  halt,  for  before  he 
could  invade  Nicaragua  his  force  was  taken  prisoner 
by  Commodore  Paulding,  of  the  United  States  navy, 
and  brought  back  to  the  country  they  had  left.2 

A  perfect  hornet's-nest  was  raised  about  the  ears 
of  the  unfortunate  Paulding.  He  was  denounced  in 
the  newspapers,  pilloried  in  each  House  of  Congress 
as  guilty  of  high-handed  outrage,  and  censured  by 
Buchanan  for  exceeding  his  instructions  and  violat- 

1  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V.,  448. 

2  Senate  Exec.  Docs.,  35  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  Nos.  13,  63;  House  Exec. 
Docs.,  35  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  24;    Richardson,  Messages  and  Pa- 
pers, V.,  466. 


256  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1857 

ing  the  neutrality  of  a  foreign  country.  But  al- 
though Walker  was  instantly  set  at  liberty,  and, 
when  tried  for  violating  the  neutrality  laws,  was 
promptly  acquitted  by  a  New  Orleans  jury,  the 
result  of  Paulding's  action  proved  decisive.1  Nica- 
ragua formally  thanked  the  United  States,  dis- 
avowed a  grant  to  a  rival  French  canal  scheme,  and, 
with  Costa  Rica,  revoked  hostile  decrees  recently 
issued  against  the  United  States.  Walker  was  not 
able  to  renew  his  filibustering  until  1860,  when  he 
met  his  death  in  an  expedition  against  Honduras, 
and  by  that  time  a  settlement  of  the  isthmian  dif- 
ficulty had  been  attained  through  diplomatic  chan- 
nels. 

The  Dallas-Clarendon  treaty,  which  was  pending 
when  Buchanan  assumed  office,  was  amended  by  the 
Senate  so  as  to  eliminate  any  reference  to  the  pro- 
posed treaty  between  Honduras  and  Great  Britain, 
and  left  standing  a  simple  recognition  of  the  sover- 
eignty of  Honduras  over  the  Bay  Islands.  This  in 
turn  was  rejected  by  her  majesty's  government,  and, 
after  a  fruitless  attempt  to  renew  the  treaty  in  a 
form  acceptable  to  both  sides,  affairs  seemed  to  have 
come  to  a  deadlock.  A  treaty  with  Nicaragua,  made 
by  Cass,  which  gave  the  United  States  the  right  to 
defend  the  canal  route  in  case  of  war,  while  still 
guaranteeing  its  neutrality,  failed  to  make  the  situa- 
tion any  clearer.2  Buchanan  then  turned,  as  usual, 

1  Senate  Exec.  Docs.,  35  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  No.  10. 

2  Travis,  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  183. 


i86o]  FOREIGN   AFFAIRS  257 

to  Congress,  and  in  his  first  message  intimated  that 
an  abrogation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  would 
be  the  only  solution.1 

This  threat  spurred  the  British  government  to 
action.  Lord  Napier  and  Sir  William  Ouseley,  at 
Washington,  pointed  out  the  embarrassments  of  re- 
turning to  the  condition  of  things  in  1849,  and  urged 
arbitration  of  the  true  meaning  of  the  treaty.  They 
observed,  also,  that  if  the  treaty  were  abrogated 
Great  Britain  would  of  course  be  left  free  to  consult 
her  own  interests  on  the  isthmus,  a  remark  which 
had  a  calming  effect  upon  Cass  and  Buchanan.2  The 
idea  of  renewing  the  scramble  of  1848-1850  was  dis- 
tinctly unwelcome  to  either  of  them,  and  so,  al- 
though declining  to  arbitrate,  they  agreed  to  wait, 
provided  Great  Britain  would  seek  to  conclude 
treaties  with  the  Central  American  states  on  the 
lines  of  the  American  contention.3 

This  plan  was  actually  carried  out,  and  between 
1857  and  1860  Great  Britain  made  conventions  set- 
tling the  boundaries  of  Belize,  ceding  the  Bay  Islands 
to  Honduras  and  the  Mosquito  protectorate  to  Nica- 
ragua, on  condition  of  self-government  for  the  ceded 
regions  and  an  annual  subvention,  in  default  of  which 
Great  Britain  could  again  intervene.  Little  as  these 
treaties  accorded  with  the  adjustment  which  Clayton 

1  Travis,  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  177-181;   Richardson,  Mes- 
sages and  Papers,  V.,  444. 

2  Clarendon  to  Ouseley,  November  19,  1857,  British  and  For. 
State  Papers,  XLVIL,  729,  737. 

3  British  and  For.  State  Papers,  XLVIL,  701. 


258  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1858 

supposed  he  was  making  in  1850,  or  the  claims  put 
forward  by  Marcy,  they  were  accepted  and  pro- 
claimed by  Buchanan  as  "  a  final  settlement  entirely 
satisfactory  to  this  Government. ' '  * 

Buchanan's  habitual  waiting  upon  Congress  in 
matters  of  importance  effectually  prevented  any  re- 
sumption of  Cuban  diplomacy  during  his  term.  In  his 
second  annual  message,  December,  1858,  Buchanan 
repeated,  although  in  milder  tones,  the  arguments  of 
the  Ostend  Manifesto,  not  forgetting  to  refer  to  cir- 
cumstances which  might  render  the  seizure  of  the 
island  justifiable  under  "the  law  of  self-preserva- 
tion." 2  In  response  to  his  request  for  congressional 
support,  a  bill  for  the  appropriation  of  thirty  millions 
for  the  purchase  of  Cuba  was  introduced  into  the 
Senate,  but  it  was  never  brought  to  a  decisive  vote.3 
Again,  in  his  third  message,  December,  1859,  Bu- 
chanan laid  the  matter  before  Congress,  but  without 
avail.  The  result  was  that  no  action  whatever  was 
taken  regarding  Cuba,  in  spite  of  the  language  of  the 
Democratic  platform.  Even  an  attempt  to  settle 
the  vexatious  losses  of  American  citizens  at  the 
hands  of  Cuban  officials  was  blocked  because  the 
Senate  refused  to  accept  a  convention  with  Spain  on 
the  ground  of  its  inclusion  of  the  Amistad  claim. 

Towards  Mexico,  where  the  Conservative  or  Cleri- 

1  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V.,  639;   Travis,  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty,  201;    Keasbey,  Nicaragua  Canal,  252-263. 

2  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  V.,  510. 
8  See  p.  241,  above. 


1859]  FOREIGN   AFFAIRS  259 

cal  party,  in  the  course  of  chronic  civil  war,  had 
been  guilty  of  numerous  outrages  upon  American 
citizens,  Buchanan  recommended  the  adoption  of 
drastic  measures.  In  1858  he  suggested  that  the 
United  States  assume  a  protectorate  over  the  north- 
ern part  of  Mexico ;  and  in  1859  he  asked  for  author- 
ity to  invade  the  country  to  restore  order.  Needless 
to  say,  such  suggestions  were  entirely  unwelcome  to 
the  northern  members  of  Congress,  and  were  ignored. 
The  Senate  would  not  even  consider  two  treaties  of 
1859,  by  which  the  United  States  was  to  assume 
claims  against  Mexico  in  return  for  commercial  con- 
cessions, and  allowed  the  proposed  agreements  to 
die  unnoticed.1 

In  one  case  only  did  Buchanan  gain  the  backing 
he  sought.  In  response  to  a  recommendation  in  the 
message  of  1857,  Congress  authorized  an  expedition 
to  Paraguay,  which  sailed  with  nineteen  vessels, 
forced  an  apology  for  an  insult  offered  to  the  United 
States  steamer  Water  Witch  in  1855,  gained  a  com- 
mercial treaty,  and  made  an  agreement  for  a  com- 
mission to  investigate  an  American  claim  for  dam- 
ages.2 This  success  over  the  small  and  distant 
Paraguay  was  the  only  positive  action  in  external 
affairs  which  even  remotely  carried  out  the  spirit 
of  the  Democratic  platform. 

1  Buchanan,    Buchanan's   Administration,    267-286;     Wilson, 
"Buchanan's  Proposed  Intervention  in  Mexico,"  in  Am.  Hist. 
Rev.,  V.,  686. 

2  Moore,  Arbitrations,  1485;    Buchanan,  Buchanan's  Adminis- 
tration, 264. 


260  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1856 

In  the  far  east  the  United  States  secured  diplo- 
matic victories  during  Buchanan's  term,  but  only 
by  the  ordinary  methods  of  negotiation,  directed 
with  caution  and  shrewdness.  In  China  the  Gush- 
ing treaty  of  1845  had  not  proved  wholly  adequate, 
and  a  succession  of  American  ministers  had  worn 
out  their  patience  trying  to  secure  a  new  commercial 
treaty  with  a  Chinese  government  whose  foreign  min- 
ister refused  even  an  interview.  When,  in  1856-1858, 
England  and  France  became  involved  in  war  with 
China,  and  their  vessels  bombarded  the  Barrier  forts, 
the  United  States  managed  to  profit  by  the  circum- 
stances. Cass  declined  participation  in  the  allied 
attack,  but  Reed,  the  American  minister,  steering 
his  own  course,  succeeded  in  securing  a  treaty  of 
commerce  in  June,  1858,  which  was  solemnly  rati- 
fied the  next  year.1  At  the  same  time,  additional 
privileges  were  gained  from  Japan  by  treaties  con- 
cluded in  1857  and  1859  through  Townsend  Harris.2 
As  a  result  of  these  Oriental  negotiations,  our  com- 
mercial relations  were  placed  on  a  better  footing 
than  ever  before,  a  worthy  diplomatic  success,  gain- 
ed without  committing  the  country  to  any  belligerent 
foreign  policy. 

In  another  quarter,  also,  a  diplomatic  success  may 
be  credited  to  Buchanan  and  Cass,  although  won  in 
a  field  where  little  glory  was  to  be  reaped.  In  the 

1  Callahan,  Amt  Relations  in  the  Pacific,  101-104;  Foster,  Am. 
Diplomacy  in  the  Orient,  225. 

2  Griffis,  Harris,  172-325;   Nitobe,  U.  5,  and  Japan,  64-69. 


i86i]  .       FOREIGN   AFFAIRS  261 

years  before  1860,  there  took  place  a  sharp  rise  in 
the  price  of  slaves,  and,  in  consequence,  the  African 
slave-trade  to  Cuba  and  the  United  States  increased 
surprisingly.  The  law  was  violated  with  impunity, 
and  Buchanan's  administration  seemed  unable  or 
unwilling  to  prevent  the  traffic.  But  when  British 
cruisers,  in  1857  and  1858,  searched  suspected  Amer- 
ican vessels,  not  only  off  the  coast  of  Africa,  but 
even  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  the  administration 
roused  itself  and  protested  strenuously  against  this 
renewed  claim  to  a  right  of  search.1  Secretary 
Toucey  ordered  United  States  men-of-war  to  pro- 
ceed to  Cuban  waters  to  protect  American  vessels 
from  "  outrage,"  but  the  whole  affair  was  ended  with 
bewildering  suddenness  by  the  prompt  admission  of 
Lord  Malmesbury  to  Dallas  that  the  British  govern- 
ment accepted  entirely  the  principles  laid  down  by 
Cass  in  his  protests.  This  unexplained,  voluntary 
concession  of  the  point  at  issue  was  regarded  by  Cass 
and  Buchanan  as  a  great  triumph.2  It  was  followed 
by  a  long  discussion  over  means  of  verifying  the 
nationality  of  vessels  so  as  to  prevent  abuse  of  the 
flag  by  slave-traders,  but  Cass  adopted  a  negative 
attitude  and  nothing  had  been  accomplished  when 
Buchanan  went  out  of  office.  The  same  was  true 
regarding  a  disagreement  which  developed  concern- 
ing the  ownership  of  certain  islands  in  Puget  Sound 
which  was  left  for  a  later  administration  to  settle. 

1  Senate  Exec.  Docs.,  35  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  No.  49. 
*  Ibid.,  2  Sess.,  No.  i,  34-41. 


262  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1860 

The  diplomatic  history  of  the  decade  1850-1860 
concluded  with  defeat  for  territorial  expansion  in 
almost  every  quarter.  The  opportunity  for  em- 
barking the  country  upon  an  aggressive  foreign 
policy,  which  seemed  open  at  the  beginning  of 
Pierce 's  term,  was  lost  when  the  Kansas-Nebraska 
act  once  more  stirred  up  sectional  antagonism. 
Cuba  still  remained  under  the  Spanish  yoke  and 
American  losses  in  the  island  remained  unsettled. 
Mexico  continued  to  seethe  in  her  internal  conflicts 
without  intervention  from  her  neighbor,  but  from 
the  northeastern  frontier  to  the  Central  American 
isthmus  no  further  cause  of  controversy  appeared. 
By  luck  or  diplomatic  skill,  by  violence  or  com- 
promise, a  settlement  had  been  attained  of  every 
serious  diplomatic  controversy. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

SOCIAL  FERMENT  IN  THE  NORTH 
(1850-1860) 

THE  life  of  the  people  of  the  northern  states,  in- 
cluding under  this  term  the  border  slave  states, 
was  not  wholly  concerned  with  politics  and  indus- 
trial activity,  although  profoundly  influenced  by 
them  both.  It  had  its  own  current,  a  mingled  one, 
in  which  may  be  discerned  two  streams,  one  the 
continuation  of  the  American  intellectual  and  demo- 
cratic renaissance  which  began  after  the  second  war 
with  England,  and  the  other  a  growth  of  new  ten- 
dencies, arising  from  new  social  conditions  and  des- 
tined to  alter  the  face  of  American  society. 

In  many  ways  this  decade  may  be  regarded  as  the 
culmination  of  that  outburst  of  national  conscious- 
ness and  self-assertion  which  transformed  politics  in 
the  days  of  Andrew  Jackson.  Democracy  now  ruled 
unchallenged  in  public  life  and  thought,  the  democ- 
racy, that  is,  of  Jefferson  and  Jackson,  which  stopped 
short  of  including  the  negro,  however  much  it  em- 
phasized the  equality  of  the  white  man.  By  this 
time  the  states  had  completed  the  remodelling  of 
their  constitutions,  and  only  a  few  serious  changes 

VOL.  XVIII. — 18 


264  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

were  left  to  the  years  after  1850.  Nearly  every- 
where state  offices,  including  the  judiciary,  had  been 
made  elective,  terms  had  been  shortened,  qualifica- 
tions other  than  manhood  and  residence  abolished, 
and  the  final  decision  in  matters  of  supreme  impor- 
tance in  the  public  eye,  such  as  the  permission  to 
charter  banks  or  the  extension  of  the  suffrage,  left 
to  popular  referendum. 

In  federal  politics,  state  rights  enjoyed  supreme 
prestige,  receiving  the  tribute  not  only  of  the  south 
but  of  northern  statesmen  and  political  organiza- 
tions. In  Congress,  adherence  to  a  strict  construc- 
tion of  the  constitution  was  a  commonplace  of 
speeches  on  all  subjects,  and  stood  as  the  approved 
principle  of  deciding  all  public  questions,  at  least  in 
theory.  By  the  judiciary,  also,  the  doctrine  of  state 
rights  was  treated  with  respect  and  solemnity,  and 
only  a  few  individuals  in  any  branch  of  the  federal 
service  ventured  to  employ  the  political  conceptions 
of  the  Federalists  or  of  the  older  generation  of  Whigs. 
The  same  Jacksonian  democracy  continued  to  ap- 
pear in  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  towards  for- 
eign countries,  as  illustrated  in  the  bold  words  of 
Webster  and  Marcy  and  Huelsemann  and  in  the  cir- 
cular on  diplomatic  costume. 

By  the  year  1860,  Jacksonism  in  politics  had 
triumphed  throughout  the  north  and  west.  The 
Republican  and  Democratic  organizations,  which 
confronted  each  other,  differed  in  no  respect  of 
machinery  or  control.  Each  was  fully  democratic 


1860]  NORTHERN   FERMENT  265 

in  structure  and  leadership,  and  relied  upon  the 
same  appeal  to  the  sentiments  and  interests  of  the 
masses  which  had  carried  Jackson  to  victory  in 
1828  and  were  now  universal.1 

The  last  stronghold  of  conservatism  fell  in  the 
north  when  the  Whig  party  collapsed  under  the  ex- 
citement of  the  anti-Nebraska  campaign,  and  the 
tumultuous,  parvenu  organization  of  the  Know- 
No  things  arose  on  its  ruins.  The  aristocracy  of  the 
"Cotton  Whigs"  remained  excluded  from  politics,  a 
class  of  cultured,  conservative  gentlemen  who  dis- 
liked slavery  and  were  loath  to  see  it  extended,  but 
who  disliked  radicalism,  hard  words,  and  bad  man- 
ners still  more,  and  were  unable  to  overlook  these 
qualities  in  the  new  anti-slavery  organizations  of  the 
Know  -  Nothings  or  the  Republicans.  "I  deplore 
the  passage  of  the  Nebraska  act,"  said  Robert  C. 
Winthrop,  of  Massachusetts,  "but  I  honestly  believe 
that  Northern  rashness  and  violence  have  been  the 
main  instruments  in  accomplishing  its  worst  results. 
.  .  .  Anti-slavery  agitation  has  introduced  a  strain 
of  vituperation  and  defamation  into  our  discussions 
which  is  perfectly  unendurable";  and  again:  "I 
have  an  unchangeable  conviction  that  intemperate 
anti-slavery  agitation  has  been  a  source  of  a  very 
large  part  of  the  troubles  by  which  our  country  has 
been  disturbed."  2 

In  the  world  of  thought  the  years  between  1850 

1  Ostrogorski,  Political  Organizations,  II.,  92—111. 

2  Winthrop,  Memoir  of  Robt.  C.  Winthrop,  181,  189,  193. 


266  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

and  1860  marked  the  flood  -  tide  of  the  literary 
movement  which  began  thirty  years  before.  With 
the  exception  of  Poe,  who  died  in  1849,  and  Cooper, 
who  died  in  1851,  nearly  all  the  writers  who  first 
created  American  literature  were  at  their  prime. 
Within  these  years  the  New  England  poets  produced 
some  of  their  most  enduring  and  popular  works. 
Longfellow  published  the  "  Golden  Legend,"  "Hia- 
watha," and  "Miles  Standish";  Whittier,  although 
immersed  in  the  anti-slavery  cause,  issued  Songs  of 
Labor  and  made  a  collection  of  his  poetical  works, 
as  did  Bryant,  likewise  an  anti- slavery  leader.  In 
1857  a  new  periodical,  The  Atlantic  Monthly,  was 
established  as  an  especial  representative  for  New 
England  culture  by  Lowell,  aided  by  Emerson, 
Holmes,  and  others;  and  soon  the  "  Autocrat  of  the 
Breakfast-Table"  was  enlivening  its  pages,  together 
with  essays  by  Lowell,  the  editor,  and  poems  and 
essays  by  Emerson.  At  the  same  time,  Hawthorne 
reached  the  summit  of  his  genius  in  the  Scarlet 
Letter  at  one  end  of  the  decade  and  the  Marble  Faun 
at  the  other.  Apart  from  these  writers,  but  none 
the  less  a  product  of  the  period,  stood  two  others: 
Thoreau,  whose  Walden,  in  1854,  was  the  last  word 
of  democratic  individualism,  and  Whitman,  whose 
Leaves  of  Grass,  in  1855,  carried  the  doctrine  of 
democracy  to  the  pitch  of  mysticism.  Beside 
these  older  writers  stood  younger  ones  just  com- 
ing into  prominence — Bayard  Taylor,  George  Will- 
iam Curtis,  Mrs.  Stowe,  and  a  number  of  lesser 


1860]  NORTHERN   FERMENT  267 

lights  who  seemed  destined  to  be  worthy  successors 
in  poetry  or  prose. 

In  other  literary  lines  the  same  fertility  of  Ameri- 
can genius  appeared.  Bancroft,  in  1852,  resumed, 
after  a  pause  of  twelve  years,  his  History  of  the 
United  States,  Hildreth  completed  his  History  of  the 
United  States  a  little  later,  Prescott  wrote  his  Philip 
II.  and  Irving  his  Life  of  Washington  at  the  same 
time,  and  three  new  historians  of  great  distinction 
appeared — Parkman,  whose  Conspiracy  of  Pontiac 
came  out  in  1851;  Motley,  whose  Dutch  Republic 
began  in  1856;  and  Palfrey,  whose  New  England  was 
issued  in  1858.  Other  writers  entered  the  field  of 
political  economy — Bowen  in  1856,  and  Bascom  and 
Henry  C.  Carey  in  1859;  Lieber  wrote  his  Civil 
Liberty  and  Self -Government  in  the  earlier  years  of 
the  period,  and  Woolsey  his  International  Law  in  the 
later  ones.  In  the  regions  of  abstract  thought,  Way- 
land's  Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy  appeared 
in  1854,  and  Bushnell's  Nature  and  the  Supernatural 
in  1858.  In  all  fields  of  literary  effort  it  seemed  as 
though  the  flowering-time  of  American  thought  and 
scholarship  had  arrived.  The  reading  public  of  the 
ante-bellum  world,  not  distracted  by  any  great  flood 
of  cheap,  entertaining,  ephemeral  reading  -  matter, 
enjoyed  a  far  purer  intellectual  life  and  were  habit- 
uated to  a  more  purely  literary  culture  than  was  the 
case  at  a  later  time. 

Side  by  side  with  the  culmination  of  the  literary 
renaissance  of  the  first  half  of  the  century  came  the 


268  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

full  development  of  the  intellectual  restlessness 
which  for  a  generation  had  been  producing  a  suc- 
cession of  reform  movements  of  numberless  kinds. 
Revolutionary  radicalism  pervaded  all  fields,  in  re- 
ligion, politics,  and  morals,  making  of  the  ten  years 
before  the  Civil  War  an  era  of  agitation  scarcely 
paralleled  before  or  since.  Socialism  of  the  earlier, 
communistic  type  was  seen  to  be  showing  signs  of 
weakness,  and  most  of  the  Fourierist  or  similar  ex- 
periments started  in  earlier  years  now  broke  down; 
but  in  its  place  came  a  new  revolutionary  socialism 
from  Europe,  founded  by  German  immigrants.  More 
characteristic  of  the  period  was  the  advocacy  of 
absolute  personal  independence  and  freedom  from 
any  constraint  in  mind  or  body,  by  the  individualist, 
who  carried  his  logic  of  liberty  to  the  point  of  com- 
plete anarchism — the  "Come-outer,"  as  he  was  gen- 
erally styled  in  those  days. 

Probably  the  most  aggressive  reform  movement 
at  this  time,  and  certainly  the  most  conspicuous, 
was  the  agitation  for  women's  rights,  and  especially 
woman  suffrage,  which  filled  the  place  in  public 
esteem  formerly  held  by  the  abolitionists.  Num- 
bers of  devoted  women,  burning  to  emancipate  their 
sex,  undertook  to  begin  by  emancipating  themselves, 
and  while  attempting  to  enter  all  sorts  of  callings— 
the  law,  the  ministry,  medicine — felt  also  obliged  to 
manifest  their  personal  freedom  and  rationalism  in 
other  less  vital  but  still  more  conspicuous  ways. 
Short  hair  and  the  "Bloomer  costume,"  in  the  early 


i86o]  NORTHERN   FERMENT  269 

fifties,  were  adopted  as  signs  of  intellectual  liberty 
by  some,  and  brought  upon  the  advocates  of  the 
movement  an  amount  of  popular  ridicule  and  coarse 
abuse  which  no  other  action  could  have  attracted. 
Such  women  as  the  Reverend  Antoinette  Brown, 
Dr.  Lucy  Stone,  and  Miss  Susan  B.  Anthony  were 
regarded  by  the  conservative  with  no  less  horror 
than  the  irrepressible  and  eccentric  Abby  Kelly.1 

There  were  not  lacking  men  to  enter  the  women's- 
rights  movement  with  equal  fervor,  and  these,  with 
their  coworkers  of  the  other  sex,  labored  incessantly 
by  lecturing  and  by  endeavoring  to  participate  in  all 
sorts  of  meetings  where  women  were  not  usually 
in  evidence,  to  emphasize  their  rights  and  demand 
equality.  Some  few  aberrant  members  of  this  cru- 
sade adopted  the  doctrine  of  Free  Love  and  pro- 
claimed a  sort  of  logical  anarchism  in  the  relations 
of  the  sexes,  making  a  stir  out  of  all  proportion  to 
their  numbers.  Great  notoriety  was  gained  by  a 
convention  at  Rutland,  Vermont,  on  June  25,  1858, 
in  which  all  varieties  of  reformers  took  part — aboli- 
tionists, spiritualists,  woman-suffragists,  and  the  like 
—and  certain  speakers  made  a  public  advocacy  of 
the  abolition  of  the  marriage  tie  as  a  bar  to  human 
progress  and  the  equality  of  the  sexes.2 

Radicalism  in  religion  was  now  actively  advocated 
by  a  host  of  speakers,  the  most  prominent  of  whom 

1  Harper,  Susan  B.  Anthony,  I.,  57—205;  Stanton,  Anthony; 
Gage,  Hist,  of  Woman  Suffrage,  I.,  chaps,  vi.— viii.,  xiii.,  xiv. 

2  N.  Y.  Tribune,  June  29,  1858. 


270  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

was  Theodore  Parker,  then  at  the  height  of  his  fame 
and  influence  in  Boston,  a  man  of  passionate  anti- 
slavery  zeal  and  a  genius  for  polemics  of  any  kind. 
The  craze  for  conventions,  which  made  the  life  of 
the  professional  agitator  a  series  of  meetings  with 
his  fellow-reformers,  showed  itself  in  this  field — for 
instance,  in  a  convention  held  at  Hartford,  Connect- 
icut, in  June,  1858.  The  object  of  this  meeting, 
"for  the  purpose  of  freely  canvassing  the  origin, 
authority  and  influence  of  the  Jewish  and  Christian 
Scriptures,"  appeared  so  blasphemous  to  the  con- 
servative that  it  was  denounced  by  the  press  of  the 
country  as  an  abomination,  and  was  mobbed  by  the 
students  of  a  neighboring  denominational  college, 
results  which  served  only  to  whet  the  zeal  of  the 
"Free  thinkers,"  as  they  styled  themselves.1 

The  natural  tendency  was  for  these  various  re- 
forms to  blend  together,  from  the  fact  that  those 
who  were  radically  inclined  in  one  direction  were 
generally  favorably  disposed  to  reforms  in  all  others. 
The  woman- suffragist  was  likely  to  be  an  advocate 
of  temperance,  abolition,  and  free  religion,  so  that 
when  conservative  people  lumped  the  entire  field  of 
reform  activity  under  the  heading  of  "the  isms," 
and  spoke  of  the  leaders  as  "  the  short-haired  women 
and  the  long-haired  men,"  there  was  a  certain  justi- 
fication. Susan  B.  Anthony,  for  instance,  devoted 
herself  almost  equally  to  temperance,  anti-slavery, 
and  women's  rights;  Garrison,  in  the  Liberator, 

1  Garrisons,  Garrison,  III.,  383. 


i86o]  NORTHERN   FERMENT  271 

while  especially  interested  in  abolition,  sympathized 
warmly  with  every  other  reforming  movement  and 
was  a  leader  in  the  woman's -rights  field.  There 
were,  of  course,  many  persons,  especially  in  the  west, 
whose  anti-slavery  action  was  not  the  result  of  icon- 
oclastic radicalism,  as  was  shown  by  the  numerous 
"Christian  Anti-Slavery  Conventions"  held  in  Ohio, 
Indiana,  and  elsewhere  in  1850  and  later,  but  the 
substantial  unity  of  all  reformers  as  radicals  was  the 
popular  impression  of  the  time. 

Besides  this  ultra-individualistic  and  rationalistic 
free  thought,  there  sprang  up  certain  social  move- 
ments arising  from  a  mystical  or  superstitious  crav- 
ing. Millerism  had  had  its  day  in  the  previous  dec- 
ade, but  spiritualism,  founded  in  1848,  rapidly  grew 
to  conspicuous  proportions  and  seemed  to  be  filling 
the  place  of  a  distinct  religious  sect.  Its  adhe- 
rents, like  all  the  other  reformers,  held  conventions 
or  conferences  in  numerous  places,  published  spirit- 
ualistic papers,  and  claimed  vaguely  to  number  one 
or  two  millions  of  adherents.1  The  American  rever- 
ence for  congressional  action  was  strikingly  shown 
when,  in  1854,  the  members  of  this  sect  presented  a 
petition  to  the  Senate,  signed  by  fifteen  thousand 
names,  asking  for  the  appointment  of  a  commission 
to  investigate  the  phenomena  of  "occult  forces." 
Senator  Shields,  of  Illinois,  presented  the  memorial 
in  a  speech  of  some  length,  but  in  the  debate  which 
followed  no  senator  proved  so  courageous  as  to  de- 

1  Podmore,  Modern  Spiritualism,  303. 


272  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

fend  the  cause  of  table-tipping  and  spirit-rapping, 
and  after  many  humorous  and  some  contemptuous 
comments,  and  a  facetious  attempt  to  refer  the  me- 
morial to  the  committee  on  foreign  affairs,  it  was 
allowed  to  drop.  Spiritualism  remained  without  the 
governmental  sanction  its  adherents  hoped  to  secure. 

Practical  philanthropy  went  hand-in-hand  with 
radical  agitation.  It  was  in  these  years  that  the 
great  work  of  Dorothea  Dix,  in  securing  the  reor- 
ganization and  proper  construction  of  asylums  for 
the  insane,  was  carried  through.  It  comprised  one 
almost  tragic  disappointment;  for  when,  in  1854, 
after  years  of  effort,  Miss  Dix  finally  succeeded  in 
getting  through  Congress  a  bill  granting  ten  million 
acres  of  public  lands  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  the 
states  to  care  for  their  insane,  President  Pierce 
vetoed  the  gift  as  unconstitutional  on  grounds  of 
strictest  state -rights  doctrine.  Nevertheless,  the 
results  accomplished  by  Miss  Dix's  campaign  were 
epoch-making  in  the  history  of  public  charity,  espe- 
cially in  the  south  and  west.1 

All  these  reforming  and  radical  movements,  it 
should  be  said  in  conclusion,  found  their  outlet  not 
only  in  special  publications,  but  on  the  lecture  plat- 
form, an  institution  then  in  its  prime.  Over  the  new 
railways  into  all  parts  of  the  country  travelled  the 
foremost  literary  men  and  the  most  eloquent  re- 
formers of  the  time,  spreading  the  gospel  of  intel- 
lectual enlightenment  in  all  quarters.  Such  men  as 

1  Tiffany,  Dorothea  Dix,  135-200,  307-330. 


i86o]  NORTHERN    FERMENT  273 

Holmes,  Lowell,  Emerson,  and  George  William  Cur- 
tis were  active  alongside  of  prominent  clergymen  like 
Henry  Ward  Beecher,  temperance  reformers,  aboli- 
tionists, and  whatever  other  speakers  local  "Lyce- 
ums" were  ready  to  listen  to.  In  .this  way  the  pub- 
lic, not  yet  absorbed  in  magazine  reading,  found  its 
intellectual  stimulus,  and  the  national  sentiment 
and  new  culture  of  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth 
century  its  expression. 

Side  by  side  with  the  culmination  of  the  national 
expression  in  government,  politics,  and  intellectual 
life,  began  the  development  of  social  habits  due  to 
the  new  industrialism  of  the  decade — the  railways, 
the  telegraph,  and  the  influx  of  California  gold. 
The  new  business-man  came  on  the  stage,  his  whole 
nature  concentrated  in  competitive  production  or 
distribution.  He  filled  the  cities,  accompanied  the 
railroads  into  all  corners  of  the  north,  and  turned 
into  wealth-getting  the  keenness  and  vigor  of  an 
unexhausted  race.  Then,  too,  appeared  the  new 
figure  of  "Labor,"  of  the  man  who  expected  always 
to  live  as  wage-earner,  and  joined  with  his  fellows 
to  protect  his  interests.  The  first  national  unions 
of  local  labor  organizations  all  date  from  this  time, 
and  the  first  great  railway  strike  was  that  on  the 
Erie  road  in  1857. l 

Still  another  new  social  element  strikingly  appar- 
ent in  this  decade  was  that  of  the  Irish  and  German 
immigrants  who  came  to  this  country,  trained  in 
1  Ely,  Labor  Movement,  57-60. 


274  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

no  school  of  Jacksonian  democracy,  but  bringing 
the  traditions  of  a  defiant  and  bitter  revolutionary 
republicanism.  The  presence  of  large  numbers  of 
brawling,  ignorant,  clannish  Irish,  not  long  enough 
escaped  from  sordid  poverty  to  have  any  conception 
of  American  ideals,  made  an  indelible  impression 
upon  Americans  at  this  time.  Scarcely  less  unwel- 
come to  the  conservative  was  the  spectacle-wearing, 
beer-drinking,  Sunday-despising  German  peasant  or 
petty  townsman.  The  Know  -  Nothing  movement 
sprang  from  a  real  sense  of  alarm  and  dislike  felt 
by  dwellers  in  city  and  country  towards  these  alien 
arrivals.  The  literature  and  the  periodicals  of  the 
fifties  are  filled  with  allusions  to  the  Irish  and  Ger- 
mans, betraying  the  mingled  tolerance  and  aversion 
felt  towards  their  habits.  The  types  of  the  Irishman 
and  the  German,  fixed  in  American  humor  and  on 
the  American  stage,  take  their  origin  from  these 
years.  The  Germans,  however,  brought  with  them  a 
higher  grade  of  education  and  culture,  and  from  the 
start  the  more  educated  among  them  rose  rapidly 
to  positions  of  prominence  in  politics  and  society. 

Now  all  these  new  types  and  social  elements  were 
cast  into  a  rapidly  changing  world.  The  extension 
of  railways  and  telegraphs  to  cover  the  north  and 
penetrate  the  south  introduced  the  factor  of  speed 
into  business  to  a  degree  never  experienced  before. 
It  became  worth  while  to  hurry  when  competition 
was  possible,  not  only  from  near  at  hand  but  from  a 
distance.  Speculation  offered  glittering  chances  of 


i86o]  NORTHERN  FERMENT  275 

wealth,  to  be  gained  in  a  few  years  where  formerly 
half  a  lifetime  would  have  been  inadequate.  The 
California  gold  craze  simply  exaggerated  the  current 
conviction  that  the  day  had  come  when  it  was  pos- 
sible for  any  one  to  acquire  riches  quickly.  The 
time  was  at  hand  when  American  society  was  to  be 
transformed. 

Already,  in  these  years,  observers  noted  the  de- 
velopment of  a  pleasure-seeking  class.  The  new 
wealth  had  to  be  spent,  and  the  American  world  of 
the  years  before  1850  had  not  been  called  upon  to 
create  fashionable  amusements.1  Those  who  had 
leisure  found  no  athletic,  hunting,  or  rural  traditions 
to  fall  back  upon,  except  in  the  south,  where,  indeed, 
the  newly  rich  were  not  so  often  found.  Baseball, 
soon  to  be  the  national  game,  was  scarcely  heard  of, 
and  the  first  intercollegiate  boat-races  appeared  only 
in  1852.  Yachting  was  known  in  the  harbors  and 
along  the  coasts,  but  was  not  the  sport  of  any  large 
numbers.  The  winning  of  the  Queen's  Cup  by  the 
America,  in  1851,  marked  an  epoch  in  international 
racing,  but  it  was  not  as  yet  the  object  of  wide- 
spread ^interest.  It  was  a  continual  comment  of  for- 
eign observers  and  domestic  critics  that  Americans 
did  not  know  how  to  play  or  exercise,  and  in  con- 
sequence were  dyspeptic,  physically  weak,  and  ner- 
vously irritable.2 

"Society"  had  to  find  diversion  in  dancing,  eat- 

1  Rhodes,  United  States,  III.,  80. 

2  See  evidence  collected  in  ibid.,  III.,  66. 


276  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

ing,  drinking,  smoking,  the  theatre  and  opera,  and 
the  national  sport  of  horse-trotting,  with  its  accom- 
panying betting.  Even  the  great  "resorts"  which 
appeared  at  this  time — Newport,  Saratoga,  Sharon 
Springs — with  their  immense  hotels,  existed  simply 
for  the  purpose,  according  to  observers,  of  enabling 
people  to  herd  together  and  drink,  smoke,  flirt,  and 
dance  the  more  easily.1  Of  course,  this  was  at  the 
same  time  arousing  a  genuine  love  for  the  beauties  of 
wild  nature,  and  the  public  which  read  Starr  King's 
poetic  descriptions  of  the  White  Hills,  in  1859,  was  in- 
spired by  the  same  feelings  which  have  since  turned 
American  society  into  the  country  and  the  wilderness 
every  summer  and  autumn.  Still,  it  was  an  era  of 
bad  taste  in  Europe  in  things  social,  and  the  influ- 
ence of  the  court  of  Napoleon  III.  was  stronger  with 
American  fashionable  society  than  was  the  example 
of  the  staider  court  of  Victoria  and  Albert. 

It  was  a  common  observation  that  display  and  at- 
tempts at  individual  luxury  preceded  public  comfort. 
The  cities  of  the  north  grew  greatly  in  size,  but  they 
continued  to  be  poorly  paved  and  lighted  and  ill-sup- 
plied with  water.  Street-cars,  however,  in  this  dec- 
ade first  began  to  replace  the  slow-moving  omnibuses 
hitherto  customary,  and  their  growth  was  rapid. 

The  altered  conditions  of  American  life  were  re- 
flected in  the  newspaper  press  of  the  country. 

1  Rhodes,  United  States,  III.,  75-82;  Curtis,  Lotus-Eating,  105- 
123,  166-176;  Harper's  Mag.,  department  called  "Easy  Chair," 
1857,  1858. 


i86o]  NORTHERN   FERMENT  277 

Hitherto  the  chief  reason  for  newspapers  had  been 
to  direct  political  activity;  but  now  this  function 
was  to  a  large  degree  superseded  by  the  task  of 
furnishing  commercial  information  to  business-men 
and  farmers.  Already  the  zeal  for  promptness  and 
priority  of  news  made  possible  by  the  railway  and 
telegraph,  and  appreciated  in  a  hurrying  commu- 
nity, had  been  introduced  into  the  newspaper  world 
by  Bennett  and  the  New  York  Herald.  Although  the 
paper  whose  standing  depended  upon  its  news  and 
its  advertisements  and  not  upon  its  editorial  page 
was  in  existence,  the  term  "  news"  had  not  yet  been 
extended  to  include  all  discoverable  local  items, 
trivial  as  well  as  significant.  That  phase  of  jour- 
nalism was  still  in  the  future. 

The  editorial  page,  however,  still  held  an  impor- 
tant place,  particularly  in  an  epoch  of  such  political 
excitement,  and  the  leading  editors  of  the  great  city 
dailies  and  weeklies  were  men  of  a  prominence  and 
weight  not  enjoyed  by  their  successors.  Greeley,  of 
the  Tribune ;  Raymond,  of  the  Times ;  Bryant,  of 
the  Evening  Post,  in  New  York;  Bowles,  of  the 
Springfield  Republican ;  Medill,  of  the  Chicago  Tri- 
bune, and  their  fellows,  made  the  ante-bellum  press 
a  real  power  in  the  political  world.  The  Washington 
correspondent,  also,  held  a  position  of  greater  influ- 
ence then  than  later,  notably  such  men  as  Pike,  of 
the  Tribune,  and  Simonton,  of  the  Times.1  Among 
these  journalists  the  most  influential,  without  doubt, 

1  Hudson,  Journalism,  431,  540,  618. 


278  PARTIES  AND    SLAVERY  [1850 

was  Greeley.  Eccentric  in  person,  a  curious  com- 
pound of  shrewdness  and  vanity  in  temperament,  he 
was  gifted  with  a  power  of  expression  in  terse,  vivid 
English,  marked  by  a  downright  earnestness  of  anti- 
slavery  feeling  which  made  his  editorials  and  letters 
more  popular  than  the  utterances  of  any  other  single 
man.  The  Tribune  was  the  political  Bible  of  anti- 
slavery  Whigs,  and,  later,  of  Republicans  throughout 
New  York  and  the  middle  west. 

A  striking  result  of  the  greater  intensity  of  the 
new  industrial  life,  together  with  the  lack  of  physical 
health,  was  the  growth  of  excitability  in  the  Ameri- 
cans of  the  time.  Waves  of  popular  frenzy  were  no 
new  thing,  for  they  had  been  known  since  the  Stamp 
Act,  but  at  no  time  were  they  so  prevalent  as  in  these 
years,  and  they  were  now  accompanied  by  popular 
crazes  of  a  non-political  character  to  an  extent  which 
filled  conservative  people  with  bewilderment.  In 
1850-1855  the  temperance  movement  swept  the 
country  in  the  Maine-law  agitation ;  then  came  the 
anti-Nebraska  fever,  followed  by  the  Know-Nothing 
riots  and  excitement,  the  Kansas  crusade,  and  the 
Lecompton  struggle,  each  of  which  rose,  raged,  and 
declined  from  exhaustion.  In  1857  the  financial 
panic  swept  like  a  fire  across  the  land,  and  it  was 
followed  in  1858  by  a  wide-spread  religious  revival, 
the  last  one  to  arouse  all  sections  of  the  north. 

Hitherto  unknown  manifestations  of  excitement 
were  called  forth  by  the  visits  of  interesting  foreign- 
ers in  these  years,  notably  by  Jenny  Lind,  in  1850, 


1860]  NORTHERN    FERMENT  279 

and  Kossuth,  in  1852.  These  did  not  rest  ultimately 
upon  any  especial  musical  susceptibility  in  Ameri- 
cans nor  on  any  absorbing  sympathy  with  Hungary, 
but  on  the  love  of  being  excited,  of  uniting  with  one's 
neighbors  in  experiencing  a  thrill  in  a  fashion  later 
commonly  termed  hysterical.  Ampere,  who  saw  the 
Kossuth  excitement,  remarked:  "Je  vois  que  dans 
cette  ivresse,  entrait  pour  beaucoup  ce  besoin  d'ex- 
citation,  de  manifestations  bruyantes,  qui  est  le  seul 
amusement  vif  de  la  multitude  dans  un  pays  ou 
Ton  ne  s'amuse  guere.  Ce  vacarme  est  sans  conse- 
quence et  sans  danger."  l 

These  years  were  times  of  ferment — with  the  con- 
tinued radicalism  of  the  past,  the  flowering  of  the 
literary  genius  of  the  land,  the  sweep  of  popular 
crazes,  and  above  and  around  all  the  zest  and  fas- 
cination of  the  new  industrial  and  agricultural  out- 
look. In  spite  of  the  Kansas  question,  the  slavery 
problem  was  not  the  only  nor  even  the  most  impor- 
tant subject  in  popular  interest,  except  for  brief 
periods;  and  it  was  never  regarded  at  any  time  as 
anything  but  an  unpleasant  interruption  except  by 
the  professed  agitators.  Nevertheless,  in  these  years 
the  attitude  of  the  northern  people  towards  the 
south  underwent  a  distinct  change.  In  1850  the 
great  majority  of  voters  were  not  ready  to  let  their 
dislike  of  slavery  draw  them  into  any  permanent  an- 
tagonism towards  the  south,  and  they  were  eager  to 
welcome  any  fair  compromise.  But  by  1860  the  re- 

1  Ampere,  Promenade  en  Amerique,  II.,  53. 

VOL.  XVIII. — IQ 


28o  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1850 

peal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise,  the  Kansas  strug- 
gle, and  the  controversy  over  the  Lecompton  consti- 
tution had  stirred  up  a  deep  sectional  feeling,  based 
on  anger  at  what  was  considered  the  perfidy  and 
aggressiveness  of  the  south  in  seeking  to  establish 
slavery  in  free  territory.1 

This  irritation  had  now  hardened  into  a  fixed  pur- 
pose to  force  slavery  to  remain  in  the  regions  which 
it  already  occupied,  and  to  eliminate  pro-slavery 
men  from  their  control  of  the  central  government. 
This  feeling,  it  is  clear,  could  not  be  considered 
aggressive,  for  the  idea  of  interfering  with  slavery  in 
the  southern  states  was  hardly  entertained.  It  was 
rather  defensive  and  sectional,  directed  against  the 
encroachments  of  the  "slave  power,"  or,  as  it  was 
frequently  called,  the  "slaveocracy."  The  current 
northern  feeling  was  that  unless  the  south  were 
checked  it  would  insist  on  protection  to  its  slaves, 
not  only  in  the  territories,  but  in  the  free  states. 
It  was  widely,  although  erroneously,  believed  that 
Toombs  had  boasted  that  he  would  live  to  call  the 
roll  of  his  slaves  at  the  foot  of  Bunker  Hill  monu- 
ment, and  the  Dred  Scott  decision  was  looked  upon 
as  a  step  in  the  process  of  making  slavery  national. 

The  people  of  the  north  did  not  like  the  slave- 
holders, did  not  understand  them,  and  had  no  desire 
to  do  so.  The  peculiarities  of  the  southern  code  of 
manners  created  a  belief  that  they  were  a  race  of 

1  For  earlier  phases  of  this  subject,  see  Hart,  Slavery  and  Abo- 
lition (Am.  Nation,  XVI.),  chaps,  xvi.-xix.,  xxi. 


i86o]  NORTHERN   FERMENT  281 

faithless,  blustering,  cruel  slave  -  drivers ;  and  the 
figure  of  a  Henry  Clay,  once  popular  at  the  north, 
was  hidden  behind  that  of  a  "  Border  Ruffian." 
An  influence  of  incalculable  effect  in  establishing 
this  opinion  of  slavery  and  slave  -  owners  was  the 
novel  of  Uncle  Tom's  Cabin.  Published  in  1852, 
it  achieved  an  unparalleled  success  from  the  start, 
edition  after  edition  being  absorbed  by  a  public  gone 
wild  over  the  humor  and  the  tragedy  of  the  work. 
Although  based  in  every  detail  upon  facts,  it  was 
not,  as  enraged  southerners  kept  insisting,  a  fair 
representation  of  the  slave  system;  but  it  was  not 
intended  so  to  be.  It  showed  in  literary  guise  the 
possibilities  of  horror  and  tragedy  rooted  in  the  in- 
stitution, and  it  fixed  in  the  north,  as  no  other  one 
influence  did,  the  popular  ideal  of  slavery.  In  her 
astonishment  at  the  popular  enthusiasm,  Mrs.  Stowe 
wrote :  "  The  success  of  what  I  have  written  has  been 
so  singular  and  so  unexpected  .  .  .  that  I  scarce 
retain  a  self-consciousness  and  am  constrained  to 
look  upon  it  all  as  the  work  of  a  Higher  Power,  who 
when  he  pleases,  can  accomplish  his  results  by  the 
feeblest  instruments."  * 

By  1860  the  institution  of  slavery  had  few  de- 
fenders at  the  north,  and  some  of  the  foremost  Re- 
publicans, such  as  Lincoln  and  Seward,  did  not 
hesitate  to  express  sentiments  which  a  few  years 
earlier  would  have  been  regarded  as  ultra -radical. 
Undoubtedly  thousands  now  agreed  with  them  that 
1  Stowe,  Stowe,  166. 


282  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

the  contest  with  slavery  was  an  irreconcilable  one, 
and  must  end  eventually  with  its  extinction;  but 
the  actual,  technical  abolitionists  still  remained  few. 
The  small  group  led  by  Garrison,  Phillips,  and  others 
had  taken  the  form  of  a  sect,  united  by  a  creed 
and  judging  all  others  by  their  beliefs.  This  creed 
was  a  complete  logical  structure  whose  fundamental 
assumption  was  that  slavery  was  a  sin,  and  that  the 
duty  of  every  man  was  to  do  his  utmost  to  destroy 
it.  The  feature  upon  which  the  abolitionists  laid 
great  weight,  was  getting  rid  of  personal  responsi- 
bility. "Our  duty  is  first  personal,  in  regard  to 
ourselves,'*  wrote  Garrison.  "We  are  to  see  to  it 
that  we  make  no  truce  with  slavery  either  directly 
or  by  implication,  .  .  .  that  our  hands  are  clean  and 
our  consciences  without  condemnation."  l  This  was 
done  by  bearing  witness  against  it,  refusing  to  obey 
any  laws  recognizing  it,  rejecting  the  authority  of 
the  federal  government  which  recognized  it,  refusing 
fellowship  with  any  slave-holder  or  any  person  who 
upheld  slavery,  and  by  advocating  the  separation  of 
the  free  from  the  slave  states. 

The  programme  of  the  ultra -abolitionists  was  with- 
out any  relation  to  actual  events,  and  could  not,  in 
the  nature  of  things,  attract  ordinary  people,  hence 
they  remained  few  in  number,  taking  consolation, 
as  every  small  sect  must  do,  in  a  certain  complacency 
over  their  own  doings.  Throughout  the  years  1850- 

1  Garrisons,  Garrison,  III.,  444;  cf.  Hart,  Slavery  and  Abolition 
(Am.  Nation,  XVI.),  chap.  xii. 


i86o]  NORTHERN    FERMENT  283 

1860  Garrison  continued  to  criticise  the  course  of 
public  affairs,  mercilessly  applying  his  standards  of 
unbending  abolitionism  to  every  man  and  giving 
scant  sympathy  to  even  those  hotly  engaged  on  the 
northern  side  in  the  slavery  controversy  so  long  as 
they  did  not  act  from  purely  anti-slavery  motives. 
The  distrust  which  Chase  felt  towards  Douglas,  when 
he  found  him  opposing  the  Lecompton  constitution, 
Garrison  and  Phillips  applied  to  Chase  himself.  Yet, 
although  this  attitude  of  unyielding  radicalism  did 
not  win  converts,  the  abolitionists  did  exercise  a 
very  great  indirect  influence,  since  their  steady  repe- 
tition of  their  one  idea  kept  it  before  the  public,  and 
even  their  extravagances — such  as  the  public  burn- 
ing of  the  Constitution  by  Garrison,  in  1854 — served 
to  force  home  their  detestation  of  the  slave  system 
and  of  the  men  who  maintained  it.  Their  idealiza- 
tion of  the  negro,  whom  they  held  to  be  equal  in  all 
respects  to  the  white  man,  found  little  sympathy  in 
the  north,  but  their  hatred  of  the  slave-owner  struck 
a  responsive  note,  and  from  their  denunciations  of 
the  slave  system  undoubtedly  grew  the  popular  idea 
of  slavery  as  always  and  everywhere  monstrous  and 
disgusting. 

The  altered  feelings  of  the  north  on  the  subject 
of  "southern  aggressions"  showed  themselves  not 
only  in  the  formation  of  the  Republican  party,  but 
in  numerous  other  ways  equally  exasperating  to  the 
south,  as  they  were  intended  to  be.  The  fugitive- 
slave  law,  at  first  reluctantly  accepted,  was  later  the 


284  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

object  of  continual  attack  and  obstruction  from  the 
northern  people,  moved  partly  by  sympathy  for 
the  fugitives,  but  equally  by  a  desire  to  thwart  the 
pursuers.  The  Underground  Railroad  continued  its 
activity  with  increased  popular  sympathy  and  as- 
sistance.1 Rescues  or  attempted  rescues  of  slaves 
were  numerous,  among  the  most  famous  being  the 
attack  on  a  federal  court-house,  in  May,  1854,  by  a 
Boston  mob,  in  a  vain  attempt  to  free  Anthony 
Burns,  an  arrested  fugitive.  The  return  of  this  pris- 
oner was  carried  out  under  protection  of  state  and 
federal  troops,  in  the  presence  of  a  groaning,  hissing 
crowd,  and  in  later  years  every  Massachusetts  agent 
in  the  rendition  was  relentlessly  hunted  from  politi- 
cal life.  In  Wisconsin,  the  same  year,  occurred  the 
Booth  case,  which  has  already  been  referred  to,2  and 
in  1858  the  so-called  Oberlin  -  Wellington  rescue, 
where  a  crowd  of  northern  Ohio  men,  including  a 
professor  and  students  from  Oberlin  College,  rescued 
a  fugitive  and  were  tried  under  the  provisions  of  the 
act  of  1850,  until  the  vigorous  interposition  of  the 
state  authorities  forced  the  federal  government  to 
drop  the  prosecution.3 

In  a  still  more  aggravated  form,  this  determina- 
tion to  block  the  law  in  every  way  led  to  the  enact- 
ment, by  many  states,  of  so-called  "  Personal  Liberty 

1  Siebert,  Underground  Railroad,  318-320,  342. 

2  See  above,  chap.  xiv. 

3  Siebert,  Underground  Railroad,  327-336,  App.  B;  McDougal, 
Fugitive  Slaves,  43-5 2 ,  124-128. 


i86o]  NORTHERN   FERMENT  285 

Laws."  These  statutes,  most  of  which  were  passed 
after  the  Know  -  Nothing  and  Republican  parties 
gained  control,  prohibited  the  use  of  jails  to  confine 
fugitives,  forbade  state  judges  or  other  officers  to 
aid  in  their  capture,  authorized  the  issue  of  writs  of 
habeas  corpus  in  case  of  arrests  of  alleged  fugitives, 
provided  for  a  jury  trial,  sometimes  ordered  state 
attorneys  to  act  as  counsel  for  fugitives,  and  im- 
posed heavy  fines  and  imprisonment  upon  any  per- 
son kidnapping  a  free  man.1  These  laws  certainly 
came  near  to  nullifying  the  United  States  Constitu- 
tion, and  their  moral  effect  at  the  south  was  tremen- 
dous. They  showed,  as  nothing  else  could,  to  what 
an  extent  sectional  feeling  had  progressed,  and  an- 
nounced to  the  south  that  the  fugitive  -  slave  law 
could  be  executed  only  over  the  opposition  of  the 
northern  people. 

By  1860,  therefore,  the  north,  busily  occupied  with 
industrial  expansion  of  all  kinds,  with  reforms  and 
with  intellectual  ferments,  was  growing  all  the  time 
more  and  more  conscious  of  its  hostility  towards  the 
south  and  of  its  own  strength  to  render  that  hostility 
effective. 

Johnston,  "Personal  Liberty  Laws,"  in  Lalor,  Cyclopedia, 
III.,  162;  McDougal,  Fugitive  Slaves,  67-70;  Parker,  Personal 
Liberty  Laws,  3-51 ;  cf.  Hart,  Slavery  and  Abolition  (Am.  Nation, 
XVI.),  chap.  xix. 


CHAPTER    XX 

SECTIONALISM    IN    THE    SOUTH 
(1850-1860) 

IN  the  years  immediately  preceding  the  Civil  War, 
the  characteristic  civilization  of  the  southern 
states  reached  its  culmination,  making  of  the  slave- 
holding  area  a  region  with  most  of  the  features 
of  a  separate  national  consciousness,  a  community 
little  affected  by  the  industrial,  intellectual,  and 
emotional  influences  which  were  transforming  the 
north. 

The  economic  basis  of  southern  society  was  now 
the  culture  of  cotton,  and,  to  a  less  degree,  of  corn, 
rice,  and  sugar,  commodities  which  could  be  pro- 
duced with  profit  by  slave  labor.  The  railway  ex- 
pansion of  the  south  was  mainly  subsidiary  to  the 
agricultural  industry,  carrying  cotton  to  the  ports 
of  export,  and  also  bringing  from  the  north  those 
manufactured  articles  which  the  south  was  as  un- 
able to  produce  in  1860  as  in  the  previous  century. 
"  Whence  come  your  axes,  hoes,  scythes  ?"  asked  Orr, 
of  South  Carolina.  "Yes,  even  your  plows,  harrows, 
rakes,  ax  and  auger  handles?  Your  furniture,  car- 


1860]  SOUTHERN   SECTIONALISM  287 

pets,  calicos,  and  muslins?  The  cradle  that  rocks 
your  infant  to  sweet  slumbers — the  top  your  boy 
spins — the  doll  your  little  girl  caresses — the  clothes 
your  children  wear — the  books  from  which  they  are 
educated  ...  all  are  imported  into  South  Carolina."  * 
With  negroes  as  a  large  part  of  the  real  capital 
of  the  south,  and  the  plantation  as  the  normal  form 
of  investment,  the  social  and  economic  structure  of 
the  slave  states  was  almost  impervious  to  the  forces 
which  were  beginning  to  prevail  in  the  north.  The 
planter  aristocracy  remained  at  the  top  of  the  scale, 
its  numbers  small  in  comparison  with  the  total  popu- 
lation. In  1860  it  was  estimated  that  there  were 
only  384,753  slave-holding  individuals,  and  of  these 
less  than  one-half  had  more  than  five  slaves  and  less 
than  one-tenth  as  many  as  twenty.2  Capital  tended 
as  always  to  concentrate  in  few  hands.  Associated 
with  these  were  the  professional  classes  and  the 
financial  element,  which,  although  far  less  important 
than  the  similar  class  at  the  north,  played  an  active 
part  in  the  southern  economy.  Below  these  came 
the  body  of  southern  whites,  some  of  whom  were 
engaged  in  the  relatively  few  railways,  steamers, 
mills,  and  factories  of  the  south,  but  most  of  whom 
were  small  farmers  with  a  status  shading  off  into 
that  of  the  steady  accompaniment  of  slavery,  the 
"poor  white  trash."  But  few  of  the  slave  states  re- 
ceived any  of  the  flood  of  German  and  Irish  immi- 

1  Charleston  Courier,  April  18,  1855. 

2  Ingle,  Southern  Side-Lights,  362. 


288  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

gration,  since  the  lack  of  opportunity  for  free  labor 
kept  all  such  out  of  the  cotton  belt.1 

Nothing  had  taken  place  since  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury to  alter  the  ideals  of  the  southerners,  except 
the  fact  that  in  the  interior  and  Gulf  states  the 
aristocracy  of  family  was  replaced  by  a  more  flexible 
aristocracy  of  wealth.2  Although  many  large  slave- 
owners were  of  humble  origin,  there  yet  existed 
within  the  planter  class  a  sort  of  democratic  fellow- 
ship, interrupted  only  by  a  few  conservatives  of  the 
type  of  the  Virginian  who  observed  that  "Whigs 
knew  each  other  by  the  instincts  of  gentlemen."  3 

Social  and  political  leadership  rarely  passed  from 
the  hands  of  this  upper  class.  A  career  like  that  of 
Andrew  Johnson,  who,  from  being  an  illiterate  tailor, 
rose  to  be  twice  elected  governor  of  Tennessee  and 
later  senator,  was  altogether  exceptional ;  and  such 
a  book  as  Helper's  Impending  Crisis  was  an  anom- 
aly.4 Helper's  thesis  was  that  slavery  depressed  the 
poor  whites  and  enabled  the  slave-owners  to  profit 
at  their  expense ;  but  whatever  his  hopes  may  have 
been  of  turning  the  non-slave-holding  whites  against 
the  planter  capitalists,  he  could  not  arouse  them. 
Politics  were  an  affair  of  leaders,  who,  when  they 
differed,  appealed  to  the  voters,  but  did  not  consti- 
tute a  class  of  office-brokers  or  machine  organizers. 

1  For  details,  cf.  Hart,  Slavery  and  Abolition  (Am.  Nation, 
XVI.) ,  chap.  v.  2  Brown,  Lower  South,  45. 

3  Wise,  End  of  an  Era,  58. 

4  Helper,  Impending  Crisis,  123-132,  149-154. 


i86o]  SOUTHERN   SECTIONALISM  289 

The  southern  gentleman,  in  the  years  just  before 
the  war,  stood  as  the  product  of  an  aristocratic  soci- 
ety, a  figure  almost  without  a  parallel  at  the  north. 
No  wealthy  manufacturers,  railway  promoters,  cap- 
italists, or  business-men  challenged  his  supremacy, 
and  the  whole  of  southern  society  took  its  tone 
from  this  master.  The  ideals  of  the  southern  gen- 
tleman were  simple,  and  to  the  northerner  scarcely 
comprehensible.1  His  interests  were  few — cotton, 
negroes,  family  life,  neighborhood  affairs,  and  poli- 
tics. Education,  at  one  of  the  not  very  flourishing 
southern  colleges  or  at  one  of  the  larger  northern 
universities,  was  confined  to  a  small  number.  The 
personal  ideal  of  the  southerner  was  usually  ex- 
pressed by  the  word  "chivalry,"  a  term  comprising 
the  virtues  of  gallantry  towards  women,  courtesy  to 
inferiors,  hospitality  and  generosity  towards  friends, 
personal  courage,  and  a  sensitive  "honor." 

The  code  of  the  duel  was  still  a  sacred  part  of 
southern  social  standards,  not  usually  defended  in 
public,  but  practically  exacted  in  private,  and  based 
upon  ideals  of  "honor"  not  easily  understood  out- 
side the  society  wh  ch  upheld  them.  Jennings  Wise, 
for  instance,  the  son  of  Governor  Wise,  of  Virginia, 
a  man  of  "unaffected  piety,  naturalness,  sincerity, 
and  gentleness,  a  lover  of  children  and  so  amiable 
that  he  never  had  a  personal  quarrel,"  felt  himself 
obliged,  when  editing  the  Richmond  Enquirer,  to 
force  a  duel  upon  any  one  who  criticised  his  father. 
1  Ingle,  Southern  Side-Lights,  29-32,  39-46. 


2go  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

The  result  was  no  less  than  eight  "hostile  encoun- 
ters" in  two  years,  which  the  public  regarded  as 
"  natural  and  manly,  evincing  chivalry  of  the  high- 
est order."  1  Sensitiveness  to  insult  obliged  the 
southerner  to  seek  "  satisfaction  "  of  some  kind ;  and 
when  he  encountered  men  who  recognized  no  code, 
but  answered  him  with  equal  harshness,  he  felt 
obliged  to  employ  personal  violence,  as  in  the  case  of 
Brooks  and  Sumner.  This  affair  was  strictly  in  ac- 
cord with  southern  standards,  which  approved  instant 
vindication  of  injured  " honor"  by  violence  of  any 
kind.2  Murderous  threats  and  shooting  affrays, 
which  struck  a  northerner  with  horror,  were  of  every- 
day occurrence  in  many  southern  communities ;  and 
nothing  stood  more  in  the  way  of  mutual  compre- 
hension. The  refusal  of  the  northerners  to  fight 
when  challenged  made  the  whole  section  appear  to 
southerners  as  cowardly  and  ignoble,  while  the  unre- 
strained anger  and  ready  violence  of  the  southerner 
impressed  northern  men  as  the  brutality  of  a  partly 
civilized  bully.  Yet  the  home  life  and  domestic 
tenderness  and  courtesy  of  the  same  fiery  southern- 
ers who  fought  duels  and  uttered  threats  were  of  a 
charm  unimagined  by  their  northern  opponents,  but 
proved  by  the  testimony  of  innumerable  witnesses.3 
Upon  such  a  society  the  intellectual  upheaval  of 

1  Wise,  End  of  an  Era,  90. 

2  Von  Hoist,  United  States,  V.,  331 ;  Olmsted,  int.  to  Gladstone, 
Englishman  in  Kansas,  pp.  xviii.,  xix. 

3  Trent,  int.  to  Olmsted,  Seaboard  States  (ed.  of  1904) ,  I.,  p.  xxv. ; 
Page,  Old  South,  143. 


1860]  SOUTHERN   SECTIONALISM  291 

the  time  made  little  or  no  impression.  The  business 
hustle  and  hurry  of  the  new  industrial  life  faded 
away  as  one  entered  the  land  of  cotton,  and  so  did 
the  other  features  of  northern  life  of  the  decade. 
Orthodoxy  in  religion  prevailed  undisturbed  at  the 
south,  and  "isms"  and  reforms  remained  unknown 
there  except  when  brought  by  such  energetic  in- 
vaders as  Dorothea  Dix,  whose  crusade  for  asylums 
for  the  insane  stands  almost  alone  in  the  south  of 
that  time.  Spiritualism,  communism,  radicalism, 
all  failed  to  grow  in  the  south,  and  were  almost  as 
abhorrent  to  the  planters  as  abolitionism  itself.  The 
crazes  which  swept  the  north  stirred  slight  echoes 
there.  Jenny  Lind  and  Kossuth  found  less  ecstatic 
hearers,  the  Maine  law  failed  to  convulse  politics,  and 
the  Know-Nothing  movement  lacked  spectacular 
features.  Upon  their  superior  sanity  the  southern 
journals  often  congratulated  their  readers  in  lan- 
guage not  to  be  matched  outside  the  Tory  utterances 
of  Europe.  "In  the  North,"  said  the  Richmond 
Enquirer,  "  every  village  has  its  press  and  its  lecture 
room,  and  each  lecturer  and  editor,  unchecked  by  a 
healthy  public  opinion,  opens  up  for  discussion  all 
the  received  dogmas  of  faith.  .  .  .  The  North  fifty 
years  ago  was  eminently  conservative.  Then  it  was 
well  to  send  Southern  youth  to  her  colleges.  She  is 
now  the  land  of  infidelities  and  superstitions  and  is 
not  to  be  trusted  with  the  education  of  our  sons 
and  daughters."1 

1  Richmond  Enquirer,  January  r,  1856. 


292  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

As  a  consequence,  the  south  entered  but  feebly 
into  the  literary  renaissance  of  the  times,  and  in 
years  when  the  New  England  school  of  writers  was  in 
its  prime  still  struggled  along  with  but  the  tenderest 
shoots  of  a  local  literature.  Except  William  Gilmore 
Simms,  whose  prolific  genius  was  still  pouring  out 
poems,  romances,  dramas,  political  articles,  and  mis- 
cellaneous productions,  there  was  scarcely  a  southern 
writer  known  beyond  a  narrow  circle.  Southern 
magazines  found  it  almost  impossible  to  live,  for  the 
southern  people  were  never  great  readers,  and,  when 
they  subscribed  to  any  periodical,  commonly  took 
Putnam's,  Harper's,  or  the  North  American  Review. 
Only  the  Southern  Literary  Messenger  managed,  with 
difficulty,  to  survive  until  the  Civil  War. 

As  the  growing  divergence  between  the  sections 
progressed,  indignation  was  often  expressed  at  the 
dependence  of  the  south  upon  "abolitionist"  publi- 
cations, and  fervent  appeals  were  made  for  the  sup- 
port of  distinctly  southern  writers  and  periodicals. 
"  So  long  as  we  use  such  works  as  Way  land's  Moral 
Science"  wrote  one  irritated  southerner,  "and  the 
abolitionist  geographies,  readers,  and  histories,  over- 
running as  they  do  with  all  sorts  of  slanders,  carica- 
tures and  blood-thirsty  sentiments,  let  us  never  com- 
plain of  their  use  of  that  transitory  romance  [Uncle 
Tom's  Cabin}.  They  seek  to  array  our  children  by 
false  ideas  against  the  established  ordinances  of 
God."  l  But  declamation  and  resolutions  were  fu- 
1  De  Bow's  Review,  May,  1856,  p.  661. 


1860]  SOUTHERN    SECTIONALISM  293 

tile  to  create  a  literature,  and  the  south  con- 
tinued to  neglect  its  own  authors  and  publish- 
ers.1 

The  only  change  brought  by  the  years  1850-1860 
to  the  southern  states  was  an  intensification  of  their 
sense  of  common  interests  and  common  ideals  re- 
sulting from  the  incessant  slavery  controversy.  That 
southern  sectionalism  which  existed  from  the  forma- 
tion of  the  Union  now  developed  into  something 
approaching  closely  to  a  real  national  consciousness, 
evinced  in  innumerable  ways;  and  the  term  "The 
South"  was  as  familiar  in  congressional  and  other 
speeches  as  "  The  United  States  "  or  the  name  of  any 
single  state,  and  carried  an  equal  political  signifi- 
cance. One  form  assumed  by  this  new  self-con- 
sciousness was  that  of  a  sectional  "patriotism"  and 
exaltation  at  the  expense  of  the  antagonistic  north. 
Over  southern  society,  people,  manners,  intelligence, 
courage,  religious  life,  scenery,  natural  resources,  and 
future  prospects  flowed  an  unceasing  current  of 
praise.  "We  expect  true  refinement  of  mind  in 
America,"  said  one  writer,  "  to  be  born  and  nurtured 
and  to  exist  chiefly  in  the  Southern  portions  of  the 
Union.  .  .  .  The  pride  of  the  North  is  in  her  dollars 
and  cents,  her  factories  and  her  ships.  .  .  .  The  pride 
of  the  South  is  in  her  sons,  in  their  nobleness  of  soul, 
their  true  gentility,  honor,  and  manliness.  .  .  .  Both 

1  Trent,  Simms,  102,  128,  163;  Trent,  Southern  Writers,  65; 
Page,  Old  South,  57;  Miner,  The  Southern  Lit.  Messenger;  De 
Bow's  Review,  XXIV.,  173  (January,  1858). 


294  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1850 

have  their  gratification,  the  one  in  her  dollars  the 
other  in  her  sons."  i 

Beneath  all  this  self-assertion,  however,  existed  a 
growing  feeling  of  uneasiness  which  became  strongly 
felt  in  this  decade.  Although  De  Bow,  in  his  period- 
ical devoted  to  southern  economic  and  social  inter- 
ests, argued  that  the  south  was  more  prosperous 
than  the  north,  and  a  chorus  of  writers  and  speakers 
echoed  the  comfortable  belief,2  the  fact  remained 
that  the  north  was  undeniably  outstripping  the 
south  in  numbers,  industrial  wealth,  and  political 
power.  In  the  effort  to  arouse  the  community  to  a 
sense  of  its  danger,  and  to  discover  remedies  for 
southern  backwardness,  an  interesting  series  of 
Southern  Commercial  Conventions  was  held,  with 
annual  sessions  after  1852.  These  met  in  various 
cities,  and  debated  such  projects  as  a  southern 
Pacific  railroad  and  a  direct  southern  steamship 
line  to  Europe,  besides  many  other  subjects  of  in- 
terest to  planters.  As  the  Kansas  struggle  pro- 
gressed, these  meetings  reflected  more  and  more 
the  political  passions  of  the  time,  until,  by  1860, 
they  became  the  debating-ground  of  southern  radi- 
cals and  conservatives,  and  the  time  of  the  sessions 
was  taken  up  with  the  consideration  of  resolutions 
on  the  slave-trade  and  the  slavery  situation  in  gen- 
eral. In  1859  the  radicals  went  so  far  as  to  carry 
through  resolutions  evidently  intended  to  pave  the 

1  Southern  Lit.  Messenger,  XX.,  295  (May,  1854). 

2  Cleveland,  Stephens,  98. 


i86o]  SOUTHERN    SECTIONALISM  295 

way  for  the  transformation  of  the  Commercial  Con- 
vention into  a  permanent  body,  with  members 
elected  by  the  people,  capable  of  taking  political 
action.1  In  a  practical  way  these  meetings  accom- 
plished nothing:  something  more  than  resolutions 
and  fiery  speeches  was  needed  to  enable  the  south 
to  keep  pace  with  the  north. 

The  movement  for  southward  expansion,  already 
referred  to,2  was  another  result  of  the  southern 
uneasiness  over  the  growing  preponderance  of  the 
north.  The  popularity  of  Walker,  the  filibuster,  the 
demand  for  Cuba,  and  the  attempts  to  aid  Cuban 
insurrection,  all  were  based  on  a  feeling  that  only 
by  an  increase  of  territory  suitable  for  slave  economy 
could  the  south  hold  its  own.  "Would  I  perform 
my  duty  to  God,  to  my  country,  to  humanity  and 
to  civil  freedom,"  asked  Quitman,  of  Mississippi, 
"were  I  to  refuse  to  devote  a  portion  of  my  life  to 
such  a  cause  ?  .  .  .  Our  destiny  is  intertwined  with 
that  of  Cuba.  If  slave  institutions  perish  there  they 
will  perish  here.  .  .  .  Our  government  can  not  or  will 
not  act.  We  must  do  it  as  individuals."  3 

Another  scheme  for  aiding  the  south  was  the  re- 
opening of  the  slave-trade,  an  idea  which  rapidly 
gained  favor  in  these  years;  for  in  no  other  way 
could  the  planters  be  relieved  from  the  high  price 
of  slaves,  the  population  of  the  south  be  increased, 

1  De  Bow's  Review,  1853-1850,  especially  June,  1858,  and  July, 
1859.  2  See  above,  81,  87. 

3  Claiborne,  Quitman,  II.,  207. 

VOL.   XVIII. 20 


296  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1850 

and  the  economic  future  be  made  certain.  The  agi- 
tation began  after  1850,  the  advocates  of  the  re- 
opening of  the  trade  taking  high  ground.  A  writer 
in  De  Bow's  Review  classed  it  "  among  those  mysteries 
which,  however  repulsive  to  fastidious  eyes,  are  yet, 
in  the  hands  of  God,  the  instruments  of  Man's 
progress."  l  The  full  argument  was  thus  stated  by 
E.  A.  Pollard,  in  1857:  "There  are  many  minds 
among  us  firmly  convinced  that  the  Slave  Trade  is  al- 
most the  only  possible  measure,  the  last  resource  to 
arrest  the  decline  of  the  South  in  the  Union.  They 
see  that  it  would  develope  resources  which  have 
slept  for  the  great  want  of  labor,  that  it  would  in- 
crease the  area  of  cultivation  in  the  South  six  times 
what  it  is  now,  that  it  would  create  a  demand  for 
land  and  raise  its  price,  so  as  to  compensate  the 
planter  for  the  depreciation  of  the  slaves,  that  it 
would  admit  the  poor  white  man  to  the  advantages 
of  our  social  system,  that  it  would  give  him  clearer 
interests  in  the  country  he  loves  now  only  from 
simple  patriotism;  that  it  would  strengthen  the 
peculiar  institution;  that  it  would  strengthen  our 
representation  in  Congress,  and  that  it  would  revive 
and  engender  public  spirit  in  the  South."  2 

The  demand  was  first  made  publicly  by  Governor 
Adams,  of  South  Carolina,  in  1856;  and  on  various 
occasions  committees  of  the  South  Carolina  and 
Louisiana  legislatures  reported  in  favor  of  reopening 

1  De  Bow's  Review,  December,  1854. 

3  Charleston  Mercury,  February  17,  1857. 


1860]  SOUTHERN   SECTIONALISM  297 

the  trade.  In  1856  the  project  was  brought  before 
the  Southern  Commercial  Convention  and  was  de- 
feated, 1 8  to  67;  but  three  years  later  the  vote 
changed  to  49  to  19  in  its  favor.  The  subject  was  also 
brought  up  in  Congress  in  1859,  although  the  south, 
as  a  whole,  was  not  ready  to  seek  such  radical  ac- 
tion. But  the  high  prices  of  negroes  and  the  eager- 
ness of  southerners  for  added  slave  labor  led  to  a 
great  growth  of  slave  -  smuggling  in  these  years. 
Scores  of  slave-ships  sailed  from  New  York  to  the 
coast  of  Africa,  and  hundreds  of  negroes  were  land- 
ed in  the  southern  states.  The  federal  government 
was  apathetic,  and  the  laws  seemed  impossible  of 
execution.  In  forty  cases  tried  in  the  ten  years 
preceding  1856,  only  one  sentence  was  obtained,  the 
southern  juries  almost  uniformly  refusing  to  con- 
vict. In  1859  the  yacht  Wanderer  landed  over  three 
hundred  negroes  in  Georgia,  but  in  spite  of  the  wide- 
spread knowledge  of  the  affair  no  one  was  pun- 
ished.1 

The  desire  for  the  reopening  of  the  slave-trade 
was  part  of  a  significant  change  which  took  place  in 
southern  sentiment  in  these  years  regarding  the  in- 
stitution of  slavery.  For  twenty  years  southerners 
had  undergone  the  unremitting  and  merciless  at- 
tacks of  abolitionists  upon  the  slave  system,  and 
upon  themselves  for  not  instantly  abandoning  it; 
and  as  time  went  on  the  chorus  of  censure  steadily 

1  DuBois,  Slave-Trade,  180  et  seq.;  Spears,  Slave-Trade,  195 
et  seq. 


298  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

increased,  until  it  seemed  to  them  as  though  the  en- 
tire north  was  united  in  holding  them  guilty  in  the 
sight  of  God  and  man.  Yet  the  two  beliefs  most 
deeply  rooted  in  the  mind  of  every  southerner  were, 
that  he  was  an  honorable,  Christian  gentleman,  and 
that  the  slave  system  was  absolutely  necessary  to 
his  prosperity.  Some  positive  answer  was  necessary 
to  the  abuse  by  the  anti- slavery  critics.  It  was  not 
enough  to  retort  with  anger  and  contempt,  for  the 
European  world  stood  committed  to  the  northern  side, 
and  its  opinion  must  be  dealt  with.  Accordingly,  in 
this  decade  there  was  developed  a  new  political  and 
social  philosophy,  supplanting  all  previous  half  de- 
fences and  apologies,  which  boldly  asserted  that 
slavery  was  a  positive  good,  the  only  sure  basis  for 
society,  religion,  and  the  family,  while  liberty  was  a 
danger  to  the  human  race.1 

The  new  defenders  of  slavery  swept  away  at  the 
start  the  old,  traditional  doctrines  of  the  Revolution, 
denied  the  natural  equality  of  man  or  the  existence 
of  any  natural  right  to  liberty,  and  argued  that  only 
when  two  unequal  races  existed  together,  with  the 
inferior  in  subjection  to  the  superior,  was  true  hap- 
piness possible  to  either  and  the  highest  civilization 
attainable  by  the  superior  race.  To  prove  this  they 
pointed  to  the  miserable  condition  of  the  laboring 
classes  in  manufacturing  countries,  insisting  with 
never-tiring  emphasis  that  the  slaves  were  infmite- 

1  Merriam,  American  Political  Theory,  227-246;  cf.  Hart,  Sla- 
very and  Abolition  (Am.  Nation,  XVI.),  chap.  x. 


1860]  SOUTHERN   SECTIONALISM  299 

ly  better  off.  "Those  countries,"  said  one  writer, 
"  must  retain  their  form  of  society  and  try  to  make 
the  best  of  it.  But  we  contend  that  ours  is  better. 
We  assert  that  in  all  countries  and  at  all  times  there 
must  be  a  class  of  hewers  of  wood  and  drawers  of 
water  who  must  always  of  necessity  be  the  sub- 
stratum of  society.  We  affirm  that  it  is  best  for 
all  that  this  class  should  be  formed  of  a  race  upon 
whom  God  himself  has  placed  a  mark  of  physical 
and  mental  inferiority."  *  This  doctrine  had  been 
elaborated  before  1850,  by  Calhoun  and  others,  but 
it  now  became  the  accepted  creed  of  the  defenders 
of  slavery,  proclaimed  by  clergymen,  congressmen, 
and  newspapers  in 'the  teeth  of  the  Republicans. 

On  the  actual  condition  of  the  slaves  in  the  years 
1850-1860,  an  opinion  may  safely  be  formed,  for  at 
no  time  was  the  institution  subjected  to  more  care- 
ful study.  Travellers  observed  it  continually,  some- 
times laudatory  in  their  remarks,  oftener  the  reverse ; 
abolitionists  amassed  evidence  of  its  atrocities,  and 
defenders  painted  pictures  of  its  idyllic  sides.  All 
other  investigations  were  cast  into  the  shade  by  the 
work  of  Frederick  Law  Olmsted,  who  published  in 
this  decade  the  results  of  extensive  journeys  under- 
taken by  him  in  the  slave  states  for  the  sake  of 
seeing  slavery  as  it  was  in  the  dairy  life  of  the  peo- 
ple. Olmsted  was  no  friendly  critic  of  the  "  peculiar 
institution,"  and  he  acknowledged  himself  that  his 
books  were  "  too  fault-finding" ;  but  if  allowance  be 
1  Southern  Lit.  Messenger,  XXXVII.,  93  (July,  1858). 


300  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

made  for  this  personal  element,  the  observations 
create  such  a  picture  of  the  slave-holding  civilization 
as  can  be  found  nowhere  else.  The  real  economic 
failure  under  the  apparent  prosperity  of  slavery  and 
the  depressing  effects  of  the  system  upon  the  whites 
were  the  lessons  of  the  book.  Gleaned  from  every 
sort  of  source,  from  planter,  poor  white,  tavern 
loafer,  slave,  or  free  negro,  the  old  south  painted  its 
own  portrait  in  his  pages.1 

The  feeling  of  the  southern  people  towards  the 
north  grew  in  these  years  into  its  final  form.  Before 
the  Kansas-Nebraska  excitement  it  was  customary 
for  all  but  the  extreme  followers  of  Calhoun  to  be- 
lieve that  the  abolitionists — by  which  was  meant  all 
who  in  any  way  attacked  or  criticised  slavery — were 
in  a  small  minority,  and  that  the  national  feelings 
of  the  northern  majority  would  maintain  harmony. 
After  the  rise  of  the  Republican  party,  it  became  the 
conviction  of  a  majority  of  southerners  that  the 
north,  as  a  whole,  was  fundamentally  wrong  in  its 
view  of  southern  institutions,  and  could  not  be  relied 
upon  to  do  justice.  The  self  -  defensive  sentiment 
behind  northern  anti- slavery  feeling  was  not  grasped, 
and  the  course  of  politics  since  1850  was  regarded  as 
an  unprovoked  series  of  aggressions  upon  southern 
rights  and  southern  feelings.  "We  are  arraigned 
day  after  day,"  said  Davis  in  the  Lecompton  debate, 
"  as  the  aggressive  power.  What  southern  senator, 
during  this  whole  session,  has  attacked  any  portion 
1  Trent,  in  Olmsted,  Seaboard  States  (ed.  of  1904) ,  I.,  p.  xxxiii. 


i86o]  SOUTHERN   SECTIONALISM  301 

or  any  interest  of  the  north?  In  what  have  we 
now,  or  ever,  back  to  the  earliest  period  of  our  his- 
tory, sought  to  deprive  the  north  of  any  advantage 
it  possessed?  .  .  .  The  whole  charge  is  that  we  seek 
to  extend  our  institutions  into  the  common  terri- 
tory of  the  United  States.  .  .  .  You  have  made  it 
a  political  war.  We  are  on  the  defensive.  How 
far  are  you  to  push  us?"  1 

Since,  to  the  southern  mind,  slavery  was  right, 
common  fairness  required  that  it  should  have  at 
least  an  equal  share  in  the  federal  territories  and 
that  its  supporters  should  not  be  proscribed ;  hence 
the  Free  Soil  and  Republican  programme  was  wholly 
unjust  and  unfair.  Further,  the  duty  of  returning 
fugitive  slaves  was  part  of  the  common  Constitution, 
and  the  refusal  to  do  so,  whether  expressed  by  mobs, 
by  "  personal  liberty  laws,"  or  by  mere  inertness,  was 
equally  unpardonable.  Still  further — and  here  lay 
the  chief  ground  of  offence  in  the  people  of  the  north 
—the  inhabitants  of  the  free  states  were  no  more 
qualified  to  judge  of  the  rightfulness  of  slavery  than 
were  the  slave-holders  themselves,  and  their  per- 
sistent hostility  to  the  " peculiar  institution"  was  an 
affront  to  the  "honor"  of  the  entire  south. 

If  northern  injustice  were  to  continue,  there  could 
be  but  one  possible  result  —  secession.  Calhoun's 
spirit  dominated  southern  thought  after  his  death 
as  it  never  had  done  during  his  lifetime ;  his  Disqui- 
sition on  Government  was  studied  in  southern  colleges 
1  Cong.  Globe,  35  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  619. 


302  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

and  became  the  political  Bible  of  the  younger  men 
of  the  time,  until  the  doctrine  of  the  indivisible 
sovereignty  of  the  separate  states  was  an  ingrained 
part  of  the  southern  creed.1  If  the  states  were 
sovereign,  disunion  would  not  be  revolution,  but  a 
mere  dissolution  of  partnership,  and  ought  to  involve 
no  more  trouble  than  making  an  equitable  division 
of  common  property  and  common  liabilities.  No 
state,  moreover,  was  bound  to  adhere  to  the  partner- 
ship any  longer  than  was  profitable  or  honorable; 
and  the  other  partners  had  no  right  whatever  to 
object  to  its  withdrawal,  still  less  to  prevent  it. 

By  1859  the  time  was  close  at  hand,  in  the  opinion 
of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  southern  men,  when  the 
partnership  of  north  and  south  would  cease  to  be 
of  further  mutual  profit.  The  north  could  not  be 
driven  into  a  course  of  justice  by  reason,  and  com- 
pulsion through  commercial  boycott,  although  often 
discussed,  was  felt  to  be  inadequate.  Moreover,  as 
the  years  went  on  the  sense  of  social  repulsion  be- 
tween southern  aristocrats  and  northern  "mechan- 
ics," existing  since  the  foundation  of  the  country, 
increased  in  bitterness  until  the  planters  of  1860 
talked  as  if  the  "Yankee"  were  the  incarnation  of 
vulgarity  and  depravity.  De  Bow  curtly  defined 
"Yankees"  as  "that  species  of  the  human  race  who 
foster  in  their  hearts,  lying,  hypocrisy,  deceit  and 
treason";  elsewhere  he  discovered  the  source  of  the 

1  Merriam,  Am.  Political  Theory,  278-283;  McLaughlin,  in 
Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  V.,  484  (April,  1900). 


i86o]  SOUTHERN   SECTIONALISM  303 

social  degeneracy  of  the  north:  "The  basis,  frame- 
work and  controlling  influence  of  Northern  senti- 
ment is  Puritanism — the  old  Roundhead,  rebel  refuse 
of  England  which  .  .  .  has  ever  been  an  unruly  sect 
of  Pharisees,  .  .  .  the  worst  bigots  on  earth  and  the 
meanest  of  tyrants  when  they  have  the  power  to 
exercise  it.  They  have  never  had  the  slightest  con- 
ception of  what  constitutes  true  liberty  and  are  in- 
capable by  nature  of  giving  or  receiving  such."  * 

The  undeniable  ferment  of  the  north  in  thought 
and  in  reform,  taking,  as  it  did,  many  extravagant, 
although  harmless  shapes,  made  the  section  appear 
in  southern  eyes  reeking  with  irreligion,  blasphemy, 
and  radicalism.  Southern  defenders  were  forever 
drawing  comparisons  between  the  "poverty,  crime, 
infidelity,  anarchy  and  licentiousness  of  Free  Society 
and  the  plenty,  morality,  conservatism,  good  order 
and  universal  Christian  faith  of  Slave  Society." 2  To 
the  strictly  orthodox  southern  planters,  New  Eng- 
land seemed  a  land  of  abomination,  and  abolitionists 
appeared  bloody-minded  fanatics,  longing  to  cause 
negro  insurrection,  with  massacre  and  unmention- 
able horrors. 

So  matters  stood  in  1859:  mutual  misunderstand- 
ing, mutual  dislike  and  contempt;  on  one  side  a 
fixed  purpose  to  exclude  the  other  from  control  of 
the  federal  government;  on  the  other  an  equally 
fixed  purpose  to  secede  if  ousted.  For  years  the 

1  De  Bow's  Review,  August,  1857,  July,  1858. 

2  Richmond  Enquirer,  December  7,  1855. 


304  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1860 

control  had  been  kept  in  the  hands  of  the  south  by 
a  combination  in  the  ranks  of  the  Democratic  party 
of  northern  conservatives  with  southern  moderates; 
but  now  this  coalition  seemed  to  be  shaken.  Upon 
the  outcome  of  the  election  of  1860  hung  the  de- 
cision; in  the  minds  of  most  southern  leaders  the 
result  was  already  determined.  The  Union  must 
come  to  an  end. 


CHAPTER    XXI 
CRITICAL   ESSAY   ON   AUTHORITIES 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL   AIDS 

THE  most  useful  bibliography  for  this  period  is  that  in 
Edward  Charming  and  Albert  B.  Hart,  Guide  to  American 
History  (1896),  §§  186,  189,  198-202,  which,  although 
lacking  references  to  works  published  in  the  last  ten  years, 
is  reasonably  complete  as  regards  the  sources  and  the 
standard  authorities.  A  less  comprehensive  list,  annotated 
with  critical  comments,  is  found  in  J.  N.  Larned,  Literature 
of  American  History  (1902).  Older  and  less  complete,  but 
still  capable  of  use,  is  William  E.  Foster,  References  to  the 
History  of  Presidential  Administrations  (1885).  The  Cam- 
bridge Modern  History,  VIII.,  The  United  States  (1903),  con- 
tains a  select  bibliography  of  the  period;  and  the  index 
volume  of  Hermann  Von  Hoist,  Constitutional  History  of 
the  United  States,  VIII.  (1892),  contains  a  list  of  authorities 
which  deals  chiefly  with  the  period  after  1850.  See  also  the 
Critical  Essay  on  Authorities  in  the  preceding  and  follow- 
ing volumes  of  this  series,  Garrison,  Westward  Extension, 
and  Chadwick,  Causes  of  the  Civil  War. 

GENERAL  SECONDARY  WORKS 

The  secondary  work  which  studies  the  events  of  the 
period  before  the  Civil  War  in  the  greatest  detail  is  Her- 
mann E.  Von  Hoist,  Constitutional  History  of  the  United 
States,  IV.-VI.  (1885-1892).  The  author  based  his  writ- 
ings on  a  thorough  study  of  the  public  documents  and 


306  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

other  published  material  in  the  field,  and  displayed  a  con- 
sistently critical  attitude  towards  the  men  and  measures  of 
the  slavery  controversy  which  renders  his  work  of  unique 
service.  He  was  not,  however,  in  sympathy  with  American 
political  or  social  habits,  judged  overharshly,  and  was  so 
strongly  anti-slavery  in  predisposition  as  seriously  to  im- 
pair the  value  of  his  treatment  of  southern  leaders.  Less 
detailed  in  treatment,  but  far  more  successful  in  point  of 
view  of  combined  scholarship  and  impartiality,  is  James 
Ford  Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States  from  the  Com- 
promise of  1850  (7  vols.,  1893-1906),  which  devotes  parts 
of  vols.  I.  to  III.  to  this  period  and  bids  fair  to  be  regarded 
as  the  standard  account  of  these  years.  It  needs,  however, 
to  be  supplemented  on  the  side  of  diplomatic  and  legal  his- 
tory. James  Schouler,  History  of  the  United  States  (6  vols., 
1880-1897),  covers  this  period  in  the  fifth  volume,  ade- 
quately as  to  facts,  but  in  somewhat  mechanical  form 
and  with  a  strongly  northern  spirit.  The  account  by  John 
W.  Burgess,  The  Middle  Period  (1897),  and  The  Civil 
War  and  the  Constitution  (2  vols.,  1901),  is  concise,  an- 
alytical, legalistic,  and  founded  on  a  limited  range  of 
sources. 

Other  general  works  are  frankly  controversial,  almost  all 
of  them  written  by  northern  partisans.  Horace  Greeley, 
The  American  Conflict  (2  vols.,  1864),  gives  a  brief  resume, 
with  extracts  from  documents;  James  G.  Elaine,  Twenty 
Years  of  Congress  (2  vols.,  1884-1886),  comments  on 
economic  and  political  events.  The  full  but  ill-digested 
narrative  in  Henry  Wilson,  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Slave  Power 
(3  vols.,  1872-1877),  has  the  value  attaching  to  author- 
ship by  an  active  participant  in  the  contests  it  describes. 
George  Lunt,  The  Origin  of  the  Late  War  (1866),  describes 
events  from  the  stand-point  of  the  conservative  Whig. 
On  the  southern  side  there  is  little  of  value;  Alexander  H. 
Stephens,  The  War  between  the  States  (2  vols.,  1868-1870), 
and  Jefferson  Davis,  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate 
Government  (2  vols.,  1881),  slip  over  this  field  with  little 
detail  of  discussion. 


i86o]  AUTHORITIES  307 

COLLECTIONS    OF    DOCUMENTS 

The  only  general  compilation  of  documents  in  this  field 
is  Michael  W.  Cluskey,  Political  Text-Book  (1857),  which 
contains  a  mass  of  miscellaneous  material  bearing  on  the 
political  history  of  the  country  from  1850  to  1857.  The 
Whig  Almanac  (annual  vols.,  1851  to  1855)  and  its  con- 
tinuation, The  Tribune  Almanac  (annual  vols.,  1856  to 
1861),  contain  much  political  information;  and  the  Ameri- 
can Almanac  (annual  vols.,  1850  to  1861)  has  collections  of 
federal  and  state  statistics.  Albert  Bushnell  Hart,  Ameri- 
can History  Told  by  Contemporaries  (4  vols.,  1897-1901), 
contains  extracts  from  a  number  of  sources.  William 
MacDonald,  Select  Documents  Illustrative  of  the  History  of 
the  United  States  (1898),  comprises  the  most  important 
public  documents  of  these  years.  Among  special  collec- 
tions containing  documentary  matter  are  two  devoted  to 
presidential  papers — James  D.  Richardson,  Messages  and 
Papers  of  the  Presidents  (10  vols.,  1896-1897),  and  Edwin 
Williams,  Statesman's  Manual  (4  vols.,  1858).  John  B. 
Moore,  International  Arbitrations  (5  vols.,  1896);  Freeman 
Snow,  Treaties  and  Topics  in  American  Diplomacy  (1894), 
and  J.  C.  Bancroft  Davis,  editor,  Treaties  and  Conventions 
(1871),  contain  material  relating  to  foreign  affairs.  Charles 
F.  Dunbar,  Extracts  from  the  Laws  .  .  .  relating  to  Currency 
and  Finance  (1891),  and  Frank  W.  Taussig,  State  Papers 
and  Speeches  on  the  Tariff  (1892),  include  documents  bear- 
ing on  financial  history.  Ben  Perley  Poore,  Federal  and 
State  Constitutions  (2  vols.,  1877),  prints  the  state  consti- 
tutions and  amendments  adopted  in  this  period;  and 
Edward  Stanwood,  History  of  the  Presidency  (1898),  and 
Thomas  V.  Cooper  and  Hector  T.  Fenton,  American  Poli- 
tics (1882),  reprint  party  platforms  and  election  statistics. 

PUBLIC    DOCUMENTS 

The  primary  sources  for  most  of  the  history  of  this 
period  are  the  public  documents  of  the  United  States.  The 


3o8  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

history  of  legislation  and  of  party  and  public  opinion,  be- 
sides a  good  deal  of  information  upon  local  politics  and 
federal  administration,  are  to  be  found  in  the  Congressional 
Globe,  from  the  thirty-first  Congress,  second  session,  to  the 
thirty-fifth  Congress,  second  session.  The  progress  of  fed- 
eral finances,  foreign  affairs,  military  and  administrative  ac- 
tion is  to  be  studied  from  the  House  and  Senate  Journals, 
Executive  Documents,  and  Miscellaneous  Documents,  and 
in  the  Reports  of  Committees  from  the  thirty -first  to  the 
thirty-sixth,  or  in  some  cases  later,  congresses.  The  Stat- 
utes at  Large  of  the  United  States  contain  the  laws  of  this 
period  in  vols.  IX.  to  XL  (1851  to  1859),  and  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court  Reports  (vols.  8  to  24,  Howard),  are 
indispensable  for  the  judicial  history.  The  British  and 
Foreign  State  Papers  (in  vols.  XXXVIII.  to  L.,  1862  to 
1867)  contain  much  of  the  correspondence  relating  to  con- 
troversies to  which  the  United  States  was  a  party.  In 
addition,  important  material  is  to  be  found  in  the  docu- 
ments of  the  various  states,  the  Legislative  Journals,  the 
Session  Laws,  or  Acts  and  Resolves,  and  the  reports  of 
state  supreme  court  decisions. 

CONTEMPORARY    PERIODICALS 

The  magazines  of  the  period  contain  some  political  ma- 
terial and  are  of  value  in  exhibiting  the  social  and  intel- 
lectual life  of  the  times.  Among  the  northern  periodicals, 
Harper's  New  Monthly  Magazine  runs  through  the  period, 
as  does  the  older  North  American  Review.  Putnam's  Maga- 
zine began  in  1853,  and  the  Atlantic  Monthly  in  1857.  The 
American  Whig  Review  lived  only  to  1852,  but  the  Demo- 
cratic Review  lasted  until  1859.  In  the  south,  the  Southern 
Quarterly  Review  did  not  survive  1856,  but  the  Southern 
Literary  Messenger,  edited  by  William  Gilmore  Simms  and 
containing  the  best  products  of  southern  pens,  existed 
through  the  decade.  Among  economic  periodicals,  the 
Bankers'  Magazine,  of  New  York,  and  Hunt's  Merchants' 
Magazine,  of  Philadelphia,  furnish  much  information, 


1860]  AUTHORITIES  309 

mainly  about  northern  conditions,  and  De  Bow's  Commer- 
cial Review,  of  New  Orleans,  is  especially  valuable  for  the 
material  it  contains  relating  to  the  economic  and  political 
welfare  of  the  south. 

Among  newspapers,  all  shades  of  political  opinion  are 
represented  by  numerous  examples.  The  radical  aboli- 
tionist point  of  view  is  exhibited  in  the  Liberator  and  the 
National  Anti-Slavery  Standard;  the  Free  Soil  position  by 
the  National  Era.  Anti  -  slavery  Whig  and  Republican 
sentiments  are  shown  in  the  New  York  Tribune,  the  New 
York  Times,  the  Chicago  Tribune,  the  Boston  Advertiser, 
and  the  official  Whig  organs  in  the  west;  the  Ohio  State 
Journal,  Indiana  State  Journal,  and  the  Wisconsin  State 
Journal.  An  example  of  the  Whig  element  in  a  border 
state  is  the  Baltimore  American.  Anti-slavery  Democrats 
at  the  north  are  represented  by  the  New  York  Evening  Post 
and  the  Chicago  Democrat;  the  Hunker  Democracy  by  the 
Cleveland  Plain  Dealer  and  the  Washington  Union.  At  the 
south,  the  Charleston  Mercury  and  the  New  Orleans  Delta 
represent  the  extreme  pro-slavery  wing,  and  the  Richmond 
Enquirer  a  rather  more  moderate  attitude.  It  is  not  pos- 
sible to  enumerate  the  journals  which  contribute  informa- 
tion regarding  the  politics  and  life  of  the  time.  The  use  of 
the  telegraph  and  the  habit  of  copying  freely  from  each 
other  tended  to  make  the  more  important  papers  of  nearly 
equal  value  for  news,  the  distinguishing  feature  being  the 
presence  or  absence  of  editorial  power. 

WRITINGS    OF    PUBLIC    MEN 

The  published  works  of  statesmen  and  others  who  were 
active  in  this  period  include  few  by  southerners.  The  lead- 
ing ones  are:  The  Life,  Correspondence,  and  Speeches  of 
Henry  Clay  (edited  by  Calvin  Colton,  6  vols.,  1857;  reis- 
sued 1896);  The  Works  of  Daniel  Webster  (6  vols.,  1851); 
The  Private  Correspondence  of  Daniel  Webster  (edited  by 
Fletcher  Webster,  1857);  The  Writings  and  Speeches  of 
Daniel  Webster  ("national  edition,"  by  J.  W.  Mclntyre,  18 


3 io  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1850 

vols.,  1903);  The  Works  of  William  H.  Seward  (edited  by 
G.  E.  Baker,  5  vols.,  1853-1884);  The  Works  of  Charles 
Sumner  (15  vols.,  1870-1883);  The  Complete  Works  of 
Abraham  Lincoln  (edited  by  John  G.  Nicolay  and  John  Hay, 
2  vols.,  1904);  The  Speeches,  Lectures,  and  Letters  of  Wen- 
dell Phillips  (1863) ;  The  Works  of  Rufus  Choate  (edited  by 
Samuel  G.  Brown,  2  vols.,  1862);  R.  C.  Winthrop,  Ad- 
dresses and  Speeches  (4  vols.,  1852-1886) ;  Edward  Everett, 
Orations  and  Speeches  on  Various  Occasions  (4  vols.,  1853- 
1868) ;  The  Orations  and  Addresses  of  George  William  Curtis 
(edited  by  Charles  Eliot  Norton,  2  vols.,  1891);  The 
Speeches,  Correspondence,  etc.,  of  Daniel  S.  Dickinson  (2 
vols.,  1867);  and  John  A  Dix,  Speeches  and  Occasional 
Addresses  (2  vols.,  1864).  The  only  writings  of  ultra- 
southern  men  of  this  period  which  have  been  published  are, 
James  H.  Hammond,  Letters  and  Speeches  (1866),  and 
Thomas  L.  Clingman,  Writings  and  Speeches  (1877).  The 
Lincoln-Douglas  Debates  were  published  in  1860,  and  have 
been  reissued  in  1899.  Rowland  G.  Hazard,  Economics 
and  Politics  (1889),  contains  material  bearing  on  political 
and  financial  life  in  this  decade.  A  few  collections  of  let- 
ters to  and  by  public  men  have  appeared:  James  S.  Pike, 
First  Blows  of  the  Civil  War  (1879);  Salmon  P.  Chase, 
Diary  and  Correspondence  (American  Historical  Association, 
Report,  1902) ;  and  Some  Papers  of  Franklin  Pierce  (Ameri- 
can Historical  Review,  X.,  97,  350). 

AUTOBIOGRAPHIES    AND    REMINISCENCES 

Few  of  the  many  volumes  of  reminiscences  contribute  to 
the  knowledge  of  events  in  the  political  world,  but  their 
value  is  considerable  on  the  social  and  personal  side. 
Among  the  more  important  are  the  following,  which  treat 
of  political  doings  at  Washington :  Horace  Greeley,  Recol- 
lections of  a  Busy  Life  (1868);  Nathan  Sargent,  Public 
Men  and  Events  (2  vols.,  1875);  J.  W.  Forney,  Anecdotes 
of  Public  Men  (2  vols.,  1873,  1881);  Ben  Perley  Poore, 
Perley's  Reminiscences  (1886);  Thurlow  Weed,  Autobiog- 


i86o]  AUTHORITIES  3n 

raphy  (1884);  Richard  W.  Thompson,  Recollections  of 
Sixteen  Presidents  (1894);  James  A.  Hamilton,  Remi- 
niscences (1869).  Two  elaborate  attempts  at  self-justifica- 
tion are  James  Buchanan,  Mr.  Buchanan's  Administration 
on  the  Eve  of  the  Rebellion  (1866);  and  J.  Madison  Cutts, 
A  Brief  Treatise  upon  Constitutional  and  Party  Questions 
as  Received  Orally  from  the  Late  Stephen  A.  Douglas  (1866). 
Episodes  in  diplomatic  history  are  touched  upon  by  Samuel 
C.  Goodrich,  Recollections  of  a  Lifetime  (1856),  and  by 
Maunsell  B.  Field,  Memories  of  Many  Men  and  Some 
Women  (1874).  Western  political  life  is  set  forth  in  John 
Sherman,  Recollections  of  Forty  Years  (2  vols.,  1895); 
George  W.  Julian,  Political  Recollections  (1884) ;  and  Henry 
Villard,  Memoirs  (2  vols.,  1904).  Massachusetts  politics 
appear  in  George  S.  Boutwell,  Reminiscences  of  Sixty  Years 
(2  vols.,  1902),  and  Charles  T.  Congdon,  Reminiscences  of 
a  Journalist  (1880).  Southern  political  life  is  illustrated 
by  Benjamin  F.  Perry,  Reminiscences  of  Public  Men  (1883) ; 
Henry  S.  Foote,  Casket  of  Reminiscences  (1874);  Reuben 
Davis,  Recollections  of  Mississippi  and  the  Mississippians 
(1889);  and  Moncure  D.  Conway,  Autobiography  (2  vols., 
1904).  The  views  of  representative  anti- slavery  leaders 
appear  in  James  Freeman  Clarke,  Anti-Slavery  Days  (1883)  I 
Samuel  J.  May,  Recollections  of  the  Anti-Slavery  Conflict 
(1869);  Levi  Coffin,  Reminiscences  (1880);  and  the  Life 
and  Times  of  Frederick  Douglass,  Written  by  Himself  (re- 
vised ed.,  1895). 

BIOGRAPHIES 

The  lives  of  leading  men  are  among  the  best  secondary 
authorities  for  the  period,  although  here,  as  in  general,  the 
southern  literary  representation  is  regrettably  inferior.  For 
the  "Unionist,"  or  conservative  northern,  stand-point  there 
are  three  admirable  biographies  by  George  Ticknor  Curtis 
— James  Buchanan  (2  vols.,  1883),  Daniel  Webster  (2  vols., 
1870),  and  Benjamin  R,  Curtis  (2  vols.,  1879).  Others 
representing  the  same  tendency  are:  Andrew  C.  McLaughlin, 
Lewis  Cass  (1891) ;  Samuel  G.  Brown,  Rufus  Choate  (1870); 


VOL.  XVIII. — 21 


3i2  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

Robert  C.  Winthrop,  Jr.,  Memoir  of  Robert  C.  Wintkrop 
(1897);  and  George  C.  Gorham,  Life  and  Public  Services 
of  Edwin  M.  Stanton  (2  vols.,  1899).  Douglas  still  awaits 
an  adequate  biography,  the  best  campaign  life  being  James 
W.  Sheahan,  Life  of  Stephen  A.  Douglas  (1860).  The  more 
important  lives  of  Republican  leaders  are:  Edward  L. 
Pierce,  Memoir  of  Charles  Sumner  (4  vols.,  1877) ;  Frederic 
Bancroft,  William  H.  Seward  (2  vols.,  1900) ;  Frederick  W. 
Seward,  Seward  at  Washington  (1891);  Moorfield  Storey, 
Charles  Sumner  (1900) ;  James  W.  Schuckers,  The  Life  and 
Public  Services  of  Salmon  P.  Chase  (1874) ;  Robert  B.  War- 
den, The  Private  Life  and  Public  Services  of  Salmon  P. 
Chase  (1874);  Albert  Bushnell  Hart,  Salmon  Portland 
Chase  (1899);  Charles  E.  Hamlin,  Life  and  Times  of  Han- 
nibal Hamlin  (1899);  George  W.  Julian,  Joshua  R.  Gid- 
dings  (1892);  these  covering  the  congressional  history 
of  the  times.  The  course  of  state  politics  appears  in 
George  E.  Merriam,  The  Life  and  Times  of  Samuel  Bowles 
(2  vols.,  1885);  William  D.  Foulke,  Oliver  P.  Morton  (2 
vols.,  1899);  Parke  Godwin,  Life  and  Works  of  William 
Cullen  Bryant  (6  vols.,  1883);  Charles  Francis  Adams, 
Richard  H.  Dana  (2  vols.,  1890);  and  the  numerous  lives 
of  Lincoln,  especially  John  T.  Morse,  Abraham  Lincoln  (2 
vols.,  1893);  John  G.  Nicolay  and  John  Hay,  Abraham 
Lincoln,  a  History  (10  vols.,  1890);  Isaac  N.  Arnold,  Life 
of  Abraham  Lincoln  (1885);  Ward  H.  Lamon,  Life  of 
Abraham  Lincoln  (1872);  Ida  M.  Tarbell,  The  Life  of 
Abraham  Lincoln  (4  vols.,  1900);  and  a  dozen  others  of 
less  merit.  Among  biographies  of  radicals  the  Life  of 
William  Lloyd  Garrison  by  His  Children  (4  vols.,  1889), 
stands  pre-eminent  for  fulness  and  thoroughness  in  its  pres- 
entation of  the  combative  abolitionist  leader,  written  in  a 
spirit  of  unqualified  filial  eulogy,  but  based  in  nearly  every 
point  upon  the  words  of  the  subject  of  the  biography. 
Other  works  illustrating  the  reforming  activities  of  the  time 
are:  Oliver  Johnson,  Garrison  and  His  Times  (1880) ;  Octa- 
vius  B.  Frothingham,  Theodore  Parker  (1874),  and  Gerrit 
Smith  (1879);  John  Weiss,  Life  and  Correspondence  of 


i86o]  AUTHORITIES  313 

Theodore  Parker  (2  vols.,  1864);  James  W.  Chadwick, 
Theodore  Parker  (1901);  Francis  Tiffany,  Dorothea  L.  Dioc 
(1876);  George  L.  Austin,  Life  and  Times  of  Wendell 
Phillips  (1888);  Samuel  T.  Pickard,  John  G.  Whittier 
(1894);  J.  Eliot  Cabot,  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson  (2  vols., 
1887);  Lyman  Abbott,  Henry  Ward  Beecher  (1903);  Will- 
iam C.  Beecher  and  Samuel  Scoville,  Biography  of  Henry 
Ward  Beecher  (1888) ;  Edward  Gary,  George  William  Curtis 
(1894);  Annie  Field,  Life  and  Letters  of  Harriet  Beecher 
Stowe  (1898);  Charles  E.  Stowe,  Life  of  Harriet  Beecher 
Stowe  (1889);  Ida  H.  Harper,  Susan  B.  Anthony  (2  vols., 
1899) ;  and  the  lives  of  John  Brown  referred  to  below  in  the 
section  dealing  with  Kansas. 

On  the  southern  side  the  lives  of  representative  Union 
men  are:  Calvin  Colton,  The  Last  Seven  Years  of  the  Life 
of  Henry  Clay  (1856);  Mrs.  M.  Coleman,  The  Life  of  John 
J.  Crittenden  (2  vols.,  1871);  Carl  Schurz,  Henry  Clay 
(2  vols.,  1887);  William  Meigs,  The  Life  of  Thomas  Hart 
Benton  (1904);  Alfred  M.  Williams,  5am  Houston  and  the 
War  of  Independence  in  Texas  (1893);  James  S.  Jones, 
Andrew  Johnson  (1901);  but  no  adequate  life  exists  of 
John  Bell,  John  M.  Clayton,  or  any  other  of  the  southern 
Whigs.  The  radical  southern  leaders  are  represented  by 
Barton  H.  Wise,  Henry  A.  Wise  (1899);  Mrs.  Varina  J. 
Davis,  Jefferson  Davis,  a  Memoir  (2  vols.,  1890);  Frank 
H.  Alfriend,  Life  of  Jefferson  Davis  (1868);  Henry  Cleve- 
land, Alexander  H.  Stephens  in  Public  and  Private  (1868); 
Richard  M.  Johnston  and  William  H.  Browne,  Life  of 
Alexander  H.  Stephens  (1878);  Pleasant  A.  Stovall,  Robert 
Toombs,  Statesman,  Speaker,  Soldier,  Sage  (1892) ;  John  W. 
DuBose,  The  Life  and  Times  of  William  Lowndes  Yancey 
(1892);  Samuel  Tyler,  Memoir  of  Roger  B.  Taney  (1872); 
Henry  A.  Wise,  Seven  Decades  of  the  Union,  a  Memoir  of 
John  Tyler  (1876);  Lyon  G.  Tyler,  Letters  and  Times  of 
the  Tylers  (2  vols.,  1885);  Samuel  Boykin,  Memorial  Vol- 
ume of  Howell  Cobb  (1870) ;  Virginia  Mason,  Public  Life  of 
James  M.  Mason  (1903);  William  P.  Trent,  William  Gil- 
more  Simms  (1892);  John  F.  H.  Claiborne,  Life  .  .  .  of 


3i4  PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY  [1850 

John  A.  Quitman  (2  vols.,  1860).  Three  volumes  of  brief 
essays  upon  political  leaders  deserve  mention:  John  Sav- 
age, Our  Living  Representative  Men  (1860);  David  W. 
Bartlett,  Presidential  Candidates  (1859);  and  William  P. 
Trent,  Southern  Statesmen  of  the  Old  Regime  (1897).  Other 
biographies  are  referred  to  in  connection  with  special  fields 
of  the  period. 

PARTY    HISTORY 

There  is  no  general  history  of  parties  which  treats  fully 
of  this  period.  Jesse  Macy,  Political  Parties,  1846-1860 
(1900),  is  an  analytical  and  suggestive  study  of  party 
policies  and  relations,  but  it  does  not  deal  with  details. 
Party  methods  are  considered  in  a  number  of  modern 
monographs,  the  most  considerable  of  which  are  M.  Ostro- 
gorski,  Democracy  and  the  Organization  of  Political  Par- 
ties (2  vols.,  1902);  Jesse  Macy,  Party  Organization  and 
Party  Machinery  (1904);  Mary  P.  Follett,  The  Speaker  of 
the  House  of  Representatives  (1896) ;  Edward  C.  Mason,  The 
Veto  Power  (Harvard  Historical  Monographs,  1890);  Lucy 
Maynard  Salmon,  The  Appointing  Power  (1886);  and  Carl 
R.  Fish,  The  Civil  Service  and  the  Patronage  (Harvard  His- 
torical Studies,  1905).  Single  parties  are  treated  in  a  few 
contemporary  accounts  and  a  number  of  recent  scientific 
monographs.  Among  the  former,  partisan  in  temper,  are 
Robert  M.  Ormsby,  The  Whig  Party  (1859);  John  H.  Lee, 
Origin  .  .  .  of  the  American  Party  (1855) ;  Thomas  R.  Whit- 
ney, A  Defence  of  American  Policy  (1856);  James  R. 
Hambleton,  The  Political  Campaign  in  Virginia  in  1835 
(1856).  Among  recent  works,  Louis  D.  Scisco,  Political 
Nativism  in  New  York  (1901),  is  an  exhaustive  treatise, 
valuable  for  the  entire  history  of  the  Know-Nothing  move- 
ment. Other  studies  upon  the  same  party  are:  Laurence 
F.  Schmeckebier,  The  Know-Nothing  Party  in  Maryland 
(1899);  Charles  Stickney,  Know-Nothingism  in  Rhode  Isl- 
and (1894) ;  and  two  studies  of  Massachusetts  nativism  by 
George  H.  Haynes — "A  Know-Nothing  Legislature,"  in 
American  Historical  Association,  Report,  1896,  and  "The 


i86o]  AUTHORITIES  315 

Causes  of  Know-Nothing  Success,"  in  American  Historical 
Review,  III.,  67  (October,  1897).  The  career  of  the  Free 
Soil  and  Republican  organizations  appears  in  Theodore 
Clarke  Smith,  The  Liberty  and  Free  Soil  Parties  in  the 
Northwest  (Harvard  Historical  Studies,  1897);  Norman  D. 
Harris,  Negro  Servitude  in  Illinois  (1901);  a  series  of 
articles  by  Russell  Errett  in  the  Magazine  of  Western 
History,  X.  (1889);  and  Francis  Curtis,  The  Republican 
Party  (2  vols.,  1904).  A  valuable  study  of  the  growth  of 
corrupt  municipal  politics  in  New  York  City  appears  in 
Gustavus  Myers,  The  History  of  Tammany  Hall  (1901). 

LEGAL   HISTORY 

A  full  but  drily  technical  study  of  the  activity  of  the 
supreme  court  at  this  period  is  George  W.  Biddle,  "Con- 
stitutional Development  ...  as  Influenced  by ...  Taney," 
in  Henry  W.  Rogers  (and  others),  The  Constitutional  His- 
tory of  the  United  States  as  Seen  in  the  Development  of 
American  Law  (1889).  A  more  readable  account  is  Hamp- 
ton L.  Carson,  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  (2 
vols.,  1892).  George  Ticknor  Curtis,  Constitutional  History 
of  the  United  States  (2  vols.,  1896),  has  an  important  chapter 
upon  the  Dred  Scott  case  in  which  the  author  took  part, 
but  it  is  published  in  the  incomplete  state  in  which  it  was 
left  at  the  death  of  the  writer.  Of  the  numerous  contem- 
porary pamphlets  upon  the  Dred  Scott  case,  the  two  best 
known  are  Thomas  Hart  Benton,  Historical  and  Legal 
Examination  of  the  Case  of  Dred  Scott  (1857),  and  Horace 
Gray  and  John  Lowell  A  Legal  Review  of  the  Case  of  Dred 
Scott  (1857). 

DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY 

The  only  general  history  of  American  diplomacy  is  John 
W.  Foster,  A  Century  of  American  Diplomacy  (1900),  which 
gives  a  brief  but  in  the  main  correct  survey  of  these  years. 
The  fisheries  question  is  specially  dealt  with  by  John  B. 
Henderson  in  American  Diplomatic  Questions  (1901).  The 


316  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

slave-trade  and  the  Danish  Sound  dues  are  covered  by 
Eugene  Schuyler,  American  Diplomacy  and  the  Furtherance 
of  Commerce  (1886).  On  Cuban  relations  there  are  two 
monographs:  James  M.  Callahan,  Cuba  and  International 
Relations  (1899),  is  an  elaborate  study  of  the  Cuban  ques- 
tion deprived  of  much  of  its  usefulness  to  the  reader  by 
the  complete  omission  of  references;  more  valuable  to  the 
student  and  much  more  readable  is  John  H.  Latane,  "The 
Diplomacy  of  the  United  States  in  Regard  to  Cuba,"  in 
American  Historical  Association,  Report,  1897;  with  which 
is  to  be  compared  an  article  by  Sidney  Webster,  entitled 
"Mr.  Marcy,  the  Cuban  Question,  and  the  Ostend  Mani- 
festo," in  Political  Science  Quarterly,  VIII.  (1893).  On  the 
complicated  Central  American  question,  the  best  account, 
thorough  and  impartial  in  spirit,  is  Ira  D.  Travis,  The 
Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  (1900).  Briefer  studies  are  in  the 
volume  of  Henderson  above  referred  to,  and  in  John  H. 
Latane,  The  Diplomatic  Relations  of  the  United  States  and 
Spanish  America  (1900).  The  work  of  Lindley  M.  Keas- 
bey,  The  Nicaragua  Canal  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine  (1896), 
is  disfigured  by  violent  anti-British  partisanship,  and  is  to 
be  used  with  caution.  Thomas  J.  Lawrence,  Essays  on 
Disputed  Questions  (1884),  discusses  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  from  a  moderate  British  point  of  view.  The  career 
of  William  Walker,  the  filibuster,  is  treated  in  two  general 
works,  Hubert  H.  Bancroft,  California,  III.,  chaps,  xvi., 
xvii.  (1885),  and  Theodore  H.  Hittell,  California,  III. 
(1897).  Contemporary  accounts  of  more  or  less  trust- 
worthiness are  William  Walker,  The  War  in  Nicaragua 
(1860) ;  William  V.  Wells,  Walker's  Expedition  to  Nicaragua 
(1856).  Modern  studies  are  James  T.  Roche,  The  Story  of 
the  Filibusters  (1896),  and  especially  William  C.  Scroggs, 
"  Walker  and  the  Steamship  Company,"  in  American  His- 
torical Review,  X.  (July,  1905).  Akin  to  the  foregoing  is 
Howard  L.  Wilson,  "Buchanan's  Proposed  Intervention  in 
Mexico,"  in  American  Historical  Review,  V.  (July,  1900). 
The  dealings  of  the  United  States  with  China  and  Japan 
are  summed  up  by  James  M.  Callahan,  in  American  Rela- 


i86o]  AUTHORITIES  317 

lions  in  the  Pacific  and  ike  Far  East  (1901);  and  by  John 
W.  Foster,  American  Diplomacy  in  the  Orient  (1903).  A 
fuller  but  still  a  compact  account  of  Japanese  diplomacy 
is  Inago  O.  Nitobe,  The  Intercourse  between  the  United 
States  and  Japan  (1891).  Two  biographies  by  William  E. 
Griffis  are  also  to  be  consulted  in  this  field — Commodore 
Matthew  Galbraith  Perry  (1887),  and  Towns  end  Harris 
(1895).  The  lives  of  two  English  statesmen  who  took  part 
in  diplomatic  dealings  contain  a  small  amount  of  matter — 
T.  Walrond,  Life  and  Letters  of  James, Eighth  Earl  of  Elgin 
(1872),  and  E.  Ashley,  Life  of  Henry  John  Temple,  Vis- 
count P aimer ston  (2  vols.,  1876). 

ECONOMIC    HISTORY 

There  is  no  satisfactory  general  economic  history  for 
this  period.  Two  compilations  containing  many  facts  in 
an  unco-ordinated  shape  are  The  First  Century  of  the  Repub- 
lic (1876),  and  One  Hundred  Years  of  American  Commerce, 
edited  under  the  name  of  Chauncey  M.  Depew  (1895).  In- 
dustrial history  appears  in  two  works:  Albert  S.  Bolles, 
The  Industrial  History  of  the  United  States  (1879),  which  is 
incomplete  and  marked  by  strong  protectionist  views ;  and 
John  L.  Bishop,  History  of  American  Manufactures  (3  vols., 
1861-1868),  which  is  better,  but  not  of  the  first  rank.  Of 
greater  merit  are  certain  special  works :  James  D.  B.  DeBow, 
The  Industrial  Resources  of  the  Southern  and  Western  States 
(3  vols.,  1852-1853);  Benjamin  F.  French,  The  History  of 
the  Iron  Trade  (1858);  and  two  modern  monographs — 
James  M.  Swank,  Iron  in  all  Ages  (second  ed.,  1892),  and 
Matthew  B.  Hammond,  The  Cotton  Industry  (1897).  The 
railway  building  of  the  period  is  described  in  John  L.  Ring- 
wait,  The  American  Transportation  System  (1888),  and  by 
Fletcher  W.  Hewes,  in  The  American  Railway  (1889).  The 
political  aspect  of  railway  construction  is  well  handled  by 
John  B.  Sanborn,  Congressional  Grants  of  Land  in  Aid  of 
Railways  (1899),  an(^  by  William  A.  Scott,  The  Repudia- 
tion of  State  Debts  (1893).  Two  writers  treat  of  the  Amen- 


3r8  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

can  shipping  industry  from  diametrically  opposite  points 
of  view:  David  A.  Wells,  Our  Merchant  Marine  (1890), 
holding  that  the  loss  of  the  carrying-trade  was  due  to  over- 
protection;  and  William  W.  Bates,  The  American  Marine 
(1897),  maintaining  that  the  trouble  was  due  to  insufficient 
governmental  support.  The  efforts  to  lay  the  Atlantic 
cable  of  1858  are  described  in  Henry  M.  Field,  The  History 
of  the  Atlantic  Telegraph  (1869). 

The  finances  of  the  period  are  admirably  summarized  in 
Davis  R.  Dewey,  The  Financial  History  of  the  United  States 
(1903),  a  work  notable  for  clearness,  completeness,  and  cool- 
ness of  judgment.  Albert  S.  Bolles,  Financial  History  of 
the  United  States  (3  vols.,  1879-1886),  has  greater  merits 
than  the  Industrial  History,  but  does  not  cover  the  entire 
field  and  is  controversial  in  tone.  David  Kinley,  The  Inde- 
pendent Treasury  (1893),  is  a  scientific  study  of  part  of  the 
governmental  machinery.  William  G.  Sumner,  Banking  in 
all  Nations  (4  vols.,  1896),  vol.  I.,  has  an  elaborate  history 
of  state  banking  prior  to  the  Civil  War,  and  a  briefer  treat- 
ment of  the  same  subject  is  in  Horace  White,  Money  and 
Banking  (1896).  There  are  three  contemporary  mono- 
graphs upon  the  panic  of  1857:  David  M.  Evans,  The  His- 
tory of  the  Commercial  Crisis  (1859);  James  S.  Gibbons, 
The  Banks  of  New  York  .  .  and  the  Panic  0/1857  (1858); 
and  Max  Wirth,  Geschichte  der  Handelskrisen  (1858).  By 
far  the  best  recent  treatment  of  the  panic  and  its  results  is 
in  Charles  F.  Dunbar,  Economic  Essays  (edited  by  O.  M.  W. 
Sprague,  1904).  The  tariff  is  treated  from  opposite  points 
of  view  by  Frank  W.  Taussig,  Tariff  History  of  the  United 
States  (revised  ed.,  1898),  which  is  critical  in  its  attitude 
towards  protection;  and  Edward  Stanwood,  American 
Tariff  Controversies  (2  vols.,  1903),  which  is  frankly  written 
from  the  protectionist  stand-point,  but  with  attempts  at 
impartiality.  No  full  study  of  the  movements  of  popula- 
tion in  this  decade  has  been  made,  but  there  is  a  brief 
reference  to  municipal  development  in  Adna  F.  Weber,  The 
Growth  of  Cities  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  (1899).  The 
principal  sources  for  the  economic  history  of  the  decade 


i86o]  AUTHORITIES  319 

are  the  volumes  of  the  Eighth  Census  of  the  United  States 
(4  vols.,  1864-1866),  the  House  Executive  Documents  and 
Senate  Executive  Documents,  containing  reports  of  secre- 
taries of  the  treasury.  The  similar  reports  of  state  finances 
should  not  be  overlooked. 


THE    SOUTH 

The  critical  chapter  of  Albert  Bushnell  Hart,  Slavery 
and  Abolition  (American  Nation,  XVI.),  deals  with  the 
literature  of  this  topic  in  detail.  The  nature  of  southern 
political  life  is  well  shown  in  Joseph  Hodgson,  The  Cradle 
of  the  Confederacy  (1876) ;  Ulrich  B.  Phillips,  "Georgia  and 
State  Rights,"  in  tlie  American  Historical  Association, 
Report,  1901;  and  James  W.  Garner,  "The  First  Struggle 
over  secession  in  Mississippi,"  in  Mississippi  Historical  So- 
ciety, Publications,  IV.,  91  (1901).  A  useful  and  temperate 
book  upon  the  south  as  a  section  is  Edward  Ingle,  Southern 
Sidelights  (1896).  The  classic  works  upon  southern  eco- 
nomic and  social  conditions  before  the  war  are:  Frederick 
Law  Olmsted,  The  Seaboard  Slave  States  (1856;  a  new  ed., 
1904),  A  Journey  through  Texas  (1857),  and  A  Journey 
in  the  Back  Country  (1860).  A  condensation  of  these 
was  published  under  the  title  The  Cotton  Kingdom  (2  vols., 
1861).  A  contemporary  southern  view  is  David  Christy, 
Cotton  is  King  (1855).  A  modern  study  of  slavery  before 
the  war  is  in  Matthew  B.  Hammond,  The  Cotton  Industry 
(1897) ;  and  the  subject  is  also  treated  by  George  W.  Will- 
iams, The  History  of  the  Negro  Race  in  America  (2  vols., 
1883).  Hinton  R.  Helper,  The  Impending  Crisis  (1857),  is 
of  historical  interest  as  showing  the  beliefs  of  an  anti- 
slavery  southerner  about  slavery  and  its  effects,  but  its 
temper  is  too  polemic  to  permit  of  accuracy.  John  C. 
Hurd,  The  Law  of  Freedom  and  Bondage  (2  vols.,  1858- 
1862),  is  the  most  elaborate  legal  treatise  upon  slavery. 
William  Goodell,  The  American  Slave  Code  (1853),  is  a  more 
anti-slavery  presentation;  and  Thomas  R.  R.  Cobb,  An  In- 
quiry into  the  Law  of  Negro  Slavery  (1858),  gives  a  southern 


320  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

point  of  view.  The  leading  books  in  defence  of  slavery  as 
a  positive  good  are  Albert  T.  Bledsoe,  Liberty  and  Slavery 
(1856),  William  Harper,  James  H.  Hammond,  William  G. 
Simms,  and  Thomas  B.  Dew,  The  Pro -Slavery  Argument 
(1853);  and,  still  more  radical,  the  works  of  George  Fitz- 
hugh,  Sociology  for  the  South  (1854),  and  Cannibals  All 
(1857).  These  views  are  conveniently  summarized  and 
analyzed  in  Charles  E.  Merriam,  American  Political  Theories 
(1903).  The  sharp  revival  of  the  slave-trade  at  this  period 
is  described  in  W.  E.  Burghardt  DuBois,  The  Suppression 
of  the  Slave-Trade  (Harvard  Historical  Studies,  1896),  and 
in  more  popular  style  in  James  R.  Spears,  The  American 
Slave-Trade  (1900).  The  conditions  of  social  life  and  sec- 
tional feeling  in  the  south  have  been  described  in  a  large 
number  of  reminiscent  works,  nearly  all  tinged  with  rose- 
color,  but  useful  as  showing  how  the  southern  aristocracy 
regarded  themselves.  Some  of  the  best  of  these  are :  John 
S.  Wise,  The  End  of  an  Era  (1899);  Thomas  Nelson  Page, 
The  Old  South  (1892) ;  Mrs.  V.  V.  Clayton,  Black  and  White 
under  the  Old  Regime  (1899);  Mrs.  Roger  A.  Pryor,  Remi- 
niscences of  Peace  and  War  (1904);  Ada  Sterling,  A  Belle 
of  the  Fifties  (1904);  and  William  M,  Polk,  Leonidas  Polk, 
Bishop  and  General  (2  vols.,  1893). 

STATE    HISTORIES 

A  few  of  the  state  histories  are  of  value  for  the  political 
life  of  the  times.  Among  the  southern  states,  Louisiana  is 
treated  fully  in  Alcee  Fortier,  The  History  of  Louisiana  (4 
vols.,  1904).  Others  are  Dudley  G.  Wooten,  A  Compre- 
hensive History  of  Texas  (2  vols.,  1898) ;  Robert  Lowry  and 
William  H.  McCardle,  History  of  Mississippi  (1893) ;  Lucien 
Carr,  Missouri  (1888) ;  Walter  B.  Davis  and  Daniel  S.  Dur- 
rie,  Illustrated  History  of  Missouri  (1876);  W.  F.  Switz- 
ler,  The  Commonwealth  of  Missouri  (edited  by  Chauncey 
R.  Barns,  1877);  Isaac  W.  Avery,  History  of  the  State  of 
Georgia  (1881);  C.  G.  Smith,  History  of  Georgia  (1900); 
John  W.  Moore,  History  of  North  Carolina  (1880) ;  Nathaniel 


1860]  AUTHORITIES  321 

S.  Shaler,  Kentucky  (1885).  Among  northern  state  his- 
tories the  following  contain  political  matter:  Francis  B. 
Lee,  New  Jersey  (4  vols.,  1902);  Ellis  H.  Roberts,  New 
York  (2  vols.,  1887);  John  Moses,  Illinois,  Historical  and 
Statistical  (2  vols.,  1892);  Charles  R.  Tuttle,  Illustrated 
History  of  Wisconsin  (1875) ;  and  Alexander  M.  Thompson, 
Political  History  of  Wisconsin  (1900).  California  has  a 
voluminous  literature,  most  of  which  is  of  purely  local 
interest.  The  fullest  and  most  authoritative  histories  of 
the  state  are  Hubert  Howe  Bancroft,  California,  History 
of  the  Pacific  States,  XVII.  (1888);  Theodore  H.  Hittell, 
California  (4  vols.,  1885-1897);  Franklin  Tuthill,  History 
of  California  (1866);  and  Josiah  Royce,  California  (1886). 
For  Utah  and  New  Mexico  the  best  summaries  are  in 
Hubert  Howe  Bancroft,  History  of  the  Pacific  States,  XII. 
and  XXI.  (1889). 

KANSAS 

The  primary  sources  for  Kansas  history  are  to  be  found 
in  the  congressional  documents  and  the  territorial  docu- 
ments. Contemporary  newspapers,  especially  those  pub- 
lished in  Kansas,  are  to  be  used  with  caution.  Remi- 
niscences are  of  doubtful  value  unless  checked  by  the 
testimony  of  the  documents.  The  Kansas  Historical  Society, 
Transactions  (7  vols.  published  to  1902),  contain  many  such, 
of  all  degrees  of  merit.  Histories  of  Kansas  are  nearly  all 
controversial  in  tone,  for,  although  none  has  been  written 
from  the  pro-slavery  point  of  view,  there  was  so  much  per- 
sonal and  factional  antagonism  among  the  members  of  the 
Free  State  party  that  recent  works  are  all  more  or  less 
tinged  with  their  sentiments.  The  contemporary  accounts 
are:  Sara  Robinson,  Kansas,  its  Exterior  and  Interior  Life 
(1856);  William  Phillips,  The  Conquest  of  Kansas  (1856); 
Thomas  H.  Gladstone,  The  Englishman  in  Kansas  (1857); 
and  John  H.  Gihon,  Governor  Geary  and  Kansas  (1857). 
Among  later  writers  there  is  a  sharp  division  between  those 
who  hold  that  John  Brown  and  "Jim"  Lane  were  chiefly 
effective  in  gaining  the  day  for  the  Free  State  party,  and 


322  PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY  [1850 

those  who  consider  that  peaceful  and  political  means  were 
more  successful.  The  biographies  of  John  Brown  main- 
tain the  former  view:  Frank  B.  Sanborn,  Life  and  Letters 
of  John  Brown  (1885) ;  James  Redpath,  The  Public  Life  of 
Captain  John  Brown  (1860);  John  Newton,  Captain  John 
Brown  (1902);  William  E.  Connelly,  John  Brown  (1900); 
and,  to  a  less  degree,  Daniel  W.  Wilder,  Annals  of  Kansas 
(1875);  John  N.  Holloway,  History  of  Kansas  (1868);  and 
Charles  R.  Tuttle,  Centennial  History  of  Kansas  (1876). 
On  the  other  side,  the  leading  works  are:  Eli  Thayer,  The 
Kansas  Crusade  (1889),  which  claims  full  credit  for  the 
Emigrant  Aid  Society,  and  is  supported  rather  more  moder- 
ately by  William  Lawrence,  The  Life  of  Amos  A.  Lawrence 
(1888) ;  and  two  books  upholding  the  claims  of  Robinson — 
Charles  Robinson,  The  Kansas  Conflict  (1892;  second  ed., 
1898),  the  work  of  the  Free  State  leader  himself;  and 
Frank  W.  Blackmar,  The  Life  of  Charles  Robinson  (1902). 
George  W.  Brown,  a  participant,  writes  three  controversial 
works  —  Reminiscences  of  Old  John  Brown  (1880),  False 
Claims  of  Kansas  Historians  Truthfully  Corrected  (1902), 
and  Reminiscences  of  Governor  R.  J.  Walker  (1902).  Lever- 
ett  W.  Spring,  Kansas,  the  Prelude  to  the  War  for  the  Union 
(1885),  although  not  controversial  in  tone  and  eminently 
fair  to  the  pro-slavery  as  well  as  the  Free-State  side,  decides 
against  the  partisans  of  Brown  and  Lane,  as  does  A.  T. 
Andreas,  The  History  of  Kansas  (1883).  Two  good  articles 
in  this  field  are  Walter  L.  Fleming,  "The  Buford  Expedi- 
tion to  Kansas,"  in  American  Historical  Review,  VI.,  38 
(October,  1900),  and  Leverett  W.  Spring,  "The  Career  of 
a  Kansas  Politician,"  in  American  Historical  Review,  IV., 
80  (October,  1898). 

SOCIAL    CONDITIONS 

The  observations  of  foreign  travellers  in  the  decade  be- 
fore the  Civil  War  continue  to  be  of  value,  although  to  a 
less  degree  than  at  earlier  dates.  William  Chambers, 
Things  as  They  Are  in  America  (1854),  is  an  example  of  a 


1860]  AUTHORITIES  323 

highly  friendly  account ;  Jean  Jacques  Ampere,  Promenade 
en  Amerique  (2  vols.,  1855),  is  a  more  critical  work.  Others 
worth  consulting  are  Ferencz  and  Terezia  Pulszky,  White, 
Red,  Black,  Sketches  of  American  Society  (2  vols.,  1853); 
Isabella  Bird,  The  Englishwoman  in  America  (1856);  and 
Lady  E.  S.  Wortley,  Travels  in  the  United  States  (1851). 
Descriptions  of  the  new  fashionable  society  life  are  in 
Nathaniel  P.  Willis,  Hurry  graphs  (1851);  Charles  N. 
Bristed,  The  Upper  Ten  Thousand  (1852);  and  George 
Will  iam  Curtis,  Lotus-Eating  (1852).  A  highly  unfavorable 
view  of  the  reform  movements  of  the  time  is  in  George 
Lunt,  Radicalism  in  Philosophy,  Religion,  and  Social  Life 
(1858).  Modern  studies  of  the  Maine-law  agitation  are  in 
Arthur  Sherwell  and  John  Rowntree,  The  Temperance 
Problem  and  Social  Reform  (1899) ;  Frederick  H.  Wines  and 
John  Koren,  The  Liquor  Problem  in  its  Legislative  Aspect 
(1897) ;  Robert  C.  Pitman,  Alcohol  and  the  State  (1877),  and 
the  Cyclopedia  of  Temperance  and  Prohibition  (1891).  The 
standard  work  on  the  woman's  rights  movement  is  Eliza- 
beth Cady  Stanton,  Susan  B.  Anthony,  and  Matilda  J.  Gage, 
The  History  of  Woman  Suffrage  (4  vols.,  1881).  The  au- 
thority upon  the  spiritualistic  craze  of  the  fifties  is  Frank 
Podmore,  Modern  Spiritualism  (2  vols.,  1902). 

The  general  attitude  of  the  north  towards  slavery  is 
summed  up  and  discussed  by  Charles  E.  Merriam,  American 
Political  Theories  (1903).  Since  no  new  doctrines  were  de- 
veloped by  abolitionists  during  this  period,  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  do  more  than  mention  the  leading  books  published 
by  them:  William  Chambers,  American  Slavery  and  Colour 
(1857),  an(i  Richard  Hildreth,  Despotism  in  America  (1854). 
Nehemiah  Adams,  A  South-side  View  of  Slavery  (1855),  won 
unending  notoriety  in  New  England  as  a  defence  of  the 
institution.  The  subject  of  fugitive  slaves  and  the  attitude 
of  the  north  towards  them  is  shown  in  William  Still,  The 
Underground  Railroad  (1883),  and  particularly  in  Wilbur 
H.  Siebert,  The  Underground  Railroad  (1898),  the  standard 
work  on  the  subject.  Marion  G.  McDougall,  Fugitive 
Slaves  (1891),  is  a  useful  summary;  and  Joel  Parker,  Per- 


324  PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY  [1860 

sonal  Liberty  Laws  (1858),  is  a  contemporary  criticism  of 
one  aspect  of  the  northern  opposition  to  the  fugitive-slave 
act.  Three  of  the  best-known  cases  of  fugitive  rescues  are 
treated  in  Charles  E.  Stevens,  Anthony  Burns,  a  History 
(1856);  Jacob  R.  Shipherd,  History  of  the  Oberlin-W  elling- 
ton  Rescue  (1859);  and  The  History  of  the  Trial  of  Castner 
Hanway  for  Treason  .  .  .  by  a  Member  of  the  Philadelphia 
Bar  (1852). 


INDEX 


ABLEMAN  vs.  Booth,  207. 

Abolitionists,  results  of  agita- 
tion, 4,  282;  and  fugitive- 
slave  law,  15;  Union  meet- 
ings against,  16;  attitude, 
282;  bibliography,  312. 

Accessory  Transit  Company, 
89 ;  and  Grey  town  port  dues, 
00-92;  and  Walker,  251,  252. 

Adams,  J.  H.,  and  reopening  of 
slave-trade,  296. 

Agriculture,  grain  exports,  66; 
shifting  of  grazing  centre,  67 ; 
"king  cotton,"  67;  effect  of 
panic,  177-181. 

Ampere,  J.  J.,  on  American  ex- 
citability, 270. 

Amusements,  dearth  of  ration- 
al, 275;  of  "society/!  275. 

Anarchism,  rise,  268. 

Annexation.     See  Territory. 

Anthony,  Susan  B.,  as  agitator, 
269,  270. 

Atchison,  D.  R.,  and  Kansas, 
125,  126;  appeal  to  southern- 
ers, 143;  sack  of  Lawrence, 
156. 

Atlantic  Monthly,  266. 

Austria,  Huelsemann  incident, 
76;  Koszta  affair,  78. 

BANCROFT,  GEORGE,  as  histori- 
an, 267. 

Banks,  N.  P.,  speakership  con- 
test, 145,  146;  presidential 
nomination,  163;  withdraws, 
169. 


Banks,  expansion,  70;  condi- 
tion (1850-1857),  71;  suspen- 
sion, 175,  176;  resumption, 
177;  revival,  187;  bibliogra- 
phy, 318. 

"Barnburners"  return  to  regu- 
larity, 17,  36. 

Barringer,  D.  N.,  and  Lopez 
prisoners,  83. 

Bay  Islands  colony,  90,  91,  253, 
256,  257. 

Beecher,  H.  W.,  "Beecher's 
Bibles,"  143;  as  lecturer,  273. 

Bedini  in  America,  115. 

Bell,  John,  political  character, 
46;  and  Know-Nothingism, 
139;  and  Lecompton  consti- 
tution, 225. 

Bell,  P.  H.,  secessionist  (1850), 
19. 

Benjamin,  J.  P.,  joins  Demo- 
crats, 139. 

Bennett,  J.  G.,  as  journalist, 
277. 

Benton,  T.  H.,  loses  senator- 
ship,  25,  42;  on  Kansas- 
Neoraska  bill,  103. 

Bibliographies  of  period  1850— 
.  1860,  305. 

Biographies  of  period  1850- 
1860,  310-314. 

Black  Warrior  affair,  86. 

"Blue  Lodges,"  125. 

"Border  Ruffians,"  128. 

Boston,  Shadrach  rescue,  23; 
Sims  case,  25;  Burns  rendi- 
tion, 284. 


326 


PARTIES   AND    SLAVERY 


Boutwell,  G.  S.,  elected  gov- 
ernor, 1 8. 

Bowen,  Francis,  as  writer,  267. 

Bowles,  Samuel,  as  journalist, 
277. 

Breckinridge,  J.  C.,  vice-presi- 
dential nomination,  162. 

Bright,  J.  D.,  on  partisan  civil 
service,  53. 

Broderick,  D.  C.,  and  adminis- 
tration, 224,  245;  election  of 
1859,  246;  killed,  246. 

Brooks,  Preston,  assaults  Sum- 
ner,  157;  resigns,  re-elected, 
158;  and  public  opinion,  159, 
290. 

Brown,  A.  G.,  as  debater,  52; 
demands  protection  for  sla- 
very, 242. 

Brown,  Antoinette,  as  agitator, 
269.  . 

Brown,  John,  massacre  in  Kan- 
sas, 165;  bibliography,  322. 

Buchanan,  James,  and  placa- 
tion  of  south,  n;  political 
character,  45;  and  rotation 
in  office,  54;  Co vode  investi- 
gation, 56;  diplomatic  dress, 
79;  Ostend  manifesto,  87; 
Central  American  diplomacy, 
91,  92,  255-258;  nomination, 
162;  on  Republican  section- 
alism, 171;  professed  atti- 
tude on  Kansas,  171;  elect- 
ed, 172;  on  panic  of  1857, 
177;  and  tariff,  184;  and 
retrenchment,  185;  and  Dred 
Scott  decision,  190,  206;  op- 
portunity in  Kansas  contro- 
versy, 210;  endorses  Le- 
compton  constitution,  217, 
219,  240;  and  Douglas,  219, 
223-227;  advises  admission 
of  Kansas  as  slave  state,  221; 
popular  condemnation,  233- 
235;  and  Mormons,  239;  and 
tropical  annexation,  253— 
255;  and  Walker,  255;  and 
Cuba,  258;  and  Mexico,  258; 


and  Paraguay,  259;  and  far 
east,  260;  and  slave-trade, 
260;  bibliography  of  admin- 
istration, 305,  306;  biog- 
raphy, 311. 

Buford,  Jefferson,  Kansas  ex- 
pedition, 144;  at  sack  of 
Lawrence,  156. 

Bulwer,  Sir  Henry,  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty,  89-91. 

Burlingame,  Anson,  on  assault 
on  Sumner,  159. 

Burns,  Anthony,  rendition,  284. 

Bushnell,  Horace,  as  writer, 
267. 

Butler,  A.  P.,  Sumner's  attack, 
157;  and  Brooks's  assault, 
157- 

CABINET,  Fillmore's  12; 
Pierce's,  38. 

Calderon  de  la  Barca,  Angel, 
and  Lopez's  expeditions,  82; 
Black  Warrior  affair,  86. 

Calhoun,  John,  Lecompton  con- 
stitution, 215,  216. 

Calhoun,  J.  C.,  political  guide 
of  south,  301. 

California,  slavery  controversy, 
3 ;  free  state,  8 ;  effect  of  gold 
output,  70;  election  of  1859, 
245;  Broderick-Terry  duel, 
246. 

Campbell,  J.  A.,  as  justice,  192. 

Campbell,  L.  D.,  and  Kansas- 
Nebraska  bill,  106. 

Canada  reciprocity  treaty,  80. 

Carey,  H.  C.,  as  economist,  267. 

Cass,  Lewis,  and  finality  of 
compromise,  2  2 ;  political 
character,  44;  and  tropical 
annexation,  254;  treaty  with 
Nicaragua,  256;  and  slave- 
trade,  260. 

Catron,  John,  as  justice,  192; 
Dred  Scott  decision,  201. 

Central  America,  importance  of 
isthmian  transit,  81;  British 
Mosquito  protectorate,  88 ; 


INDEX 


327 


treaties  with  Nicaragua,  88, 
256;  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty, 
89;  Greytown  incident,  90— 
92;  interpretation  of  treaty, 
90;  question  reopened,  91; 
in  abeyance,  92,  93;  Walker's 
filibustering,  251-253,  255; 
Dallas  -  Clarendon  draught 
treaty,  253,  256;  Buchanan's 
attitude,  253-255;  British 
agreements,  257;  bibliogra- 
phy, 316. 

Chase,  S.  P.,  joins  Democrats, 
25;  political  character,  48; 
protest  against  Kansas-Ne- 
braska bill,  98 ;  debate  of  bill, 
100 ;  and  Know-Nothingism, 
140;  governor,  142;  re-elec- 
tion, 209;  on  overtures  to 
Douglas,  228;  bibliography, 
310,  312. 

Chatfield,  Frederick,  and  Mos- 
quito protectorate,  88. 

Chicago  7>i6ww£onDouglas,  228. 

China,  commerical  treaty  (185  8), 
260;  bibliography  of  diplo- 
macy, 316. 

"Chivalry,"  use  at  south,  289. 

Choate,  Rufus,  political  char- 
acter, 45 ;  and  Know-Noth- 
ingism, 139. 

Christiana  fugitive  affair,  24. 

Cities,  growth  (1850-1860),! 88; 
rise  of  lake,  188;  conditions, 
276;  bibliography,  318. 

'Civil  service,  rise  of  partisan- 
ship, 53;  rotation  in  full 
development,  54. 

Clarendon,  Lord,  and  Central 
America,  91,  92,  253. 

Clay,  C.  C.,  as  debater,  52. 

Clay,  Henry,  and  finality  of 
compromise,  22;  death,  41. 

Clayton,  J.  M.,  political  charac- 
ter, 46;  and  Lopez's  expedi- 
tion, 82,  83;  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty,  89 ;  and  Know-Noth- 
ingism, 139. 

Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  89;  in- 

VOL.    XVIII. 22 


terpretation,   90;   abrogation 
proposed,  257. 

Cobb,  Howell,  Unionist  (1850), 
20,  21 ;  elected  governor,  26; 
as  debater,  52;  financial 
policy  after  panic,  182;  and 
tariff,  184;  and  retrench- 
ment, 185;  and  Lecompton 
constitution,  218. 

Collamer,  Jacob,  elected  sena- 
tor, 119;  on  Kansas,  151. 

Collins  line  of  steamships,  69; 
abandoned,  187. 

Commerce,  telegraph,  62;  ef- 
fect of  westward  railroad  ex- 
tension, 63;  development  of 
foreign  grain,  66;  cotton  ex- 
port, 68;  merchant  marine, 
69,  186,  187;  effect  of  Cali- 
fornia gold,  70;  exports  and 
imports,  71,  181;  tariff  act 
(1857),  73;  Canadian  reci- 
procity, 80;  first  cable,  186; 
federal  control  of  navigable 
waters,  193 ;  of  interstate  and 
foreign  trade,  195;  Southern 
Conventions,  294;  Chinese 
treaty  (1858),  260.  See  also 
Slave-trade. 

Compromise  of  1850,  8;  finality 
in  north,  10,  14-17,  24-26; 
in  south,  18-22,  26,  27;  in 
Congress,  22,  33. 

Congress,  Thirty-first:  compro- 
mise, 8;  finality  of  compro- 
mise, 22;  enforcement  of 
fugitive-slave  law,  23.  ^ 

Thirty  -  second :  unimpor- 
tant, 32,  38;  regulation  of 
steamships,  66. 

Thirty  -  third :  Kansas-Ne- 
braska bill,  94-107;  spirit- 
ualism, 271;  grant  for  care 
of  insane,  272. 

Thirty  -  fourth :  rivers  and 
harbors,  65 ;  tariff,  73 ;  speak- 
ership  contest,  145,  146; 
Kansas,  150-154,  166-169; 
assault  on  Sumner,  156-160. 


328 


PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY 


Thirty  -  -fifth :  Douglas-ad- 
ministration  controversy, 
223,  224,  242-244;  high  feel- 
ing, 224;  English  compromise, 
225;  Pacific  railroad,  240; 
homestead  bill  and  Cuba, 
241;  protection  of  slavery, 
242-245. 

Constitution,  federal,  control  of 
navigable  waters,  193;  viola- 
tion of  contract,  194;  inter- 
state commerce,  195. 

Constitutions,  state,  democratic 
tendencies,  263. 

Cooley  vs.  Port  Wardens,  195. 

Corruption,  rise  of  political,  55  ; 
federal  cases,  56,  57;  in  New 
York  City,  57. 

Corwin,  Thomas,  secretary  ^  of 
treasury,  13;  Gardiner  claim, 

56- 

Costa  Rica,  Nicaragua  boun- 
dary, 89.  See  also  Central 
America. 

Cotton,  prosperity,  67;  "king," 
68;  unaffected  by  panic,  179- 
181;  bibliography,  317. 

"  Cotton  Whigs  "  in  retirement, 
265. 

Covode  investigation,  56. 

Crampton,  Sir  J.  F.  T.,  recruit- 
ing controversy,  250;  dis- 
missed, 250. 

Crawford,  G.  W.,  Galphin  claim, 
56. 

Crimean  War,  recruiting  in 
America,  250. 

Crittenden,  J.  J.,  attorney-gen- 
eral, 1 3 ;  political  character, 
46;  and  British  interference 
in  Cuba,  84 ;  and  Lecompton 
constitution,  225. 

Cuba,  southern  desire  for,  12, 
80,  295;  Polk's  attempted 
purchase,  82;  Lopez's  expe- 
ditions, 82,  83;  trade  exac- 
tions, 84 ;  British  and  French 
interference,  84;  Marcy's  at- 
titude, 85;  Black  Warrior 


affair,  86 ;  Ostend  manifesto, 
87;  purchase  debate  (1858), 
241;    cessation   of  agitation, 
258;  bibliography,  316. 
Cumming,  Alfred,  Mormon  war, 

239- 
Curtis,  B.  R.,  as  justice,   192; 

dissent  in  Dred  Scott   case, 

202-204. 
Curtis,  G.  W.,  as  writer,  266; 

as  lecturer,  273. 

DALLAS,  G.  M.,  Central  Amer- 
ican diplomacy,  253. 

Dallas-Clarendon  treaty,  253; 
fails,  256. 

Daniel,  P.  V.,  as  justice,  192. 

Davis,  Jefferson,  state  election, 
(1851),  26;  secretary  of  war, 
38;  political  character,  51; 
and  Kansas  -  Nebraska  bill, 
97,  105;  and  Lecompton  con- 
stitution, 218;  on  Freeport 
doctrine,  244,  247;  on  aggres- 
sion of  north,  300. 

Dayton,  W.  L.,  vice-presiden- 
tial nomination,  164. 

De  Bow,  J.  D.  B.,  on  southern 
prosperity,  294;  on  north, 
302. 

De  Bow's  Review  on  southern 
wealth,  1 80. 

Debt,  federal,  reduction,  7  2 ; 
increase  after  panic,  183. 

Declaration  of  Paris,  American 
attitude,  251. 

Democracy,  ascendency,  263— 
265. 

Democratic  party,  defeat 
(1854),  117,  119;  looks  up 
(1855),  142;  split  on  Le- 
compton constitution,  220, 
222;  Douglas  and  adminis- 
tration (1858),  223-227;  ef- 
forts at  reuniting,  237;  pre- 
destined failure  of  efforts, 
244;  See  also  Elections,  Poli- 
tics, and  leaders  by  name. 

Denmark,  Sound  dues,  251. 


INDEX 


329 


Diplomatic  uniform,  Marcy's 
circular,  78. 

District  of  Columbia,  slave- 
trade  forbidden,  8. 

Dix,  Dorothea,  and  insane,  272, 
291. 

Dixon,  Archibald,  and  repeal  of 
Missouri  Compromise,  97. 

Dobbin,  J.  C.,  secretary  of 
navy,  38. 

Donelson,  A.  J.,  vice-presiden- 
tial nomination,  147. 

"Doughfaces,"  reason  for  pla- 
cating south,  10,  51;  honesty 
and  patriotism,  46. 

Douglas,  S.  A.,  and  fugitive- 
slave  law,  17;  candidacy 
(1852),  34;  political  charac- 
ter, 43,  50;  early  Nebraska 
bills,  95;  introduces  Kansas- 
Nebraska  bill,  95;  responsi- 
bility for  it,  96;  motive,  96; 
lack  of  foresight,  96 ;  accepts 
repeal  of  Missouri  Compro- 
mise, 97;  debate  of  bill,  99- 
103;  popular  abuse,  117;  on 
election  of  1854,  119;  up- 
holds pro-slavery  in  Kansas, 
151-153,166;  andassaulton 
Sumner,  157;  and  Dred  Scott 
decision,  Freeport  doctrine, 
206,  232,  243;  opposes  Le- 
compton  constitution,  218- 
221;  split  with  administra- 
tion, 219,  223-227;  Republi- 
can overtures,  227;  popular- 
ity in  Illinois,  229;  Lincoln 
debate,  230-233;  as  debater, 
230;  indifference  as  to  sla- 
very, 231 ;  enhanced  prestige, 
233 ;  futile  attempt  at  recon- 
ciliation, 238;  attack  by 
southern  senators,  242-244, 
246 ;  article  in  Harper's,  246 ; 
bibliography,  311,  312. 

Dred  Scott  decision,  essence, 
190;  facts  of  case,  197;  point 
before  supreme  court,  orig- 
inal decision,  198;  injection 


of  purpose  to  settle  territorial 
slavery  controversy,  198;  di- 
verse opinions,  Taney's,  199, 
200;  concurring,  201;  dis- 
senting, 202-204;  reception 
in  south,  204;  in  north,  204; 
Republicans  on,  205;  as  a 
plot,  206;  without  effect  on 
controversy,  208;  and  Free- 
port  doctrine,  232;  bibliog- 
raphy, 315. 
Duelling,  southern  code,  289. 

ECONOMIC  conditions,  prosperj- 
tv»  59'  74J  rise  of  business 
man,  273;  of  labor  organiza- 
tion, 273;  southern  uneasi- 
ness, 294;  bibliography,  317, 
319.  See  also  Agriculture, 
Commerce,  Finances,  Manu- 
factures, Railroads,  Tariff. 

Edmundson,  H.  A.,  and  assault 
on  Sumner,  157. 

Elections,  (1848)  slavery  issue, 
7;  (1850)  results  in  north, 
17;  in  south,  19;  (1851)  re- 
sults, 25,  26;  (1852)  party 
situation ,  32-34;  nomina- 
tions, platforms,  34-36;  cam- 
paign, 36;  Free-Soilers,  36; 
vote,  37;  (1854)  Kansas- 
Nebraska  act  as  issue,  109; 
impotence  of  Whigs,  109; 
development  of  anti-Nebras- 
ka party,  109-114;  rise  of 
Know-Nothingism,  1 1 4-1 1 7 ; 
attitude  of  Democrats,  117; 
results,  1 1 8,  119;  surprise, 
120;  (1855)  results,  142; 
(1856)  Know-Nothing  dis- 
ruption, 146 ;  its  nominations, 
147 ;  Democratic  convention, 
161  ;  an ti  -  slavery  Know- 
Nothing  convention,  162, 
169;  Republican  nomina- 
tions and  platform,  162-164; 
campaign ,  169;  secession 
threats,  170;  their  effect,  170; 
Buchanan's  Kansas  prom- 


330 


PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY 


ises,  171;  vote,  172;  (1857) 
Republican  decline,  209; 
(1858)  conditions,  228;  Doug- 
las-Lincoln campaign,  229- 
233;  administrative  defeat, 
233-235;  (l859)  California 
campaign,  245. 

Elgin,  Lord,  Canadian  reciproc- 
ity treaty,  80. 

Emerson,  R.  W.,  as  writer,  266 ; 
as  lecturer,  273. 

English  compromise,  225,  226. 

Erie  gauge  war,  6 1 . 

Everett,  Edward,  political  char- 
acter, 45 ;  and  Cuba,  84. 

Expenditures,  federal,  no  re- 
trenchment after  panic,  184. 

FiLLMORE,MiLLARD,andfinality 
of  compromise,  12,  22;  cabi- 
net, 1 2 ;  and  Shadrach  rescue, 
23;  candidacy  (1852),  35;  po- 
litical character,  45;  Know- 
Nothing  nominee,  147;  on 
Republican  sectionalism,! 71 ; 
bibliography  of  administra- 
tion, 305,  306. 

Finances,  banking  conditions, 
70,  71;  government,  72,  181, 
183-185;  bibliography,  307, 
318.  See  also  Panic. 

Fish,  Hamilton,  as  leader,  45. 

Fisheries,  Canadian  reciprocity 
treaty,  80. 

Floyd,  J.  B.,  defaulter,  57. 

Foote,  H.  S.,  Unionist  (1850), 
20,  26. 

Foreign  affairs,  spirit  of  mani- 
fest destiny,  75,  76;  Huelse- 
mann  incident,  76;  Kostza 
affair,  78;  diplomatic  dress, 
78;  Japan,  79,  260;  Declara- 
tion of  Paris,  251;  Sound 
dues,  251 ;  Mexico,  258;  Para- 
guay, 259;  China,  260;  search 
of  slavers,  260;  democratic 
attitude,  264;  bibliography, 
307,  308,  315.  See  also  Cen- 
tral America,  Cuba,  Territory. 


Forney,  J.  W.,  and  Buchanan's 
campaign,  171;  and  election 
of  1858,  229. 

France  and  Cuba,  84. 

Free  Love  movement,  269. 

Free  Soil  party,  campaign  of 
1848,  8;  and  finality  of  com- 
promise, 14;  decline,  17,  25; 
campaign  of  1852,  36. 

Free  thinkers,  270. 

Freeport  doctrine,  232,  243. 

Fremont,  J.  C.,  nomination, 
163;  vote,  172. 

Fugitive  slaves,  law  of  1850,  8, 
12,  15;  agitation  against  it, 
15;  counter-movement,  16; 
law  unpopular  at  north,  23; 
rescues,  23,  284;  Christiana 
case,  24;  law  acquiesced  in, 
24;  supreme  court  cases,  196, 
207 ;  northern  attacks  on  law, 
283;  Personal  Liberty  laws, 
284;  bibliography,  323. 

Fuller,  H.  M.,  speakership  con- 
test, 145. 

GADSDEN  purchase,  79. 

Galphin  claim,  56. 

Gardiner  claim,  56. 

Garrison,  W.  L.,  as  general  re- 
former, 270;  as  abolitionist, 
282,  283. 

Gavazzi,  Alessandro,  anti-Cath- 
olic agitator,  115. 

Geary,  J.  W.,  governor  of  Kan- 
sas, suppresses  civil  war,  166 ; 
resigns,  211. 

Gene  see  Chief  case,  193. 

Georgia,  convention  and  plat- 
form (1850),  21. 

Germans,  immigration,  188; 
character  of  immigrants,  274. 

Geyer,  H.  S.,  elected  senator, 
25. 

Giddings,  J.  R.,  as  anti-slavery 
leader,  22,  48. 

Gold,  effect  on  commerce  of 
California  output,  70 ;  export, 
70,  72- 


INDEX 


Gorsuch,  Edward,  killed,  24. 

Gough,  J.  B.,  as  temperance 
agitator,  29. 

Great  Britain,  and  Cuba,  81,  84 ; 
Crimean  War  recruiting,  250; 
slave-trade  search,  261.  See 
also  Central  America. 

Greeley,  Horace,  on  Kansas 
election  (1855),  127;  and 
Know-Nothingism,  140;  on 
hard  times,  179;  portection- 
ist,  183;  and  Douglas,  227; 
as  journalist,  277,  278. 

Greytown,  established  as  free 
city,  90;  trouble  with  Tran- 
sit Company,  90-92;  bom- 
barded, 92. 

Grier,  R.  C.,  as  justice,  192. 

Grimes,  J.  W.,  candidacy  for 
governor,  112. 

Guthrie,  James,  secretary  of 
treasury,  38,  73. 

Gwin,  W.  M.,  and  Broderick, 
245- 

HALE,  J.  P.,  candidacy  (1852), 

36;  as  anti-slavery  leader,  48. 
Hammond,  J.  H.,  on  cotton  and 

panic  of  1857,  180. 
Hanway,     Castner,     trial     for 

treason,  24. 
Harris,     Townsend,     Japanese 

treaties,  260. 
Hawaii,  attempted  annexation, 

79- 

Hawthorne,  Nathaniel,  as  novel- 
ist, 266. 

Helper,  H.  R.,  Impending  Crisis 
ineffectual,  288. 

Hildreth,  Richard,  as  historian, 
267. 

Hise,  Elijah,  draught  treaty,  88. 

History  writers,  267. 

Hollins,  G.  N.,  bombards  Grey- 
town,  92. 

Holmes,  O.  W.,  as  writer,  266; 
as  lecturer,  273. 

Homestead  law  debate  (1858), 
241. 


Honduras.  See  Central  Amer- 
ica. 

Houston,  Samuel,  political  char- 
acter, 46. 

Howard,  W.  A.,  Kansas  com- 
mittee, 154;  report,  168. 

Huelsemann  incident,  76. 

Hughes,  John,  and  public 
schools,  115. 

ILLINOIS,  Republican  party 
movement,  112;  Lincoln- 
Douglas  campaign,  228-233. 

Immigration,  amount  and  char- 
acter, 1 88;  social  influence, 
273;  avoids  south,  287. 

Indiana,  Republican  party 
movement,  in. 

Ingram,  D.  N.,  Koszta  affair, 
78. 

Insane,  amelioration  move- 
ment, 272. 

Intellectual  life.  See  Litera- 
ture. 

Internal  improvements, Pierce's 
veto,  65. 

Iowa,  Republican  party  move- 
ment, 112. 

Irish  immigration,  188;  char- 
acter of  immigrants,  274. 

Iron,  property  of  industry,  68; 
effect  of  panic,  178;  bibliog- 

Irving,  Washington,  as  histo- 
rian, 267. 

Isthmian  transit,  importance, 
81;  Clayton -Bulwer  treaty, 
89;  Democrats  on  (1856), 
253;  Nicaragua  treaty,  256. 
See  also  Central  America. 

Iverson,  Alfred,  as  debater,52; 
on  Pacific  railroad  and  seces- 
sion, 240. 

JAPAN,  Perry's  expedition,  79; 
American  treaties  (1858, 
1859),  260;  bibliography, 
316- 

Jerry  rescue,  24. 


332 


PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY 


Jones,  S.  J.,  "  Wakarusa  War," 
133;  shot,  155;  and  sack  of 
Lawrence,  156. 

Jones  vs.  Van  Zandt,  196. 

KANSAS,  designed  for  slavery, 
1 2 1 ;  pro-slavery  settlers, 
12 1 ;  New  England  Aid  So- 
ciety, 122;  northern  settlers, 
122;  Lawrence  founded,  123; 
southern  resentment  of  north- 
ern immigration,  124;  Reeder 
governor,  125;  first  election 
(1854),  Missourian  invasion, 
125 ;  pro-slavery  appeals,  126, 
143;  second  election  and  in- 
vasion (1855),  126,  127;  pro- 
slavery  legislation,  127;  pop- 
ular opinion  of  election,  127; 
Pierce  and  Reeder,  128;  legis- 
lature and  Reeder,  129;  slave 
code,  129;  public  interest, 
130,  143;  Free  State  To- 
peka  constitution,  131;  Shan- 
non governor,  132;  "Wak- 
arusa War,"  133;  Free  State 
organization,  political  result, 
134;  "Beecher  s  Bibles,"  143; 
Buford's  expedition,  144;  at- 
titude of  Republican  party, 
148;  Pierce  upholds  pro-sla- 
very party,  149 ;  his  message, 
150;  his  proclamation,  150; 
Douglas  upholds  pro-slavery, 
151;  enabling  act  introduced, 
152;  Free  State  memorial, 
153;  Wilson  on,  153;  House 
visitation  committee,  154; 
process  against  Free  State 
government,  155;  arrest  of 
its  leaders,  155;  sack  of 
Lawrence,  156  ;  Sumner's 
speech,  156;  assault  on  Sum- 
ner,  157-160;  excitement  as 
Republican  asset,  161,  168; 
platforms  on  (1856),  162, 
164;  civil  war,  164-166;  Free 
State  legislature  dispersed, 
165;  Geary  governor,  166; 


strife  suppressed,  166,  173; 
Toombs's  enabling  act,  166- 
168;  report  of  House  com- 
mittee, 1 68;  House  free-state 
bill,  169;  Buchanan's  prom- 
ises, 171,  21 1 ;  Buchanan's 
opportunity,  210;  Walker 
governor,  popular  vote  on 
constitution  promised,  211; 
pro-slavery  convention,  212; 
Free  State  men  abandon  sepa- 
rate government,  213;  south 
denounces  Walker,  213;  Free 
State  men  carry  territorial 
election,  214;  Lecompton 
constitution,  provision  for 
limited  vote,  215,  216;  north- 
ern indignation  at  this,  216; 
Walker  denounces  it,  216; 
Buchanan  endorses  it,  217, 
219,  221,  240;  Douglas  at- 
tacks it,  218-221;  votes  on 
it,  221;  Buchanan  advises 
pro-slavery  admission,  221; 
English  compromise,  225; 
constitution  rej  ected,  226; 
bibliography,  321. 

Kansas-Nebraska  bill,  prede- 
cessors, 95;  introduced,  with 
popular  sovereignty  clause, 
95,  103;  Douglas's  responsi- 
bility and  motive,  96;  ex- 
pressed repeal  of  Missouri 
Compromise,  97;  adminis- 
trative support,  97,  98;  pro- 
vision for  two  territories,  98 ; 
public  interest  aroused,  98; 
protest  of  Independent  Dem- 
ocrats, 98;  Senate  debate, 
99-103;  passes  Senate,  103; 
in  House,  103,  105-107;  pop- 
ular protest,  104;  southern 
attitude,  105,  121;  enacted, 
107;  fatefulness,  107;  result 
on  parties,  109,  116;  popular 
disapproval  at  polls,  119; 
when  popular  sovereignty 
became  operative,  123. 

Keitt,   L.   M.,   and  assault  on 


INDEX 


333 


Sumner,  157;  resigns,  re- 
elected,  158. 

Kelly,  Abby,  as  agitator,  269. 

Kentucky  vs.  Dennison,  207. 

King,  William,  candidacy 
(1852),  35. 

Know-Nothing  party,  nse  as 
secret  society,  114;  agitation 
against  Catholicism,  115,  274 ; 
profits  by  anti  -  Nebraska 
movement,  116,  117;  organi- 
zation, 116;  political  success, 
(1854),  118,  120;  as  succes- 
sor of  Whigs,  136,  141;  na- 
tional organization,  Union 
oath,  137;  success  (1855), 
138,  142;  and  slavery,  138; 
leaderless,  139-141;  concil- 
iates south,  141;  loses  secret 
character,  141;  and  speaker- 
ship  contest,  145,  146;  dis- 
ruption on  slavery  question, 
146;  presidential  nomina- 
tions, 147;  anti-slavery  fac- 
tion nominations,  162,  169; 
vote  (1856),  172;  moribund, 
234;  at  south  (1859),  246; 
bibliography,  314. 

Kossuth,  Louis,  visit,  30;  and 
government,  32. 

Kostza  affair,  78. 

LABOR,  demonstrations  after 
panic,  178;  rise  of  organiza- 
tion, 273. 

Lane,  James,  in  Kansas,  To- 
peka  convention,  131;  and 
Free  State  memorial,  153. 

Lawrence,  Amos,  and  settle- 
ment of  Kansas,  122. 

Lawrence,  Kansas,  founded, 
123;  "  Wakarusa  War,"  133; 
sacked,  156. 

Lecompte,  S.  D.,  charge  against 
Free  State  government,  155. 

Lecompton  constitution,  215; 
provision  for  popular  vote, 
215;  Walker  denounces,  216; 
Buchanan  endorses,  217,  219, 


221,  240;  Douglas  attacks, 
218-221;  votes  on,  221;  in 
Congress,  225;  English  com- 
promise, 225;  Kansas  re- 
jects, 226. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  vice-presi- 
dential candidacy  (1856), 
164;  on  Dred  Scott  decision 
as  a  plot,  206;  nominated 
for  senator,  228;  Douglas 
debate,  230-233;  as  debater, 
230;  house  -  divided  -  against  - 
itself  speech,  231;  anti-sla- 
very views,  232;  bibliog- 
raphy, 312. 

Lind,  Jenny,  in  America,  278. 

Literature  of  period,  in  north, 
265-267;  lyceum  system, 
272;  southern  inactivity, 
292. 

Longfellow,  H.  W.,  as  poet, 
266. 

Lopez,  Narcisso,  filibustering 
expeditions,  82-84. 

Lowell,  J.  R.,  as  writer,  266; 
as  lecturer,  273. 

Lyceum  system,  272. 

MCCLELLAN,  ROBERT,  and  Kan- 
sas-Nebraska bill,  105. 

Mace,  Daniel,  and  Kansas-Ne- 
braska bill,  1 06. 

McLean,  John,  as  justice,  192; 
Dred  Scott  decision,  202. 

Maine,  prohibition,  30;  Re- 
publican party  movement, 
114. 

Malmesbury,  Earl  of,  and  search 
of  slavers,  261. 

Manifest  destiny,  spirit,  75; 
and  slavery,  76. 

Mann,  D.  A.,  and  Hungary,  76. 

Manufactures,  stimulation,  59; 
prosperity,  68;  effect  of 
panic,  176;  rise  of  protection, 
183,229,234;  southern  lack, 
286;  bibliography,  317. 

Marcy,  W.  L.,  secretary  of 
state,  38;  political  character, 


334 


PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY 


44 ;  and  civil  service,  5  5 ;  and 
manifest  destiny  and  slavery, 
76;  Kostza  affair,  78;  and 
diplomatic  dress,  78;  and 
Hawaii,  79;  and  Cuban  an- 
nexation, 85;  and  Ostend 
manifesto,  87;  and  Central 
America,  91;  and  Kansas- 
Nebraska  bill,  105;  and 
Crimean  War  recruiting,  250; 
and  neutral  trade,  250;  and 
Declaration  of  Paris,  251; 
and  Sound  dues,  251. 

Mason,  J.  M.,  threatens  seces- 
sion, 170. 

Mason,  J.  Y.,  diplomatic  dress, 
78;  Ostend  manifesto,  87. 

Massachusetts,  election  of  1850, 
18;  Know-Nothing  success, 
118. 

Means,  J.  H.,  secessionist  (1850), 

Medill,  Joseph,  as  journalist, 
277. 

Mexico,  Buchanan's  attempted 
intervention,  258. 

Michigan,  Republican  party 
movement,  in. 

Millerism,  271. 

Minnesota  admitted,  237. 

Missouri  Compromise,  question 
of  extending  to  Pacific,  4,5; 
repealed,  97;  declared  un- 
constitutional, 200-203. 

Money,  gold  standard,  72. 

Mormons,  control  in  Utah,  238; 
war,  239. 

Mosquito  protectorate  negotia- 
tions, 88-92,  253,  257. 

Motley,  J.  L.,  as  historian,  267. 

NAPIER,  Lord,  Central  Ameri- 
can diplomacy,  257. 

Nashville  convention  (1850),  9, 
20. 

Nationalism,  character  of  south- 
ern, 2 1 ;  of  leaders  before 
1852,  40-43;  of  their  surviv- 
ors, 43  -  47 ;  of  anti  -  slavery 


leaders,  47.  See  also  Seces- 
sion. 

Nativism.  See  Know-Nothing 
party. 

Nebraska.  See  Kansas- Nebras- 
ka bill. 

Nelson,  Samuel,  as  justice,  192; 
Dred  Scott  decision,  201. 

Neutrality,  Marcy's  efforts, 250; 
Declaration  of  Paris,  251. 

New  England  Emigrant  Aid 
Society,  122;  misunderstood 
by  southerners,  124;  Pierce 
condemns,  150;  Douglas  at- 
tacks, 151,  152;  Wilson  de- 
fends, 153. 

New  Mexico,  slavery  question, 
3,  236;  territory  organized, 
8. 

New  Orleans,  anti-Spanish  riot, 

83- 

New  York,  Whigs  and  Repub- 
lican movement  (1854),  113. 

New  York  City,  corruption,  57. 

New  York  Herald,  influence, 
277. 

New  York  Tribune,  influence, 
278. 

Newport  as  resort,  276. 

Newspapers,  conditions,  276- 
278;  bibliography,  308. 

Nicaragua,  draught  treaties 
with,  89;  Costa  Rica  boun- 
dary, 89;  Walker  in,  251-253, 
256;  Marcy's  treaty,  256.  See 
also  Central  America. 

North,  and  fugitive-slave  law, 
15,  23,  283;  and  Kansas- 
Nebraska  bill,  104;  perma- 
nent preponderance,  237;  so- 
cial currents,  263;  rule  of 
democracy,  263-265;  litera- 
ture, 265-267;  radical  agita- 
tion, 268-272;  philanthropy, 
272;  lyceums,  272;  social 
effect  of  new  industrialism, 
273-275;  of  immigration , 
273;  amusements  of  society, 
275;  condition  of  cities,  276; 


INDEX 


335 


newspapers,  276-278;  ex- 
citability, 278;  change  in 
feeling  towards  south,  279- 
285;  southern  opinion  on, 
291,  293,  300-303. 

OBERLIN  -  WELLINGTON  rescue, 
284. 

Ohio,  Republican  party  move- 
ment, in. 

Oliver,  Mordecai,  Kansas  com- 
mittee, 154;  report,  168. 

Olmsted,  F.  L.,  slavery  investi- 
gations, 299. 

Oregon  admitted,  237. 

Orr,  J.  L.,  on  southern  lack  of 
manufactures,  286. 

Ouseley,  Sir  William,  Central 
American  diplomacy,  257. 

PACIFIC  railroad,  scheme  and 
rivalry,  65,  240. 

Palfrey,  J.  G.,  as  historian,  267. 

Panic  of  1857,  causes,  174,  175; 
decline  in  railroad  snares, 
175;  crash,  1 75;  suspension, 
175,  176;  industrial  decline, 
176;  effect  on  agriculture, 
177;  resumption,  177;  hard 
times,  178,  179;  demonstra- 
tions of  unemployed,  178; 
south  not  affected,  179-181; 
effect  on  foreign  trade,  181; 
public  deficit,  181,  184;  gov- 
ernment measures  of  relief, 
182;  treasury  notes,  183; 
increase  in  federal  debt,  183; 
government  solvency  not  af- 
fected, 183,  no  retrenchment, 
185;  recovery,  185;  bibliog- 
raphy, 318. 

Paper  money,  treasury  notes  of 
1857.  183. 

Paraguay,   expedition  against, 

259- 
Parker,  Theodore,  as  religious 

radical,  270. 
Parkman,  Francis,  as  historian, 

267. 


Passenger  cases;  ,195. 
.,  W{ 

sode,  255. 


Paulding,    Hiram,  Walker  epi- 


Pennsylvania,  election  of  1856, 
172;  of  1858,  229,  234. 

Periodicals  of  period  1850- 
1860,  308. 

Perry,  M.  C.,  Japan  expedition, 

79- 

Personal  Liberty  laws,  284. 

Pierce,  Franklin,  and  placation 
of  south,  ii ;  nomination,  34; 
campaign,  36;  election,  37; 
cabinet,  38;  and  office-seek- 
ers, 54;  internal  improve- 
ments vetoes,  65;  promises 
calm  on  slavery  question,  94; 
and  Kansas-Nebraska  bill, 
97,  98;  political  character, 
97,  107;  and  Reeder,  128, 
130;  upholds  Kansas  pro- 
slavery,  149;  Kansas  mes- 
sage, 150;  proclamation,  150; 
and  Dred  Scott  decision,  206 ; 
and  Crampton,  250;  aid-for- 
insane  veto,  272;  bibliog- 
raphy of  administration,  305, 
306. 

Pike,  J.  S.,  as  journalist,  277. 

Political  economy,  writers,  267. 

Politics,  party  regularity  and 
sectionalism,  5 ;  principles,  6 ; 
parties  and  slavery,  7 ;  prob- 
lem (1850-1860),  10;  placat- 
ing south,  10-12,  50;  danger 
from  Cuban  question,  12; 
lack  of  national  issue  (1851), 
29;  change  in  leaders,  40; 
nationalism  of  old  leaders, 
40;  their  retirement,  41-43; 
surviving  Unionists,  43-46 ; 
their  honesty  and  patriotism, 
46;  anti-slavery  leaders  as 
Unionists,  47 ;  anti-slavery 
leaders,  48-50 ;  southern- 
rights  leaders,  50-53;  and 
civil  service,  53-55;  corrup- 
tion, 55-57;  become  a  busi- 
ness, 57;  results  of  Kansas- 


336 


PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY 


Nebraska  biK,  109;  no  leader 
for    the    opportunity,     no 
rule  of  democracy,  263-265 
character  of  southern,    288 
bibliography,    307,    314;     of 
southern,  319.    See  also  Elec- 
tions, and  parties  and  leaders 
by  name. 

Polk,  J.  K.,  and  Cuba,  82. 

Pollard,  E.  A.,  on  reopening 
slave-trade,  296. 

Poor  whites,  submission  to 
slave-holders,  288. 

Popular  sovereignty,  in  com- 
promise of  1850,  8;  in  Kan- 
sas-Nebraska bill,  95;  when 
to  operate,  123;  Douglas's 
views,  218,  224,  232. 

Population,  amount  and  distri- 
bution (1860),  187;  growth 
of  urban,  188;  foreign,  188. 

Post-office,  reduction  in  post- 
age, 63. 

Prescott,  W.  H.,  as  historian, 
267. 

Prices,  and  California  gold,  70; 
effect  of  panic,  178;  slaves 
(1857),  180. 

Prigg  vs.  Pennsylvania,  196. 

Privateering,  question  of  aboli- 
tion, 251. 

Public  lands,  railroad  grants, 
64;  homestead  bill  (1858), 
241. 

Pugh,  G.  E.,  and  administra- 
tion, 223. 

QUITMAN,  J.  A.,  secessionist 
(1850),  19,  26,  52;  on  annexa- 
tion of  Cuba,  295. 

RADICALISM.  See  Social  condi- 
tions. 

Railroads,  extension  over  Ap- 
palachians, 59-61;  develop- 
ment by  sections,  6,  185; 
condition,  61;  popular  and 
government  interest,  61;  ri- 
valry, "Erie  War,"  61 ;  effect 


on  west,  62;  effect  on  eco- 
nomic balance,  63,  66 ;  federal 
land  grants,  64 ;  state  aid,  64 ; 
scheme  for  Pacific,  65,  240; 
accidents,  65;  and  grain  ex- 
port, 66 ;  and  cotton  produc- 
tion, 67;  over-construction, 
174;  decline  of  stock,  175; 
bankruptcy,  175;  recovery, 
185;  strikes,  273;  beginning 
of  street,  276;  bibliography, 

3I7- 
Raymond,  H.  J.,  as  journalist, 

Reed,W.  B.,  Chinese  treaty,  260. 

Reeder,  A.  H.,  governor  of 
Kansas,  unfitness,  125;  and 
Missouri  invasion,  125;  and 
second  election,  127;  be- 
comes obnoxious  to  pro-sla- 
very, 128;  and  Pierce,  128; 
and  legislature,  129 ;  removed, 
130;  Free  State  delegate,  132, 
154;  flees,  155. 

Referendum  in  state  constitu- 
tions, 264. 

Religion,  radicalism,  269;  free 
thinkers,  270;  spiritualism, 
271;  last  great  revival,  278. 

Republican  party,  movement 
in  northwest  (1854),  no; 
platform  there,  in;  failure 
in  east,  112;  loses  ground 
(1855),  136,  142;  first  nation- 
al convention,  147;  Kansas 
question  as  asset  (1856),  148, 
161,  1 68;  nominees  and  plat- 
form, 162-164;  vote,  172 ;  and 
Dred  Scott  decision,  205 ;  re- 
action against  (1857),  209; 
and  Douglas,  227;  success 
(1858),  2  34;  issue  determined, 
247;  Seward  as  leader,  247; 
bibliography,  315.  See  also 
Elections,  Politics. 

Revenue,  surplus,  72;  deficit 
after  panic,  181,  184. 

Rhett,  Barnwell,  secessionist, 
52- 


INDEX 


337 


Richardson,  W.  A.,  and  Kansas- 
Nebraska  bill,  103,  105; 
speak ership  contest,  145. 

Richmond  Enquirer  on  northern 
ferment,  291. 

Rivas,  Patrick),  and  Walker, 
252. 

Robinson,  Charles,  in  Kansas, 
Topeka  constitution,  131;  ar- 
rested, 155;  bibliography, 
322. 

Roman  Catholic  church,  move- 
ment against,  115. 

SAN  JUAN  Island  controversy, 
261. 

Saratoga  as  resort,  276. 

Saunders,  R.  M.,  and  bid  for 
Cuba,  82. 

Scott,  Winfield,  nomination 
(1852),  35;  campaign,  36,  37; 
defeat,  37. 

Search,  right  of,  and  slave- 
trade,  261. 

Secession,  threats  and  territo- 
rial slavery,  5,  9;  southern 
campaigns  (1850),  19-22; 
(1851),  26;  threats  (1856), 
170;  as  southern  remedy, 
301. 

Sectionalism,  influence  of  party 
regularity,  5.  See  also  Na- 
tionalism, Secession. 

Seward,  W.  H.,  political  char- 
acter, 49;  and  Republican 
party  movement  (1854),  113; 
and  Know-Nothingism,  140; 
and  Kansas  enabling  act, 
167;  on  Dred  Scott  decision, 
205;  "  irrepressible  conflict , ' ' 
234;  as  Republican  leader, 
247;  bibliography,  310,  312. 

Shadrach  rescue,  23. 

Shannon,  Wilson,  governor  of 
Kansas,  132  ;  and  "  Wakarusa 
War,"  133;  and  civil  war, 
165;  replaced,  166. 

Sharon  Springs  as  resort,  276. 

Sharps  rifles  in  Kansas,  133, 143. 


Sherman,  John,  Kansas  com- 
mittee, 154;  report,  168. 

Shields,  James,  and  spiritual- 
ism, 271. 

Shipping,  maximum,  69;  de- 
cline, 1 86;  bibliography,  318. 

Simms,  W.  G.,  as  writer,  292. 

Simonton,  J.  W.,  as  journalist, 
277. 

Sims,  fugitive  case,  25. 

Slavery,  controversy  over  Cali- 
fornia, 3-5 ;  attitude  of  politi- 
cal parties,  7;  compromise 
of  1850,  8;  territorial  regula- 
tion completed,  9 ;  finality  of 
compromise,  10,  14-27;  sup- 
pression of  issue,  10-12,  14, 
28;  possible  sources  of  fric- 
tion, 12;  instability  of  calm, 
39,  94;  northern  antagonism 
to  increased  territory,  76, 
249;  280;  and  Know-Noth- 
ingism, 138,  146;  prices  of 
slaves  (1857),  180;  Douglas's 
indifference,  231;  Lincoln's 
attitude  (1858),  231,  232; 
Seward's  attitude,  234;  act- 
ual territorial  status  (1858), 
236 ;  demand  for  federal  pro- 
tection, 243-245;  popular 
attitude  at  north,  279-281; 
influence  of  Uncle  Tom's 
Cabin,  281;  of  abolitionists, 
282;  as  positive  good,  297- 
299 ;  condition  of  slaves, 
299;  bibliography  of  condi- 
tions, 319;  of  northern  atti- 
tude, 323-  See  also  Dred 
Scott,  Fugitive  slaves,  Kan- 
sas, Kansas-Nebraska,  Re- 
publican, Slave-trade. 

Slave-trade,  domestic,  forbid- 
den in  District  of  Columbia, 
8;  foreign,  smuggling,  261, 
297;  British  search  contro- 
versy, 261;  agitation  for  re- 
opening, 295-297;  bibliog- 
raphy, 320. 

Social  conditions,  political  cor- 


338 


PARTIES  AND   SLAVERY 


ruption,  55-57 ;  northern  cur- 
rents, 263 ;  northern  intellect- 
ual life,  265-267;  radicalism, 
268;  women's  rights,  268; 
religious  radicalism,  269;  so- 
cial conventions,  270;  union 
of  radicals,  270;  spiritualism, 
271;  care  of  insane,  272;  in- 
fluence of  new  industrialism, 
273-275;  of  immigration, 
273;  nse  of  idle  rich,  275; 
lack  of  rational  amusements, 
275;  life  at  resorts,  275; 
condition  of  cities,  2  76 ;  news- 
papers, 2  7  6-2  7  8 ;  excitability, 
278;  economic  basis  of  south- 
ern, 286 ;  southern  scale,  287 ; 
leadership  there,  288;  south- 
ern gentleman,  289;  his  code 
of  honor,  289;  his  home  life, 
290;  south  unaffected  by 
northern  ferment,  290 ;  south- 
ern intellectual  life,  292 ;  bib- 
liography, 319,  320,  322-324. 
See  also  Slavery. 

Socialism  in  period  1850-1860, 
268. 

Soule",  Pierre,  minister  to  Spain, 
instructions,  85 ;  Black  War- 
rior affair,  86 ;  Ostend  mani- 
festo, 87;  resigns,  88. 

Sound  dues,  Denmark  aban- 
dons, 251. 

Sources  on  period  1850-1860, 
collections,  307;  public  doc- 
uments, 307;  periodicals, 
308;  newspapers,  309;  writ- 
ings, 309;  autobiographies 
and  reminiscences,  310;  on 
slavery,  319;  on  southern 
society,  320;  on  Kansas,  321 ; 
travels,  322. 

South,  political  placation,  10- 
12,  50;  and  finality  of  com- 
promise, 1 8-2  2 ;  Union  vic- 
tories (1850,  1851),  20-22, 
26;  railroads,  60,  185;  pros- 
perity, 67;  and  Kansas-Ne- 
braska bill,  105;  and  Kan- 


sas, 124,  126,  143;  northern 
preponderance  over,  237; 
changed  attitude  of  north 
towards,  279-285;  economic 
basis  of  society,  286;  lack  of 
manufactures,  286;  social 
scale,  287;  control  by  upper 
class,  288;  ideals  of  gentle- 
men, 289,  290;  unaffected  by 
northern  ferment,  290;  liter- 
ary inactivity,  292;  national 
consciousness,  293;  sectional 
patriotism,  293;  economic 
uneasiness,  294;  commercial 
conventions,  294;  and  trop- 
ical expansion,  295;  and  re- 
opening of  slave-trade,  295- 
297;  feeling  towards  north, 
300-303;  bibliography,  319. 
See  also  Secession,  Slavery. 

Southern  Commercial  Conven- 
tions, 294;  attempt  to  give 
them  political  power,  295; 
and  slave-trade,  297. 

Southern  Literary  Messenger, 
292,  308. 

Southern  Rights  associations 
(1850),  19. 

Spain.     See  Cuba. 

Speaker  of  House  of  Represent- 
atives, election  contest  (1855), 
145,  146. 

Spiritualism,  rise,  271;  asks 
federal  aid,  271. 

Squier,  E.  G.,,  draught  treaty, 
89. 

Stan  ton,  F.  P.,  and  Lecompton 
constitution,  212,  221;  re- 
moved, 221. 

State  rights,  prestige,  264. 

States,  constitutional  tenden- 
cies, 263;  bibliography,  320. 

Steamships,  and  railroad  com- 
petition, 63;  accidents,  65; 
regulation,  66;  ocean  liners, 
69,  187. 

Stephens,  A.  H.,  Unionist 
(1850),  20,  21 ;  bolts  (1852), 
36;  as  debater,  52;  and 


INDEX 


339 


Kansas-Nebraska  bill,    105- 
107;  and  Know-Nothingism, 

Z39- 

Stone,  Lucy,  as  agitator,  269. 

Stowe,  Harriet  B.,  as  writer, 
266;  Uncle  Tom's  Cabin,  281. 

Stringfellow,  B.  F.,  and  Kansas, 
126. 

Stuart,  C.  E.,  and  administra- 
tion, 223. 

Suffrage,  woman,  268. 

Sumner,  Charles,  elected  sena- 
tor, 18;  political  character, 
49 ;  on  Kansas- Nebraska  bill, 
101;  and  Know-Nothingism, 
140;  Kansas  philippic,  156; 
Brooks's  assault,  157-160; 
accused  of  malingering,  158. 

Sumner,  E.  V.,  and  Kansas  civil 
war,  165. 

Supreme  court,  policy  under 
Democratic  control,  191; 
character  of  cases,  191;  in- 
consistent constitutional  con- 
struction, state-rights  ten- 
dency, 192  —  195  ;  Genesee 
Chief  and  Wheeling  Bridge 
cases,  control'  of  navigable 
waters,  193;  violation  of  con- 
tract cases,  194;  Passenger 
cases  and  Cooley  vs.  Port 
Wardens,  control  of  com- 
merce, 195;  public  esteem, 
195;  Prigg  vs.  Pennsylvania, 
Jones  vs.  Van  Zandt,  fugitive 
slaves,  196;  Ableman  vs. 
Booth,  fugitive-slave  law, 
207 ;  Kentucky  vs.  Dennison, 
extradition  for  aiding  fugi- 
tives, 207;  bibliography,  315. 
See  also  Dred  Scott. 

Syracuse,  Jerry  rescue,  24. 

TANEY,  R.  B.,  constitutional 
attitude,  192;  Dred  Scott  de- 
cision, 199,  200,  206;  fugitive- 
slave  decisions,  207. 

Tariff,  act  of  1857,  73;  revival 
of  protection  agitation,  183, 


229,  234;  Morrill  tariff,  184; 
bibliography,  318. 

Taylor,  Bayard,  as  writer,  266. 

Telegraph,  development,  62; 
first  cable,  186. 

Temperance  question,  29 ;  Maine 
law,  30;  bibliography,  323. 

Territories,  slavery  regulation 
completed,  9;  actual  slavery 
status  (1858),  236;  demand 
for  protection  of  slavery  in, 
243-245.  See  also  Dred  Scott, 
Kansas,  Kansas-Nebraska. 

Territory,  northern  antagonism 
to  more  slavery,  76,  249,  280; 
attempted  annexation  of  Ha- 
waii, 79;  Gadsden  purchase, 
79;  Democrats  and  tropical 
(1856),  253;  Buchanan's  at- 
titude, 254;  southern  desire 
for  tropical,  295.  See  also 
Central  America,  Cuba. 

Terry,  D.  SM  Broderick  duel, 
246. 

Texas,  boundary  agreement,  8, 

21. 

Thayer,  Eli,  and  settlement  of 
Kansas,  122. 

Thompson,  Jacob,  and  Lecomp- 
ton  constitution,  217,  218. 

Thoreau,  H.  D.,  as  writer,  266. 

Tigre  Island  incident,  88. 

T  o  o  m  b  s ,  Robert,  Unionist 
(1850),  20,  21 ;  bolts  (1852), 
36;  political  character,  51; 
and  Know-Nothingism,  139; 
and  assault  on  Sumner,  157; 
Kansas  enabling  act,  1 66;  on 
homestead  bill  and  Cuba, 
241 ;  Bunker  Hill  boast,  280. 

Topeka  constitution,  131. 

Toucey,  Isaac,  and  search  of 
slavers,  261. 

Travel,  bibliography,  322. 

Treaties,  Canadian  reciprocity 
(1854),  80;  Clayton-Bulwer 
(1850),  89;  Dallas-Clarendon 
draught  (1856),  253, 256;  Nic- 
aragua (1856),  256;  Chinese 


340 


PARTIES   AND   SLAVERY 


and  Japanese    (1858,    1859), 
260. 

Trumbull,  Lyman,  as  anti-sla- 
very leader,  50 ;  elected  sena- 
tor, 119. 

Uncle  Tom's  Cabin,  influence, 
281. 

Underground  Railroad  activi- 
ty, 284. 

Utah,  territorial  organization, 
8;  Mormon  war,  238. 

VANDERBILT,  CORNELIUS,  and 
Walker,  252. 

Vetoes,  Pierce's  internal  im- 
provement, 65;  Pierce's  aid 
for  insane,  272. 

WADE,  B.  F.,  elected  senator, 
18;  political  character,  49; 
on  Kansas-Nebraska  bill,  i  o  i ; 
on  homestead  bill  and  Cuba, 
241. 

"Wakarusa  War,"  133. 

Walker,  R.  J.,  governor  of 
Kansas,  promises  popular 
vote  on  constitution,  211; 
and  Free  State  men,  213,214; 
hopes  for  Democratic  state, 
213;  southerners  denounce, 
213;  denounces  Lecompton 
constitution,  216;  resigns, 
218. 

Walker,  William,  in  Nicaragua, 
251-253;  second  expedition, 
and  Paulding,  255;  third  ex- 
pedition, killed,  256;  bibliog- 
raphy, 316. 

Washburne,  E.  B.,  and  Kansas- 
Nebraska  bill,  1 06. 

Wayland,  Francis,  as  writer, 
267,  292. 

Wayne,  J.  M.,  as  justice,  192; 
and  Dred  Scott  decision, 
198. 

Webster,  Daniel,  and  placa- 
tion  of  south,  n;  secretary 


of  state,  13;  and  finality  of 
compromise,  17,24;  and  Kos- 
suth,  32;  candidacy  (1852), 
35,41;  death,  42 ;  Huelsemann 
letter,  77;  and  Lopez's  expe- 
ditions, 82-84;  and  Central 
America,  89. 

Weed,  Thurlow,  and  Republi- 
can party  movement  (1854), 

ri3' 

West,  railroad  connection  with 
east,  59-61;  effect  on  trade 
current,  66 ;  grain  exports, 
66;  after  panic,  179. 

Wheeling  Bridge  case,  193. 

Whig  party,  loses  southern  sup- 
port, 36;  effect  on,  of  elec- 
tion (1852),  37;  loses  leaders, 
45 ;  and  Kansas-Nebraska 
bill,  109;  and  Republican 
movement,  113;  Know-Noth- 
ingism  as  successor,  136-139, 
246;  collapse  of  conserva- 
tism, 265.  See  also  Elections, 
Politics. 

Whitfield,  J.  W.,  Kansas  terri- 
torial delegate,  125,  154. 

Whitman,  Walt,  and  democ- 
racy, 266. 

Whittier,  J.  G.,  as  poet,  266. 

Wilmot  Proviso,  5. 

Wilson,  Henry,  as  anti-slavery 
leader,  50 ;  as  Know-Nothing 
leader,  140;  on  Kansas,  153; 
and  Douglas,  227. 

Winthrop,  R.  C.,  and  Know- 
Nothingism,  139;  political 
attitude,  265. 

Wisconsin,  Republican  party 
movement,  1 1 1 ;  and  fugitive 
slaves,  207. 

Wise,  H.  A.,  canvass  (1855), 
138;  on  assault  on  Sumner, 
158 ;  threatens  secession 
(1856),  170. 

Wise,  Jennings,  as  duellist, 
289. 

Women's  rights  movement,  268; 
bibliography,  323. 


INDEX 


Wood,  Fernando,  corrupt  boss, 

Wool,  tariff  of  1857,  73. 
Woolsey,  T.  D.,  as  writer,  267. 


YANCEY,  W.  L.,  as  secessionist, 

19,  26,  52. 
Young,   Brigham,  governor    of 

Utah,  239. 


END     OF     VOL.    XVIII. 


THE  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA,  SANTA  CRUZ 


This  book  is  due  on  the  last  DATE  stamped  below. 


NOV  2  9  1967 
DEC  131887 


FEB281373 


FEBU'81 

°  1981 


100m-8,'65(F6282s8)2373 


E415.7.S63 


3  2106  00060  09 


